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ABSTRACT 
 
Manufacturing is a vital and significant element of the British economy. The sector 
has made a transition towards the production of higher value-added products and 
services to remain competitive in increasingly international markets. A highly skilled 
and competitive supply base is central to the viability of the sector as tasks once 
undertaken by end-manufacturers are increasingly being absorbed into the portfolio 
of functions undertaken by the supplier. This thesis examines how one supply 
industry, intermediate metal processing (IMP), is adjusting to international 
competition in the context of increasingly complex dependencies in the supply chain. 
An intensive study of IMP manufacturers in the West Midlands (UK) was undertaken 
through qualitative interviews and desk based research to understand the current 
challenges and opportunities the industry faced. The analysis is focused on the 
transition to higher value manufacturing and the complexity of buyer-supplier 
relationships. This is developed through a case study analysis of the industry’s 
adjustment to rising industrial energy costs and a detailed examination of customer 
agreement structures in shaping transactional governance structures. 
The research makes a contribution to current conceptions of the spatial organisation 
of production and the nature of production relationships. Mature industries, such as 
metal component manufacture, are successfully undertaking complex and varied 
forms of adaptation to remain competitive. Despite transitions to value-added 
products, costs continue to be an important element to both competitiveness and 
viability. Production relationships, and specifically the nature of the inter-firm 
agreement, are a significant aspect of adjustment and the capacity to capture value 
through governance mechanisms. Contracts are a relatively under represented factor 
of inter-firm relationships but are found to be central to the adaptability of firms, the 
attainment of value and stability of the business.   
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Glossary 
 
Alloy – Mixture of two or more metal elements to generate specific properties. 
Casting – The formation of metal shapes through the pouring of liquid metal.  
Production sites are termed ‘foundries’. 
Component – A part of a larger product manufactured separately. 
Contract manufacturer – A supplier firm that undertakes a specific set of related 
activities for its customer. Also termed first-tier supplier (automotive industry) and full 
package supplier (apparel industry). 
End manufacturer – The final assembly manufacturer who sells direct to the end 
customer. OEMs are a common term to reflect end manufacturers in automotive, 
aerospace and power generation industries that purchase products sold under their 
brand name. 
Ferrous metals – Iron based metals including steel (ferrous alloy). 
Forging – The transformation of metal through applied pressure (‘metal bashing’). 
Further manufacturer – An intermediate manufacturer who purchases from a 
manufacturer and sell to a manufacture. 
Jobbing – A low volume (typically ‘one off’s’) manufacturer serving an extensive 
range of markets. Common in the casting industry. 
Surcharge – A supplementary payment that reflects change in prices from a pre-
agreed ‘base price’. Surcharges are commonly used between manufacturers in 
conjunction with commodity purchases, such as metal. 
Tooling – Equipment used to manufacture components. Tooling is equipment 
adapted to specific products and commonly customised to each customer in the IMP 
industry. 
Trade credit – A common credit system in the manufacturing system whereby 
products are exchanged between firms prior to payment ‘on credit’. Payment is 
usually made within 30-90 days of invoicing. 
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Abbreviations 
 
CCL  Climate Change Levy 
CID  Confidential Invoice Discounting 
EII  Energy Intensive Industry 
GDP    Gross Domestic Product  
GVA  Gross Value Added 
IMP  Intermediate Metal Processing 
IPR  Intellectual Property Rights 
LTA  Long Term Agreement 
OEM  Original Equipment Manufacturer 
SIC  Standard Industrial Classification 
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1 FORGES, FOUNDRIES AND CAPITALISM: 
ADAPTATION AND THE INTERMEDIATE METAL 
PROCESSING INDUSTRIES 
 
As we pick our economy out of the ashes of the financial crisis, we need to 
ask ourselves: what do we want the new economy to look like? How can we 
make it better, greener, stronger? What are our true strengths? Manufacturing 
is absolutely central to the answer (Nick Clegg, Deputy Prime Minister cited in 
ESPRC, 2011). 
 
Over the past few decades British manufacturing has been considered a ‘thing of the 
past’, a previous success story that has little significance for a country with a post-
industrial economy. Manufacturing employment declined by just under four million 
between 1978 to 2008 (PWC, 2009) and its contribution to gross domestic product 
(GDP) fell to 11% by 2009 (BIS, 2010a). This has been a relative rather than 
absolute decline, reflecting the changing composition of the sector, its position in the 
increasingly internationalised economy and the nature of its business rather than 
reduced significance. In 2009 the sector employed 8% of the United Kingdom’s (UK) 
workforce (BIS, 2010b), contributed £140billion in gross value added (GVA) (BIS, 
2010a) and 50% of total exports (Benedettini et al., 2010). Most interestingly, the 
sector is the largest exporter of high-technology products (BERR and IUS, 2008), 
contributes the largest proportion of investment in innovation and research and 
development (R&D) (75%) (BIS, 2009a) and since 1980 the overall value of its 
products have risen by a third in real terms (BIS, 2010a). Manufacturing is 
undergoing a transition but it remains a critical component of the UK economy.  
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The growth of the manufacturing sector is a current strategic focus of government 
policy which emphasises the re-balancing of the service dominated British economy 
following the economic crash of 2008 (HMT and BIS, 2011). In an endeavour to 
‘make things again’, the strategy focuses on developing existing competitive 
strengths and industries where the UK has a global comparative advantage, as well 
as developing future markets, and specifically low-carbon technologies. The focus is 
on advanced manufacturing where value1 can be attained through product and 
business model innovations (GHK et al., 2009). Fundamental to this strategy is the 
growth of UK exports (HMT and BIS, 2011). Export levels have reduced significantly 
over the past decade, particularly in finished manufactured goods where foreign 
investment in assembly plants in the UK has reduced export activity and influenced 
the level of imports in the supply chain (ERA, 2011). The UK ‘strategy for growth’ 
aims to rebalance this deficit and encourage export-led recovery. Both these 
objectives, high value and export growth, are underpinned by the stability and growth 
of the manufacturing sector and particularly the supply industries in the UK.  
 
1.1 Manufacture and Production 
Manufacturing involves several related activities that together produce a product. The 
common misrepresentation of manufacturing as purely a production process ignores 
the multitude of associated activities required to procure inputs, produce a product 
and then sell completed products. Within the production process there are several 
                                            
1 Value is defined here as the estimated monetary worth of a product or service.  The term 
‘value added’ is often used in conceptions of production systems and refers to the increased 
worth of the product for sale as a result of an activity, such as further processing. These 
definitions of value do not reflect the costs of performing these functions. 
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stages, each requiring a distinct process and capacity. Livesey (2006) identifies 
these stages and activities and develops a value chain definition of modern 
manufacturing, illustrated in Figure 1.1. Production, defined as processes that involve 
physical alterations to raw materials, only constitute one of the five essential activities 
in the manufacturing process. Production takes several forms: prototype, pre-
production, scale (batch, mass) and market (customisation, component supplier, 
products for end-users) of the product. 
Figure 1.1 Manufacturing Process and Production Types
 
Source: Livesey, 2006: 7  
 
Manufacturing in relatively high-cost locations2, such as the UK, has been forced to 
adapt to increasing internationalisation. In many cases, labour-intensive elements of 
production processes have been off-shored to regions with lower labour costs3, 
leaving the UK with a distinctly different manufacturing sector to that of earlier 
decades. The value of the country’s knowledge base is considered as a key 
                                            
2 High cost location is defined here to be a region of relatively high labour costs. 
3 The term ‘labour cost’ has been used to reflect the total expenditure for employers, 
including wages, taxes, training and subsidies. 
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competitive edge in a global economy (ERA, 2011), where businesses can provide 
essential services at either end of the mass production stage, such as product 
development and branding and marketing (Herrigel, 2010). This does not mean that 
mass production no longer occurs in the UK. Production remains a critical element of 
UK manufacturing but it is based on proximity to customers, design and the ability to 
customise products, small production volumes where a price premium can be 
achieved (Bryson and Taylor, 2010; Bryson et al., 2008) and technologically 
sophisticated mass production. The distribution of employment in manufacturing 
reflects this transition, with a decline in production based employment and an 
associated rise in professional design and service activities, resulting in a roughly 
equal proportional split (BIS, 2010c). Non-price forms of competitiveness based on 
these additional services and capabilities, in conjunction with cost control, have 
supported continued manufacturing activity in the UK (Bryson and Taylor, 2010; Pike, 
2010; Tokatli, 2012). By 2009, as much as 20% of total revenue in the manufacturing 
sector of the UK was attributed to services provided within the sector (BIS, 2010c).  
Service functions are inextricably linked to the wider production process (Cohen and 
Zysman, 1987) and its international context (Massey, 2010). The British 
manufacturing sector is part of an international production system and the structural 
position of its manufacturing base is in part a result of its linkages to this system; its 
role is distinguished against low cost producers (Berger, 2005). It is the industries 
and functions that create the most value added that are favoured by new policy 
directives and which are of most strategic importance to the UK. These industries are 
based on a framework of supply industries that underpin their capacity to 
manufacture in particular locations (Cohen and Zysman, 1987). Retaining high value 
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elements of the manufacturing process requires retaining capacity in the wider supply 
chain. Component manufacturers that can produce to short delivery times, have a 
skill base to meet the sophisticated demands of high technology products and the 
proximity to engage with the developers of these products provide cost and time-to-
market advantages to further manufacturers. Backward linkages and relationships 
are critical to developing a strong, sustainable and vibrant British manufacturing 
sector.  
 
1.2 Research Aims and Objectives  
Relationships between firms have been a prominent focus in economic geography 
due to the increased fragmentation of the production chain (Dicken et al., 2001), the 
need to share tacit knowledge between buyers and suppliers (Bathelt and Gluckler, 
2011; Sturgeon et al., 2008) and to remain flexible in dynamic production systems 
(Castells, 1996). There have been significant changes in the organisation of 
production in the manufacturing process based on greater interaction between firms. 
Tasks once undertaken by end-manufacturers are increasingly being absorbed into 
the functions of suppliers to increase their competitiveness through the provisions of 
a portfolio of production and service activities (for example, product design, stock 
management etc) (Bryson and Taylor, 2010; Fields, 2006). As a result, production 
systems are progressively more interdependent, generating new and complex 
connections between buyers and suppliers.  
This level of connectivity within production systems (Saxenian, 1994) generates 
complex relationships between firms.  Current conceptualisations highlight tacit forms 
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of relationship in networked production systems (Bathelt and Glücker, 2011; Brusoni 
et al., 2001; Sturgeon et al., 2008). Interactions are contextual and relational, based 
on forms of trust between exchange partners that provide flexibility through 
information exchange and joint problem solving (Uzzi, 1996). These interactions and 
linkages between firms create a dynamic network of flows of information and trade 
that connect firms in a global economy (Castells, 1996; Hudson, 2005). 
However, a variety of relationship types are found in empirical evidence.  The greater 
absorption of core tasks by suppliers, and the associated need for increased 
intellectual property protection (MacPherson and Pritchard, 2007), has required 
different forms of inter-firm relationships that are often based on explicit agreements. 
Formal contracts have distinct governance structures that influence the 
responsibilities, flexibility and repercussions for suppliers involved in these 
agreements which are not incorporated into current conceptions of inter-firm 
relationships (Oinas, 2006; Rusten and Bryson, 2010; Taylor and Bryson, 2006).  
In addition, and as a consequence of this variety in relationship forms, the firm is 
comprised of a bundle of relationships, each with distinct power differentials. The 
influence of power structures in the governance of transaction partners in the supply 
chain has not been fully explored (Dorry, 2008; Gereffi et al., 2005). Transnational 
corporations, with large resource and capability stocks, have been the prominent 
focus of studies on governance in production systems (Christopherson and Clark, 
2007). Gereffi et al. (2005) have identified instances of suppliers influencing the level 
of interdependence with their customers through the development of capabilities and 
product complexity. The exact nature of inter-firm relationships and the capacity for 
suppliers to have an active role in their own relationship dynamics requires further 
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investigation. The combination of inter-firm connections within the firm, and the 
associated variety in power differentials, can directly influence the capacity and 
practice of adjustment.  
The review of academic literature on the organisation of production, the nature of the 
firm and adaptation strategies has identified these two specific knowledge gaps 
around inter-firm relationships: the hierarchy of relationship types and the bundle of 
relationships within the firm. In a context of connectivity in production systems, this 
generates far greater complexity in the nature and extent of adjustment in firms.  A 
richer understanding of inter-firm relationship structures and dynamics will allow 
greater insight into the adjustment capacity of component manufacturers, and their 
ability to survive, in an advanced economy. 
These current research limitations have led to the formulation of four research 
questions designed specifically to address the role of connectivity and relationships 
in the adjustment of supplier firms in high cost locations: 
(1) How, and through what mechanisms, are firms connected with each other in the 
supply chain?   
(2) What is the nature of firm adjustment and how does this vary in different 
timescales of change? 
(3) What is the process of adjustment and how is this shaped by different actors, 
risks and structures? 
(4) How does the nature of firms external connections affect the firm’s vulnerability 
to change? 
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These research questions will be explored through the context of a particular 
industry, intermediate metal processing (IMP), in a particular location, the West 
Midlands region, UK, and during a specific point in time, the recession that 
commenced in 2008. This provides a framework for understanding the intricacies of 
the processes, structures and circumstances of adjustment whilst also identifying 
wider trends in manufacturing (Lawrence, 1987; Massey, 1995). 
 
1.3 The Intermediate Metal Processing (IMP) Industry 
The IMP industry produces metal components that are incorporated in to a range of 
end-producer markets. The industry has been classified here as comprising two 
principal production activities: casting and forging (SIC 2003 27.5 and 28.4). These 
are the initial production activities that create a component, or part, as a functioning 
unit of a larger, further manufactured end product. Both industries are capable of 
manufacturing a range of metal components – from basic shapes to complex 
fabrications of multiple components – for a range of markets and production volumes 
– from one-off custom products to mass production. Each industry does however, 
specialise in different capabilities. The casting industry is better suited to 
manufacturing complex shapes, using customised metal alloy compositions, whereas 
the forging industry is able to manufacture more standardised products with accurate 
material products. Although the processes and materials of manufacture differ 
between the industries, both sub-industries produce the same type of product at the 
same stage in the manufacturing process. As such, they are constrained by the same 
factors: they are highly sensitive to the economic performance of their customer 
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industries and both are making a transition towards higher value products to remain 
competitive. 
Table 1.1 Significance of the IMP Industry to the UK Economy, 2007 
Industry Number of 
Enterprises 
Total Employment Approximate Gross 
Value Added at Basic 
Prices 
Share of 
total UK 
economy 
(%) 
Change in 
absolute 
number  
(1995-2007) 
(%) 
Share of 
total UK 
economy 
(%) 
Change in 
absolute 
number  
(1998-2007) 
(%) 
Share of 
total UK 
economy 
(%) 
Change in 
absolute 
number  
(1995-2007) 
(%) 
Casting  
(SIC 27.5) 
0.43 -9.29 0.49 -40.14 0.33 -47.77 
Forging  
(SIC 28.4) 
0.74 2.64 0.81 -16.48 0.55 -18.57 
IMP Total 1.17 -6.65 1.3 -56.62 0.88 -66.34 
Data source: ONS (2009) 
 
Table 1.2  Export Activity of IMP Sub-Industries and Significance of Major 
Markets in UK 
Industry Average Export 
Level of 
Industry (2011)a 
(% of total turnover) 
Share of 
Manufacturing 
GVA (2009)b 
(% of manufacturing 
GVA) 
Share of Whole 
Economy GVA 
(2009)b 
(% of total GVA) 
  
IMP Other basic metals 
and casting * 
38.7 
Fabricated metal 
products inc. forging 
* 
17.1 
IMP sector average 27.9 
Market Automotive 
(SIC 07 29) 
48.2 4.60 0.66 
Aerospace 
(SIC 07 30.3) 
62.8 4.95 0.71 
Marine 
(SIC 07 30.1) 
20.4 0.98 0.14 
Construction of 
Buildings (SIC 07 
41) 
 -   -  3.02 
Civil Engineering  
(SIC 07 42) 
 -   -  1.32 
* Classifications include other processing and manufacturing industries with a higher export level 
Data source: (a) ONS (2012a), (b) ONS (2011a) 
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The IMP industry in the UK has experienced considerable decline since the 1970s, 
continuing over the past 15 years with reductions in enterprise numbers, employment 
and GVA, as shown in Table 1.1 above. Despite these declines, the IMP industry 
continues to contribute over 1% of UK manufacturing employment and enterprises 
and 0.88% of UK GVA (Table 1.1). The industry plays a critical role is supporting 
other manufacturing activities (Economist, 2012), with 51.1% of outputs from the 
basic and fabricated metals (SIC 27 & 28) used as inputs in further manufacturing 
industries (BIS, 2010b). The IMP industry provides key capabilities and services to 
UK based manufacturers through the provision of development work, low volume 
production and customisation of components for the automotive, aerospace, marine, 
construction and engineering markets. These industries are significant contributors to 
exports and value-added and together account for 5.85% of the UK economy’s GVA, 
illustrated in Table 1.2 above.  
 
1.4 The West Midlands  
The region is located in the heart of England and is comprised of six counties, 
illustrated in Figure 1.2, which vary considerably in population density and industrial 
composition (Taylor and Bryson, 2008). The West Midlands in 2010 had a population 
of 5.5 million (ONS, 2011b). The main industrial counties are Staffordshire and the 
West Midlands metropolitan county, with regional specialisms in automotive, 
ceramics, food and metal manufacturing (Clayton and Lee, 2009). This region has a 
long history of industrial activity and the area was known as the ‘workshop of the 
world’ during the nineteenth century. Today, the manufacturing sector employs 11% 
of the region’s working population (Medland, 2011), contributes 27% of regional GVA 
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and has a significantly higher GVA per employee than the regional average (30% 
above average) (AWM, 2008). The region has an extensive supply network 
characterised by small firms (AWM, 2008). Although the region suffered considerably 
during the recession (Martin, 2010b), manufacturing firms withstood the downturn 
remarkably well (Economist, 2008; 2012). 
The West Midlands region was selected as a ‘visible’ case (James, 2006: 295) of the 
IMP industry. The region has a history of specialisation in metal industries (Allen, 
1929; Florence, 1948) and retains one of the highest concentrations of IMP firms in 
the UK despite suffering the largest decline in employment and enterprise numbers 
(Eurostat, 2011b). In response to the decline, a niche metal industry has developed 
in the region producing higher value products and diversifying away from a previous 
dependency on the automotive industry (Bryson and Taylor, 2006). For this reason, 
the region offers the most accessible insight into restructuring and reconfiguration in 
the industry. 
  
 
1
2
 
Figure 1.2 Location of the West Midlands Region within the UK and its Constituent Counties   
 
Source: Author (2012) 
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1.5 Thesis Structure  
The thesis is specifically concerned with the competitiveness of intermediate 
manufacturing firms through adjustment practices. Although areas of growth are 
identified throughout the forthcoming discussion, the study does not focus on growth 
per se for three reasons. Firstly, the study is concerned with understanding how an 
intermediate manufacturing base can be retained in the UK to enable the continued 
presence and growth of related higher value end-user manufacturers. The decline of 
the IMP industry over the past few decades threatens this and therefore it is essential 
to understand adjustment processes in the industry. Secondly, adjustment practices 
for survival are largely different to those utilised for growth in that they focus on 
maintaining a firm’s existing position, rather than developing it, through existing, 
rather than new, networks of customers and suppliers. The third reason follows this. 
Survival is an ongoing process of adjusting to dynamic environments; it is not a 
specific ‘target’ enacted over set period, as growth-specific strategic adjustments may 
be. A focus on survival allows exploration of multiple and simultaneous adjustment 
practices that are continually deployed by firms. The industry and location selected 
for the study reflects this. The IMP industry is in decline, with the West Midlands 
region suffering the largest overall decline in the industry, but still retains the largest 
concentration of firms. This indicates successful adjustment for survival and to 
remain competitive without overall growth of the industry. 
The overall framework of the study focuses on the links that organise production over 
space and how these characteristics shape the adjustment and stability of the 
individual firm. The research questions are explored throughout the eight chapters, 
although not specifically addressed. During the research process the initial questions 
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were significantly refined from discussions with study participants. Particular issues, 
notably customer relationships and energy costs, were prevalent across the industry 
and required far more intense examination and representation in the thesis if they 
were to accurately reflect the complexity of firm experiences. For this reason, the 
empirical chapters are focussed on unpacking the role of relationships and 
agreements in the industry through two case studies of existing adjustments and a 
critical examination of the subsequent role of inter-firm relationships. 
Chapter Two sets out the theoretical foundations of the project. It draws evidence 
from three sets of key literature: the organisation of production, the nature of the firm, 
and adaptation. The framework proposes a way of viewing the firm and its practices 
as part of a wider, integrated process of flux, where the connections between firms 
and change itself are inextricably linked. 
Chapter Three provides an overview of the research approach, techniques and 
methods used in the study. A discussion of methodological limitations highlights the 
particular challenges of undertaking fieldwork during a period of economic 
turbulence, the peculiarity of elites in manufacturing businesses and the difficulty in 
using concepts of power in research studies. 
Chapter Four outlines the context for the empirical investigation and the refinement of 
the research questions. It provides an overview of the transitions and challenges 
being experienced by the IMP industry and identifies the fundamental problem of 
profitability in the survival of firms. The key challenges which currently face the 
industry are identified for further analysis in subsequent chapters; the transition to 
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high-value manufacturing, the problem of energy price volatility and the role of 
existing customer relationships in the stability of IMP firms. 
Chapter Five explores the adjustment of IMP firms to continuing pressures from 
international competition and the resultant structural adaptations made. Particular 
attention is given to the nature of supplier-buyer relationships, areas of power and 
the implications of such structures on profitability and value capture for IMP firms. 
Chapter Six4 is a case study examination of the industry’s response to radical 
changes in a key input – energy. Energy represents a volatile input cost, structured 
through multiple scales, and the discussion identifies the varied strategic approaches 
of IMP firms to manage the risk from cost increases. The interaction of transient 
changes to energy price fluctuations and the longer term adjustments identified in 
Chapter Five are investigated. Both Chapter Five and Six build an understanding of 
how the structure of trading relationships between transaction partners influences the 
nature and capacity of adjustment in IMP firms.  
Chapter Seven explores the nature, form and stability of the agreement structures 
identified as constraints and enablers in the previous empirical chapters. Specifically 
the role of formal contracts in shaping current production organisation and the 
distribution of risks between firms are investigated. The chapter draws together the 
role of contracts in value creation, risk transfer and stability from chapter’s five to 
eight and explores the notion of blending as a survival mechanism.  
                                            
4 The arguments of this chapter have been published in a separate article (Mulhall and 
Bryson, forthcoming), which is included at the end of the thesis. 
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Chapter Eight draws together evidence from the previous chapters to examine the 
role of connectivity in the adjustment processes and strategies of IMP firms. It 
illustrates the continued significance of mature industries in understanding industrial 
structure, innovation and adjustment. Contracts are identified as critical, and are 
underrepresented in current accounts of structures of economic action in buyer-
supplier relationships. The chapter concludes by providing an evaluation of the 
research study, its value and areas for further development. 
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2 INTER-FIRM RELATIONSHIPS IN THE 
ORGANISATION OF PRODUCTION: THEORETICAL 
FOUNDATIONS 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The manufacturing sector encompasses a range of industries and functions. These 
are arranged through the simultaneous process of fragmentation (Dicken, 1986; 
Glasmeier and McCluskey, 1987) and connectivity (Saxenian, 1994) within 
production systems to generate competitive advantage and value. Thus, inter-firm 
relationships are a fundamental aspect of production systems that enable the 
separation of production activities whilst retaining a continued connection between 
firms through exchange, ownership structures and alliances. These ties blur the 
boundaries of firms, shape the geographical spread of the individual firm or 
production system and enable coordination across boundaries. The following 
discussion will draw on four principal streams of literature to build a theoretical 
understanding of the process of competitiveness within this context; theories of the 
firm, organisation of production, adjustment and governance. These streams have 
been focussed on as they underpin the nature and function of inter-firm relationships 
in production systems. The examination identifies the significance of inter-firm 
relationships in shaping the competitiveness and adjustment capacity of firms 
through governance structures.  
 18 
 
The discussion is structured as follows; a brief overview of the conceptualisation of 
the firm is provided, this is followed by an examination of the theoretical foundations 
of the organisation of production, adjustment and governance ideas within economic 
geography and management literatures. These themes are reflected in the research 
context, where an overview of current understandings of competitiveness and 
manufacturing in high wage rate regions is provided. Finally, a conceptual framework 
draws together the findings from the review of literatures and identifies current 
limitations in the understanding of competitiveness and adjustment within linked 
systems of production.  
 
2.2 Theoretical Foundations 
The following section will review three key literatures that underpin the research aim; 
the organisation of production, adjustment and governance. First, a brief outline of 
the conception of the firm is provided. 
2.2.1 Conceptualisations of the Firm 
The nature of the firm is highly contested and debated within economic geography 
(Maskell, 2001a). The firm is traditionally viewed as an alternative organisation 
structure to markets in the economy, where production functions can be carried out 
more efficiently (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1973). Under this conceptualisation the 
firm performs distinct functions of organising and transacting, developing a legal 
(Cheung, 1983; Hodgson, 2002) and transactional view of the firm (Cox, 1996; 
Eccles, 1981; Grossman and Hart, 1986). An alternative perspective highlights the 
socio-economic basis of the firm , drawing on Penrose’s (1959) resource based view 
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(RBV) and evolutionary notions of learning and innovation (Nelson and Winter, 
1982). Under this notion the firm is increasingly viewed as a socioeconomic entity 
that acts strategically through bounded rationality (Audretsch, 2000; Maskell, 2001a). 
More recent work has called for economic geography to incorporate both aspects of 
the firm, its social and contractual nature (Oinas, 2006; Taylor, 2006), as 
[t]he firm as a legal entity still matters as contractual relationships are formed 
between firms and not between individual employees; they are negotiated and 
formed by social actors embedded in networks, but regulated and governed at 
the level of the firm rather than the individual (Rusten and Bryson, 2010: 250). 
 
Current conceptualisations highlight the varied and complex functions of the firm. The 
firm is viewed increasingly as a set of assets (Clark and Wrigley, 1997a; Clark and 
Wrigley, 1997b) and resources (Barney, 1991; Maskell and Malmberg, 1999; Teece 
and Pisano, 1994), through which strategic action is taken to generate value. The 
political processes within and between firms are a key feature of firm activity 
(Christopherson and Clark, 2007; Schoenberger, 1997). The firm encompasses 
many different forms and spatialities (Taylor and Asheim, 2001) through connections 
and coordination activities. These elements of the firm will be used to understand the 
organisation of production. 
2.2.2 Organisation of Production 
The following review provides a broad conceptualisation of the way production is 
organised over space and in place. The review begins by identifying the classical 
theories of the location of economic activity, before exploring the development of the 
field into the geographical spread of industrial activity and specifically the extension 
of production organisation theories into socio-economic conceptualisations. The 
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scalar conceptualisations of production organisation and the resultant nature of 
relationships in the production system are depicted through the review. 
Classical theories 
The classical approach to the spatial organisation of production draws upon Von 
Thurnen’s 1826 model of the spatial distribution of agriculture. Land rent, the optimal 
price for acquiring land, is a function of transportation costs and revenues, where 
transportation costs are based upon distance from market, and therefore accessibility 
to market determines the optimal crop type for a location (Aoyama et al., 2011). 
Alonso applied von Thurnen’s model to other industrial activities, suggesting that the 
value of access to market varies between industries and, therefore, implied a spatial 
pattern of industrial location from the market based the importance of accessibility to 
different industrial activities (Aoyama et al., 2011). 
Weber’s (1929) theory of least cost location is perhaps the most influential industrial 
location theory. His concept built upon von Thunen’s notion of location based upon 
transport costs as a function of distance but introduced labour costs as a defined 
feature in areas where other costs were equal, spaces he termed ‘critical 
isodaplanes’ (Weber, 1929). Critically, Weber introduces multiple industries in the 
location model and agglomeration and diseconomies of such interactions. Weber 
suggests that the co-location of similar activities occurred  because similar activities 
have the same isodaplanes of locations costs and benefit from shared costs (e.g. 
skilled labour pool) but also may face diseconomies, such as traffic (Aoyama et al., 
2011). Both Weber and von Thunen’s models are based on a spatial distribution of 
raw materials and markets, albeit under the assumption of these being a pre-given 
factor, and focused on cost based locations. Losch’s (1954) model however, did not 
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acknowledge this spatiality and assumed uniform distributions of materials and 
markets. Losch’s focus was more heavily on demand influences on location 
decisions. He introduced the critical notion of multiple, overlapping markets (Losch, 
1938), allowing for fluctuations in demand and associated prices and a framework 
based on total costs and total revenues (Aoyama et al., 2011). 
Neo-classical theories: industrial location theory  
A critical change in approach was the inclusion of variability in factor costs and 
dynamism in industrial location. Walter Isard’s work spurred a new focus, the 
quantitative revolution, in regional science. Isard moved away from the notions of 
general models to show how trade, spatial position and the location of resources 
were connected (Issard, 1956). In particular, Isard examined the role of spatial costs 
in shaping industrial location and illustrated how changes in industrial location 
occurred through increasing returns from agglomeration patterns (Fujita, 1999). 
There was a particular development of the idea of price and location. Smith (1970) 
extended Weber’s isodaplane concept by incorporating linkages, which he suggested 
influenced the price of inputs by effectively bringing them closer. Smith proposed the 
cost-surface notion to incorporate spatial distributions of total costs and total 
revenues. This reformulation of Weber’s model included all associated costs and is 
not limited to Weber’s transport cost based model. Webber (1972) developed the 
notion of uncertainty in affecting the price of inputs, where links can influence the 
level of uncertainty about the environment. Under this notion, the variability of prices, 
not the location of inputs per se, is the important determinant of industrial location. 
Clark (1985) highlighted the disjuncture between ‘centralised’ and decentralised’ 
markets of particular factors and the resultant influence of prices in shaping industry 
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structure. However, he suggests the importance of temporal, rather than spatial, 
changes in labour prices. 
These approaches began to identify the significance of multiple cost components 
within the individual firm in shaping the overall competitiveness and location of 
activities. In addition, trade based linkages were identified as a key feature in 
adjusting the nature of these input costs and achieved market values. The focus was 
on the physical extent of these linkages and the result and impact on cost efficiencies 
to markets, with little attention given to the nature of linkages. The following section 
outlines the role of international trade in developing understanding of production 
organisation. Trade based linkages continue to be a prominent feature of firms 
capitalising on input cost differences between regions. 
International trade: new international division of labour and product life cycle 
The increasing prominence of international trade led an approach to understanding 
the role of trade across national boundaries and the mobility of capital in shaping the 
location of industrial activity. The approach rejected the notion of pre-existing 
distributions of resources, as in the earlier approaches, and highlighted the role of 
differential labour wages in shaping the organisation of production (Walker, 2000). 
There were two key theories: new international division of labour (NIDL) and product-
life-cycle (Schoenberger, 2000). The NIDL proposed by Frobel et al. (1977) 
highlighted the increasing role developing nations played in the production process. 
Through capital mobility and the multinational corporation (MNC), production became 
increasingly fragmented between countries as a world market for labour and 
production emerged. The role of the MNC is particularly significant in shaping this 
research stream and the assumption of increased locational flexibility, with intra-firm 
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linkages being a fundamental element of maximising geographical cost differences. 
Hymer’s (1972) seminal work on the MNC suggested the decline of traditional state 
power through the integration of political systems to encourage international business 
and MNCs that optimised production locations across nations. Critically, Hymer 
suggested that distinctive differences between the political basis of the core and the 
periphery were important in shaping the distribution of production organisation 
through the agency of the MNC. Dicken (1986) also considered that nation states 
were key factors in shaping the ‘permeability’ of their borders to MNCs and capital. 
The work of Vernon (1966) on the product life cycle model looked more closely at the 
nature of the product and the role of innovation in shaping trade patterns. Vernon’s 
approach looks beyond input costs for the distribution of economic activity and 
includes innovation as a factor in shaping the location of particular activities in 
particular locations. The life cycle influences the amount and nature of the labour 
required to produce the product, particularly differentiating standardised goods as 
having a largely price based market that require high levels of investment, and 
therefore capital availability, in home markets (Vernon, 1966). Vernon (1979) 
developed the product life cycle approach by introducing two additional 
considerations based around dynamism: networks and changes in economic 
circumstances. Essentially Vernon suggests that assumed differences in factor costs 
and income between countries reduced from the spread of international networks, 
limiting the gains that can be attained through shifting locations. Instead, he suggests 
that product life cycle is still based on least cost location but innovation and MNCs 
strategic action change the nature of these cost differentials.  
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Both theories are based on understanding the role of increased flexibility in 
production location. Different location-based cost structures formed the basis of 
competitive advantage between countries, stemming from the core-periphery 
conceptualisation of inter-country differences (Fagan and Webber, 1994). Central to 
these approaches is intra-firm trade in MNC, particularly between headquarters and 
branch plants in utilising these spatial advantages, initially from cost savings but later 
for accessibility to resources (Audretsch, 2000). Essentially, both models are 
concerned with the flow of resources, particularly capital, between locations and 
within firms (Schoenberger, 2000) in an increasingly complex and interdependent 
production system (Dicken, 1986). Again, linkages across space are a key feature of 
generating advantage, however the focus on the MNC in these approaches highlight 
the significance of intra-firm linkages in capitalising on these advantages.  
New perspectives 
Large scale deindustrialisation, defined as the “…widespread, systematic 
disinvestment in the nation’s basic productive capital” (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982: 
6), across the developed economies of the UK and USA gave rise to more critical 
accounts of the organisation of production. The work of Massey and Meegan (1982) 
in the UK and Bluestone and Harrison (1982) in the USA are key texts on the 
deindustrialisation process, particularly focusing on the capital-labour relation within 
production systems. It was suggested that technology reduced the tie of production 
to skilled labour, allowing the increased mobility of capital in terms of investment and 
finance. This mobility gave firms the flexibility to move production to lower cost labour 
regions, or increasingly, to areas of less unionisation, as Bluestone and Harrison 
succinctly describe: 
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If labor was unwilling to moderate its demands, the prescription became 
“move” – or at least threaten to do so. For one enterprise this entailed 
disinvestment. When entire industries adopted this strategy, the result was 
deindustrialization (1982: 17). 
 
The increased mobility of capital was only one aspect of the deindustrialisation 
process. Productivity improvements drove an overall reduction in employment levels, 
exacerbated by corporate strategy to utilise regional wage rate differences through 
capital mobility. 
Deindustrialisation also spurred a focus on alternative frameworks of globalisation 
and particularly the capacity for change, dynamism and diversification in the 
organisation of production. Social and institutional factors were incorporated as 
spatial-derived aspects that were significant in shaping the location of production, 
which expanded more traditional notions of cost and raw material distributions as the 
primary drivers of location choice. The sociological notion of embeddedness, most 
notably the work of Granovetter (1985), has been used as a framework for 
understanding the role of social structures and context in shaping production 
systems. Granovetter’s work depicted the significance of social relationships and 
institutional structures in shaping economic action as “[a]ctors do not behave or 
decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do they adhere slavishly to a script 
written for them by the particular intersection of social categories that they happen to 
occupy. Their attempts at purposive action are instead embedded in concrete, 
ongoing systems of social relations” (1985: 487). 
A key element of this approach is the focus on diversification in patterns of 
organisation, from social, political and technological influences. Two prominent 
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schools developed during this period that focussed on socio-institutional factors; UK 
based work of Massey and the US Californian school (Scott, 1988; Scott and Storper, 
1986; Storper and Walker, 1984; Storper, 1989). Massey’s seminal work on the 
social division of labour highlighted the integral role of space in shaping production: 
The labour demand for a labour process is determined not by the process 
itself but by a whole host of wider social and ideological traditions. Again, 
scientific management and Fordism only make spatial separation of control 
and production possible. They do not, outside of particular circumstances, 
determine that it will happen. Separation within production does not in itself 
give rise to geographical separation. Simply to classify by labour processes is 
not to take account of the historical conditions in which they emerge (1995: 
25). 
 
Here Massey highlights the time and space specificity in the use of labour and capital 
through the social processes within the production organisation. The geographical 
pattern of organisation is a central element to the structuring and functioning of 
production due to the social practices that it engages with.  
The Californian School, through Scott, Storper and Walker, simultaneously 
developed institutional approaches to the pattern of industrial organisation. Territory 
(Scott and Storper, 1986; Storper, 1989) was a particularly significant characteristic 
in shaping the diversification of production organisation. Territory is comprised of 
“…place specific regimes of accumulation” (Storper, 1989: 215), influenced by 
institutional structures and social action within the location. Spatial concentration of 
social, political and institutional resources provided a contextually specific basis on 
which technological changes manifest. Scott’s (1988) work on new industrial spaces  
suggested that technological advances opened new areas of production, shifting 
capital from traditional areas to these new spaces which allowed for flexibility in 
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production organisation because “[a] social division of labour had not yet begun to 
form in any major way within most of the sectors composing these ensembles and 
they had not yet engendered large specialized labor markets; as a result, their 
locational behaviour was initially relatively independent of external economies and 
agglomeration forces” (1988: 106-7). Over time the space developed into an 
“…evolving regime of flexible specialization” (Scott, 1988: 106) where intense social 
relations generated continued economies of scale. Externalities, defined as “…any 
occurrence or activity that lies outside the range of control of the individual firm, but 
that has definite effects on the firm’s internal production function” (Scott, 1998: 8), 
generate competitive advantage through the combined economic activity of firms 
within the region. Under this conceptualisation, the relationships between firms, 
based on collaboration, outsourcing and proximity, are central elements to the 
competitiveness of the individual firm and the region within a global economy (Scott 
and Storper, 2003). 
The regional approach has generated a dominant stream of work within economic 
geography over the past two decades. The approach is focussed on the comparative 
success regions, as opposed to traditional theories of Fordism mass production 
structures, as an alternative form of production organisation (Leitner et al., 2002). 
The seminal work of Piore and Sable (1984) on flexible production systems is a 
fundamental characteristic of regional production systems. The concept was based 
on the complementary role of competition and collaboration between firms to 
generate continued innovation in the production system. The notion of industrial 
districts developed from early work on agglomeration economies. Industrial districts 
are defined by Markusen (1999a) as a distinctly different form of regional production 
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system as it incorporates geographical and social proximity between firms that 
generates a distinct ‘cultural homogeneity’ within the space. Regional innovation 
systems focus upon a social embeddedness that drives innovation through learning 
between proximate firms (Asheim, 2000). A key feature of industrial districts is their 
capacity to adapt to changing environmental circumstances through the maintenance 
and adjustment of inter-firm relationships. Relationships enable the spread of 
innovation within the region, thereby generating a flexible and resilient network of 
locationally based firms. The American stream of literature largely focussed on new 
areas (Saxenian, 1994; Scott, 1988; Storper, 1989), identifying rigidities in older 
areas (Markusen, 1999a). 
Alternative theories based on agglomeration economies were developed by Krugman 
under the ‘New Economic Geography’ approach. Krugman’s (1991, 1998) model of 
regional divergence incorporated traditional ideas of location economics by 
incorporating local interactions between firms of the agglomeration model with 
transport costs of the least cost location model. The externalities from this interaction 
generated increasing returns of technology spill-over, generating concentrations of 
specialisation. The approach has been heavily criticised, particularly by Martin and 
Sunley (2003), for its neglect of the social foundations of interaction which have been 
developed into concurrent literatures.  
The early work of regional science was based on an industry focus, which 
Schoenberger (2000) criticises for lack of wider relevance beyond the industry. The 
regional approach has been criticised for its focus on internal resources and limited 
attention to external structures and influences (Leitner et al., 2002). Both Amin and 
Thrift (1992) and Gertler and Levitte (2005) stress the importance of existing 
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structures and connections to wider, global, production system to utilise the 
advantages of regional agglomerations. They view industrial complexes as part of 
wider global networks where “…Neo-Marshallian nodes in global networks act, as it 
were, as a collective ‘brain’, as centres of excellence in a given industry” (Amin and 
Thrift, 1992: 577). Markusen (1999a) developed a framework on industrial districts 
that expands the regional model to incorporate external links and interactions in the 
formation and functioning of regional structures. The typology moves away from the 
traditional focus on small firms, including the state and MNC as active players in 
some models of industrial district, and questions the prior focus of Scott’s model of 
new industrial spaces, suggesting older regions can retain industrial activity through 
‘sticky elements’ (1988). The work identifies inclusion in production networks outside 
the region as critical to the diversity of industrial complexes found empirically: 
In reality, sticky places are complex products of multiple forces- corporate 
strategies, institutional structures, profit cycles, state priorities, local and 
national politics. Their success cannot be studied by focusing only on local 
institutions and behaviours, because their companies (through corporate 
relationships, trade associations, trade, government contracts), workers (via 
migration and international unions) and other institutions (universities, 
government installations) are embedded in external relationships – both 
cooperative and competitive – that condition their commitments to the locality 
and their success there (Markusen, 1999a: 119). 
 
More recent work has criticised the regional approach for its lack of consideration of 
power in inter-firm networks (Bathelt and Taylor, 2002; Christopherson and Clark, 
2007; Rutherford and Holmes, 2007). In their seminal work, Christopherson and 
Clark (2007) highlight the influential role on transnational corporations (TNC) in 
shaping regions through their ability to distribute risks and costs of production to the 
local area. A distinction is made in this work which implies firms and regions do not 
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necessarily work towards the same goal (Coe, 2009), particularly stressing the 
importance of lead firms as powerful agents in shaping the regional economy. The 
role of the firm as separate to the region is a key distinction from some earlier notions 
of industrial districts. 
The conceptualisation of production organisation over space has generated a rich 
and diverse literature. Linkages have been a continuing feature within the field, firstly 
through a focus on trade (Webber, 1972), then the development of interdependent 
production systems (Dicken, 1986) and the embedding of production systems in a 
socio-economic context (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996; 1997; 1999; Uzzi and 
Gillespie, 2002; Uzzi and Ryon, 2003). The earlier work on the MNC and the latter 
focus on the region have distinctly different conceptualisations of spatial organisation. 
Both approaches highlight the role of relationships in structuring production over 
space for competitive advantage but operate at different scales. The global 
perspective of the MNC views relationships over a large scale, based largely on 
transactions and linkages between plants within an organisation. In contrast, the 
regional approach draws attention to the notion of proximate relationships between 
independent firms organised in regional innovation systems, industrial districts and 
clusters. Taylor succinctly describes the significance of relationships in the 
performance of firms under the regional conception: 
The local integration of small firms in agglomerations, yielding benefits of 
externalities and untraded interdependencies, has thrown into prominence 
firms’ interconnections and idosyncracities, along with their competencies, 
capacities, and capabilities, and their weaknesses, limitations and 
vulnerabilities (2006: 4). 
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Relationships, based on trade and collaborative linkages between firms, are viewed 
as a key aspect in the competitive success of organisations. Current debates in 
economic geography call for a wider appreciation of inter-firm relationships by 
incorporating a global perspective into regional conceptualisations (Gertler and 
Levitte, 2005; Yeung, 2009) to develop a more holistic view of the firm and its 
connections within the production system.  
2.2.3 Transformation, Adjustment and Change 
Flexibility has been a key aspect of the new perspectives in the organisation of 
production. The capacity of firms to adjust to changing environmental conditions has 
direct implications for the sustained competitiveness of the firm (Christopherson, 
1996; Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Hughes, 2000; Teece and Pisano, 1994; Uzzi, 
1997). The process and capacity for adaptation has a rich and diverse literature 
across ecology, environmental, risk and management literatures. Smit and Wandel 
(2006) derive the concept of adaptation from cultural transformations in response to 
environmental stresses. The concept became concerned with developing human 
systems to enhance success and survival of societal systems. The two most 
significant literature streams are organisational adaptation and adaptation to physical 
environmental factors, specifically vulnerability to climate change (Adger, 2006; 
Sharma, 2000; Berkhout and Hertin, 2006; Bouvier, 2009; Marshall and Cordan, 
2095). Both streams developed somewhat independently and still remain widely 
detached. The subsequent review focuses on organisational adaptation, with an 
examination of theoretical perspectives from management and organisational 
literature and economic geography. An overview of conceptions of corporate 
transformations is then provided. The discussion focuses on organisational 
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adjustment as it is a fundamental element of the research study, bringing together 
adaptation theories within the context of firms and production systems. 
Management perspectives: the organisation as a learning entity  
There are two alternative management perspectives of the capacity of organisations 
to undertake change: strategic management and population selection. The strategic 
management approach draws on evolutionary economics perspectives and the role 
of routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982) and path dependency in the firm (David, 1985; 
Liebowitz and Margolis, 1990) to understand the capacity of firms to adapt to their 
environment through learning. Chakravarthy (1982) viewed adaptation as a function 
of the resources and managerial capability within the organisation, which 
differentiated firms ability to cope with changes in the economic environment. The 
degree of ‘fit’ between firm resources and socio-economic conditions is a central 
element of the approach and flexibility is seen as the ability to re-orientate resources 
to new conditions (Levinthal, 1997; Miller, 1992). The notion of ‘optimal fit’ has been 
debated within the literature. Denrell and March’s (2001) notion of the ‘hot stove 
effect’ is critical of this idea of optimum fit. They suggest that orientating the 
organisation to adjust too quickly to environmental changes, through environmental 
search capabilities, means that potential adaptation measures may be rejected too 
early as the organisation is in a state of continual adjustment. A continuum of 
adaptive abilities between firms, dependent on the organisations ability to expand 
and align innovations within their economic context, has been suggested within the 
literature (Ganesh et al., 2004).  
Despite the focus on information to generate ‘fit’ with the environment, the ability of 
the organisation to absorb and utilise information was not addressed (Bogner and 
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Barr, 2000; Ganesh, 2004; Siggelkow and Rivkin, 2005). The seminal work by Cohen 
and Levinthal (1990) conceptualised the need to be able to use the information 
gathered from the environment as the firms’ ‘absorptive capacity’. This ability is 
reliant on prior knowledge to be able to recognise and assimilate new information. As 
a result, the innovative capabilities of the organisation are path dependent. The 
internal structure of the organisation and flexibility are shown to be significant factors 
in adaptive processes. Dessein and Santos (2006) suggest that a loose structure is a 
key element in organisational adaptation, primarily because information is required to 
undergo such transformations. Engagement with the external socio-political and 
economic context of the organisation allows access to information, although the 
extent of its usefulness and success of adaptations is a result of prior investment in 
structures and processes for knowledge accumulation (Hansen and Birkinshaw, 
2007). Collinson and Wilson (2006) suggest that although a fit is required to gain 
information for change, this knowledge also needs to be integrated into the 
organisation. If the information cannot be incorporated into the organisation’s 
structure, the firm remains incapable of responding to external changes. It is 
suggested that this capacity to integrate information, and therefore the ability to adapt 
to changes, is a result of the extent of latent resources available to engage 
knowledge and initiate change. 
An alternative perspective has been developed based on the ecological notion of 
selection. The population ecology approach, developed by Hannan and Freeman 
(1977), sees the forces of selection and retention across the population of 
competitive organisations as the primary mode of adjustment to prevailing 
environmental conditions. The approach is critical of the strategic management focus 
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on single units or organisations and instead proposes that a larger, aggregate 
population approach can identify large scale changes and account for the diversity of 
organisational forms. Two key concepts are used to explain variation in 
organisational form: structural inertia and isomorphism. Hannan and Freeman (1984) 
conceptualised the notion of structural inertia as the incapacity of change through 
prior investments, resulting in a synchronisation between the organisation and prior 
environments, generating inertia coalitions and the standardisation of precedent 
forms. Successful organisations can often develop inertia from a predisposition to 
existing and proven production and management systems, without reconfiguring to 
the current environment (Miller and Chen, 1994). The success of these systems can 
provide the organisation with a false sense of security in their capacity to buffer 
environmental change. However, it is suggested that competitive inertia is also a 
function of strategic actions, which is related to the complexity of the current 
environment. The uniqueness of each situation renders prior experience not 
beneficial in helping to shape the response. Here Miller and Chen (1994) strongly 
suggest that current and prior experiences are significant in determining tactical and 
strategic responses. Hannan et al. (2004) redefine this relationship by suggesting 
that it is the complexity of the organisation which determines its structural inertia. It is 
suggested that a change within the organisation leaves it vulnerable because the 
change can generate a cascade of changes throughout the organisation, thereby 
increasing the time and extent of reorganisation within the firm. As a result, the firm is 
in a state of vulnerability for an extended period of time, which increases the costs of 
reorganisation and may leave the organisation in a poorer financial state than 
anticipated. Therefore, the firm experiences greater consequences of change than 
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were expected as the process was not fully understood and the costs of change were 
underestimated.  
Organisational form, defined as the structure and practices of the business, is 
suggested to converge over time through a process of isomorphism (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). This is because the environment, seen as the institutional context, 
provides a unified influence upon the firm. This departs somewhat from the work of 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), who denote that adaptation to specific environments 
within the wider environmental context acts as the driver of change. The intricacies of 
the sub-environments are regarded as insignificant and the wider institutional context 
encourages homogeneity of the population. DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) seminal 
work further developed the theory of isomorphism by suggesting that convergence 
pressures are related to specific areas of the firm’s institutional environment; namely 
political, professional and security. Environmental change is seen here as a driver of 
conformity because organisational response to change is similar within the 
environment. As a result, change drives organisations to conform through institutional 
drivers, as opposed to diverging as in contingency theory. 
The population ecology concepts depart from strategic management perspectives 
because of a focus on external environmental forces that drive continuity within a 
population of firms. The role of learning and resources in strategic management 
instead focuses on change and difference between firms and the ability of a single 
entity to adjust. The capacity of a single enterprise to adjust is a central element of 
economic geography perspectives, which are outlined in the following section. 
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Economic geography perspectives: sunk costs, resources and path dependency 
A related stream in economic geography builds on Cyert and March’s (1992) 
behavioural theory of the firm and is an alternative conceptualisation to the 
agglomeration economies theory of early regional work. This stream focuses on the 
internal structure of the firm as the mechanism of adjustment and change, unlike the 
agglomeration approach which focuses on the external benefits of proximity and 
external economies. Cert and March’s theory identifies the contextual nature of 
decision making by actors in the firm, and specifically states that prior actions 
constrain the options available to decision makers, making responses to changing 
environmental conditions not necessarily a single optimum action. They identify 
‘sequences of behaviour’ as a fundamental aspect of decision making. This point is 
developed by Clark and Wrigley (1995) in their notion of sunk costs as a constraint of 
firm action and influence in the heterogeneity of spatial configuration of firms. 
Specifically, Clark and Wrigley suggest that sunk costs can affect the strategic 
direction of the firm through three means: market entry, development of skills and 
capabilities. and firm strategy through investment decisions (Clark and Wrigley, 
1997b). Prior investments can generate rigidities because the value of the investment 
is often attained in the context of the particular strategy, thereby deterring the firm 
from adjusting strategies. Clark and Wrigley (1997a) conceptualise this strategy in 
the context of firm exit decisions in US and UK manufacturing restructuring. In this 
they suggest that the decision to exit is part of a series of decisions which shaped the 
use and accumulation of capital in the firm, therefore creating a cost to adjust, 
influencing the final decision of exit. Schoenberger (1997) and Glasmeier’s (2000) 
work highlights the influence of context in shaping dominant forms of change and 
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resistance in the firm or industry. Schoenberger viewed adjustment as influenced by 
the culture of the firm, specifically developed through managerial identities, and 
‘commitment structures’ where “…the kinds of change they were willing and able to 
undertake were constrained to run in certain channels and not others” (1997: 5-6). In 
both theories, the firm is viewed as an active strategic decision maker that selects 
which change is undertake and, in that sense, resist some forms of change and 
embrace others. The value of existing resources is a critical influence in making 
significant changes beyond the context in which the resources are valuable. 
Glasmeier, through her examination of the transformation of the Swiss watch 
industry, suggests the rigidities to change are encountered at various scales that 
create lock-in to specific processes and different types of change are reacted to 
differently: 
The intensity and speed of change has important implications for coping. The 
changes that are most readily aligned with the status quo will have a 
resounding effect within the immediate vicinity of change…. The more far-
reaching and episodic changes may have little to do with the targeted 
outcome, and may therefore exhibit few system-adjusting characteristics 
(2000: 21-2). 
 
Path dependency and lock-in are key concepts with economic geography drawn 
again from evolutionary economics (David, 1985). The concepts highlight the 
significance of sequences of behaviour which can generate distinct rigidities that 
restrict the capacity for change. Prior adjustments can narrow the range of possible 
options for future action (Kirk et al., 2007). Martin and Sunley (2006) suggest that 
these processes are inherently spatial, tied to the context of a place. Recent work 
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has suggested the contingent nature of path dependence as paths can be adjusted 
or multiple development paths available (Hudson, 2005). 
Approaches to adjustment in economic geography and strategic management 
highlight the central role of the firm’s internal resources in their capacity to change. 
Learning, sunk costs and resources are key aspects of flexibility. However, the 
capacity to engage with the external environment is also a key driver of adjustment 
and is achieved through links and ties that situate the firm within a specific 
environmental context. Relationships are fundamental to the capacity for 
organisations to access information to enable corporate learning (Gertler, 1995, 
2001; Grabher, 1993; Hervas-Oliver and Albors-Garrigos, 2009). The role of linkages 
will be examined through a review of empirical evidence of corporate transformation 
next. 
Corporate transformations: empirical evidence 
The corporate transformation literature has developed in two streams of work in 
economic geography: regional adjustment and firm upgrading. Both approaches draw 
on the specific context of inter-firm linkages in shaping the nature of firm adjustment. 
Regional approaches are characterised by a focus on innovative and adaptive 
systems of small firms in a bounded space. Early work on Industrial districts, based 
on the Marshallian districts, focuses on flexibility of small and locally owned firms 
adjustment to deindustrialisation through social ties. The American school of 
regionalism focuses on upgrading and adjustment in new areas, principally through 
the work of Scott on new industrial spaces (1988), as old regions were perceived to 
be rigid (Markusen, 1999a). Grabher’s (1993) work on industrial networks in the Ruhr 
valley examined the transformation of the region beyond an industrial district. Here 
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he identifies the role of inter-firm linkages and regional politics as being central to the 
ability of firms and the region to adjust by generating forms of lock-in from previous 
adaptations: 
Adaptation endangers adaptability through processes of ‘involution’. 
Adaptation leads to an increasing specialization of resources and a 
pronounced preference for innovations that reproduce existing structures. And 
while the system optimizes the ‘fit’ into its environment it loses its adaptability 
(1993a: 265). 
 
Here, the process of adaptation itself is found to reduce the capacity for future 
adjustments as firms and regions become increasingly specialised and reduce 
redundant links to the external environment.  
The upgrading literature stems from work on global commodity chains (GCC), global 
value chains (GVC) and governance. The focus of this set of literature is on the 
capacity for individual firms to adjust their value added activities within the context of 
their involvement in wider production chains, and specifically the associated 
governance structures associated with that. Humphrey and Schmitz (2000) identify 
three different elements of upgrading, which vary in ability to engage in different 
activities within the chain, from process improvements to production of higher value 
products and undertaking new activities. Here, strategic intent is a central 
consideration, as well as influences from policy and value chain governance 
structures. Gereffi et al. (2002) and Bair and Gereffi’s (2002) work on upgrading in 
the apparel industry after the development of the free trade agreement identifies the 
significance of local characteristics in shaping the ability to firms to transform their 
production capabilities. Although power relations in the chain have direct effects on 
the ability of non-lead firms to transform (Pavlínek and Ženka, 2011), access to lead 
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firms (Gereffi, 1994) and suppliers own strategic intent  (Tokatli and Kizilgün, 2004) 
are key features in enabling transformation. 
Both streams of literature in corporate transformation draw attention to the role of 
relationships in the capacity of firms to adjust. The regional approach focuses on 
horizontal networks primarily concerned with proximity and the capacity to learn 
through knowledge exchanges between firms. In contrast, the upgrading literature 
examines vertical relationships within the production chain, with exchanges confined 
to within the production system and directed through lead firms. The review highlights 
the varied role of inter-firm relationships in influencing adjustment capacity of the 
individual firm. The following section will examine the role of vertical inter-firm 
linkages in more detail with a specific examination of governance structures. 
2.2.4 Governance 
The concept of governance has been discussed in several interconnected literature 
in economics, sociology and globalisation. Although the concept has many origins, 
the general definition of the term is the ability to influence another entity without direct 
ownership. The focus in the globalisation body of work has been on the scale of 
coordination, particularly the contested demise of the nation-state as a scale of 
control in a globalised economy (for instance see Hirst and Thompson, 1995; 
Swyngedouw, 2004) and the nature of coordination between firms and the structure 
of transactions. The latter stream will be the focus of the following review. 
Transactional governance is principally concerned with the influence of 
organisational structure on the ability to coordinate firms without direct ownership 
(Ruigrok and van Tulder, 1995), that is the coordination mechanisms between buyers 
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and suppliers and the development of inter-firm relationships beyond market 
transactions. There are three sets of literature on inter-firm relationships: transaction 
cost economics (TCE), relational contracting and sociological perspectives to network 
governance (Sako, 1992). The TCE approach, initiated by Coase (1937) and latter 
developed by Williamson (1973), views the coordination of economic activity as 
based on the cost of transactions, where the most efficient method is utilised by the 
firm to minimise costs. Under this approach there are two alternative structures to 
organise production: markets and hierarchies. The most appropriate, or efficient in 
TCE terminology, is determined based on three criteria: level of uncertainty, 
frequency of transaction, and level of asset specificity. Williamson (1973) identifies 
commercial contracts as mechanisms for managing uncertainty by providing 
incentives (cost savings) for actors to ‘behave responsibly’, i.e. minimising the risk of 
opportunism by the transaction partner. The governance structure is viewed as 
“…the institutional framework within which the integrity of a transaction is decided” 
(1979: 235). Williamson draws on the relational contracting theory from contract law, 
which identifies shared ownership of assets and benefits (such as reputation), as a 
determining feature of the most cost efficient means of coordination (Berulava and 
Lezhava, 2007). Recurrent transactions and specific investment in equipment or 
resources for a specific transaction increase the cost of switching between 
transaction partners. To minimise these costs, governance structure need to match 
the level of investment and uncertainty (Figure I and II, Williamson, 1979: 247 and 
253). Under the TCE approach, asset specificity (transaction-specific investment) 
increases the need to continue the trading relationship “…since contractual gaps will 
be larger and the occasions for sequential adaptations will increase in number and 
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importance as the degree of uncertainty increases” (Williamson, 1979: 259). 
Governance structures, bilateral or unified, would then allow the most effective 
development of the relationship to retain the value of shared assets. Cox’s (1996) 
model of relational competencies is critical of Williamson’s approach to asset 
specificity. Instead, Cox proposes that the value of transaction specific assets needs 
to be incorporated into transactional models because their value is dynamic, 
dependent on the context of the environment and, therefore, so too is their 
significance in governance relationships. In particular, Cox develops a broader range 
of medium levels of asset specificity to reflect the complex nature of transaction 
specific investments in inter-firm relationships. 
The TCE approach has been criticised for its lack of appreciation of the reciprocal 
nature of inter-firm relationships (Taylor, 2006; Taylor and Asheim, 2001). The 
process of trust building over repeated exchanges, generating a distinct form of 
efficiency in transactions is not incorporated into the transaction cost approach. The 
relational contracting approach, developed within contract law primarily by Macaulay 
(1963) and Macneil (1985), views transaction as having inherently both a contractual 
and sociological basis as they are utilised within a wider sociological context. The 
implicit forms of contract are based upon the value of future relationships (Eccles, 
1981), which influences the coordination of the relationship, as Baker et al. describe: 
Relational contracts within and between firms help circumvent difficulties in 
formal contracting (i.e., contracted enforced by a third party, such as a court). 
For example, a formal contract must be specified ex ante in terms that can be 
verified ex post by the third party, whereas a relational contract can be based 
on outcomes that are observed by only  the contracting parties ex post, and 
also on outcomes that are prohibitively costly  to specify ex ante. A relational 
contract thus allows the parties to utilize their detailed knowledge of their 
specific situation and to adapt to new information as it becomes available. For 
the same reasons, however, relational contracts cannot be enforced by a third 
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party and so must be self-enforcing: the value of the future relationship must 
be sufficiently large that neither party wishes to renege (2002: 40). 
 
The value of future transactions generates a form of trust between transaction 
partners that mitigates against the risk posed by opportunism (Macaulay, 1963; 
Nooteboom, 1996; Nooteboom et al., 1997). This is an alternative form of protection 
against opportunism to the role of asset specificity identified in TCE.  
Trust as a governance mechanism has been utilised extensively in sociological 
conceptions of inter-firm relationships. Trust is defined here as an “…informal 
mechanism for coordination of economic activity, alternative and supplementary to 
price and authority, based on the belief of one party in honest and predictable 
behavior of the other party, and which allows for more effective and flexible mode of 
transaction governance” (Berulava and Lezhava, 2007: 12). Here, the evolution of 
the relationship over time through shared experience and knowledge build up 
between transaction partners is a critical element of governance. Trust is seen to be 
present to some degree in all relationships as exchanges inherently have some level 
of uncertainty (Nooteboom, 2002).  
The trust perspective developed in response to the increasingly complex and alliance 
driven nature of production systems, where the focus on control was adjusted to 
incorporate cooperation (Nooteboom et al., 1997). Sako’s (1992) interpretation of 
buyer-supplier relationships is a continuum of relationship forms based on the need 
for tacit information to build over time and, hence, stability to develop from obligation 
and control over each other. Sako’s conceptualisation of trust is based on three 
levels: contractual – meeting obligations, competence – ability to fulfil commitment, 
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and goodwill – moral commitment. The obligatory element of goodwill trust is based 
on mutual dependence between transaction partners and is the defining feature of 
obligational contracting relationships (OCR). At the other extreme of Sako’s 
continuum is arms-length contractual relation (ACR), which includes elements of 
contractual and competence trust to undertake the transaction rather than moral 
obligation. Nooteboom (2002) is critical of Sako’s typology of trust and argues for a 
far more complex relationship between trust and governance, which takes into 
account significance and the characteristics of relationships. Instead of the frequency 
of transactions, as in the TCE approach, Nooteboom suggests that learning and 
knowledge built up from relationships that developed over a period of time are the 
critical factors in shaping transactional governance by forming alternative 
coordination mechanisms. Although he states there is a role of switching costs and 
hostages (elements that are strategically important and in the possession of one 
transaction partner), he suggests that knowledge and institutions shape relationships 
and these relationships act as a governance mechanism through trust. To 
Nooteboom, trust “…reduces incentives to utilize opportunities for opportunism on 
the basis of some degree of loyalty, which may be based on ethics, friendship, 
empathy, kinship or habituation/routinization” (2002: 113). 
The role of institutions, suggested by Nooteboom above, is a critical element of the 
trust framework. Sako (1992) and Helper (1993) have identified the significance of 
location in shaping the types of governance used in transactions in specific places. 
For Nooteboom “…institutional differences yield differences in the viability and 
efficiency of different instruments for governance, and thereby yield different forms of 
inter-firm relations” (2002: 128). Ettlinger (2003) supports a context-driven approach 
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to trust in relationships but is critical of the inter-firm approach. Instead, she suggests 
that relationships, and therefore trust, are built through inter-personal ties. Building 
on sociological themes and particularly Granovetter’s weakness of ties argument 
(1973), Ettlinger stresses the role of bounded rationality in shaping decision making, 
resulting in multi-rationality from various personal contexts, creating various types of 
trust. The types of networks and connections are important and particularly the 
process of network development. Murphy (2006) develops the notion of context in 
shaping trust through his proposition of a relational understanding of trust formation. 
In particular, he suggests that trust is inherently contextual through the process of 
building trust by agents in specific contexts.  
The network approach is a key conceptual tool in understanding inter-firm 
relationships in economic geography. The approach is based on the sociological 
notions of trust and embeddedness in coordinating and shaping relationships (Bair, 
2008). The network approach was considered as an alternative to the market and 
hierarchies model developed by Williamson, where power is considered to be a 
necessary feature in shaping and determining the structure of production. The 
relative position of actors in networks is considered an influential factor in 
coordination (Leitner et al., 2002). The network view is based on Granovetter’s 
(1985) concept of embeddedness of economic action in social structures. Network 
approaches offered alternative conceptualisations to governance than an industry or 
enterprise focus. Håkansson and Johanson (1993) developed a network framework 
based on dependency as a control structure. In their model multiple actors had the 
potential to influence the actions of others by altering their resource set through their 
own activities:   
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The industrial network … consists of the actors and the relations among them, 
but it also consists of certain activities/resources and the dependencies 
between them… Each actor controls certain activities and resources directly, 
but because the dependencies to some extent mean control, the actor has an 
indirect control over the counterparts’ activities and resources (1993: 36) 
 
The network approach focuses on the nature of inter-firm connections rather than 
specifically location. Humphrey and Schmitz (2000) identify the nature of cooperation 
between firms as the central element of the competitiveness of network structures. 
The types of inter-firm connection, between strong and weak (Rowley et al., 2000) 
and the duration of ties, particularly work on temporary networks and project 
ecologies (Christopherson, 2002; Grabher, 2002; Grabher and Ibert, 2006), has been 
the focus of attention rather than locational influences. Economic geography has 
utilised the network methodology to incorporate a locational perspective to network 
organisation (Dicken et al., 2001; Dicken and Malmberg, 2001). More recently, 
context, through market and institutional governance mechanisms, has been 
highlighted as influencing the effectiveness of transaction structures. 
Christopherson’s (1999, 2007) work is critical of the focus on transactional 
governance without consideration of the wider context within which the transactions 
occur, stating that “[a]lthough we have theories that attempt to explain how firm 
networks interact to reduce costs and increase production flexibility these theories 
focus almost exclusively on production cost variables (neglecting other sources of 
competitive advantage) or on governance at the local scale” (1999: 171).  
Critically, networks have a limited appreciation of other forms of inter-firm 
relationships, specifically, contracts. The relational contracting perspective 
incorporated both contractual and sociological relationships in conceptualisation of 
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governance. This approach has continued to develop a rich literature of the 
interaction of both explicit and implicit forms of relationship. Trust is increasingly seen 
as a supplement to contractual agreements that influences the functioning of 
contracts as both control and coordination tools (Mellewigt et al., 2007; Woolthuis et 
al., 2005). The legal nature of the firm continues to be significant, as contracts remain 
a fundamental element of transactions (Hodgson, 2002; Rusten and Bryson, 2010). 
However, this aspect is not included in the network approach or models of 
transactional governance. The following section will explore how network approaches 
and sociological notions of dependency and trust are used in conceptual models in 
economic geography. 
Spatial models of transaction governance 
Several models of buyer-supplier governance have developed based on the network 
methodology. Ruigrok and van Tulder (1995) developed a model of governance 
based on a dependency scale from five key areas of control between buyers and 
suppliers: (1) the labour process, (2) supply of materials, (3) distribution within the 
value chain, (4) the ownership of core production technologies and (5) supply of 
finance. They suggest that each element is a potential control problem and hence 
“[t]he more a firm depends for these essential activities on other parties which it 
cannot fully control, the more it will have to take the strategies of these parties into 
consideration, and hence the less independent the firm is” (1995: 37). Under this 
assumption inter-firm relations, and the governance they construct, are bargained 
based on investment levels and control of core technology and strategic 
competencies. Christopherson (1999) criticises the approach for its limited inclusion 
of institutional influences on the activities of firms. Instead, Christopherson suggests 
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the fundamental basis of coordination between firms is power and “…power is 
established and maintained through social, political, and legal institutions” (1999: 
156). 
The notion of dependency is a continuing feature in the GCC and GVC approaches. 
The GCC framework developed by Gereffi and Koreniewicz (1994) uses governance 
as one of the central features in structuring buyer-supplier relationships. The 
approach applies a spatial focus to understanding of governance mechanisms 
(Sturgeon, 2008), particularly moving from the local perspective of single transactions 
to a broader industry conceptualisation of the global structure (Aoyama et al., 2011). 
Critically, this perspective focuses on the influence of an enterprise over the many 
tiers of suppliers within the industry. Gereffi (1994) developed two alternative models 
to governance, buyer-driven and producer-driven, based on the principal agent of 
coordination within the chain. The buyer-driven model viewed governance as 
directed by retailers and consumers through key areas of power for the buyer. The 
relatively open access in the supplier market reduced the buyer’s dependency on 
individual enterprises, allowing buyers to have a more active role in shaping supplier 
practices (Aoyama et al., 2011). The alternative model, producer driven, was 
characterised as chains where manufacturers have higher levels of control over the 
supply chain because of higher investment requirements (Aoyama et al., 2011). 
Approaches based on GVCs developed a more complex model of governance to 
reflect the increasingly intricate inter-firm linkages within the production system 
(Rainnie et al., 2011). The GVC model took a firm-centric view of production linkages. 
Both the approaches had a relative static perception of governance due to the 
linearity of models, focussing on particular chains, with little consideration of external 
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governance structures and institutional frameworks of their locations (Rainnie et al., 
2011).  
Sturgeon and Lee’s (2001) model of modular production networks is based on the 
assumption of stability within the production network from relational contracting. The 
model is developed through a case study of large scale contract manufacturers in the 
USA’s computer industry. The model proposes that the evolution of outsourcing non-
core production tasks to suppliers has in some cases developed a new breed of 
suppliers; turn-key suppliers (Sturgeon, 2002) who, through economies of scope 
across customers, have developed increased capabilities, low asset-specificity and 
consequently, increased scale across customers. These capabilities become so good 
and cost effective that inter-firm links with buyers need only be relationally structured: 
there is limited need for additional mechanisms of control. In this notion, the 
standards achieved by turn-key suppliers act as trust relations: the standards imply 
an associated level of trust in capability and behaviour (Bair, 2008). Gereffi et al. 
(2005) extend the notion of asset specificity in shaping power relations through their 
typology of governance forms. The model is based on three elements: complexity of 
transaction, the ability to codify information, and capabilities in the supply base. 
Under this model the governance structure is influenced by the nature of the 
relationship, rather than solely based on product type features. The typology expands 
network governance into three distinct, although not mutually exclusive, types: 
modular, relational, and captive production networks. Both approaches are dynamic, 
based on the evolution of relationships between firms during the course of their 
transaction(s). The critical departure from Sturgeon’s single model is that Gereffi et 
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al. (2005) suggest that variance in governance structures exists and will continue due 
to the complexity of individual inter-firm relationships.  
Herrigel’s (2010) model is based on the interdependency of design and production 
tasks, and specifically the required collaboration between buyers and suppliers for 
iterative rounds of co-product design. This notion of interdependency of core 
functions between buyers and suppliers is characteristically different from earlier 
dependency approaches based on asset specificity and particularly the modular 
production network, which makes clear distinctions between firm roles. The sustained 
competitive collaboration (SCC) model is suggested to be a further evolution of 
Gereffi et al.’s (2005) relational approach. Ongoing collaborations in the SCC allow 
for specialisations but also diversification up and across value chains to develop 
multiple customer contracts and develop a ‘know-how’ from experiences across the 
customer base to develop cost-saving knowledge as well as traditional capabilities 
(Herrigel, 2010).  
The heterogeneity in governance structures has been developed further by the 
recent work of Murphy and Schindler (2011) on the Bolivia wood industry. The 
approach suggests the role of relational factors in shaping access to large scale 
international trading networks, implying relational proximity is a network element that 
“…should not be conflated with deep trust or horizontality but is instead based on 
common interest, familiar practices and routines, shared identities, and mutual 
recognition of each other’s positionality in a relationship”(2011: 65). The evolution of 
the relationship over time allows agents to constitute the relationship in different 
ways, generating far more complex development and power asymmetries than prior 
work on governance structures. 
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Empirical examinations of buyer-supplier network relationships have been 
undertaken in the automotive (Rutherford and Holmes, 2008; Sturgeon et al., 2008), 
computer (Fields, 2006; van Egeraat and Jacobson, 2005) and retail-based (Collins, 
2002; Hughes, 2000) sectors. The studies highlight the use of governance structures 
for the transfer of risk and costs from lead firms to suppliers and particularly the cost-
squeeze facing suppliers. The role of context in shaping governance structures is an 
enduring feature, leading to heterogeneity in the utilisation of mechanisms. Sturgeon 
et al. (2008) particularly emphasises the contrast in governance approaches between 
American and Japanese automotive production systems. American-based lead firms 
are characterised as opportunistic, where mutual dependency is managed to the 
advantage of lead firms through utilisation of relational and contractual agreement 
structures at various points in the relationship. In contrast, Japanese lead firms 
typically develop long term, stable relationships with their suppliers which are 
characterised by limited lead-firm dependence. The retail industry studies are 
characterised by the economies of scale of retailers as a source of influence (Collins, 
2002; Hughes, 2000). However, Murphy and Schindler’s (2011) discussion of the 
Bolivian wood sector highlights the variety of applications of retail power and diversity 
within networks from the activities of small scale suppliers in their local context. 
These studies are relatively limited to a focus on lead firms. Alternative 
conceptualisations, such as Murphy’s recent work on suppliers in the Bolivian Wood 
industry, are required to understand the role of suppliers in influencing governance 
structures and responses to the frequently identified cost-squeeze from lead-firms.  
The chain approaches are based on structural links rather than the embeddedness of 
networks (Bair, 2008) but they continue to illustrate a focus on relational notions of 
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governance based on dependency between transaction partners. The models 
identified above are limited in their conceptualisations of supplier’s role in shaping 
governance structures. Although suppliers are conceptualised in the models, their 
role is largely determined by the lead firm’s direct influence in sharing technologies or 
core functions (such as the modular value chain models). The focus on the lead firm 
limits the understanding of governance structures because it has neglected the 
influence of multiple and variable forms of governance: a single actor is involved in 
multiple value chains and each relationship is shaped by the specific characteristics 
of both transaction partners. Gereffi et al.’s (2005) model and its development by 
Herrigel (2010) includes a conceptualisation of supplier competence in governance 
structures but still fails to incorporate a strategic role of suppliers in shaping these 
relationships. As such, a more nuanced understanding of the range of governance 
relationships and the interaction of multiple types of relationship within the individual 
firm is required. 
GPN and relational understandings of power 
The global production network (GPN) theory, principally developed by the 
Manchester school, stems from the GCC and GVC approaches but incorporates 
territorial and network embeededness  (Coe et al., 2008), through actor-network 
theory (ANT) and sociological theories of embeddedness. The approach stems from 
criticisms of the GCC/GVC firm centred approaches (Smith et al., 2002) and is aimed 
at incorporating the variety of production organisation structures through a network 
approach. Critically, a consideration for the variable roles of economic actors, both 
firms and external entities, on the structuring and governance of the production 
system, as well as its increasing complexity, were incorporated.  
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Henderson et al. (2002) identified three elements to GPN: value, power and 
embeddedness. Value has been discussed extensively by Hudson (2004, 2005, 
2008) as an organising element based on social conceptions of worth embodied in a 
product that can be exchanged. Hudson’s (2005) work on flows identifies economic 
structures as largely shaped by socially constructed circuits of such value. The 
cultural and political determinants of value (Hudson, 2008; Lee, 2006) are useful 
concepts in understanding the system of production. Following this conception of 
economic structure, the concept of power is a useful framework in GPN. Coe et al. 
(2008) highlight the interdependencies within the network and the consequential role 
of power. Power is seen to be “…complex, contingent and variable over time 
…[where]…relationships between firms and their suppliers are rarely as simple as 
the conventional wisdom tends to suggest whereby the large automatically dominate 
and exploit the small. Size does not always matter” (Coe et al., 2008: 276). Coe et al. 
(2004) suggest that the approach allows for the integration of the local and regional 
scale, which they see as the critical scale of organisation because labour is 
organised at this level. Their notion of strategic coupling identifies the interaction of 
global and regional assets into the formulation and performance of production 
networks for a more contextual and embedded perspective on integration in 
production systems.  
The relational approach draws on several streams in economic geography, although 
specifically on network conceptualisations. The approach is defined by Bathelt and 
Glücker (2011) as bridging gaps in previous work by linking scales between global-
regional-local through a focus on micro processes in a socio-institutional context. The 
approach essentially focuses on relationships between firms in a network, as 
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opposed to purely structural or organisational frameworks (Dicken et al., 2001). 
Territories thus become critical elements in the analysis as relationships are seen to 
be embedded in socio-institutional contexts (Dicken and Malmberg, 2001) in which  
social agents act (Boggs and Rantisi, 2003). As a result, power is seen as a 
‘collective endeavour [where]…governance based on trust and relational forms rather 
than just command and control/hierarchy or market transactions’ (Hess, 2004: 456). 
The relational approach has been criticised for its focus on the agent. Sunley (2008) 
suggests a more inclusive treatment of power to include institutional structures 
outside the networks. He suggests that there does not necessarily have to be a 
connection for it to influence the operation of the production system. Both Jones 
(2009) and Yeung (2005) also suggests the need for a fuller conceptualisation of 
power within the framework by examining the ‘relational geometries’ generated from 
the network structures, rather than a complete focus on agents as definitions of 
power. The relational view assumes benign social interrelationships, to paraphrase 
Taylor (2006), within the production system,  neglecting other forms of relationships 
with distinct power asymmetries. Contractual agreements are entangled with various 
determinants of power and therefore contracts are “…clearly matters of power and 
control” (Hodgson, 2002: 55). As such, the legal structure of inter-firm relationships is 
a critical aspect in understanding corporate power, governance and the resultant 
capacity of individual forms to change.  
The review of governance literature has highlighted a key limitation to current 
understanding of inter-firm relationships. Contractual arrangements are a key aspect 
of coordination between firms but have a limited incorporation into the growing 
network and relational approaches within economic geography. Firms themselves 
 55 
 
are key aspects of contractual relationships, based on legal entities, but the focus 
within models of governance structures has largely been on lead firms in shaping the 
nature of the relationship. A more nuanced understanding of inter-firm relationships 
that incorporates alternative forms of transactions and power is required to more fully 
conceptualise relationships in economic geography. Contracts, power and the 
strategic input of non-lead firms in production organisation are important for 
understanding change. 
 
2.3 Research Context: Competitiveness in High-Cost Locations 
There are three principal literature streams focused on firm competitiveness: cost, 
collaboration, and resource-based competitiveness. The need for firms to purchase 
inputs, or resources, in markets external to the firm generates price differentials 
between competitors based in different locations. The localisation of some factor 
inputs highlights the difference that geography makes to firm competitiveness. 
Globalisation acts to converge capabilities across space through a process of 
‘ubiquitification’ (Maskel and Malmberg, 1999), generating an evenness of some 
input prices which are relatively less related to location. However, in doing so 
globalisation amplifies the differentiation of other costs, namely labour, which are tied 
to specific locations. Even those inputs traded on global markets, which theoretically 
are less spatially sticky and therefore should generate relatively even price for any 
buyer, can create price differentials between locations based on availability and the 
purchasing structure of the location and of the buyer (Giarratani et al., 2006). As a 
result, the market context of production inputs/resources, the political economy of 
individual firm’s dependence on such inputs and their interaction with wider strategic 
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decisions determine the significance of these price differentials (Clark, 1985; Clark 
and Wrigley, 1997a; Coe et al., 2004; Dicken and Malmberg, 2001). Local 
institutional structures around purchasing markets and the organisation of production 
activities generate a more complex structuring of costs over space, particularly for 
cost inputs that are strongly localised.  
A supplementary stream of literature has developed in both management studies and 
economic geography concerning the influence of costs on strategic decision making, 
specifically through past investments (Clark and Wrigley, 1995; 1997b) and the 
restructuring behaviour of MNC in response to wage rate differences (Christopherson 
and Clark, 2007; Hymer, 1972). Christopherson and Clark’s work has highlighted the 
critical role of costs in shaping location decisions and adjustment through their model 
of the ‘three Rs’: relocation, restructuring and redistribution. These mechanisms, it is 
suggested, allow firms to transfer a proportion of costs outside the firm and to the 
regional economy: 
…whether firms threaten to relocate production or slowly reorganise work 
processes to redistribute the risks and costs of production to the region – the 
strategic goal is the same: to shape a landscape of production where places 
bear an increasingly larger share of production costs and firms gain more of 
the benefits (2007: 47). 
 
More recently, the role of cost in competitiveness has been suggested to be specific 
to the nature of the organisation (Ouma, 2010) and market (Zabin, 1997). The 
significance of costs is framed through a more contextual understanding of external 
influences on the local environment, such as institutional structures and technology 
influences. Giarrantani et al. (2006) examine the role of technology in influencing the 
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input and resultant cost structure of an industry, suggesting that the role of costs 
differs between individual firms through product orientation and strategy. Although 
the studies highlight the role of context in understanding cost competitiveness, they 
fall short of incorporating the significance of costs within the wider production 
systems. Birch (2008) draws attention to the wider implication of factor costs on the 
production chain as a whole. Here, cost advantages are weighed against cost 
disadvantages to construct the most competitively suitable production chain, rather 
than specific restructuring of elements of the chain.  
The two other streams, collaborative and resource-based competitiveness, build on 
‘strong’ forms of competitiveness (Hudson, 2005). The collaborative approach 
focuses on competitive advantage generated through collaboration and relationships 
with other firms, particularly drawing on the collective assets idea of regional 
agglomeration theories (Scott, 1998; Storper, 1997) and Burt’s (1995) notion of the 
social structure of competition, based on networks of relations. In this approach, 
collaboration provides benefits beyond price through mutual interdependence and 
learning between horizontal linkages and networks. Porter’s (2000a; 2000b) work 
identifies competitive advantage built through the whole value chain and therefore 
influenced by activities and relationships with suppliers and distributors. Under this 
conception the performance and growth of an individual firm is linked to external 
agglomeration benefits and social capital in the local environment (Porter and Solvell, 
1998). Research on knowledge networks has developed a large stream of work on 
the competitive success of regions specialising in particular industries or activities 
(Cooke, 2004, 2005; Maskell, 2001b) and regional innovation systems that link local 
and global networks (Bathelt et al., 2004; Huggins and Johnston, 2009). The 
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approach has been criticised for the assumption of open knowledge exchange 
between traditional competitors, the lack of appreciation of power asymmetries in the 
relationship (Bathelt and Taylor, 2002; Christopherson and Clark, 2007) and a limited 
global perspective (Gertler and Levitte, 2005; Sturgeon et al., 2008; Yeung, 2009). 
Burt’s (1995) work on structural holes builds upon the notion of links between firms 
and particularly Granovetters’ (1973) work on the strength of ties by viewing social 
capital, and its use through socially constructed networks, as benefiting the rate of 
return on investments. Importantly, Burt adds to the weak ties argument by 
suggesting that it is not the strength of tie but the ‘structural hole’s’ between ties that 
is important. Structural holes generate inefficiencies in information exchange and 
control. Control is the central element for competitive benefit in a firm’s network as it 
shapes the information structures of other firms, such that “…players with networks 
optimized for structural holes – players with networks providing high structural 
autonomy – enjoy higher rates of return on their investments because they know 
about, have a hand in, and exercise control over, more rewarding opportunities” 
(1995: 49).  
These collaborative approaches imply the role of interdependence between 
traditional competitors, where firms exchange knowledge and learn through the 
social and transaction connections they may have. Hudson (2001) suggests that this 
is an element of the competitive position of firms: long term collaborations, through 
strategic alliances, mergers and acquisitions and supply strategies, use networks 
based on mutual dependence and collaboration between partners. Bowen and 
Leinbach (2006) propose that these connections, in the context of GPNs, can aid 
upgrading by sharing the competitive success of vertical relationships.  
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The third stream, resource based competitiveness, focuses on the role of markets in 
shaping competitiveness through differences in individual firm resources and 
capabilities, as opposed to factor differences in cost approaches. The approach was 
developed from work by Wernerfelt (1984) and Barney (1991) who suggested that 
firm’s competitive position could be influenced by its resource configuration. 
Resources are heterogeneous and imperfectly mobile, which generates 
differentiation between competitors. The role of inimitability is central to the idea; 
firms are competitive if their strategy is difficult to copy in the short term, providing 
advantage against others. The ability to influence the competitive position of others 
firms is again essential to the approach.  
The notion of sustainable competitive advantage differs from Porter’s (1991; Porter 
and Solvell, 1998) model which is based on holding advantage for a period of time, 
unlike the resource-based view of inimitability. The notion of core competencies, 
defined by Prahalad and Hamel (1990), suggests that the resources of the firm 
should be focused on competitive competencies in order to gain and sustain 
competitive advantage. However, the focus on a finite set of competencies, 
developed with little regard for the external conditions, was shown to leave 
organisations inflexible and vulnerable to changes within the environment 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Collis (1994) suggested that this was a result of the 
core competencies being spatially and temporally specific as they are susceptible to 
erosion, substitution and being superseded. Changing external markets were 
incorporated into competitiveness ideas in organisational studies through work on 
organisational learning (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) and dynamic capabilities (Horne, 
1997; Teece and Pisano, 1994; Teece et al., 1997). Prior literature on capabilities 
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focused on developing the strengths of the company, neglecting to some degree of 
the external competitive environment and its fit with the firms capabilities (Leonard-
Barton, 1992). Teece et al. (1997) suggested that the organisational capabilities, or 
strengths, should change with the external environment for sustained competitive 
advantage. Porter’s (1991) notion of dynamic strategy criticises the resource-based 
view for not considering the role of the local environment and the abandonment of 
product market factors. He suggests that resources are an essential element of 
competitiveness but are a result of past managerial actions and, therefore, resources 
and activities are ‘duals of each other’ and need to be considered together. 
Resources are valued by the market price. This engagement with the local 
environment has featured in later resource-based conceptions of competitiveness 
through internal and external learning for innovation (Schroeder et al., 2002) and 
‘performance heterogeneity’  from price and cost differences between regions as well 
as other factors (Hoopes et al., 2003). 
Flexibility to adjust to changing circumstances and maintain a competitive advantage 
is a fundamental aspect of competitiveness. The manufacturing sector is comprised 
of many and varied industries and production structures. The sector is faced with 
increasing international competition, from both advanced economies and lower wage 
regions, that requires intricate competitive strategies (Christopherson, 2009a; Clark 
and Clavel, 2012). Inter-firm relationships, both within a region or global production 
system, have been identified as key aspects of generating competitive advantage 
(Schroeder et al., 2002). The following section will examine current understandings of 
these strategies within the context of manufacture in a high wage region. 
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2.3.1 Manufacturing Competitiveness in High-cost Locations 
 Competitiveness in relatively high cost locations is focussed on alternative ways to 
create added value to avoid direct price competition, largely drawing from resource 
development and collaborative forms of competitiveness in the value chain. These 
locations, such as the UK, are suggested to have made a transition to the knowledge 
economy (Drucker, 1993), where innovation, knowledge and complex products 
(Davies, 1997) are central to competitiveness. Several models of adjustment in high-
labour cost regions have identified innovation as a means of non-price 
competitiveness through new forms of flexible production organisation in creative 
economies (Florida, 1996) and phoenix industries (Christopherson, 2009b, 2009c). 
The approaches build on the flexible specialisation idea developed by Poire and 
Sable (1984). Firms in these regions have established technologically advanced 
specialisms whilst retaining the flexibility to adjust to changing markets. 
Christopherson suggests that this flexibility stems from the range of organisational 
roles, incorporating many different but compatible skills bases. European based 
studies on adaption in old industrial regions suggest the role of national policy 
directives, in combination with regional characteristics, in shaping the adjustment 
capacity of these firms and regions (Birch et al., 2008).  Here, the adjustment path is 
influenced by larger scale national trajectories, in addition to the regional 
characteristics. 
The work on producer services in advanced economies has highlighted the role of 
differentiation as a competitive strategy, moving away from prior focus on cost 
towards a performance based advantage (Lindahl and Beyers, 1999). This work has 
prompted the development of a stream of literature suggesting manufacturing is 
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becoming increasingly composed of a mixture of production and service activities 
(Bryson, 2009). Livesey (2006) identifies the various roles within production, 
suggesting that production only forms one task in the manufacture a product. The 
work of Bryson (2009; Bryson and Taylor, 2010) and MacPherson (1997b) posits that 
the role of services in manufacturing is increasing, providing competitive 
differentiation through the ability to provide additional and vital supplementary 
activities associated with the product manufactured. A set of interrelated services and 
production functions come together to add value both in the production process and 
product itself (Bryson, 2009). MacPherson (1997a) has highlighted the role of 
external services based on technical support for product development as a primary 
force in driving innovation in small manufacturing firms in the USA. 
Following this, the role of differentiation is increasingly based on intangible assets, 
particularly design and branding activities. Design provides additional value to 
manufacturing based on technical expertise which differentiates firms and adds value 
to products. Place-based associations are a central element in both design and 
branding literatures. The relationship between place and design is complex, drawing 
on historical skill developments and cultural assets in regions (Bryson and Rusten, 
2011), legal structures to support inimitability and design protection (Bryson and 
Taylor, 2010) and modifications of product to meet the requirements of particular 
locations (Rusten et al., 2007). Brand literature has identified location as a direct 
generation of value through spatial associations that differentiate producers (Pike, 
2010; Tokatli, 2012). 
There is increasing convergence on the idea that competitiveness in high cost 
locations is far more complex than cost verses non-cost forms of advantage. This 
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distinction does not reflect the increasingly intricate division of tasks between 
locations in the production chain, where high cost regions are undertaking a range of 
strategies to reflect the variety of products manufactured, of both high and low value 
(Bryson and Rusten, 2011; Christopherson and Clark, 2007; Herrigel, 2010; Hudson, 
2001). Shorter product cycles and rounds of product innovation have encouraged the 
transfer of knowledge between firms (Casson, 1991a; 1991b; Vanchan and 
MacPherson, 2008) and prompted increased collaboration within the production 
chain. Research on competitive strategies has identified a distinct area of value 
associated with additional services, capabilities and skills based both on place- and 
non-place-based associations. The evolution of firms into design, branding and 
collaborative production activities to capture value in an increasingly international 
market gives rise to the role of formal legal structures of property rights and formal 
contracts in protecting these competitive advantages, if even for a time-limited period 
(Bryson and Rusten, 2011; MacPherson and Pritchard, 2007). Inimitability is a central 
competitive strategy under these value creating methods, where collaboration within 
the supply chain and the transfer of valuable knowledge between manufacturers is 
increasingly important for competitive advantage. Maintaining the value of this 
knowledge is vital to sustain differentiation and generate advantage from design and 
branding (Bryson and Taylor, 2010; Bryson et al., 2008; Monk, 2009).  
 
2.4 Conceptual Framework: Contractual Relationships 
The review of literature has identified the central role of relationships in current 
understandings of production organisation and adjustment in economic geography. 
Relationships have become a prominent focus due to increasingly fragmented 
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production through outsourcing of both production (Angel and Engstrom, 1995; 
Glasmeier and McCluskey, 1987) and, increasingly, core tasks (MacPherson, 1997b; 
MacPherson and Vanchan, 2010). The absorption of functions in the supply base has 
required knowledge exchange, particularly tacit, between firms and their suppliers 
(Bathelt and Glücker, 2011; Sturgeon et al., 2008). This network approach to 
production has given rise to a more flexible system based on specialisation and 
integration between firms. The need for responsive, lean and adaptable systems of 
production requires ‘loosely coupled networks’ (Brusoni et al., 2001), where inter-firm 
ties connect firms in an integrated system of production allowing the individual firm to 
remain flexible (Grabher, 1993; Uzzi, 1996; 1997; 1999). Flexibility, defined as the 
ability to respond and adjust to changing environments, is a central element of the 
approach. Continuous innovation is a key source of competitiveness in global 
production systems (Casson, 1991b). The speed of development and innovation 
requires immediate response to product development or production demand 
changes, enabled through flows of information and knowledge within the network. 
Cooperation and trust between transaction partners, who are unable to specify and 
formalise all production activities under these rapidly changing environments 
(Casson, 1991a) is a key competitive strength (Uzzi, 1997).  
In line with the development of the network approach, there has been a focus on 
relational contracting in economic geography. Relational contracting, based on non-
contracted forms of interdependency and reciprocal trust between transaction 
partners [developed as an alternative to formal contracts in contract law (Berulava 
and Lezhava, 2007; Macaulay, 1963)], has been drawn on heavily in economic 
geography in conceptualisations of networked production systems, governance 
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structures (Gereffi et al., 2005), upgrading (Bathelt and Kappes, 2009) and 
competitiveness through collaboration, capabilities and learning. The relational 
approach highlights inter-personal ties, informal trust and internal working of the firm 
in shaping the interplay of relationships between firms (Taylor, 2006). Trust and 
cooperation are cornerstones to the learning approach of competitiveness (Bathelt 
and Glücker, 2011) and the organisation and performance of networks (Bathelt et al., 
2004; Gertler, 2003; Maskell, 2001b). The focus has been primarily on social inter-
personal relationships as structures of economic activity such that:  
[g]lobalization, then, is obviously not a process of disembedding based on 
mere market transactions and impersonal trust, but rather a process of 
transnational (and thereby translocal) network building or embedding, creating 
and maintaining personal relationships of trust at various, interrelated 
geographical scales (Hess, 2004: 176). 
 
Trust is seen as a resource in economic systems (Bathelt and Glücker, 2005) and 
“…fundamental characteristics of business networks” (Murphy, 2006: 428) which is 
socially embedded, allowing the maintenance of value in the relationship (Gaur et al., 
2011). The focus has been on understanding relational ties between economic 
agents through socio-economic context and mutual understandings (such as in 
relational proximity work, see Bathelt and Glücker, 2003; Murphy, 2011), such that 
trust “…enables structures such as networks, clusters or commodity chains to 
emerge and be stabilized over time” (Murphy, 2006: 429). This approach has led to a 
focus on inter-firm relationships (interactions) rather than specific entities (firms, 
industries) or spatial scales in understanding production complexes through the 
network approach (Castells, 1996; Dicken et al., 2001). 
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The transaction cost literature has developed a far more complex understanding of 
inter-firm relationships based on a hierarchy of relationship types between market 
exchanges and vertical integration (Cox, 1996; Eccles, 1981; Hodgson, 2002; 
Williamson, 1973), with relational contracting itself having many forms depending on 
the nature of the asset and ownership structure (Cox, 1996; Grossman and Hart, 
1986). The interaction of formal contractual and informal trust structures has been a 
key aspect of this debate (Connelly et al., forthcoming; Mellewigt et al., 2007; Vlaar et 
al., 2007; Woolthuis et al., 2005). Contracts have traditionally been seen as a 
substitute to trust in specific circumstances where trust is either inadequately 
developed or there is a limited prior history to the relationship (Macaulay, 1963). 
However, more recent debates have introduced the notion of contracts as a 
complement to trust in inter-firm relationships, where contracts are used as forms of 
coordination rather than purely as control mechanisms (Mellewigt et al., 2007; 
Woolthuis et al., 2005). Empirical examinations have also highlighted the 
complementary nature of contracts and trust within the same relationship, where 
each undertake different functions of governance over different elements of the 
development of the relationship (Fuller and Lewis, 2002; Mudambi and Helper, 
1998). This complexity, illustrated through the existence and multiple functions of 
contractual arrangements, suggests the significance of formal agreements in 
production relationships in addition to tacit based conceptualisations. There have 
been calls for work on the complexity of relationship structures from both TCE school 
(Woolthuis et al., 2005) and increasingly in economic geography (Taylor, 2006; 
Taylor and Bryson, 2006). The TCE approach seeks to understand the impact of the 
social context in the use of contracts and the non-legal uses of formal contracts in 
 67 
 
structuring relationships over time (Woolthuis et al., 2005). Rusten and Bryson, in 
contrast, are critical of the focus on social, as opposed to legal, aspects of inter-firm 
relationships: 
Economic geographers may have become too fixated on unravelling the 
complex geographies of relational social networks at the expense of placing 
such relationships in the wider legal and governance structures that both 
constrain and enable the behaviours of social actors embedded within firms 
(2010: 249). 
 
These critiques highlight the need to marry together these approaches to inter-firm 
relationships and, particularly for economic geography, the incorporation of formal 
relationships into current understandings of production organisation. Additional forms 
of relationship based on formal contractual structures have begun to be identified 
through empirical analysis but have yet to be incorporated into conceptualisations of 
relationships in economic geography. There are three types of formal relationship 
structures that are currently under conceptualised in economic geography: 
Strategic alliances 
Strategic relationships have been identified as a key aspect of interaction in 
knowledge intensive industries (Casson, 1991b; Powell et al., 2005). They facilitate 
access to markets (Casson, 1991b), cooperation between transaction partners 
(Beuve and Saussier, 2012) and act as a significant element of firm boundaries 
(Baker et al., 2008). The transition towards knowledge and learning as a competitive 
differentiator suggests the increased significance of these forms of organisation. 
Trust as a dynamic and historic feature 
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Stable and repeated relationships between firms are a key aspect of relational 
contracts (Baker et al., 2002; Eccles, 1981). The focus on trust aspects of relational 
contracting in economic geography has neglected the significance of future 
exchanges in sustaining trust based relationships. Distinct forms of implied contract 
from repeat transactions, such as email exchanges, develop and generate an 
obligation based on firm, rather than personal, linkages that have tangible 
ramifications.  
Contractual agreements 
There has been increasing attention to the role of inimitability maintaining competitive 
advantage (Bryson and Taylor, 2010; MacPherson and Vanchan, 2010; Poon and 
MacPherson, 2005). Outsourcing technology and strategic elements of the 
production process has highlighted the use of contractual agreements in protecting 
firm assets and value areas (MacPherson and Pritchard, 2007). The formalisation of 
inter-firm relationships through property rights (Monk, 2009) and legal structures 
(MacPherson, 2009) is increasingly evident in empirical examinations.  
An appreciation of the complexity of relationship structures between firms is 
important for understanding how firms adjust and remain competitive. Prior focus on 
interactions has conceptualised the relationship as the primary influence in the 
structure and dynamic of production organisations, where “…the power of flow takes 
precedent over the flows of power” (Castells, 1996: 469) and power and trust 
resources are the property of relationships rather than strategic entities (Bathelt and 
Glücker, 2005). According to Castells, “[n]etworks are open structures, able to 
expand without limits”, where the “…structure is a highly dynamic, open system, 
 69 
 
susceptible to innovating without threatening its balance. Networks are appropriate 
instruments for a capitalist economy based on innovation, globalization, and 
decentralized concentration; for work, workers, and firms based on flexibility, and 
adaptability” (emphasis added, 1996: 470-1). The ties between firms, and their 
structure, have been identified as a vital element of a firm’s ability to adjust 
(Christopherson, 1996; Grabher, 1993). By incorporating formal interactions, such as 
contractual agreements, alliances and trust based on prior experience, the firm 
becomes a central actor in the interaction through strategic action, coordination of 
relationships (Dicken and Malmberg, 2001) and its legal structure (Rusten and 
Bryson, 2010). This conceptualisation adds to the complexity of the firm, integrating 
other approaches and functions, where the firm is seen as a ‘multidimensional 
coordination problem’ (Oinas, 2006: 249). Thus the firm can be thought of as; 
(1) a set of assets that are historically developed  (sunk costs (Clark and Wrigley, 
1995), brands (Pike, 2010)); 
(2) a hierarchy of production relationships ranging from those formed entirely on trust 
to those which have no aspect of trust; 
(3) a blend of many, and often various forms, of relationships; 
(4) set of geographies and spatialities (Taylor and Asheim, 2001); 
(5) political processes (Christopherson and Clark, 2007). 
Under this conceptualisation the complexity of the firm is maintained. The firm is 
more than a nexus of contracts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) or a site of activities 
(Dicken and Thrift, 1992), instead conceptualised as a site of value creation based on 
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capabilities (Audretsch, 2000) and the sets of assets, spatialities and political 
processes incorporated within the firm. This complexity is reflected in the firms’ ability 
to shape relationships and where relationships vary according to their different 
histories (Hodgson, 2002), development over time (Taylor, 2006), nature of product 
(Cox, 1996) and the power that the firm itself can attain. The specificity of the firm 
and its history, resources, capabilities and spatiality generate a range of interactions 
between firms. How these forms of coordination come together in the context of the 
individual firm has received little academic attention (Oinas, 2006; Taylor, 2006) 
despite their significance in understanding adjustment.  
The thesis will address limitations in understanding in the hierarchy of relationship 
types and the conceptualisation of the firm as a bundle of relationships. The 
conceptual approach draws on current work in economic geography and 
management, marketing and procurement literature to generate a holistic view of the 
firm and its relationship structures. In doing so, it will aim to develop a more nuanced 
understanding of relationships between firms and how this complexity of interaction 
affects adjustment practices in a specific context of the IMP industry. Under this 
conceptualisation the firm is a strategic actor in the formation of relationships and 
organisation of production tasks. But the firm acts within a framework of interactions, 
transactions and connections that constrain and enable decisions. The connections 
are complex, based on multiple and varied relationships that together influence the 
adjustment capacity of the firm.  
2.5 Summary 
The review of literature has identified a research gap in the current understanding 
and conceptualisation of inter-firm relationships in economic geography. Through an 
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examination of production organisation, adjustment and firm literature it can be seen 
that the current conceptualisation of network relationships is based on informal ties of 
trust, collaborative working and knowledge exchange. By incorporating alternative 
views of interaction, largely drawn from the transaction cost and relational contracting 
approaches, it can be seen that a more nuanced understanding of relationships is 
required in economic geography that includes formal agreement structures and 
reflects the complexity of inter-firm relationships. 
Two specific research gaps have been identified; 
Hierarchy of relationship types 
Bundle of relationships within the firm 
Formal agreements built from strategic alliances, reputational trust and contracts are 
missing elements in the conceptualisation of both relationship types and the multiple 
relationships within the individual firm. 
The empirical chapters will examine relationship structures within the industry and the 
role of formal contracts in profit generation (Chapter Five), adjustment (Chapter Six) 
and the interaction of formal and trust based coordination between transaction 
partners (Chapter Seven). The next chapter details the tools and techniques used in 
the study’s methodology in order to understand change in the context of connectivity 
and relationships. 
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3 RESEARCH TECHNIQUES 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The research methods are designed to allow a detailed exploration of adjustment in 
IMP firms, with a particular focus on inter-firm relationships. Qualitative 
methodologies were used to generate a contextually rich data set, based primarily on 
corporate interview techniques. The fieldwork was undertaken in two stages: first an 
intensive industry study of 45 IMP firms and then a smaller scale study of key 
transaction partners of IMP firms. 
The following discussion will outline the research techniques used to undertake the 
study. The overall research approach is provided, followed by a detailed description 
of the sampling, data collection and analysis techniques used. The implications and 
challenges of these strategies are then discussed and finally a summary of the key 
methods undertaken. 
 
3.2 Research Approach  
The study is designed around three aspects: change and adaptation, the firm as an 
economic actor, and the importance of context in economic action. Change is defined 
here as a gradual practice, influenced by multiple ongoing processes that combine 
within the specific context. As such, change is viewed as a continuous process of 
transformation. The approach, therefore, is explorative to allow for diversity in 
triggers, processes and contextual influences on the properties of change (Pain et 
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al., 2011; Sayer, 2007) and the nature of the decision making process in structuring 
change (Lloyd and Shutt, 1985; Massey and Meegan, 1985). The focus is on 
allowing the respondents to identify their own instances of change and does not trace 
the responses to any particular event. The approach invites variety and aims at 
exploring the practices of economic activity, both everyday and under stress, to 
examine the fundamental causation in many different firm and event contexts. 
Undertaking research during the global economic crisis (2007-) had two key benefits: 
it provided a consistent change event (Hughes, 2012) and an element of dynamism 
into the study. As a change event, the recession acted as a common evaluative 
framework from which adjustments could be compared across the sample from the 
same causation (Sayer, 2000). A common criticism of studies in economic geography 
is the static nature of insights (Bryson et al., 1999; Markusen, 1999b). This study has 
been able to introduce an element of dynamism by using the recession as an ‘event’ 
– a distinct transformative period where the entity of study (in this case the firm) 
moves from one state to another. Although research on change is traditionally done 
through longitudinal studies, the critical element is the ability to identify change 
(Pettigrew, 1990), which is achieved here through a consistent event - recession.  
The research uses the firm as the unit of analysis. The firm is viewed as the 
fundamental agent of economic action through strategy and practice (Amin and 
Thrift, 2000; Dicken and Thrift, 1992; Dixon, 2011; Markusen, 1999b). Practices, 
defined by Jones and Murphy as “…stabilized, routinized, or improvised social 
actions that constitute and reproduce economic space” (2011:1), allow the 
researcher to observe the process of change through actions and events. The firm 
acts as a site for the integration of multiple scales of processes, relationships and 
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their implementation at the micro level (Jones and Murphy, 2011; Yeung, 2003). By 
focusing on the practices that occur in and through the firm the research can engage 
with these multiscalar dimensions, thereby avoiding a binary conceptualisation of 
causation (Pain et al., 2011) and retaining the transitionary processes that occur 
during change (Jones and Murphy, 2011). Although there is considerable debate 
over the role of the firm as an economic actor (for instance Walker’s (1989) critique of 
the significance of large firms or O’Neill and Gibson-Graham’s (1999) account of the 
diverging attitudes within the firm), it is considered here to be the most appropriate 
research scale as the study is primarily concerned with firm-firm relationships. The 
assumption is made that the firm is a unified entity5 because the firm acts as the 
agent of economic action (Markusen, 2003).  
The role of context in economic action is a key aspect of the research. An intensive 
analysis was undertaken as it “…seeks out substantial relations of connection and 
situates practices within wider contexts, thereby illuminating part-whole relationships” 
(Sayer, 2000: 22). The method allows exploration of challenges among a range of 
firms in the sector to provide a wide explanatory framework that includes variation 
among firms (Massey and Meegan, 1982; Sayer and Morgan, 1985). The relatively 
large number of firm interviews allowed for a comparison between companies in a 
similar situation to understand but also to highlight alternative strategies. The ‘space 
for choice’, to utilise Berger’s (2005: 34) phrasing, is an important consideration in 
evaluation of firm strategy and change process. By incorporating a larger number of 
                                            
5 The firm is viewed here as an economic actor because production agreements are based, 
and accountable to, the ‘firm’ and not individuals within it.  It is acknowledge that this 
representation does not fully encompass the complexity of the firm but is an appropriate 
representation for the purpose of this study.  For further discussion of the conceptualisation 
of the firm see Taylor & Asheim (2001). 
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cases, the capacity of actors and variety of options is maintained. This explorative 
stage was followed by a more in-depth analysis of key themes through case studies, 
which provided detailed analysis of situated examples (Yin, 2003b). 
The critical realism approach, outlined by Sayer (2000), has been used as the 
ontological framework as it incorporates the role of context and change through its 
basis of explorative theory building. By engaging with firms and their representatives 
through qualitative interviews, the assumption is made that the access to business 
informants and their knowledge is restricted and based on the participants own 
situated and partial knowledge (Gibson-Graham, 1994; Hughes, 1999a; Rose, 1997). 
As such, the critical assumption is that “…what has happened or has been known to 
have happened does not exhaust what could happen or have happened” (Sayer, 
2000: 12). With this in mind, the approach is focussed on unearthing the structures 
and mechanisms that drive causation from its effects, rather than the occurrence of 
the event itself. Building theory through comparative analysis allows for diversification 
of outcomes without reducing the validity of the research. The research does not 
need to focus on specific occurrences (e.g. ‘successful’ firms or best practices), 
which are difficult to refine in a firm based study where the resource and capability 
configuration of each firm differs, but rather on the diversity derived from the 
influence of such contextual ‘conditions’ (Amin et al., 2002; Del Casino Jr et al., 
2000). The final assumption of the study is that change occurs through the interaction 
of one entity or event with another. By following a critical realism approach, the 
‘emergent’ factors are acknowledged as a critical part of the study. 
There are several limitations to this approach. Firstly, the nature of that which is 
being studied is transient and dynamic. Law (2003) suggests that the researcher 
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should engage with the ‘mess’ and acknowledge the ‘vagueness’ of knowledge 
around the subject. By utilising an explorative approach the study aims to 
acknowledge variety and contradictions through theory building. Secondly, using the 
firm as the analytic unit suppresses other view points (Fuller and Moran, 2001; 
Glasmeier, 2007). Although this is acknowledged, it is believed that a focus on the 
firm provides the greatest ‘methodological fit’ between research questions, design 
and current theoretical understandings on adjustment and change (Edmondson and 
McManus, 2007). Thirdly, the focus on practices can give credence to insignificant 
and transient processes.  
 
3.3 Sampling Strategy 
A purposeful sampling strategy was used to target a specific type of economic 
activity – production for further manufacture - which was also undergoing significant 
change. The criteria of the sample are shown in Table 3.1. The sample was targeted 
to optimise the capture of relations and events to meet the research aims within 
limited time resources (James, 2006). 
Table 3.1: Sample Criteria 
Criteria Reason for Inclusion 
Product type: intermediate component To ensure the firm is encased by relationships with 
other manufacturers 
Actively trading with external firms Inter-firm relationships specifically examined 
Intense competitive pressure Ensure a need for change 
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Although the recession was a consistent and significant event across the sample, the 
study does not focus on a particular change event as the research is interested in 
overall ongoing transitions, rather than specific adaptations to a particular event. As 
such, it was important that the study sample was under intense competitive pressure 
from an increasingly international market and therefore continuous and ongoing 
adjustments required throughout the sector. The focus is on relationships with firms; 
ownership structure and size were not predetermined factors but remained open to 
the sample to retain diversity of resource influences (Sayer, 2007).  
3.3.1 Industry 
The industry was determined through preliminary analysis of linkages between 
sectors through Input-Output Analysis. This was done to identify those sectors that 
were fundamental to further manufacturing in the UK by measuring the number of 
forward and backward linkages through key sector analysis (Lenzen, 2003). Two 
types of linkage were examined; traditional economic relationships and 
environmental flows of materials, energy and waste. For further explanation of the 
technique see Appendix 9.1. 
Several sectors were identified with both economic and environmental significance 
(Appendix 9.1). The results were dominated by the primary production (e.g. electricity 
production and distribution) and service based (e.g. banking and finance) industries. 
Metal manufacture was found to be the only significant manufacturing industry in this 
analysis. Metal manufacture encompass several stages of production (Wood, 1976) 
and further refinement through desk based research was undertaken to identify 
component-based sub-industries, finally refined to basic and fabricated metals (SIC 
27 & 28), illustrated in Table 3.2 below. This industry is again very diverse in terms of 
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product and process. Further refinement identified foundry and forging sub-industries 
(SIC 27.5 and 28.4) as they have common products (metal components) and 
markets (further manufacture), with a high level of linkages in the wider economy 
(Taylor, 1978; Taylor and Wood, 1973). This provided a suitable sample industry with 
a high level of homogeneity in terms of the product type and engagement with the 
wider economy. 
Table 3.2: IMP Industry Classification 
Industry 
(SIC 2003) 
Sub-
industry 
Description 
27 27.1  Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferrous-
alloys 
 27.2 Manufacture of cast iron and steel tubes 
 27.3 Cold drawing, rolling and forming 
 27.4 Precious metals and non-ferrous production 
 27.5 Casting of ferrous and non-ferrous metals 
28 28.1 Manufacture of metal structures and parts of 
structures 
 28.2 Manufacture of tanks, reservoirs and containers of 
metals (inc. central heating radiators and boilers) 
 28.3 Manufacture of steam generators 
 28.4 Forging, pressing, stamping and roll forming of 
metal; powder metallurgy 
 28.5 Treatment, coating and machining of metals 
 28.6 Manufacture of cutlery, tools, locks and  hinges 
 28.7 Manufacture of fabricated metal products 
Source: Index to the UK Standard Industrial Classification of Economic Activities 2003 (ONS, 2003). 
Clear rows indicate sub-industries used in study. 
 
3.3.2 Location 
The study was based in the West Midlands region, UK. A single location was used to 
isolate the influence of place in firm behaviour through common historical and 
political structures (Amin et al., 2002).  
The region comprises six counties (see Figure 1.2), with the majority of IMP firms 
located in the West Midlands county (76% of IMP firms from the FAME database). 
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Despite the low concentration of IMP firms in sub-region 1 (Hereford, Worcester and 
Warwickshire) and sub-region 2 (Shropshire and Staffordshire), the counties were 
retained within the study’s classification to facilitate firm sampling and inter-
comparison with published data on the industry, both at European and national 
administrative levels. In addition, these areas have been identified as having 
innovative, niche metal manufacturers (Bryson and Taylor, 2006; Taylor and Bryson, 
2008). The purpose of the research is not to target specific ‘clusters’ of firms but to 
site the study within its governance/institutional framework (Amin et al., 2002). As 
such, it was important to define the study location against formal boundaries. 
The region was chosen for both methodological and practical reasons. The West 
Midlands has one of the largest concentrations of foundry and forging employment 
and enterprise populations, but has also experienced substantial decline. Figure 3.1 
and Figure 3.2 show the proportional decline of the IMP industry within the UK. 
Despite this, the IMP industries continue to be significant forms of manufacturing 
employment in the region [4.9% foundry, 18.7% forging in 2007 (Eurostat, 2011b)]. 
Targeting a large population of firms with significant decline, and therefore conditions 
for change, allowed for the most efficient use of limited time and resources to capture 
the required study data (James, 2006).  
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Figure 3.1 Employment Distribution and Change, 1998-2007 
Casting (SIC 2003 27.5)             Forging (SIC 2003 28.4)
 
 Source: Author (2012) based on data from Structural Business Statistics: Regional (Eurostat, 2011b) 
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Figure 3.2 Enterprise Distribution and Change, 1998-2007 
     Casting (2003 27.5)      Forging (SIC 2003 28.4)
 
Source: Author (2012) based on data from Structural Business Statistics: Regional (Eurostat, 2011b)
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3.3.3 Firm  
The sample was generated initially from a database of UK VAT registered firms: 
Financial Accounts Made Easy (FAME) and based on the Standard Industrial 
Classifications (SIC) (2003). The FAME database uses Companies House records 
(legally required reports of all VAT registered companies in the UK) and identifies key 
organisational and financial characteristics. It is considered the most effective 
method of generating a business population (BERR, 2009). However, the information 
recorded varies between firms due to legal requirements (BERR, 2009) and the level 
of detail the firm chooses to record beyond a legal requirement. A locational based 
population was originally constructed based on registered address (applicable to all 
VAT registered firms), active status (financial transactions within the past financial 
year (BERR, 2009)) and primary SIC. This was then sub-divided by firm employment 
size. There were several data limitations in this approach. Employment levels are not 
required for firms classified as micro-small by turnover, therefore an estimation 
function was applied by the database to classify this population. The information can 
be up to 23 months old (based on annual accounts or the anniversary of firm 
establishment), therefore firms which were not actively trading at the present time 
were included in the population. Additional sources (trade association membership 
lists and web searches) were used to validate and update the population against the 
primary SIC classification and to include those firms which were either not VAT 
registered or not correctly represented by their primary SIC code. 
A data cleansing process was then undertaken to limit inaccuracies and refine the 
sample population according to study criteria.  This is outlined in Table 3.3 and Table 
3.4 below. The prolific merger activity made it difficult to generate a population of 
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working firms. Dormant firms were identified by examining trading history (the last 
three years were provided) and tracing merger and acquisition activity (through 
historic profiles available). In cases where there was no trading activity in the last 
available year the firm was removed from the population. Multiple firms at the same 
postcode were investigated to remove double-counting. It is common practice to 
establish ‘paper’ subsidiaries and holding companies – to financially protect assets 
and liabilities – that were not production operating companies. As such, the facility 
which had operational data (purchase and sales) was retained in the sample and the 
remainder removed from the population but retained as linked entities. This created 
difficulties with the SIC classification as some of the multi-registered firms that 
remained did not have the desired SIC but were retained in the sample as their 
owners engaged in production processes. The population was checked against the 
required SIC codes. However, inaccuracies in status and production process were 
discovered when undertaking specific research on sample firms, at which point they 
were removed from the sample. 
Originally the sampling strategy was targeted at generating a subgroup of firms 
based on their financial stability and vulnerability, using credit ratings from FAME6. 
The intention was to construct a comparative analysis of ‘stronger’ and ‘weaker’ firms 
to assess the determinants of such vulnerability and the impact of risk on the firm. 
The credit rating, termed ‘quiscore’ in FAME, is based on statistical analysis of 
current and past financial stability and likelihood of closure within the following twelve 
                                            
6 The FAME database provides financial information on UK and Irish businesses based on 
records from Companies House reports. Information can be sought on individual firms and 
collections of firms based on location or industry to provide comparative business 
intelligence. The database is published by Bureau Van Dijk.    
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month period. It classifies businesses into five categories of stability: secure, stable, 
normal, caution/unstable and high risk. The proliferation of merger, acquisition, 
closure and reopening in the industry has generated a high level of dormant 
subsidiaries (registered firms without economic activity). It was predominately these 
businesses which had ‘high risk’ and ‘caution’ ratings, which, because of the non-use 
of the business were not useful for the study. As this did not generate any useful 
classifications the ‘normal’ firms were re-entered into the population (Table 3.3). 
There was an access problem with the forging subsector (see section 3.6) and as a 
result, the sampling criteria had to be widened to include a larger population (Table 
3.4). This was achieved by a web search of forging business, which uncovered 
several additional firms.  
Table 3.3: Firm Identification from FAME Database, Small and Medium Sized 
Enterprises (SME) 
Stage Criteria Number 
identified 
Sample 
number 
1 West Midlands, SIC (2003) 27.3, 27.5, 28.40, 28.51 
Active, Active (receivership), Active (dormant) 
Below 250 employees (with estimate) 
314 314 
2 Missing Quiscore variable  
 
35 279 
3 Inclusion of other database sources  
 
24 303 
4 Removal of firms with non-primary SIC 
 
157 146 
Exclusion of normal categorisation 
 
39 107 
Exclusion of dormant subsidiaries 
 
17 90 
Total sample 90 
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Table 3.4 Additional Sampling Procedure 
Stage Criteria Number 
Identified  
Sample 
Number * 
5 Inclusion of  firms with a ‘Normal’ quiscore classification 
 
39 129 
6 Recommendations from industry specialists 
 
18 135 
7 Inclusion of large firms (above 250 employees) to meet 
FAME sampling procedure 
10 145 
Removal of firms with non-primary SIC 
 
3 142 
Media/internet search  
 
2 143 
Recommendations from industry specialists 
 
3 146 
8 Web-based search for additional SIC 28.40 (forgings) 
(all sizes) 
 
7 153 
Total number of firms in sample 153 
* Sample number reflects running total- firms identified in subsequent methods are in some cases 
already included in sample. 
 
Due to the limited information available through financial records, it was difficult to 
target any particular group of firms and therefore the most suitable strategy to 
generate a cross-section of organisational success would be to follow a random 
sampling procedure. Under this approach, it would avoid the limitations of a ‘best 
practice approach’ and determine success from analysis of the individual 
organisation rather than by set criteria (Amin et al., 2002; Hanson and Pratt, 1995). 
Based on this strategy 20% of the population was selected to contact (every fifth 
firm). This continued through the outstanding working population until the desired 
number of firms had been interviewed (overall response rate of 44.4%). Through 
discussions with industry specialists (eight) and fieldwork interviewees it became 
apparent that there were key firms in the sector that were leading innovators in 
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process and business practice. As a result, it was decided that it was important to 
include these firms in the sample and they were targeted independently from the 
random sample. It should be noted that this was a biased selection based on 
engagement with the associations. For this reason, these recommendations formed 
only a small part of the selection and were only included if they were also in the 
working population. 
3.3.4 Participant 
Despite the assumption of the firm as the economic agent, the selection of individual 
participants remained an important step determining the management structure of 
the firm and to access the appropriate knowledge. Participants were selected to 
optimise access to information about the strategic and operational decisions of the 
organisation. As such, operating managers were targeted as it was believed that 
these roles held the greatest decision making capacity. Identifying the operating 
manager proved difficult for two reasons. Firstly, information was limited. Initial leads 
were taken from the registered contact on the Companies House record; however 
these were often out of date (particularly due to the increased employment change 
during the recession). Secondly, the identification of ‘managers’ is difficult in small to 
medium sized manufacturing firms as often the manager undertakes several other 
roles. 
3.3.5 Representativeness of Sample 
The final study sample comprises interviews with 45 IMP firms, which represent 0.9% 
of the region’s estimated IMP population. The distribution of the sample between IMP 
industries, firm size and representativeness to wider population is illustrated in Table 
3.5 below. 
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Table 3.5: Structure of IMP Industries at National, Regional and Respondent 
Group Level 
 Foundry  
(SIC 03 27: Manufacture of 
basic metals)  
Forge  
(SIC 03 28: Manufacture of 
fabricated metal products; 
except machinery and 
equipment) 
IMP 
Total 
SME Large Total SME Large Total 
UK Population a 1165 10 1175 19880 20 19900 21075 
UK Population of which IMP 
sub-industry a 
SIC 275 SIC 284 
 
1180 470  5  475 695 10  705 
West Midlands Population b 365 10  375 4395  25  4420 4790 
Respondent 
Group   
 
Number of 
firms 
26  2  28 14 3  17 45 
Number of 
interviews* 
30 3 33 16 5 21 54 
Note: SME (1-249 employees), large (250 or more employees)  
*Multiple interviews conducted in some firms 
Source: (a) BIS (2009b) (excludes sole proprietorships and partnerships with only owner-manager) (b) 
Wetherill (2009)  
 
Firms were classified according to their size (based on employment and turnover 
levels), ownership structure and process. The sample is predominately SMEs (40/45) 
(classified as below 250 employees and £22.8million turnover) (BERR, 2009). Size 
was used as a manageable distinction of resource differences and to reflect the 
conventional use of such classifications in policy and industry studies. It was felt that 
large firms were significant strategic actors in the industry, particularly with the trade 
association and in political lobbying, and as such they were deemed important to be 
included in the sample (Glasmeier, 2007). In addition, they have a far larger resource 
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base and structural power in comparison to smaller firms and, therefore, provided a 
comparative case of these factors. The sample is over represented in large firms due 
to the very low proportion of large organisations in the industry. This was mitigated by 
analysing the groups separately. The distribution of sample firms in the region 
reflects the general locational pattern of the wider population, with the majority in the 
West Midlands county and Dudley and Sandwell in particular, which is illustrated in 
Figure 3.3 below. 
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Figure 3.3:  Population and Sample of IMP Firms in West Midlands Region
 
Source: Author (2012) using population estimates from FAME 
 
As single interviews were the primary source of data collection, the information 
collected was representative of only the specific plant visited. Although the sample is 
Population of 
IMP firms 
Number of IMP 
firms in sample 
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predominately composed of single site enterprises (35/45), there is some diversity in 
the ownership structure of firms within the sample. Firms with multiple ‘paper’ 
subsidiaries (firms where there were no other physical sites but subsidiaries existed 
for accounting purposes) (2 firms) were represented as single sites. Multi-site 
organisations are represented according to the level of data collected: if the group 
managers were interviewed, the firm is represented as a group (Larsson, 1999); if 
only a subsidiary site was interviewed, they were represented as a subsidiary part of 
a larger organisation. This distinction is important for two reasons. Firstly, in several 
cases the interviewed sites were the only part of the group to engage in IMP activities 
and therefore it was inaccurate to reflect the whole organisation as an IMP firm. 
Secondly, the sites act as autonomous business units and therefore the decision 
making capacity (that of the interviewee) reflects the particular site. However, these 
sites also have access to resources within their group (Clarke, 1985; Taylor, 2000), 
which must be reflected in analysis by reference to the sites position within a larger 
organisation (e.g. SME X – group subsidiary). 
There is a prominence of foundry firms in the sample due to access difficulties with 
forging organisations. In addition, SIC classification was not always an accurate 
reflection of current production processes. As such, a sub-group of firms were 
identified as primarily undertaking fabrication activities (a distinctly different process 
to that of casting or forging). This was predominately found in forging enterprises (6:2 
forge: foundry ratio) that had diversified into higher value fabrication activities. These 
firms remained classified under their formal SIC code but were acknowledged during 
analysis as a sub-group. 
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3.4 Data Collection  
Date was collected over a 13 month period (September 2009-October 2010) through 
qualitative interviewing and desk based research. Fieldwork was divided into two 
stages: an intensive survey of IMP firms (45 firms, 55 interviews) and a case study of 
buyer-supplier relationships (10 firms, 11 interviews). The second stage emerged 
during data collection, when the importance of transaction relationship dynamics was 
particularly evident and quickly became a central theme in the study. All interviews 
were digitally recorded but one firm was unwilling to be recorded. Field notes were 
taken throughout the fieldwork process to record any significant perceptions or 
events, and used, in particular, to record the changing economic climate during the 
fieldwork period. 
3.4.1 Data Sources 
The study was primarily based on corporate interviews, although other primary data 
sources were used, which are outlined in Table 3.6. Secondary data sources were 
also used: financial records, corporate brochures and aggregate published statistics 
from European and UK based statistical bodies.  These were used to prompt 
interviewees on specific issues and for background information on larger processes, 
such as industrial energy pricing. The additional data also provided some level of 
verification of interviewee accounts through questioning their accounts (for instance 
from financial records of events) and gaining greater clarification from such prompts 
(Kvale and Brinkmann, 2008; Rubin and Rubin, 2005). Interviews were undertaken at 
the business premises to prompt factory tours and to situate the respondent in their 
most comfortable setting (Elwood and Martin, 2000). Second stage interviews were 
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telephone-based due to access difficulties (respondents were not based in the study 
region). 
Table 3.6  Primary Data Sources 
Data source Number 
Stage 1 Stage 2 
Number of enterprises 45 10 
Number of interviews 54 11 
Multiple interviews at firm 7 1 
Number of multiple person interviews 4 1 
Number of face-face interviews 53 7 
Number of telephone interviews 1 4 
 
3.4.2 The Corporate Interview 
The corporate interview allows access to deeper understanding of the decision 
making process and context of events in the organisation (Boons and Wagner, 2009; 
Ekanem, 2007; Miller et al., 2004; Schoenberger, 1991). The consistency and 
representation of voices that represent the firm in the interview has been questioned 
(Healey and Rawlinson, 1993; McDowell, 1992; O'Neill and Gibson-Graham, 1999; 
Oinas, 1999). Clark (1998) acknowledges the role of data construction by the 
interviewee in shaping the type of ‘truth’ that is shared suggesting that the 
advantages of accessing experiences and context through this method are critical to 
developing understandings of corporate practices (Clark, 2007). The assumption of 
the decision-maker as knowing and open to disclose information is of particular 
relevance to this study. Due to the highly contextual nature of information it was 
perceived that interviewing was the most suitable means of access. As the majority of 
firms in the study were small with a single owner/manager it was assumed that there 
would be a single decision-maker and their involvement with multiple areas of the 
organisation (managerial, production, sales) would increase the depth of information 
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and reasoning. However, the assumption did prove problematic in larger firms where 
there were multiple decision-makers. Multiple interviews were undertaken where 
possible to mitigate partial understandings (multi-person interviews proved 
particularly useful for this). In three cases this was not achieved due to access 
difficulties.  
Criticisms of the interview method focus on the taken-for-granted nature of data, 
which can be misrepresentative (Block, 2000) and heavily descriptive. The idea of 
‘performance’ as part of the interview data, as how something is said as well as what 
is said, has gained credence as a part of the qualitative interviewing approach in 
recent years (Crang, 2002; 2003; 2005b; Davies and Dwyer, 2007; 2008). The 
interviews in the study were primarily focused on content. However, an engagement 
with actions, examples, and step-by-step processes were used to identify clear 
structures and actions that could be traced and verified (Savage and Burrows, 2007; 
Silverman, 2001; Sminia, 2009).  
Questioning procedure 
Discussions were held with five industry experts to establish overarching issues in 
both manufacturing and more specifically the IMP industries. Experts were identified 
through desk based research on dominant trade associations for the manufacturing 
and metal component sectors and interviews held with the sector representative. This 
was an important step in determining current challenges, particularly as the study 
period occurred at the beginning of the recession and economic circumstances were 
changing rapidly, making other sources (particularly grey literature) quickly dated. 
Desk based research was combined with industry discussions to identify potential 
interview topics. Three key topics were initially identified based on the current issues 
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in the industry, the wider economic context and the research aims: (1) the firm’s 
relationship to the wider environment, (2) challenges facing the firm, and (3) the firms 
understanding of success and survival. During fieldwork these topics became refined 
and particular sub-topics evolved that were not initially targeted (embedded topics) 
(Briggs, 1986), as illustrated in Figure 3.4. Initially, interview topics were purposefully 
kept broad to allow individual firms to identify their specific issues (Holstein and 
Gubrium, 1995). Once these had been identified, interviews with case study firms 
followed a more purposeful questioning procedure directed at a specific research 
theme - transaction and relationship characteristics (Figure 3.4b). 
  
 
9
5
 
Figure 3.4 Interview Topic Guide 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Brief history of company and interviewee’s position: 
Structure, products & process, turnover, profitability, employees, site and market 
Firm’s relation to wider environment: 
Transaction structures, relationships, 
distribution of costs & risks,  
competitive position 
Challenges facing the firm: 
What has affected turnover & 
profitability, responses, alternative  
strategies, adjustments made 
Recession: 
Used as a change  
event, impact on  
firm, adjustments  
made 
Environmental issues: 
Impacts, responses, 
 gains 
Risk areas: 
How are they 
identified, controlled, 
responded to, how do 
they relate to cost 
structure and strategy 
Notion of survival: 
What has been most critical for survival and for  success 
Opportunities: 
What is the 
company pursuing 
& barriers 
 
Business aims: 
Attitude to growth, planning systems 
Cost base of firm and its relation to 
strategies/adjustments 
 
Order structures & agreements 
between transaction partners 
Influence of 
credit 
availability 
Energy costs 
Key: 
Embedded topics 
that emerged during 
fieldwork 
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Figure 3.4b Interview Topic Guide: Stage 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although the interviews were explorative, a semi-structured approach was used and 
topic guides established to prepare for potential avenues of discussion whilst 
retaining flexibility for topic divergence (Berry, 2002; Healey and Rawlinson, 1993; 
Kvale and Brinkmann, 2008). A conversation flow was maintained and interviewees 
encouraged to use their own frame of reference by keeping questions unstructured 
Brief history of company and interviewee’s 
position: 
Overview of role, engagement with transaction 
partners, company overview 
Transactional relationship: 
Dependency, agreements, process of developing 
a business relationship, problems with transaction 
partners, location of equipment 
Price changes: 
Mechanism of 
understanding 
relationship and 
dynamic between 
partners 
Recession: 
Event used to measure 
change in the 
relationship 
Trade credit & credit 
insurance: 
Mechanism for 
understanding 
relationship between 
transaction partners 
Risk areas: 
How are they identified, controlled, responded to, 
how do they relate to cost structure and strategy 
Business aims: 
Attitude to growth, planning systems 
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and open-ended (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002). Questions were derived following 
Mason’s (2002) methodological approach from research aims to interview questions. 
An example of the process is provided in Figure 3.5. The questioning procedure 
followed that outlined by Markusen (1999b) to develop levels of events that centred 
on changes in the global economy to structural changes and finally to management 
changes. The questions focused on generating interviewees’ experiences and 
practices as this retains the actors (in this case firms) in the causation processes 
(Berger, 2005) and captures transitionary, rather than purely structural, processes 
(Murphy, 2011).  
Particular attention was paid to question phrasing and clarification of meaning/terms 
used to avoid misrepresentation and in to ensure research topics were explored fully 
during the research process. In addition, five pilot interviews were conducted (and 
later incorporated into the analysis dataset) to test the questioning method and broad 
topic selection. It became clear from these interviews that key words, particularly 
‘recession’ and ‘resilience’, had a significant impact on the interview. These words 
had strong popular rhetoric from the media at the time of study, making it difficult to 
assess participants own experiences and they often dominated the interview. A set of 
key words/phrases that were particularly powerful were determined and avoided 
early in the interview to prevent premature closure of interview. Interview questions 
were continually evaluated and evolved throughout the fieldwork process to optimise 
the success of data collection (Briggs, 1986). 
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Figure 3.5 Procedure for Developing Interview Topics and Questions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Mason (2002:72) 
 
Stage 6: How questions relate to objectives 
Speed & frequency of change 
Research aim: The big question 
Understanding adjustment 
Stage 1: Research objectives 
How does the organisation change? 
Stage 2: Break down of research objectives into questions 
How was change in the organisation funded/achieved? 
How difficult is it for the organisation to change? How long does it take? 
Do organisations continually change or change to meet only significant 
pressures? 
What is the form of change: significant restructuring or minor alterations? 
Are there formal mechanisms for dealing with change/adaptations? 
 
Stage 3: Emergent themes 
Costs of change 
Capacity to change 
Rate of change 
Change process 
 
Stage 4: Potential interview topics 
Rate of change 
Transition period 
Innovations 
Stage 5: Potential interview questions 
How often does the firm engage in change? 
How quickly is change initiated? 
How long does it take to initiate and implement change? 
How quickly does the firm respond to changes? 
What are the drivers for innovations? 
What innovations has the firm put in place - an example? 
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Data Consistency and Accuracy  
The interviewing approach taken did generate several issues. Although exploration 
was initially driven by interviewees, probing and encouragement of topics by the 
researcher influenced the topics which were discussed. Interviews during the later 
stages of the fieldwork were more targeted at the topics that had emerged from 
earlier interviews. To mitigate against selection bias a results matrix was maintained 
to document topic selection and emerging themes. In this, interviews were 
thematically coded and a content analysis undertaken to quantify emerging themes 
during the fieldwork period. Exploration was maintained until theoretical ‘saturation’ 
was reached (Bowen, 2008; Glaser and Strauss, 1967), whereby recurrent topics 
were being brought up by interviewees. After this point, subsequent interviews were 
more focussed on collecting data on these topics.  
As a result of the exploratory approach there was a high level of data inconsistency 
between interview topics. This was particularly the case for early interviews as not all 
the final topics had been discussed at this early stage in the fieldwork. Although 
some level of data inconsistency is always generated by following a semi-structured 
approach (Hanson and Pratt, 1995), it was felt that key topics needed to be revisited 
with the first group of participants to maximise data analysis and the 
representativeness of conclusions. This group was re-contacted by email to complete 
a short questionnaire on two fundamental themes of the research - buyer-supplier 
relationship characteristics and the composition of their cost base. The response rate 
was 52% and significantly improved the completion of the data set. To reflect the 
incompleteness of data on each topic, reference to frequencies during the analysis 
are made in respect to the number of explicit responses rather than total number of 
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firms interviewed. Despite the limitations identified with an explorative questioning 
procedure, the method did allow the emergence of key themes that were directly 
determined by the interviewees themselves and reflected the firms’ current situation. 
The recession provided a consistent event across all interviews to frame responses. 
To increase the validity of the data two key checks were put in place. Firstly, key 
questions were approached from multiple angles and with prompts from desk-based 
research to measure consistency of accounts (Healey and Rawlinson, 1993; Kvale 
and Brinkmann, 2008). Due to the conversational approach taken during the 
interviews, interviewer interpretation of accounts was particularly critical as 
quantifiable data was often minimal. To mitigate misinterpretation, responses were 
summarised back to informants both during the interview (Schoenberger, 1991) and 
summary accounts provided post interview to verify interpretation and for additional 
comments (Arksey and Knight, 1999). This was a very successful approach with all 
firms responding to the email. It also provided an opportunity for additional 
information to be gathered in instances where questions had not been completely 
followed up during the interview. 
3.4.3 Relationship Case Studies 
The case study method is a common approach in organisational research (Perren 
and Ram, 2004; Piekkari et al., 2009) as it incorporates historical actions, dynamism 
and a rich understanding of processes within the firm (Gummersson, 1999). Case 
studies were used in the second stage of fieldwork to examine causal relationships in 
the data that were identified during the intensive interview stage (Healey and 
Rawlinson, 1993). The key theme (relationships and transactions) was highly 
variable in the initial data set and therefore further investigation was required through 
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‘explanatory case studies’ (Yin, 2003a; 2003b) and specifically to examine the 
phenomena from another view point (the transaction partner) (Chetty, 1996). A 
further cross-case analysis was undertaken by using several matched transactions 
(IMP firm and customer of supplier). 
Mapping and examining relationships 
Buyer-supplier relationships were identified following the procedure outline in Table 
3.7. Initially, interviewees were probed during the interview to identify key customers. 
These responses were combined to provide a database of potential relationship case 
studies. This was followed by requests for further information on direct transaction 
partners to a small number of IMP firms where a particularly strong rapport was 
established. Limited information was found in interview results as company names 
were often omitted. It was difficult to identify supplier transaction partners from the 
interview results, so a web based search was used to identify firms which were 
significant suppliers to the industry. These relationships were not used as case 
studies but provided additional information to contextualise the transaction-specific 
data. The case study sample is not representative of the broader population of IMP 
customer or supplier firms. They were selected based on the strategic significance of 
the transaction partner to either the specific IMP firm or the IMP industry generally 
(Table 3.8).  
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Table 3.7  Mapping Relationships 
Stage Mechanism Number identified 
1 Probing during interview 
 
35 
2 Network mapping of relationships  
 
3 Purposeful sampling from interview transcripts  
 
4 Email sent to 5 participants to request information 
on direct transaction partners 
4 (1 firm responded with 
information) 
5 Web search for suppliers (unable to access any 
found in purposeful sampling) 
2 (prominent suppliers in 
industry) 
Total identified 29 customers 
10 suppliers 
2 subcontractors 
Exclusion of firms not able to find contact information or 
decipher which plant the firm had the transaction link with 
8 customers 
2 suppliers 
Total accessed (response rate %) 7 customers (33.3) 
2 suppliers (25.0) 
1 subcontractor (50.0) 
 
 
Table 3.8 Significance of Transaction Partner in Study 
 Transaction Link 
Customer Supplier Subcontractor 
Significant for firm 
(value of spend) 
5 0 0 
Significant in industry  
(identified as a ‘key player’) 
2 2 1 
 
There were several limitations to this approach. Although the relationships uncovered 
were verified by desk-based research (to investigate the product and potential use of 
an IMP industry supplier/customer), inconsistencies in the mapping of transaction 
relationships occurred in one instance. In this case, IMP firms were suppliers but they 
no longer dealt with the specific IMP firm identified in the sample. The case was 
removed from the direct transaction set and used instead as framing information. 
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This highlights the potential role of interpretation in framing the case study choices. 
The interview topics were very specific on transaction and relationship practices, 
which were viewed with particular caution by potential respondents. No reference 
was made to specific firms during interviewing (to maintain confidentiality) and as 
such, details about specific relationships were only probed and left to the interviewee 
to choose to discuss. The method did prove successful in generating an account of 
the transaction relationship which was not censored to protect future trading. It did 
mean that some portions of the interview were not specifically addressing the case 
study relationship. Finally, only single interviews were undertaken with the 
transaction partners, many of which were MNEs, due to time and access constraints 
but also because the study had identified the significance of site-site relationships. 
The interview was conducted with the specific trading site and purchasing/sales 
managers to maximise access to information on the specific IMP firms involved. To 
mitigate bias in identification or interview topics, comparative case studies were 
developed around multiple transaction partners where possible and non-direct 
relationships (industry significant interviews) were used to frame the information. 
3.4.4 Access: Methods and Response Rates 
Several methods were employed to access interviewees. These are outlined in Table 
3.9. In the first stage interviewees were predominately contacted through 
recommendations from industry specialists, random selection from the database and 
snowballing. The success rate of each of these methods varied considerably through 
the sample (Table 3.10) and particularly between large and small firms. Success was 
greatest in small firms through recommendations (73.3%) and internet searches 
(71.4%). Despite these high success rates, random selection from the FAME 
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database comprise the vast majority of small firm access (23/40 firms in sample), all 
be it with a much lower response rate (40.4%), due to the limited number of 
introductions from these specialists. Large firms were predominately accessed 
through snowballing from current participants (5/6). The second stage case studies 
were identified predominately through relationships with IMP sample firms (8/10 
firms). This was supplemented through an internet search for suppliers, which were 
more difficult to identify and access from stage one interviews. 
Table 3.9 Identification Methods 
Approach Stage 1 Stage 2 
Number 
Identified 
Number 
Contacted  
(% from 
those 
identified) 
Number 
Successful  
(% from those 
contacted that 
resulted in 
interview) 
Number 
Identified 
Number 
Contacted 
(% from 
those 
identified) 
Number 
Successful 
(% from those 
contacted that 
resulted in 
interview) 
Industry 
specialists 
19 (SME) 
3 (large) 
15 (SME)  
(78.9) 
3 (large) 
(100.0) 
11 (SME) 
(73.3) 
0 (large) 
(0.0) 
   
FAME 
database  
129 
(SME) 
10 (large) 
57 (SME) 
(44.2) 
7 (large) 
(70.0) 
23 (SME) 
(40.4) 
1 (large) 
(14.3) 
   
Internet 
search 
7 (SME) 
0 (large) 
7 (SME) 
(100.0) 
0 (large) 
(0.0) 
5 (SME) 
(71.4) 
0 (Large) 
(0.0) 
2 2 (100.0) 2 (100.0) 
Media 
Reports 
1 (SME) 
0 (large) 
1 (SME) 
(100.0) 
0 (large) 
(0.0) 
0 (SME) 
(0.0) 
0 (large) 
(0.0) 
   
Snowballing 6 (SME) 
9 (large) 
1 (SME) 
(16.7) 
5 (large) 
(55.6) 
0 (SME) 
(0.0) 
5 (large) 
(100.0) 
   
Relationship 
mapping 
from 
interview 
data 
- - - 39 29 (74.4) 8 (27.6) 
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Table 3.10 Response Rates 
 Number in sample Number successful  Response rate (%) 
Cold call letter 100 
 
39 39.0 
Introduction from 
industry specialist 
18 11 61.1 
Snowballing 6 
 
5 83.3 
Average response rate 61.1 
 
Snowballing proved particularly useful in accessing large firms and particularly in 
accessing three firms which had been unresponsive to prior methods of contact 
(database and recommendations). Here, contact through an existing participant 
directed my interview request to the correct person (something which had been 
difficult to identify in large firms particularly due to the more complex organisational 
structure and greater use of personal assistants). Interestingly, however, is that the 
firms which were recommending these large firms were actually customers or 
suppliers (contacted in the second stage of the study) and not competitors in the 
same industry. This was a critical point to the success of snowballing in this study as 
it provided a lead into the discussions of relationships with these other firms. The 
snowballing technique was not successful with any small firms as they would be 
recommending their direct competitors (there were no direct competitors between the 
large firms in the study area as all were differentiated on product or material type). 
Forging firms proved particularly difficult to access despite their considerable number 
in the working sample. To increase the response rate two additional methods were 
employed: web searches and existing links between the industry and university. 
Firms identified through these methods tended to have diversified into fabrication, 
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particularly those recommended from university contacts as they were actively 
engaging in process developments. Although this sample did have a bias towards 
innovative firms i.e. those who had diversified, the other organisational 
characteristics (structure and resources) were similar to the wider sample and 
therefore they were included in the study. 
Access to transaction partners proved particularly difficult, both to firms and 
information, as confidentiality between transaction partners was maintained. As such, 
snowballing could not be used and potential respondents were cold-called. The 
range of industries restricted the amount of engagement and reputation building and 
the large size of many of the transaction partners (MNE) made finding and accessing 
suitable interviewees a challenge. The respondents that were identified were 
extremely useful in that they were purchasing or selling representatives that could 
proficiently discuss their transaction relationships. 
3.5 Data Analysis  
The analysis followed a grounded theory approach using analytic induction to build 
emergent themes and theories from an iterative process of challenging assumptions 
through deviant and comparative case analysis (Bryman, 2008; Silverman, 2005), as 
illustrated in Figure 3.6 below. All data (both primary and secondary) were analysed 
using a qualitative data analysis program (QSR NVivo 9.0). Computer-aided 
qualitative analysis has been criticised for the reliability of results, particularly from 
theorising and search functions (Humble, 2012; Welsh, 2002). However, the NVivo 
package was used in this study as a storage facility to manage, combine and store a 
relatively large quantity of data. The facility provided easy retrieval of data extracts 
and its associated raw data, actually increasing the ability to expand and refine 
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coding themes (Humble, 2012; Lu and Shulman, 2008). Interview transcriptions were 
transcribed and checked for accuracy (Figure 3.6). The analysis process is outlined 
in Table 3.11, following that of Saldan (2009). 
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Figure 3.6 Analysis Flow Chart 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from iterative process of Edmondson and McManus (Figure 3, 2007:1174)
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Statistical analysis 
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Results 
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framework 
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Table 3.11 Analysis process  
Stage Technique/method Purpose 
1 Holistic and thematic coding on 
interview summaries and fieldwork 
notes during fieldwork  
To provide an overview and identify themes to 
pursue during fieldwork 
Generated a matrix of events and processes 
for case comparisons 
2 Initial coding To break down and explore data 
Used multiple coding types to capture all data 
(both from existing themes identified and new) 
Generated 256 codes 
3 Categorisation Build concepts through linked codes (tree 
codes) 
Generated tree codes 
4 Case study comparison Comparative coding of both transaction 
partners based on coding structure already 
developed 
Source: Adapted from Saldan (2009) 
 
In the first stage a content analysis was also undertaken to keep a record of 
occurrences of events and features. This proved particularly useful for identifying 
groups of cases and possible deviant cases (Fielding and Fielding, 1986; Silverman, 
2001, 2005). Comparison between cases allowed an ‘explanation-building’ technique 
to build a ‘profile of behaviour’ (Ekanem, 2007) and link concepts and events within 
the data. The initial coding stage used four coding types, outlined in Table 3.12, to 
capture all information within the data.  
Table 3.12 Coding Types Used in Analysis 
Code Type Purpose 
Process To identify strategies 
 
Attribute Descriptive elements of firms (also added to matrix to generate 
frequency of events) 
In Vivo Extracted codes to ensure representation of behaviour, process and 
mechanisms 
Structural To retain context around concepts 
 
Source: Adapted from Fielding (2008) 
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This was initially done on a line-by-line basis but this removed the contextual nature 
of the data and often misrepresented its meaning. Therefore, subsequent coding was 
based on a point-by-point basis to retain overall meaning. However, it created a vast 
number of codes (256) which required refinement through multiple coding cycles to 
establish conceptual clarification of codes and merging of code groups (Crang, 
2005a; Rubin and Rubin, 2005). Analytic memos were a key tool during this process 
to record concept development and linkages. NVivo provided a useful tool for linking 
codes though relationships, aiding theory building through the phases of coding (see 
Appendix 9.2 for coding map example). Key stages were included in the fieldwork 
and transcription process to interpret and assess the data (Bird, 2005; Miller et al., 
2004; Schiellerup, 2008). Analysis was undertaking until consistency in codes was 
achieved. Case studies were coding using existing codes developed from stage one. 
All transaction partners’ interviews were re-coded together in a comparative process 
to identify the variant view points (Figure 3.7). 
 
Figure 3.7 Flow Chart of Stage Two: Case Studies 
 
 
  
Interviews 
Relational mapping 
Identify pairings 
Closer analysis of case studies 
Structural coding matrix 
Inform coding for 2nd 
stage interviews 
Compare accounts of relationships and 
contracts 
 111 
 
Typologies were used to identify broad strategic groups in the data. The typologies 
were based on common mechanisms and structures, following the research 
approach laid out by Sayer (2000), rather than frequency of occurrence or general 
applicability. This allowed for links to be made between concepts and identify deeper 
causal structures. To reflect the approach, firms were only included in the typologies 
if they clearly demonstrated the properties of the particular structure and were 
represented in the study with reference to these groups rather than overall 
frequencies. 
3.5.1 Measuring Slippery Concepts: Power  
Indicators were used to indentify power relationships during the analysis 
(Fredrickson, 1986; James, 2003). These are based on theoretical understandings of 
the topic and the study’s own conceptualisation of power as an explicit and implicit 
form of influence in specific contexts. The indicators used reflect the practices and 
impacts of instances of power (such as dependency, vulnerability) outlined in Table 
3.13. Under a critical realist perspective, power can only be explained in relation to 
other entities enacted on (Jones, P., 2010) and as such, the process of identifying 
power was critical in the case studies where experiences of both parties could be 
related to each other to deepen the understanding of the concept. The identification 
of power was limited by the study’s focus on decision-making representatives and 
supply chain dynamics and as such, only certain forms and utilisations of power were 
conceptualised (Hughes, 1999b; Lukes, 2005).  
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Table 3.13 Observable Indicators of Power: Practices, Impacts, Dependency  
Dimension of Power Indicator 
Practices Everyday 
 Under stress – recession 
Impacts Competitive position 
 Risk/vulnerability 
 Strategy formulation 
Dependency Proportion of turnover 
 Supplier status (sole, preferred) 
 Position in supply chain 
 Ownership 
 Diversity (number of customers/sites, sectors, product types, 
capabilities) 
 Contract type 
 Customer structure: size (employment and revenue) and ownership 
structure of customer 
Firm Vulnerability Financial security (revenue, profitability) 
 Performance (turnover per employee, value added per employee) 
Source: Author (2012) based on conceptualisations of power from Taylor (2000), Fields (2006) and 
Gereffi et al. (2005). 
 
The measurement of power was difficult in traditional coding methods because 
intensity could not be captured. To overcome this, magnitude analysis was used as a 
method of quantifying the intensity of the example (Fielding, 2008; Saldana, 2009) 
and provide levels of measurement (D'Cruz, 2004). This was undertaken through a 
comparative analysis of instances of power between cases, an approach common in 
the analysis of business strategy (Harrigan, 1983; Snow and Hambrick, 1980) and 
social research (Fielding and Fielding, 1986) to provide a spectrum of cases. A 
quantitative analysis of change was attempted through principal component analysis 
(Clarke, 1985; Taylor, 2000) using indicators of risk, power and financial stability 
within the qualitative data. However, the level of inconsistency and lack of factual 
data limited this approach (see Appendix 9 for an outline of proposed indicators for 
statistical analysis). 
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3.5.2 Mining or Unpacking the Data? 
During the fieldwork and analysis process there were instances of significant 
conceptual development from particular transcripts or data. Although these events 
are noted by others (Schiellerup, 2008), to ensure that data were not ‘cheery picked’ 
from a particularly succinct and fruitful interview checks were put into place. 
Comparative case analysis was undertaken until sufficient explanation could be given 
for each variable case through cycles of coding (Silverman, 2005) and counter-
examples were used in the presentation of examples. The NVivo tool proved 
particularly useful for this as it allowed easy retrieval of all related data (Welsh, 2002), 
therefore increasing the reliability of comparisons and concept development. The 
relative weight given to the concept/evidence was based on its ‘completeness’ of a 
concept i.e. if all the building blocks and cases of the process could be accounted for 
and theoretically discussed (Fielding and Fielding, 1986). Particular weight is given to 
the case studies because of the multiple viewpoints available that allowed a 
comparative analysis of specific instances. The process of categorising and building 
concepts resulted in a loss of specificity (Hanson and Pratt, 1995) for the sake of a 
more complete overview of the process.  
 
3.6 Access, Positionality and Validity: Some Methodological 
Considerations 
The timing of the study has significant influence over accessibility to firms, 
participants and information (Desmond, 2004; Ward and Jones, 1999). The recession 
was generating increased dynamism in the industry, with large scale redundancies, 
 114 
 
closures and restructuring. As a result, it was particularly difficult to access accurate 
information on firms and employees prior to contacting them. This made the sampling 
process more difficult (for both firm and participant) and the interviewer less informed 
prior to the interview. However, it also supported the explorative approach as there 
was little current knowledge about the firm or its situation. Telephone contact to 
arrange interviews provided the only access to up to date information. In addition, 
short-time working (partial closure during the week) was common during the period. 
This seemed to help and hinder access. Some firm representatives were busier and 
more focussed on the survival of the business during this period and therefore less 
interested in engaging in research. However, there were also firms which were more 
inclined to get involved because the significance of the research was more apparent 
(survival) and they had more available time on their hands. The content of the 
interview was framed by the recession (both as a current event and its significance) 
and made it difficult to diverge from this subject. 
The study targeted firm elites, defined here as decision making representatives. 
Conceptions of elites have centred around power, particularly from hierarchical 
position (Cormode and Hughes, 1999). This definition proved difficult in this industry 
as the structure and nature of roles differed considerably between firms and 
managers. This contrast was particularly evident between elites of the IMP firms and 
those of their customers in the second research phase (corporate MNEs), which had 
more clearly defined roles and knowledge bases. This variability in ‘elites’ is 
acknowledged by Woods (1998) and more contextualised notions have developed 
around the local characteristics and influence (Cochrane, 1998; Parry, 1998; 
Richards, 1996), exclusivity (Desmond, 2004) and connectedness (Oinas, 1999). The 
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role definition was important in both the sampling of participants and the methods of 
access to firms and knowledge. Terminology, particular ‘strategy’, was not commonly 
used by all interviewees. There was a particular subset of firms (micro businesses 
with older managers) which did not regularly engage in this type of analysis. As such, 
the topics had to be introduced more carefully. In addition, it was clear that overall 
business awareness (such as customer portfolios) and planning was not necessarily 
formally undertaken or business terminology used in all organisations. Therefore, to 
reflect the diversity of ‘elites’ the questioning practice had to be carefully judged prior 
and during the interview to access the most information possible.  
The role of positionality was an ongoing issue for access to participants and 
knowledge (Cormode and Hughes, 1999). The ‘checking out process’, as termed by 
Ostrander (1993) was ongoing, particularly during initial telephone contact and 
‘quizzing’ of consent forms and study information provided prior to the interview. 
Being in a male dominated environment (only two interviewees were female) 
highlighted the gender difference between interviewer and interviewee. However, 
being a ‘geographer’ undertaking a ‘business’ study also generated clear perceptions 
to interviewees. It became clear during the research that interviewees needed to 
define the researcher as ‘something’ whether that be ‘the lady’ or the ‘geographer’ or 
the ‘student’ (McDowell, 1998). It was difficult to challenge these perceptions and 
instead the approach taken was to attempt to capitalise on these perceptions for 
greater access to certain aspects of knowledge. A set of assumptions were 
intentionally implied about the researcher, based on the researchers assumptions 
about the respondents and their attitude towards academic research (Oinas, 1999). 
The most common approach was to designate researcher as a student conducting a 
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research project at an established institution and with a local accent. By doing this it 
was hoped the researcher would be positioned as a semi-academic, perhaps more 
approachable, less able to threaten the reputation and credibility of the business, with 
an understanding and compassion towards the industry from local ties (Harvey, 
2010). These perceptions helped ‘sell’ the research, phrasing the interview as an 
informal ‘chat’, by clearly defining positions of power in the interview. The micro-
politics during the interview process meant that in many cases the power balance 
shifted and fluctuated between ‘elite’ and ‘researcher’ (Rice, 2009; Smith, 2006). 
On the reverse of these positionalities lie other interpretations: inexperience, 
unworthy of time, unable to comprehend complex information, and inferior to the 
participant, both in status and knowledge. As such, the classification of the 
researcher as ‘something’ involves weaving in and out of positionalities to access 
information (Harvey, 2010; McDowell, 1998), dependent on the participant, the 
context of interaction (i.e. letter, telephone call or interview) and the timing of such. 
Under this interpretation the research process becomes a minefield of navigating 
barriers and active constructions of data by the participant to shield or protect their 
business. During the research process the use of positionality as a tool was effective, 
prompting access to several firms of the basis of age (‘I only agreed to speak to you 
because my son is doing a similar project at university’) and local connections (‘I 
have found memories of the University of Birmingham’, ‘I used to play golf close to 
you’), and being female (after being approached by an interviewee the researcher 
was able to get print outs of sensitive data). However, it also proved restrictive and 
difficult (almost impossible) to challenge. At least in part this inability to contest 
interpretations of ability, knowledge, and experience was restricted because of the 
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short interaction: predominately a telephone call, email and single interview. Instead, 
the researcher learnt to use perceptions of positionality as an advantage; as a young 
researcher they were seen as unable to understand strategy and legislation but, on 
the other hand, unlikely to use information to damage the company; and participants 
often started at a basic level to make their explanation more understandable to a 
novice. Both these elements meant that the researcher was able to develop 
fundamental understandings of participants approaches and often navigate through 
strategy formulations after illustrating competency (Harvey, 2010). However, the 
limitations to this positionality remained, albeit to varying degrees between 
participants, and certain topics (e.g. financial data) or complexity (e.g. strategic 
direction) remained off-limits in certain cases. 
A further complication was the association with a geography, rather than business, 
department and therefore an assumed preference to environmental, rather than 
economic, considerations by several respondents. When environmental topics were 
broached interviewees were reluctant to divulge information and quickly followed with 
a defence of their actions. In these situations it was clear the respondent felt the I 
was seeking a particular answer because of my position at a geography department 
(Gibson-Graham, 1994). The impact of these positionalities and inferences on the 
research data is difficult to define, although it was clear that access affected the data 
constructed (Clark, 2007; Cochrane, 1998). As such, the results are specific to the 
study firms and framed in reference to the methodological and theoretical approach 
used. 
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Validity and Reliability 
Several measures were implemented to ensure the validity of the research 
throughout the study; multiple data sources were combined to provide additional 
information (Yeung, 2003), the questioning procedure tailored to include redundant 
questions (Rubin and Rubin, 2005) and include collaborative checks from desk 
research, accuracy checks undertaken for interview transcription and an analytic 
induction method utilised during analysis (Silverman, 2005). The use of these 
mechanisms has been outlined above. However, there are two specific measures 
which require further discussion: reliance on single interviews and the use of member 
checks. The use of single interviews has been criticised for difficulty in determining 
the validity of single representations as a result of partial knowledge/perspectives 
(Healey and Rawlinson, 1993; Markusen, 1999b) and the hidden agendas of 
interviewees (Berry, 2002). In order to minimise respondent bias multiple interviews 
were attempted within each firm. However, this proved difficult due to the limited 
number of suitable respondents per firm (often in the smaller firms only one person – 
usually the owner/manager – was responsible for operational decisions) and ongoing 
access. Large firms were particularly susceptible to such bias because of the 
increased segregation of roles. To mitigate this error, multi-person interviews were 
conducted where possible (see Table 3.6) and a larger sample of firms used to 
provide a higher number of comparable cases (Hanson and Pratt, 1995). The second 
consideration is the use of member checks. Interviewees were provided summary 
accounts of the interview to check interpretations and provide opportunity for further 
clarification. A difficulty with is approach is the potential disagreement between 
interviewer and interviewee (Turner and Coen, 2008). All interviewees responded 
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and verified the interpretation, implying a high validity rate. The summary accounts 
were selective of potentially sensitive information, an issue highlighted by Bradshaw 
(2001) and Locke and Velamuri (2009). The accounts were ‘summaries’ and 
therefore did not warrant detailed information, some of which may have been 
deemed too sensitive in retrospect by the interviewees (the recordings and full 
transcripts were available to the interviewees should they wish for full disclosure but 
none were requested). 
The reliability of data was achieved through a reflexive approach to data collection 
and analysis (Baxter and Eyles, 1997), integrating check points for reflection (Miller 
et al., 2004) and an audit trail (Bailey et al., 1999) from a research diary and the use 
of computer-aided analysis. Again, these measures have been detailed above. Due 
to the nature of data collected, through single representatives and topic evolution, the 
findings are highly time and space specific. Although this has been suggested to be a 
weakness of qualitative research (Markusen, 2003), the process approach enables a 
wider conceptualisation of mechanisms and structures (Hudson, 2003; Yeung, 2003). 
To reflect the representativeness of the data, frequencies are indicated in the 
presentation of results to acknowledge the partial interpretation of certain topics 
(Silverman, 2005). 
 
3.7 Generalisations  
The sample broadly represents the structure of the population of the IMP industry in 
both the West Midlands and the UK. However, the number of firms in each particular 
classification can be relatively low and therefore broad generalisations are not 
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intended to be constructed from this study. The structures and mechanisms that 
underlie processes of change may be applied to other industries and at other times 
(Pain et al., 2011). As Lawson (1997) and Sayer and Morgan (1985) note, it is these 
causation properties which are the most useful outcomes of research and not 
necessarily its wider applicability. Sayer and Morgan suggest; 
…actual concrete patterns and contingent relations are unlikely to be 
‘representative’, ‘average’ or generalizable. Necessary relations discovered 
will exist wherever their relata are present, e.g. causal powers of objects are 
generalizable to other contexts as they are necessary features of these 
objects (1985: 151) 
 
By focussing on the processes which generate cause, and not necessarily aggregate 
effects, the research retains the diversity found in the field. As Rigby (2007) and 
Sayer and Morgan (1985) state, the diversity in the study agents is more useful than 
typologies as a means to conceptualise processes. Although typologies have been 
used in the study to identify broad strategic approaches that fundamentally differ, 
these only include those cases in which clear evidence was found and therefore they 
acted as ‘representational agents’ (Rigby, 2007: 183). Representational agents or 
process that retains diversity may allow for some generalisation beyond the 
immediate study group. However, the application of these processes to other 
contexts may inform understanding but are not fully generalisable because of the 
specific interaction of causation and contextual factors (Sayer and Morgan, 1985). As 
such, the findings of this study are intended only to represent the specific workings of 
the firms under study and only directly relate to their context.  
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3.8 Ethical Considerations 
An ethical report was submitted and approved by the university. The focus on 
business organisations generated two ethical issues: confidentiality of information 
and sensitivity to current tough global economic conditions. Confidentiality of firm, 
participant and information was maintained throughout the research by the use of 
pseudo names (for both firm and participant). All firms were keen to remain 
anonymous. Consent forms were used to reinforce the confidentiality agreement, 
between the participant and researcher, which included the clear identification of 
research aims, process and use of information gathered from interviews, as well as a 
formal agreement to maintain confidentiality. There was a mixed reception to the 
formalisation of the interview. Overall the consent forms were felt to be unnecessary 
and restricted the ‘informal’ nature of the interview as it was promoted. However, as 
the consent forms were a stipulation by the university they were used in all 
interviews. They were presented to the respondent once an interview had been 
arranged to provide time for the respondent to raise any questions. They were then 
re-visited at the end of the interview, once the interviewee was fully aware of the 
information they are disclosing, and asked to complete the approval with the 
interviewee. Only one interviewee refused to sign the consent form as he was 
uncomfortable ‘signing papers’, although provided explicit verbal consent that his 
interview could be used in the research. All data has been stored securely in 
accordance with university practices and ethical codes of conduct. 
At the time of the study there was considerable uncertainty in the global economy 
and upheaval in the IMP industry. The vast majority of firms contacted for 
participation were suffering huge reductions in demand, engaged in redundancy 
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programs and several entering administration or permanent closure. Due to the 
timing and focus of the research, the interview process touched on very sensitive and 
topical issues which required careful handling to ensure respect and compassion for 
their circumstances. In several cases topics moved into the personal issues raised by 
the difficulties in the business. It was felt appropriate to remove these personal 
comments from the interview transcripts as the participant had not provided consent 
for this type of information (i.e. personal, not directly relate to the business). The 
topics were identified to the participants prior to the interview, although a complete 
interview schedule was not provided unless requested. This provided context to the 
interview and made the interviewee aware of what they were agreeing to engage in 
prior to the interview, whilst retaining flexibility in the participant’s interpretation of the 
broad topics for their own firm’s circumstances.  
 
3.9 Summary 
A comprehensive research methodology was undertaken to generate a contextually 
rich and detailed data set and results. This comprised of two key stages (1) an 
intensive industry study of 45 IMP firm and (2) a case study analysis of ten 
transaction relationships. Corporate interviews were the primary research tool, 
incorporated with supplementary evidence from financial records, industry data and 
aggregate statistics. Analysis of data was primarily undertaken using coding 
techniques through an iterative process of analysis. 
The fieldwork results will be discussed in the subsequent empirical chapters. The 
results begin with an industry overview, provided in the following chapter, outlining 
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the key transitions and challenges in the IMP industry. This overview highlights the 
key areas of adjustment currently undertaken, transitions to high value-added 
products and services and increasingly volatile energy prices, which will form 
subsequent empirical discussions. 
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4 INTERMEDIATE METAL MANUFACTURE: 
TRANSITIONS AND CHALLENGES 
 
4.1 Introduction  
The IMP industry is complex, diverse and undergoing continued transformation and 
adjustment to a range of challenges. The industry has experienced a sustained 
period of decline in the UK and at the time of fieldwork was facing extreme 
competitive difficulties. An industry analysis has been undertaken to identify the most 
significant areas for further research. 
This chapter provides an overview of the industry, identifying key issues and provides 
the context for the subsequent empirical chapters. The discussion begins with an 
outline of the industry’s historical development and its current position in the global 
economy. Profitability is highlighted as a fundamental issue, resultant from an 
extended period of restructuring and limited investment. A cost-price squeeze is 
evident: the residual return between input costs and output prices is reducing. This is 
investigated through an account of the outputs of the industry, and its 
competitiveness against international competitors, and the input structure. A brief 
summary of the current position of IMP firms in the wider macro economy is provided, 
with a particular focus on the adjustment methods during the recent economic 
downturn. The chapter concludes by identifying the areas that require further 
research in order to understand the competitiveness and survival of IMP firms in the 
West Midlands. 
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4.2 The IMP Industry  
The IMP industry produces metal based, semi-manufactured components for a 
variety of engineering and construction industries. The industry is a diverse set of 
processes and capabilities, manufacturing products that vary in size, complexity and 
material composition. The components are traditionally semi-finished, requiring 
further processing through machining and treatment applications before inclusion in 
final products by end-manufacturers. The largest proportional sales in the industry 
are to further manufacturers, with over 50% of products used as inputs in other 
industries in 2008 (BIS, 2010b). IMP firms usually perform the manufacture of 
customer-designed products and have limited formal ownership of products or 
designs. There is limited direct access to final consumers or the end market and as a 
result, the IMP industry is particularly vulnerable to the performance of their 
customers and the wider economic stability of key manufacturing industries (Bryson 
et al., 1996). 
The IMP sub-industries, casting and forging, are distinctly different production 
processes, as shown in Table 4.1 below. Overall, the casting process lends itself to 
the production of lower volumes of more complex shapes and materials due to the 
ability to specify the metal composition and create more intricate moulds for complex 
shapes. In contrast, the forging process is capable of producing more standardised 
and consistent components but of a simpler design and metal composition. The 
industries have several production methods which provide a range of component 
characteristics suitable for various end-user preferences. These are outlined 
comprehensively in Table 4.2. Both sub-industries shape the metal against tooling: 
casting moulds and forging dies. The tooling characteristics again define the type of 
 126 
 
product and volume of production which can be most economically achieved. Casting 
moulds can be made from several materials (sand, wax, metal) depending on the 
required volume of production. This means that the casting process is able to 
manufacture a range of production volumes at defined accuracy levels. Forging dies 
are generally more expensive than casting moulds because they require more 
durable materials. They are able to produce more consistent and accurate material 
and shape properties. As such, mid-large production volumes are the most 
economical manufacturing volume. Both processes are characterised by the 
heterogeneity of products, markets and processes. Although the range of techniques 
varies, both industries are capable (and increasingly orientated) towards high value 
added products, albeit for different markets or product types. 
Table 4.1 Industry Characteristics 
 Casting (SIC 03 27.5) Forging (SIC 03 28.4) 
Product Capable of making more 
complex shapes 
More standardised material 
properties 
Process Shapes formed by pouring 
molten metal into a mould 
Pressure forming of components  
 
Tooling requirements Less durable but cheaper 
aggregates 
Expensive due to resistant 
materials required for recurrent 
impact shock 
Market type Ability to customise metal alloy 
composition 
Low volume/batch production 
Poor surface quality 
High level of standardisation and 
consistency of material quality 
Higher strength-weight ratio 
(particularly useful for aircraft) 
Value adding 
processes 
Heat treatment 
Machining 
Heat treatment 
Machining 
Source: Interview data (2009-10) 
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Table 4.2 Production Methods 
Process Use 
Casting Industry 
Non-expendable moulds – repeatability and accuracy, metal mould 
Die casting  
Forcing molten metal through two dies to 
create a cavity, expensive tooling so 
orientated towards high volume 
 
Non-ferrous metals 
Small and medium sized castings 
Repeat production runs 
Centrifugal casting 
Metal poured into rotating mould to spread 
metal 
 
Accuracy 
Small passages 
Expendable mould – inexpensive, less accurate 
Sand mould  
Moulding from a shell case rather than filling 
a cavity with sand 
 
Small volume moulds, cheaper to produce 
Most common as allows for range of sizes 
Investment casting/lost-wax 
Oldest technique 
 
 
High quality castings (accurate, precision 
and repeatability) 
Suitable for complex alloy materials 
More expensive but high quality output that 
requires little rework 
Forging Industry 
Drop forge 
Impact from above – ‘dropping the forge’ 
 
 
Used for surface imprints/shaping 
Open-die short runs and orientating the 
grain 
Large strength-weight ratio compared to 
casting and machined  
Press forge 
Continuous pressure to slowly force metal 
into shape 
 
 
Forms entire piece of metal 
More accurate material properties because 
can control force 
More suitable for higher volumes 
Upset forging 
Squeezes wire or rod into shape 
 
Suitable for mass production 
Roll forging 
Rolled into shape 
 
Strengthens grain structures 
Net-shape forging/precision forging Lower waste  
Source: Interview data (2009-10) 
 
4.2.1 History of Sector 
The metal industry is traditionally characterised by strong local linkages between 
small, specialised firms acting as a vertically integrated manufacturing process 
across the West Midlands region (Florence, 1948; Taylor and Bryson, 2008). 
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Rodgers (1980) describes this as a unique feature of the region’s metal processing 
cluster where; 
[m]ore than in any other British industrial region there is here close integration 
in the locational sense accompanied by disaggregation in the organisational 
sense. Processes performed by the same firm and in the same factory 
elsewhere are here performed in separate factories by different firms (1980: 
215-6). 
 
The interdependence between metal working firms acting across the manufacturing 
process (from basic metal production to finished products) generated stability in the 
region and the industry experienced significant growth during the early part of the 
twentieth century, with metal processing being an area of industrial growth for the 
west Midlands (Allen, 1929; Florence, 1948). Since the 1960s the IMP industry has 
declined substantially through two distinct periods (Massey and Meegan, 1982). The 
first stage was related to overcapacity, particularly in the castings industry, after a 
reduction in domestic markets following the post-war construction boom.  Due to the 
low value to weight ratio of castings products it was uneconomical to export products 
and therefore the industry was largely reliant on domestic markets at this stage 
(Massey and Meegan, 1982). There was a transition towards concentration of 
production in larger firms to benefit from increased automation and to capitalise on 
economies of scale over smaller, more labour intensive firms (Taylor and Bryson, 
2008), and firms moved towards more standardised production, particularly for the 
automotive industry (Massey and Meegan, 1982). This process left IMP firms 
increasingly dependent of a decreasing number of customers and markets (Bryson et 
al., 1996), a significant departure from the earlier stability of IMP firms.  Although 
local linkages remained a persistent feature of the industry (Taylor and Wood, 1973), 
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the nature of the inter-firm links was dynamic and largely influenced by organisational 
responses to wider environmental changes (Taylor, 1978). During this period sales 
links in both casting and forging made a transition towards non-local markets (Taylor, 
1978; Wood, 1976).  
The second period of decline in employment and enterprises, during the late 1970s 
to 1990s, was a result of increasing competition from low-cost producers 
internationally. A sustained lack of investment left the industry technically 
uncompetitive (Bewick, 1982; Bryson et al., 1996), which prompted a government aid 
scheme to encourage investment in modernisation through external finance (Bewick, 
1982). The recessions of the 1980s and early 1990s had particularly devastating 
effects on the industry, particularly for those firms which had specialised in 
automotive supply and taken out modernisation loans with crippling interest rates 
(Bewick, 1982). There was contraction of large firms, encouraged by the 
government’s rationalisation scheme in 1982, which paid foundries to mothball 
capacity (Baden-Fuller, 1989). Small, independent firms proved far more resilient 
during this period. Profitability dropped significantly due to competition from low-cost 
manufactures abroad. However, it was not necessarily the least profitable firms which 
closed. Baden-Fuller (1989) suggests that due to the relative high costs of closing 
plants, some of the least efficient or profitable remained open, even whilst making 
losses. The impact of sunk costs continues to influence the profitability and nature of 
the IMP industry today, which will be discussed in more detail in the following section. 
Over the recent period (mid-1990s onwards) the IMP industry has continued to 
decline in employment, enterprise and turnover levels and to a greater degree than 
the manufacturing industry average, as illustrated in Table 4.3. The lack of growth in 
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turnover and GVA is particularly evident; see Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 for an 
overview of IMP sub-industry decline since 1995. This is most apparent in the casting 
industry, which has suffered the largest decline in turnover (one third). The forging 
industry has retained a relatively stable turnover level despite an almost 40% 
reduction in employees. However, both IMP sub-industries have experienced a larger 
reduction in GVA than turnover (by around 7% in each industry), indicating a 
reduction in operating surplus (an indicator for profitability). In contrast, the 
manufacturing industry overall has seen growth in both turnover and GVA of 18.16% 
and 13.08% respectively. The forging industry’s stable turnover level, despite vast 
reductions in employment (~40%), suggests a substantial transition towards 
automation, further implied by a smaller reduction in investment levels than the 
manufacturing average (Table 4.3). Small and medium firms continue to dominate 
the industry, primarily due to closure of large firms but also growth in micro 
businesses in the forging industry (in both new firm formation and turnover), as 
illustrated in Table 4.4 below. This structural pattern is markedly different to that of 
the wider manufacturing industry as a whole, where declines are relatively consistent 
across size bands for enterprise numbers but focussed in small firms (10-49 
employees) in turnover. 
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Table 4.3 UK IMP Industry, 1995-2007 
 Number of 
Enterprisesa 
(%) 
Total 
Turnovera 
(%) 
Number of 
Employeesa 
(%)* 
GVA at 
basic 
pricesa (%) 
Investmentb 
(%)* 
Casting  
(SIC 03 27.5) 
-21.15 -33.33 -57.14 -40.94 -37.87 
Forging  
(SIC 03 28.4) 
-10.77 -0.26 -39.02 -7.92 -18.89 
Manufacturing 
average 
-13.07 18.16 -29.44 13.08 -27.76 
* data from 1998 
Source: (a) ONS (2009) (b) Eurostat (2011b) 
 
 
Figure 4.1 UK Casting Industry, 1995-2007 
Data source: ONS (2009) 
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Figure 4.2 UK Forging Industry, 1995-2007 
Data source: ONS (2009) 
 
Table 4.4 Percentage Change in Enterprise and Turnover Distributions by 
Employment Size Band, UK, 2002-2007 
Sub-Industry Number of Enterprises (%) 
 1-9 10-19 20-49 50-249 250+ Total 
Casting -15.66 -20.24 -21.85 -18.09 -77.78 -18.77 
Forging 5.12 -29.26 -30.96 -30.97 -33.33 -11.69 
Manufacturing 
Average 
-2.76 -22.02 -21.65 -18.64 -21.17 -8.05 
 Turnover (%) 
1-9 10-19 20-49 50-249 250+ Total 
Casting -1.72 -13.26 -30.88 3.28 -70.39 -26.24 
Forging 59.70 -18.20 -20.44 2.04 -12.89 -2.88 
Manufacturing 
Average 
0.87 -7.69 -7.86 1.52 5.83 20.14 
Note: Green indicates largest growth areas, pink largest areas of decline. 
Data source: Eurostat (2011a) 
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The industry has a low-medium technology base (BIS, 2010d), with innovations 
predominately orientated around process improvements through increased 
automation (Hansen, 2010; Heidenreich, 2009). This is a result of several interrelated 
factors. Principally, IMP firms do not usually design or own the products they 
produce, limiting the capacity for product innovations which can be undertaken solely 
by the IMP firm. The industries are sensitive to production volumes and require a 
sufficiently high volume of work to remain profitable. This can either be from large 
volume production of a single component or combined across several customers and 
markets, both of which encourage process improvements to achieve a higher profit 
rate. The limited product innovation that has occurred in the industry has meant that 
cost remains a critical competitive consideration (Heidenreich, 2009). However, 
Taylor and Bryson (2008) have identified some evidence of increased research and 
development and miscellaneous metal manufacturing occurring in the West 
Midlands, indicating the development of high-value niche metal manufacturers. In 
addition, their work on the associated metal industries of jewellery and lock 
manufacture has identified the capacity of metal manufacturers to transition to 
specialised, high-skilled and value-added products through additional services 
provided by firms used to orientate themselves to customers and engage in co-
innovations (Bryson and Taylor, 2010; Bryson et al., 2008). This has played an 
important role in protecting firms from price-based competition through a series of 
‘inimitability’ strategies where product based competitive advantage is combined with 
locational advantages to move away from price based competition with low cost 
producers.  The role of inter-firm linkages in generating competitive advantage in the 
metal industry continues to be cited as an important feature (Littunen and Tohmo, 
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2003; Tully and Berkeley, 2004; Watts et al., 2006) and is reinforced by Bryson and 
Taylor’s work on customisation of products and services. 
4.2.2 Profitability 
The IMP industry has a low profit margin, with 24 firms (92.3% of known firms; 
Interview and FAME data, 2010) having a single digit profit margin or lower and an 
average rate of 2.5% across the sample. The distribution of profitability in the 
fieldwork sample is illustrated in Figure 4.3. Significantly, nine firms (34.6% of know 
cases) were making losses in 2010. These results illustrate the fundamental 
weakness in the IMP industry of chronic low profitability. The majority of firms in the 
sample were established between ten to 150 years ago, with only two ‘young’ firms 
(age 6-10 years). The ‘young’ firms are the results of ownership change and 
restructuring caused by financial difficulty (administration and management buy-out). 
Disney et al. (2003) suggest that productivity growth in the wider UK manufacturing 
industry is a reflection of entrants into the industry rather than restructuring success 
in existing firms, particularly single-plant establishments which showed no 
productivity growth. This could explain the relative low profitability levels of older firms 
with a history of profit erosion and limited investment. There were only two instances 
of firms making the standard benchmark of ‘double-digit’ profit margins in the 
fieldwork data: Foundry SME 21 (17%) and Foundry Large 1 (16.17%). Foundry SME 
21 is an SME, manufacturing batches of complex components whereas Foundry 
Large 1 is a public limited company (PLC) manufacturing medium volume, complex 
but standardised products for the commercial vehicle industry. Both cases are starkly 
different and outliers to the overall profitability in the IMP industry. 
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Figure 4.3 Profitability Distribution in Sample 
 
Source: Interview data (2009-10), FAME (2010) 
 
 
There has been an overall reduction in operating surplus, an indicator of profitability, 
over recent years (post-1995) despite the transition in the IMP industry towards 
higher value products. This can be seen as an index of output prices to input costs 
shown in Figure 4.4, illustrating the cost-price squeeze on the industry (Lawrence, 
1987). From the mid-1990s to early 2000s the price-cost ratio was above one, 
indicating that the industry’s outputs sold at a higher price than the inputs cost to 
make them. However, since this point there has been a drop in ratio to approximately 
0.8 (2010), indicating a relative loss of operating surplus. From Figure 4.5 it can be 
seen that there are two inter-related factors contributing to this loss. Firstly, input 
costs have risen significantly since the mid-2000s. Secondly, this rise has not been 
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both industries has steadily increased over recent years, input costs have increased 
at a faster rate. In addition, the value of casting outputs, which were higher than 
forging outputs in the early 2000s, have not increased to the same extent as forging 
output values since the mid-2000s. It should be noted that this is only a broad 
indication of trends in the industry because the range and proportion of inputs varies 
considerably between firms and their product portfolio, however it does illustrate a 
wider trend for rising input costs and fluctuating output values. There appears to be a 
staggering cost-price squeeze on the IMP industry. This pressure is likely to absorb 
operating surplus, potentially eat into the financial resources of firms and is ultimately 
an unsustainable environment.  
Figure 4.4 Ratio of Index of Prices Received for Outputs to the Index of Prices 
Paid for Inputs by IMP Sub-Industry, UK, 1996-2012
 
Data source: Producer Prices Index ONS (2012b) 
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Figure 4.5 Price-Cost Ratio: Input and Output Price Index, UK, 1996-2012 
  
Data source: Producer Prices Index (ONS, 2012b) 
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The IMP industry supplies a wide range of further manufacturing industries, 
illustrated in Table 4.5, but the automotive industry is the primary market for over a 
quarter of firms. The automotive industry has and continues to dominate the 
manufacturing sector in the West Midlands (Tully and Berkeley, 2004). Despite this, 
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IMP industry, there has been an overall reduction in the volume capacity of the 
industry in-line with market demand. The industry is now primarily geared towards 
batch production of mid-low volumes on repeat orders with a relatively stable 
customer base. 
Table 4.5 IMP Principal Market Industries  
Market Number of firms with 
primary market (%) 
Automotive 12 (26.7) 
Marine 4 (8.8) 
Construction 4 (8.8) 
Aerospace 4 (8.8) 
Fabrication 3 (6.7) 
Power generation 3 (6.7) 
Off highway 3 (6.7) 
Jobbing/specials 3 (6.7) 
Pump & valve/structural 2 (4.4) 
Mining 2 (4.4) 
Decorative work 2 (4.4) 
Telecommunications 1 (2.2) 
Petrochemical 1 (2.2) 
Art 1 (2.2) 
Source: Interview data (2009-10) 
 
Overall, export levels are relatively low with the average firm exporting 26.6% directly 
(Interview data, 2009-10; FAME data, 2010). IMP firms tend to supply UK 
manufacturing sites, most of which then export to international markets.    Three firms 
have export levels above 50% (Forge Large 2 - Fabricator - Subsidiary 1, Foundry 
Large 1, Foundry SME 10 (PLC group subsidiary)). These firms are very large 
(PLCs), continue to manufacture mid-high volume and tend to supply multiple 
customer sites. Although firms overall supply the UK market, they continue to 
compete with domestic and international suppliers, particularly western Europe and 
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the USA, but also low cost manufacturers in eastern Europe and Asia for more 
standardised products. 
IMP firms manufacture to customer designs and specification. Customisation of 
products is a common service with 71% (32/45 firms) providing the service. This 
traditionally would not involve any formal recognition of the design services 
undertaken by the IMP firm but there has been an increasing transition in the industry 
to develop product ownership, either through independent product ranges or formal 
collaboration with customers. Product ranges, such as bells, locks and security 
gates, have been developed by eight SMEs. In addition to this, firms have 
undertaken vertical diversification into fabrication (7 firms) and machining activities (6 
firms). Fabrication, the assembly of a metal structure rather than only manufacturing 
a component of it, has been undertaken by both foundry and forging businesses, 
although primarily by small firms. The service provides scope for design involvement 
and a price premium by manufacturing an entire sub-unit but requires little cash 
investment. In contrast, the incorporation of machining activities includes a price 
premium (for a finished component) but requires considerable investment in 
equipment and space. 
The IMP industry has traditionally consisted of firms specialising in either discrete 
orders of small volume or continuous orders of high volume. With the decline of high 
volume demand firms have developed a greater mix of order types, which has 
resulted in a more varied order structure. There are three primary types of product 
order; 
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 discrete – independent orders for a fixed quantity at a set price in a single 
transaction over short time periods; 
 batch – independent orders for a specific quantity over an extended, yet still 
short, time period, and; 
 schedule – long term agreements, which can be over a designated time 
period, such as three to five years, or open-ended, with a stable monthly 
volume. Quantities and timescales are generally not fixed initially, although 
prices are.  
The order structure is a reflection of market and product types, where schedule 
orders remain for complex components of products still mass produced elsewhere 
and discrete and batch orders reflect the more bespoke element of component 
manufacture. Those firms with a specific market dependency, such as the automotive 
industry, may have a greater proportion of a specific order type, such as schedule.  
4.3.1 Competitive Strategies 
IMP firms have a series of competitive advantages which differentiate them from local 
and national competitors. These are outlined in Table 4.6 below. Quality (measured 
against international standards) and flexibility to customer demands (short lead times 
and bespoke manufacture) are key elements of differentiation to all competitors.   
Upgrading the firm’s image to prospective corporate clients was a common strategy. 
Seven cases were identified where firms were attempting to attract more prestigious 
clients by investing in the image of the firm, either through website development, 
building improvements, changing location or sourcing practices. This approach was 
related to proactive firms attempting to move upwards in the value chain by working 
more closely with lead firms. 
  
 
1
4
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Table 4.6 Forms of Competitiveness in the IMP Industry 
Competitive 
Strategy 
Definition Processes Location of 
Competitors 
Number 
of Firms  
Price     
Price Cost competitiveness Mechanisation 
Technological investment 
Overseas & 
local 
12 
Service Provision     
Logistics Services provided in addition to 
manufacturing 
Stock control 
Emergency production 
Overseas 4 
1 
Factoring products Purchasing mass produced 
products from low cost 
locations 
Joint ventures 
Agents 
Overseas 6 
Flexibility to 
customer 
Bespoke manufacture 
Diversified capabilities 
‘Specials’ 
Process/product/material versatility 
All 2 
3 
Capabilities     
Technical ability Complex product manufacture 
Innovation 
R&D investment/design input 
Technical knowledge input 
Overseas 17 
12 
Quality Fit for purpose products International standards 
Process investments 
All 11 
Further processing Additional manufacturing 
processes to increase value 
added 
Prototype 
Machining/finishing 
 
All 4 
9 
 
Other     
Image 
(capability/’green’) 
Capability of providing higher 
value added 
Green products 
Marketing 
Site improvements 
International standards 
All 7 
Note: Strategies are not mutual exclusive and IMP firms most commonly undertake multiple strategies. 
Source: Interview data (2009-10) 
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In addition to these strategies, IMP firms have generated competitive advantages 
targeted specifically against low cost overseas competitors based on additional 
services for their customers.   By providing a ‘package’ of production and service 
capabilities IMP firms are able to differentiate themselves against lower labour cost 
suppliers. This approach has been identified in other metal industries and the wider 
manufacturing sector as a common method to compete against lower cost 
manufacturers (Bryson, 2009; Bryson and Taylor, 2010). Technological advancement 
of material, product development and design and production capacity have explicitly 
been utilised by 12 firms within the sample. One firm in particular uses its technical 
capability as its only competitive strategy and invests heavily in material 
advancement through European R&D consortiums (Foundry SME 10 -PLC group 
subsidiary). Product factoring services (the sourcing, purchase and stock handling of 
components from lower cost producers) is a common strategy for firms which cannot 
be price competitive from their own manufacture.  In these cases the firms develop 
competitiveness from the services it provides in addition to the production of the 
product, such as quality inspections and stock management. Services and 
capabilities are the most extensive combined competitive strategies found in the 
sample, with 31 firms explicitly developing a service base to accompany production 
activities.   Vertical diversification into added value activities in further manufacture or 
development are a key part of the ‘package’ offered.  
Despite the prominence of non-price based competitive strategies, the majority of 
firms continue to engage in price based competition (only four firms are not price 
competitive). The sector is characterised by relatively low and medium technology 
levels, which Heidenreich (2009) and Hansen (2010) suggest influences firm 
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competitive strategies as firms are less able to engage in product innovations to add 
value and differentiation from competitors. Instead, firms in lower technical ability 
industries are more able to make process innovations to reduce costs and increase 
efficiencies. Therefore, it is suggested that these firms are less engaged with 
differentiation and are more likely to continue to compete on price through process 
innovations.  Those firms which do not have specific niches, either from technological 
advancement and investment (1 firm), very low volumes of old parts (2 firms) or 
extensive relationship building with their customers (1 firm), are likely to continue to 
rely on cost competitiveness. The firms that engage in some form of price based 
competitiveness do so as a partial competitive strategy, which is often more 
significant with new products or customers before financial and relational investments 
are made. Price is particularly significant for those firms who still engage in relatively 
high volumes of production for the automotive industry. In these cases, firms have 
developed cost efficiencies from technological investments in production automation, 
have exceptional international quality standards and provide additional services to 
their customers in an attempt to enhance their price competitiveness.  
4.3.2 Competitive Protection 
The strategies used to generate competitive advantage identified from the empirical 
evidence do not significantly engage with the location of the enterprise. However, a 
series of protectionist strategies were identified in the sample that explicitly engages 
with the geographical location of the firm, as outlined in Table 4.7. The approaches 
have been separated from the competitive strategies of IMP firms as they are more 
accurately concerned with protecting the competitive position of IMP firms by 
developing a competitive niche.   
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Table 4.7 Protection Strategies in IMP Industry 
Competitive 
Protection 
Strategy 
Definition Processes Location of 
Competitors 
Number 
of Firms  
Low profitability 
products 
Small quantities 
Products with low mark-up 
Accept small batches with high labour 
rate and low mark-up 
Local 9 
Sunk costs Transaction specific 
investments 
Transaction specific investments in 
tooling/equipment/training by customer 
Any 8 
Ownership Design ownership IPR Any 6 
Brand ‘Made in the UK’ Building on brand of advanced technical 
and quality expertise in UK for 
manufacture of critical products 
overseas 9 
Proximity to 
customer 
Response time 
Face-face contact 
Additional sites close to customer 
Build relationship with customer 
overseas 8 
Reputation Reliability Build relationship with customer Local 8 
Niche Distinctive set of capabilities Technical/versatile All 6 
Trust Security of production process Traceability/standards 
Relationship building 
All 2 
12 
Source: Interview data (2009-10) 
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Most interesting is the capitalisation of the ‘made in the UK’ brand that firms 
producing technically complex products for markets such as automotive, aerospace 
and power generation capitalise on. These markets require high levels of reliability 
demanded by regulations and consumers. The British manufacturing brand, seen as 
a highly skilled and reliable sector with governance structures and a proven track 
record, has provided firms with a strong competitive edge in certain markets, which 
has strengthened the competitive position of firms (Tokatli, 2012). This is particularly 
important because of the product area firms in the UK have moved into, that of 
complex, added value, high technical ability products. As a result, the reliability and 
technical criteria of these products is extremely significant and something customers 
will need to ensure, compared to products where reliability and accuracy are less 
important. Firms which are capitalising on this brand are those which are developing 
strong relationships with the original equipment manufacturers and advancing 
product development where these skills are most valued.  
Proximity to customers generates competitive advantage from short lead times and 
face-to-face contact for products which require relatively more knowledge and 
dialogue with customers i.e. development stage and bespoke manufacture. Being 
located in close geographical proximity to customers or having strong transportation 
infrastructures can make firms more competitive when responding to customer needs 
by providing fast response time (Bowen and Leinbach, 2006), particularly for low 
batch volume products and for prototyping.  The requirement to be close to suppliers 
and for certain products to only be manufactured in places of certain reputations is 
particularly significant for the competitive protection of IMP firms. Sunk costs have 
also been highlighted as a means of protecting firms in high cost locations from 
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overseas competition. Historical transaction specific investments made by the 
customer and established knowledge repertoires generate an element of locational 
‘stickiness’ depending on the extent of investment and relative gains to be made from 
sourcing elsewhere.   
In addition to these specific place-based forms of protection, several firms are 
generating ownerships rights to products (6 firms) and are developing niches from an 
assortment of capabilities (6 firms). The most interesting strategy found in the sample 
is perhaps the passive approach to competitive protection from engaging in 
manufacture of low profitability products, which “…nobody else wants” (Foundry SME 
13). This form of protection has been found at enterprises less engaged with active 
customer or market enhancement and experiencing periodic reductions in turnover 
and profitability.  
Competitiveness in the West Midlands IMP industry incorporates both price and non-
price advantages. Although price is only cited as a specific advantage for 12 firms 
(26.7%), it remains a factor of competitiveness in conjunction with service provisions 
for all but one firm. The significance of price despite integration into higher-value 
added products and services is noted by other studies of the US manufacturing 
sector (Berger, 2005; Herrigel, 2010). Building a relationship with customers is a key 
element in the competitive protection strategies in IMP firms, as identified in wider 
competitiveness studies in economic geography (Murphy and Schindler, 2011; Uzzi, 
1997). However, customer relationships in the IMP industry are characterised by 
fairly intricate commitment structures, sunk costs and ownership rights. Casting and 
forging firms manufacture products to specific customer designs with tooling that is 
tailored, stored and maintained at the IMP firm, whilst legally owned by the customer. 
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This, together with a product base tailored to responsive, technically advanced and 
low volumes, generates an intricate supplier-customer relationship where mutual 
dependence is a key factor. Despite the transition to higher value added products, 
the IMP industry continues to have a relatively low profitability.  Relationships with 
customers are shown to have a significant effect on competitiveness and access to 
higher-value markets. The following section will examine the role of inputs in shaping 
the profitability of IMP firms 
 
4.4 Input Structure  
The IMP industries are characterised by four primary inputs: labour, metal, energy 
and finance. The composition of these factors in the individual firm differs according 
to the products, processes and materials used. Each of these inputs is explored in 
turn. 
4.4.1 Labour: Automation and Skills 
Labour is the largest component of the cost base in the IMP industry overall (43% of 
selling price). Labour rates in West Midlands IMP firms are on average 25-30% 
higher than lower cost competitors in China, eastern Europe and India (Foundry SME 
21, Foundry SME 24, Forge SME 14). Relatively high labour costs have created a 
competitive disadvantage in both high- and low-volume firms. Higher volume 
manufacturers, such as larger firms orientated to the automotive or off highway 
industries, have utilised technology through automation and mechanisation of the 
production process. This has been a direct attempt to reduce the labour content in 
the production process. One interviewee of a mid-volume forge that manufactured 
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high value automotive components has drastically reduced its labour content and 
sees this as a key selling point to their customers: 
When you walk people round the forge, you see what we do, the whole place 
is buzzing, and they can see no labour. All of a sudden they, they know that is 
the right way to go (Interviewee 1, Forge SME 10). 
 
In this example, firms have been able to stabilise labour costs in the business by 
increasing mechanisation. In conjunction with this, productivity improvements 
increase the value of the remaining labour force. Continuous improvement programs, 
increased monitoring of production flows and automated systems have been used to 
increase productivity to offset higher wage rates, as one interviewee of a large 
automotive component forge explains: 
I believe it’s the best thing for this business, that while the workforce are 20% 
higher in terms of their pay, our productivity, measured by the rate divided by 
y’know what they do, it’s 40%. So they pay for themselves in essence. But if 
we don’t keep that productivity up and other people catch us up then we’ve got 
a problem because our rates of pay are high (Interviewee 1, Forge Large 1). 
 
In contrast, smaller firms that undertake lower production volumes cannot introduce 
such high levels of automation due to the diversity of products, customers and 
markets that require a range and dynamic set of production techniques. Instead, 
these firms have managed the high labour cost by reducing the lead time and 
increasing the complexity of product design. This has been facilitated in part through 
the uptake of computer aided design and process technology. Increased technology 
has adjusted the required skills for the industry, particularly for a greater range of 
design based skills in smaller firms. 
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There is a current skills gap in the industry, which has been identified in other metal 
based industries in the West Midlands (Bryson et al., 2008). There is limited 
employment of younger workers in the industry due in part from a negative industry 
image (as a result of past employment declines) and limited formal training schemes. 
The aging workforce creates succession and growth problems. The industry is 
characterised by a stable and long standing workforce that has developed a high 
level of tacit knowledge. The high skill level requires continued transfer of tacit 
knowledge through the workforce and extensive training to generate the range and 
quality of skills to manufacture bespoke and complex products. This is particularly a 
problem for smaller firms specialising in customised production. To manage the 
shortage of skills, IMP firms have attempted to deskill the production process 
(primarily larger firms that are able to efficiently employ automation), undertaking in-
house training schemes (18 firms), employed foreign labour (primarily Polish 
workers) (6 SMEs) and utilised temporary workers for short term capacity filling. The 
shortage of skills has started to drive up local wage rates (short term reductions in 
rates was undertaken during the recession, however, rates remained relatively stable 
because of the skill demand and firms were reluctant to lose employees during the 
period). As the industry is essentially ‘selling labour’ (Foundry SME 14), the local 
wage rate is a key characteristic of its global competitiveness (Christopherson, 
2009a, 2011; Christopherson and Clark, 2007). The incorporation of technology and 
widening of skill sets (to incorporate more advanced design and process capabilities) 
has been a fundamental mechanism in managing this disadvantage. 
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4.4.2 Raw Materials: Metal as a Strategic Input 
The proportional significance of metal input costs can vary depending on the material 
type and nature of the product but the average cost is 42.8% of the selling price 
(Interview data, 2009-10). IMP firms tend to specialise in either ferrous of non-ferrous 
based metals as they have distinct properties and therefore markets (see Table 4.8 
for the most common metals used in the industry). In addition, many IMP firms have 
developed capabilities to manufacture components with increasingly complex metal 
alloys. Metal alloys have been used for a considerable period, particularly in the 
casting industry, however, there has been a transition towards more complex alloys 
such as titanium and zinc based alloys in the aerospace and structural engineering 
markets. Steel and aluminium alloys remain the most common materials used in IMP 
firms (11 firms using each material). 
Table 4.8 Main Metals used in IMP Industry 
Ferrous Non-ferrous Alloy 
   
Iron Copper Steel 
 Aluminium Aluminium 
alloy 
 Lead Carbon steel 
 Zinc Nickel alloy 
 Bronze Titanium 
Source: Interview data (2009-10) 
 
The materials are purchased through vastly different markets, which are outlined in 
Table 4.9. Non-ferrous, steel and aluminium alloys are traded on global commodity 
markets, which set a global benchmark for all contract prices (Cockerill, 2003). In 
comparison, ferrous metals tend to be purchased against a more local price 
(Cockerill, 2003), influenced by the local scrap market, manufacturing capacity and 
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demand. Imports are increasingly common for the UK (ISSB, 2011), however the 
price continues to be influenced by local demand characteristics. The trading of metal 
through global commodity markets generates a more ‘ubiquitous’ factor of production 
which reduces the competitive (dis)advantage which can be generated from it  
(Maskell and Malmberg, 1999). However, localised pressures on material demand, 
availability and security can influence the international cost and generate escalating 
costs, which further threaten the competitiveness of manufacturing entities under 
different cost structures (Kalafsky, 2007).  
Table 4.9 Metal Purchasing Methods 
Method Product General 
ownership 
structure 
Implications 
Price Availability Service 
Mill Standard 
products 
 
TNC Annual 
fixed-price 
contracts 
Large 
purchases 
Specified 
quality 
standards 
for large 
buyers 
Stockholder Undifferentiate
d products 
Independent Spot price 
Premium for 
low volume 
Low volume Storage, 
breaking of 
bulk 
Service 
Centre 
Customised/ 
further 
processed  
Outlet of mill Spot prices Wide 
product 
range 
Further 
processing 
to tailor 
product to 
customer 
needs 
Merchant Recycled 
(scrap) 
Independent Influenced 
by local 
market 
prices 
Dependent 
on local 
markets and 
monopoly 
buyers 
Quality and 
metal grade 
varies 
Distributer Imported metal TNC or outlet 
of mill 
International 
market 
prices 
Large 
purchases 
Access to 
mill products 
through spot 
prices 
Source: adapted from Cockerill (2003), Ahlbrandt et al. (1996), ISSB (2011), Interview data (2009-10) 
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Metal prices are volatile. There was a considerable increase in the rate of price 
change in the early 1990s, as shown in Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7, which resulted in 
the introduction of metal surcharges. Metal surcharges are supplementary payments 
which reflect the change in price from one period to another. A base price is set 
between supplier and customer based on the current market price. Any movement 
above or below this price during a specified period is then later adjusted for through a 
separate payment at a series of intervals during the production agreement. The 
system has developed into an industry convention to protect individual firms from the 
potential cost of rapid input price changes (both for the supplier and customer). IMP 
firms have also adjusted their purchasing methods to reflect both the increased 
volatility in metal price and reduction in volume (due to overall fall in demand and 
transition towards lower volumes). Firms will typically purchase ‘as and when’ they 
need the materials for production to limit material stock. Two firms have actually 
outsourced their material purchasing to generate economies of scale in pricing 
through combined purchase with other firms registered to the system.  
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Figure 4.6 Metal Price Index, UK
 
Data source: CAEF (2011), LME (2010a; 2010b) 
 
Figure 4.7 Magnitude of Metal Price Change (Month-On-Month) 
 
Data source: CAEF (2011), LME (2010a; 2010b) 
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The adjustments by IMP firms towards lower volumes of more specialised material 
products and reluctance to hold material stock has prompted significant changes in 
the structure of the metal supply industry, particularly in ferrous metals (Cockerill, 
2003; Table 4.9). IMP firms increasingly purchase from service centres, stockholders 
or distributers rather than directly from the mill. Mills require large schedule orders or 
standard products, which many IMP firms either no longer need (demand is more 
focussed on lower batches of specialised alloys) or are reluctant to undertake 
because of the volatility in prices during the length of the agreement. In the case of 
steel, demand from stockholders has been the biggest growth area (25%) compared 
to limited growth in sales direct to the consumer (such as the IMP industry) (9%) 
(2009-10) (ISSB). Stockholders and service centres allow IMP firms to buy ad-hoc 
from them for relatively low volumes and portfolios of metal products at a price 
premium. This allows firms to move into more specialised material products by 
providing low volume ‘packages’ of materials. The ability to purchase ‘packages’ of 
metals allows firms to engage in increasingly specialised product markets and 
reduces their vulnerability to price fluctuations as they do not need to buy bulk 
supplies.  
This supply structure does have two further implications for IMP firms. Firstly, the 
price premium associated with ‘package’ supply means that firms may be 
competitively disadvantaged against other manufacturers who are able to purchase 
the materials at discounted prices through bulk purchases and under relatively more 
stable prices. Secondly, service centres undertake further processing/treatment of 
material as well as providing packages, therefore reducing the capacity for IMP firms 
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to add value within their processing activities. This is particularly the case for IMP 
firms who have relatively low value-added product bases. 
4.4.3 Energy: A Complex Commodity 
The IMP industry is energy intensive (Hammond and Norman, 2010), meaning they 
are large users of energy. The principal forms of energy used in the IMP industries 
are gas and electricity, which combined represent 74.3% of basic metal production 
(including casting) and 93.8% of fabricated metal production (including forging) use 
(Table 4.10). Total energy usage in the IMP sector has reduced considerably since 
1990 (-63.55% in the casting industry and -37.4% in the forging industry) and 
demonstrated a reduction in energy use far greater than the manufacturing sector as 
a whole (based on data from ONS, 2010a). Energy efficiency improvements in the 
sector have been made continually to reduce the overall cost base (Bassi et al., 
2009), reduce the energy content in product design and in an ongoing drive to meet 
regulations for carbon emission reductions (Carbon Trust, 2006). Despite this overall 
reduction in energy use, energy costs now represent a larger proportion of the cost 
base (8.6% 2009-10 from 2.5% during the early 2000s) (Interview data, 2009-10). 
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Table 4.10 Composition of Energy Use in IMP Industries, UK 
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equivalent) 
(% of total) 
27 
646 
(31.9%) 
858 
(42.4%) 
2022 
28 
346 
(44.7%) 
380 
(49.1%) 
774 
Change from 1990 level (%) 
27.5 -69.77 -54.70 -63.54 
28.4 -54.06 -9.07 -37.39 
Note: Lowest resolution of fuel use and volumes available. Most recent data available 
Data source: ONS (2010a) 
 
The UK has benefited from some of the lowest energy prices in Europe over recent 
years (HC, 2011), particularly for gas. However, prices are rising and forecast to 
continue to do so, particularly for industrial large consumers (DECC, 2011); in turn, 
small enterprises will be negatively affected by price increases because of the 
present contract purchasing methods in the UK market structure (HC, 2011). 
Industrial high energy consumers have been targeted for additional energy taxes 
(specifically the Climate Change Levy7). Although the Climate Change Levy (CCL) 
adds only 3.5% and 3.6% on electricity and gas respectively to industrial energy bills 
(according to Q32010 prices) (ONS, 2010b), it remains an additional cost to UK 
based firms through energy purchasing contracts (Bassi et al., 2009; HC, 2011).  
Gas and electricity prices have become increasingly volatile (based on data from 
DECC, 2010). Energy prices have always been volatile due to the influence of local 
                                            
7 The Climate Change Levy is a tax imposed on energy use at the time of supply for specific 
groups of industrial and commercial users operating in the UK, based on quantity of fuel 
supplied. It was introduced in 2001 as part of the UK’s strategy to meet carbon emission 
reduction agreements of the Kyoto agreement (Pocklington, 2001).  
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and global political and economic changes on the availability and price of energy 
resources, particularly global oil price (Jones, C., 2010; Rutledge, 2007). UK energy 
is managed through a network of interconnections with other countries, where 
demand and supply between countries is managed through price signals (DECC, 
2011). The UK’s reliance on non-domestic sources of supply is threatening the 
security of supply and consequently increased the UK’s exposure to global price 
vulnerability. This level of price volatility has the potential to destroy IMP firms 
working with relatively low profit margins. At the time of fieldwork (2009-10) there 
were no established industry conventions to manage price volatility, such as the 
surcharge mechanism for metal. This poses a significant challenge to the IMP 
industry as price volatility can erode a firm’s profit margin if sales prices do not 
accurately reflect input costs.    
4.4.4 Money: Capitalisation, Cash flow and Investment 
The structure of capital in the IMP industry varies between firms, although there are 
common finance mechanisms used to fund day-to-day working capital8 and longer 
term investment decisions. The value of working capital for the majority of firms is 
less than 50% of their turnover (22 firms, 84.62% of known values: average use is 
10.5%), with seven firms (16.7%) having negative working capital levels (current 
liabilities exceed assets). This indicates a very precarious trading position, dependent 
on continuity of trade to finance operating costs. The main routes of working capital 
are identified in Box 4.1. 
 
                                            
8
 Working capital is defined as the difference between current assets and liabilities. Cash 
flow refers to short term liquidity in the business. 
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Box 4.1: Working Capital Mechanisms  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The use of lending facilities for cash flow is common in the sample (22 firms use 
either overdraft or CID, 6 firms use both). The high usage rate of overdraft facilities 
could be a result of the timing of the study (recession). However, the propensity of 
1. Existing cash reserves from operating surplus 
The availability of cash reserves in the sample firms was mixed. Overall, 31 firms 
(68.9%) used cash reserves to at least partially fund working capital. However, 12 firms 
had no reserves, including three cases of recent administration (2005 onwards).  
 
2. Trade credit system 
Trade credit is a vital facilitator of exchange in the production system, with all firms 
using the mechanism. The system is based on credit exchanged between individual 
producers and consumers within the production system, with no formal institutional 
provision of the service (Berger and Udell, 2006). Following dispatch of goods, invoices 
are sent to the debtor usually under industry standard terms and conditions (30-60 
days payment for UK based transactions and up to 90 days for international sales). As 
credit is not secured through formal institutions there are limited mechanisms to 
recovery unpaid debts, which regularly occur. In response to this, a credit insurance 
industry has evolved which provides insurance for suppliers against unpaid invoices. A 
credit limit is provided based on the purchaser’s credit history, which determines the 
financial amount that will be covered by insurance. This service is used in the industry 
(eight firms use insurance), however many of the smaller firms (eight firms) self-
evaluate the credit worthiness of their customers or use online credit checks (such as 
Dunn and Bradshaw) (three firms), which they have subscribed to in order to avoid 
additional costs of insurance policies. 
 
3. Use of bank overdraft facilities  
Overdraft facilities provide short-term lending with a relatively high interest rate. This is 
the second most popular cash flow method, with 16 firms using overdraft facilities. This 
method is principally for short term cover for reductions in working capital. 
 
4. Confidential invoice discounting (CID) 
This mechanism generates immediate cash against a sales invoice, where the 
receivable is used as collateral for the lending. The proportion of sales value 
immediately released depends primarily on the credit worthiness of the purchaser but 
commonly 80% of the value is available. The remaining 20% is released once the 
purchaser has paid the debt. The service has an associated charge (up to 1% of the 
sales value (Cashflow UK, n.d.). Under this facility, the firm retains ownership of the 
debtor book1, therefore, customers are unaware of the use of the facility against their 
debt (i.e. confidential) and management of debts remains the responsibility of the firm. 
The value of finance raised against the debt can also be influenced by the credit 
worthiness of the supplier firm as part of a portfolio of assets (such as buildings and 
equipment as well as the debt). This allows firms in a relatively stable financial position 
to increase the value of immediate cash available. 
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CID is a clear indication of a long term finance structure in the industry. The facility is 
particularly useful for firms with limited cash reserves as it offers immediate working 
capital (5/12 firms that had no cash reserves used this method) or unproven financial 
stability (3/4 firms under new ownership from administration or management buy-
outs).  All the firms with CID illustrated relatively low cash reserves (< 6%, based on 
known turnover and bank deposits levels), which is less than the average level of 
bank deposits (9.9%). However, financial data is limited and therefore this only 
provides an indication. 
Long term investments have been funded through a mixture of sources identified in 
Table 4.11. External credit has been used through bank loans and hire purchase 
(lease) schemes. There is a clear divergence between firm size in the use of credit 
facilities, with firms that are part of a larger group tending to access finance through 
group bank loans (4 firms) and single plant organisations using lease schemes (8/9 
firms). This restriction of bank loans to sites within larger organisational groups 
reflects the cost and risk of external finance, as these sites will benefit from a 
preferential interest rate and security of group resources. In contrast, hire-purchase is 
a transaction based finance tool (Berger and Udell, 2006) and therefore credit is 
provided based on the projected value of the asset rather than the financial state of 
the firm itself. There is strong correlation between firms which use CID and hire-
purchase schemes (6/9 firms), reflecting the accessibility of transaction-based credit 
mechanisms. Interestingly, the most common credit source was a grant (15/45 firms). 
The firms which utilised these were primarily SMEs (grants are usually targeted at 
SMEs to fill finance gaps), with those larger firms having used grants in the past 
when they were smaller businesses. 
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Table 4.11 Investment Sources  
Source Cash 
Reserves 
Bank loan Grant Hire 
Purchase 
Number of firms using 
source/number of firms 
with known activity  
3/9 4/18 15/45 9/18 
Source: Interview Data (2009-10) 
 
Transaction-based lending is the primary mechanism from which IMP firms have 
accessed external credit. It is accessible to these firms because it is based primarily 
on the credit worthiness of either the purchasers (i.e. in CID) or asset (i.e. hire-
purchase), rather than using financial information on the IMP firm (Berger and Udell, 
2006). This is particularly relevant for SMEs with little available financial evidence or 
poor financial stability, which would make traditional methods of lending far more 
difficult to obtain (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006). Trade credit however, is based on 
a combination of transaction and relationship information between individual firms 
(Berger and Udell, 2002). The ability of firms to gauge their own risk through ongoing 
relationships and reputations has provided a fundamental component of working 
capital for small firms (Berger and Udell, 2006). Regional banks have traditionally 
been a source of credit for small businesses (Tickell, 2000) through relationship-
based lending and the use of ‘soft’ information on owner-managers as opposed to 
‘hard’ data on financial spreadsheets. The reduction of small regional banks has 
reduced the ability of relationship-based lending, particularly detrimental to SMEs 
(Berger and Udell, 2002). 
Analysis of the financial stability of the sample, shown in Table 4.12, illustrates that 
one third of firms are financially unstable with a liquidity ratio below one, indicating 
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their inability to pay back liabilities under their current asset base. In addition, the 
sample indicates that the majority of firms provide a higher level of credit to their 
customers than they receive from suppliers (85% of firms). This also causes concern 
for their stability, particularly during economically turbulent times and credit 
restrictions, as they become increasingly vulnerable to delayed payments and require 
high levels of cash flow. 
Table 4.12 Financial Stability Ratios 
 Liquidity  Trade credit  
(measured by ratio 
of trade debtors to 
creditors) 
Capitalisation  
(measured by ratio 
of bank deposits to 
credit) 
Sample average 1.74 1.69 3.15 
Number of firms with 
ratio > 1 
28 (67%) 17 (85%) 6 (30%) 
Number of firms with 
ratio <1 
11 (33%) 3 (15%) 14 (70%) 
Source: Interview Data (2009-10) 
 
The capitalisation in the industry is low, with 70% of firms having low available cash 
reserves compared to their existing credit use. Capital is sunk into existing equipment 
and buildings, which are very expensive. The role of credit availability for investment 
has been identified as a key constraint for growth in SMEs particularly (Becchetti and 
Trovato, 2002; Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006); however, the study here identifies 
the fundamental role of credit for working capital also. Lawrence (1987) has also 
identified the influence of credit availability in the functioning and organisation of the 
Australian agriculture industry. The low profitability over recent decades has 
increased the reliance on transaction-based credit mechanisms for day-to-day 
running. 
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4.4.5 A Changing Cost Base  
Input structures of firms have received considerable attention in economic geography 
for their impact on competitiveness from their use, such as investment practices of 
firms and restructuring to reduce labour costs (Angel and Engstrom, 1995; Clark and 
Wrigley, 1997a; Massey, 1995). The availability of inputs has been highlight to be a 
particular issue for IMP firms, both in terms of shortages and supply market 
structures. This has received comparably less attention, with the notable exception of 
Christopherson and Clark’s (2007) discussion of regional labour markets. The 
availability of input factors are a particular challenge for the IMP industry in regard to 
skill shortages, credit restrictions and the complexity (and cost) of commodity inputs 
of metal and energy. 
The cost base of IMP firms has changed. Non-labour costs now form a more 
significant part of the cost base than they did previously (Interview data, 2009-10). 
This is a reflection of both increased automation in the production process and the 
rising costs of other inputs, particularly metal and energy. This has important 
ramifications for the industry and individual firm. Labour costs are largely structured 
at the regional scale (Christopherson and Clark, 2007) and provide relatively stable 
costs. Labour costs are influenced by mechanisation, skill shortages and unionisation 
(Bluestone and Harrison, 1982). However, these changes are over a long temporal 
period. In contrast, the non-labour costs considered here, metal and energy, are 
structured through more complex procurement practices and have a far greater rate 
of change in factor prices. This price volatility can alter the structure of the cost base 
in very short periods of time. Energy is an interesting and increasingly significant 
case. Whereas industry conventions have been developed to manage price volatility 
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in metal markets, energy is a relatively new challenge (with volatility in prices since 
2005) and IMP firms are experiencing significant difficulties in managing the cost. 
Energy is perceived to be a production input managed through production efficiency 
and therefore the domain of the IMP firm. In reality, energy is an emerging 
commodity, with a complex market structure that can have immediate and significant 
impacts of the cash flow and viability of the business. 
 
4.5  The Current Macro-Economic Environment 
The IMP industry suffered considerable demand reductions during the economic 
downturn (October 2008 onwards). Demand reductions occurred across the majority 
of market segments to varying degrees and timescales. The automotive, construction 
and general engineering industries suffered the largest and quickest loss of demand, 
with aerospace suffering to a lesser extent, and a delayed onset in the marine 
industry due to long term contract structures. The demand loss at the individual firm 
ranged between 30-75% in automotive and general engineering-based businesses 
and only 10-17% in aerospace, marine and power generation-based businesses.  
The IMP firms have several vulnerabilities to such a demand reduction. Firstly, prior 
to the downturn there was peak demand in the industry, with all time high output 
levels (Benedettini et al., 2010). This caused many firms to invest in additional 
capacity, either through space, labour or both, and built up a large stock of materials, 
work-in-progress and finished products both in the supplier firm and throughout the 
supply chain to meet the continuing customer orders. Secondly, the speed of onset 
left very little time to adjust to changing order levels. Demand reduced literally 
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overnight in some industries, particularly the automotive industry, with staggered 
reductions over a few weeks most common. As a result, firms were left with high 
levels of over-capacity. Thirdly, the demand loss occurred across all markets. 
Although some markets suffered considerably more, there was not enough buoyancy 
in any market to stabilise order levels across the firm.  
4.5.1 Finance 
The ‘credit crunch’ was an associated element of the economic downturn. The term 
refers to the withdrawal of available credit for business and increased interest rates, 
which effectively reduces the availability of affordable credit. This was a particular 
issue for IMP firms for three reasons: 
1. The financial structure of the firm 
The proficiency of credit, and particularly CID, for working capital left IMP firms 
extremely vulnerable to downturns in demand and the additional cost of using these 
facilities. As the credit stream is related to the sales value, the decline in orders 
dramatically reduced working capital. In conjunction with the speed of the onset, the 
firm was left with existing material supplies and orders for a previously high demand, 
but a reduced working capital to pay for such items and, therefore, a reliance on 
agreed lending for immediate cash flow (BBA, 2010).   
The firms which had undertaken considerable investment prior to the downturn to 
modernise and increase the capacity of the business during the demand boom were 
also vulnerable in some cases.   The relatively high debt levels were seen as a risk, 
resulting in reductions in existing credit streams (overdrafts, CID) and further 
exacerbating cash flow difficulties in the business.  
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2. Tightening and withdrawal of credit insurance9 led to an increased reliance on 
trade credit and limited protection 
Due to the propensity of trade credit, credit insurance is a vital element of the system 
as products are manufactured and dispatched prior to customers being invoiced. Not 
all firms will use credit insurance because of the associated additional cost 
(particularly older, smaller businesses with long standing relationships with 
customers may not require insurance). However, it remains a common facility across 
the industry (only one firm did not use insurance originally) and, particularly, for new 
customers. With the onset of the recession, insurance became increasingly difficult to 
attain at an affordable cost or to cover the total value of orders (Cosh et al., 2009). 
The IMP firms were affected by this reduction in cover in two ways. Firstly, the firms 
were unable to cover all of their customer’s order values, leading to individual firms 
having to supply goods with no protection. Secondly, the suppliers of IMP firms were 
unable to get cover on the IMP firms’ themselves, leading to a ‘pay on delivery’ 
culture. Effectively, the large scale removal of trade credit insurance ground the 
supply chain to a halt.  
3. Limited availability of investment credit 
Credit restrictions constrained growth in the industry, despite firms gaining new 
orders, particularly in firms orientated towards the automotive market. Credit 
restrictions had a similar effect outside the industry (BBA, 2010; ERA, 2011). 
                                            
9 Credit insurance is an external product purchased to protect the firm from loss of payment 
from customers. Firms are credit scored and provided with a financial limit for which they are 
insured against. A premium is paid for the insurance cover. 
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Although growth opportunities were missed in some cases (2 firms), overall there 
was a reluctance to invest during the period. 
4.5.2 Adjustments to the Economic Downturn 
Adjustments to the economic downturn followed four main areas outlined in Box 4.2; 
cost cutting, relationships with existing customers, new customers and markets, and 
development/training. The principal approach was to minimise costs through 
reductions in labour costs (either redundancies or short-time working).  The practice 
of short time working was a direct result of the labour structure of the industry. Firms 
were reluctant to lose skilled workers as they would be difficult to replace once the 
upturn came. The older workforce meant that many of those who could potentially be 
made redundant would be unlikely to return work should they have the opportunity. 
As a result, firms worked shorter hours to maintain the employment of their staff 
during the period. Short-term working reached its peak in the autumn 2008 – spring 
2009 when in some cases firms were working one day/week (Foundry SME 4). 
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Box 4.2 Recession Adaptations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Cost cutting exercise 
By far the most common approach was to consolidate the business and reduce costs. 
All firms engaged with some form of cost reduction and in many cases this was the only 
adjustment practice. Cost reduction activities centred on reducing the workforce through 
redundancies and short time working practices. Redundancies were used in 29/45 firms, 
with between 6-60% of the workforce being affected. The largest redundancies were 
seen in firms orientated towards the automotive industry. In addition, firms were 
practicing more frugal purchasing, entered into financial holidays (such as rent and VAT) 
and restricted all investment to maintenance of buildings and equipment. Pay freezes 
were commonly enforced. 
 
Relationships with existing customers 
Very few firms lost any customers to competitors during the period and customers were 
only lost if they closed. Existing customers became very important to the overall viability 
of IMP firms while they waited for the upturn. The dependence on the customer base 
meant customers were able to increase their requests on the supplier, which often 
resulted in increased risk being placed with the supplier. Price cutting was commonly 
undertaken, although this changed during the recession period. The majority initially 
engaged in price cutting to retain their customers, however, many of the small firms 
resisted reductions because it would reduce the viability of the business. These firms 
typically had a wide customer portfolio which allowed them to be less dependent on a 
particular customer. 
 
New customers and markets 
IMP firms were less active in initiating new markets and customers. Only two firms 
engaged in explicit marketing drives. Investment in new equipment to expand their 
market base was only undertaken in one firm and was a pre-existing plan, although 
execution was prompted by the downturn (Foundry SME 23 - large group subsidiary). 
However, there was limited movement of existing customers between firms in the 
industry. Customers tended to remain with their supplier because of the threat of 
working with a supplier with unknown trade and financial history. Three of the older firms 
utilised their extensive land resources by renting it to small firms who had to downsize 
during the recession. This provided a short term income injection to support the primary 
revenue streams. 
The exchange rate benefit was utilised by some firms, although with mixed results. Two 
firms explicitly invested in export growth through employment of overseas agents and 
promotion through export trade fairs. However the firms that benefitted the most were 
those who already had a strong export base. Those firms became exceptionally cost 
competitive and already had the facilities and experience to utilise immediate exchange 
rate advantages. There was a small element of customers who had previously off-
shored their business to low-cost locations returning to IMP suppliers. This occurred in 
five firms. The relocation was triggered by the reduction in cost savings between the UK 
and low-cost producers but critically, there was existing long term unhappiness with the 
specific low-cost producers on issues of quality and service. Although the IMP firms 
benefitted from relocation of customers, this was a long term strategic move prompted 
by the recession. 
 
Development 
There was limited development of staff or technical capacity during the period. There 
were three exceptions were IMP firms utilised funding schemes to train non-active staff 
in industry relevant qualifications (such as NVQs). There were no examples of 
benefitting from equipment advancement through cheap sell offs. 
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During the period customers became increasingly demanding of the capacity and 
role of suppliers by requiring shorter lead times and increased stock contingency. In 
addition, existing contractual commitments from the customer were withdrawn and 
new order structures put in place to reflect changing demand, leaving many IMP 
firms with existing material and stock costs. The increased risk transfer from 
customers to IMP suppliers was based on increased dependency in the immediate 
term to utilise existing stock and work in progress (particularly because products are 
customised). As the downturn continued, some IMP firms became more reluctant to 
engage in price cutting, particularly because their customers were increasingly 
dependent on IMP firms when demand was slowly returning and there was minimal 
stock in the supply chain, making response time critical.  
The recession has played a significant part in the restructuring of the current order 
configuration of IMP firms, increasing the dependency in customer-supplier 
relationships. Schedule orders declined, and in many cases stopped altogether, as 
volumes reduced. Instead, customers who traditionally depended on schedule orders 
began to order smaller batches or discrete low volumes to match reduced and 
infrequent product demand from their own customers. In turn, this increased their 
reliance on British IMP firms as components were required quickly and intermittently, 
thereby, reducing the customer’s ability to purchase from high volume suppliers 
located in low cost locations.  
4.5.3 Survival: Cash Flow and Maintaining Relationships 
The response to the downturn highlighted some key features of the IMP industry. 
Firstly, cash rather than profit became critical. The prior reliance on credit 
mechanisms (overdraft and CID) as well as trade credit, combined with low 
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capitalisation, resulted in the industry being particularly susceptible to credit 
reductions. Secondly, the focus was on adjusting existing relationships rather than 
seeking new customers or markets. Although some firms did engage in market 
expansion (two firms), this was a minority response. Greater attention was given to 
supporting the demand requirements of existing customers and strengthening 
relationships through sharing financial information (Foundry SME 19), greater 
communication and inspection of IMP firm facilities for demand rises (Foundry SME 
4) and absorbing additional production functions (Foundry SME 21).   This involved 
careful management of contracts and commitments with customers. 
 
4.6 Summary 
The industry analysis has provided an overview of the current state of the IMP 
industry and identified the key challenges facing the industry. Profitability is a 
fundamental difficulty and constraint. Low capitalisation from an extended period of 
restructuring has caused a structural weakness in the industry; profits have been 
used to subsidise rising inputs costs and the value of outputs has not increased 
enough to support this. The problem is composed of several interlinked issues 
related to the industry’s ability to adjust to increased global competition based on the 
nature of its relationships with other firms.  
There are two key findings emerging from this research.  They indicate immense 
challenges facing the IMP industry at present, as follows: 
The transition to higher value added manufacturing has not generated a rise in 
profitability in the industry.  
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The competitive position of the IMP industry is underpinned by the strengthening of 
customer relationships through the absorption of additional tasks to increase the 
portfolio of capabilities and services provided by suppliers. Despite this, profitability in 
the IMP industry remains low, and in some cases has declined over recent years 
(separately to the recessionary impact). This indicates that the relationship between 
IMP firms and their customers is a key aspect of long term stability in the industry and 
involves a complex negotiation of value within the relationship. 
Energy is an increasingly significant input due to rising and increasingly volatile 
prices.  
Energy price rises and volatility pose significant risk to IMP firms, if there are not 
passed through the supply chain, as escalating costs will quickly make firms 
uncompetitive in an international market place. The IMP industry is beginning to 
adjust to the changing cost base, although it has faced considerable difficulty. The 
volatility of energy prices has generated a significant immediate risk to IMP firms, 
absorbing profitability and cash flow, and potentially a longer term problem from 
limited investment. 
The analysis has illustrated that the industry faces complex and technical issues 
related to its long term survival and competitiveness. Relationships with customers 
and rising energy prices are key elements to this. As a result, the following empirical 
chapters are focussed on exploring both of these issues and the subsequent impact 
of inter-firm agreements on the adjustment capacity of IMP firms. The experiences of 
the IMP industry in relation to these challenges are a key aspect of their potential to 
survive in an advanced economy. 
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5 CLIENT-SUPPLIER INTERACTIONS:  
RELATIONSHIP STRUCTURES IN GLOBAL 
SUPPLY CHAINS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
IMP manufacturers have undergone considerable change over the last few decades 
in response to increased competition from manufacturers located in lower labour cost 
areas. The restructuring of the market place has driven firms to make adjustments to 
remain competitive and ultimately influenced the structure, nature and stability of 
production networks and the vertical inter-firm relationships that comprise it. The 
previous chapter identified customer relationships to be a key element of 
competitiveness. IMP firms are found to be competing against low cost competitors 
by providing a ‘package’ of product and service capabilities for their customers. This 
is an attempt to move away from standard market transactions and encourage a 
‘closer’ relationship with their customer base. Interestingly, some IMP firms were 
found to be attempting to protect themselves competitively through a series of 
commitment structures (sunk costs, product ownerships, trust and reputation) based 
on strengthening the client-supplier relationship. Despite a transition to value-added 
manufacture and strengthening of client-supplier relationships, profit levels remain 
relatively low with an industry average of 2.5% (Interview and FAME data – 2010).  
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Relationships between buyers and suppliers have become an increasing area of 
focus within economic geography over recent years (Bathelt and Gluckler, 2011; 
Dicken et al., 2001; Yeung, 2005). The interconnected nature of production systems 
has generated expansion of supplier capabilities to incorporate core (and usually 
high value-added) elements of the production process, such as product design and 
prototype development (Herrigel, 2010). The collaborative nature of production has 
generated an increased level of interdependency between buyers and suppliers 
(Gereffi et al., 2005), which has prompted a focus on relationships in the production 
chain. Particular attention has been on the ability of lead firms to influence suppliers 
through various forms of tacit governance, such as trust (Sako, 1992), relational 
proximity (Murphy, 2011) or shared competencies (Gereffi et al., 2005). However, the 
conceptualisation of these relationships is based on the strategic action of lead firms 
in shaping the nature of the relationship and their flexibility to move between 
suppliers. The role of smaller suppliers in shaping global supply chain relationships 
and the flows of value within them has received far less attention (Dorry, 2008). 
The following analysis focuses on the output structure of IMP firms and the transition 
towards higher value-added products and services to remain competitive. It brings 
together current thinking on client-supplier relationships and empirical results to 
address the limitations in understanding around the role of suppliers, and particularly 
small firms, and their capacity to influence relationship structures through complex 
power asymmetries. The attainment of value from product and process upgrading in 
the industry is examined in further detail. Client-supplier interactions are 
deconstructed to identify areas of relative power between transaction partners. These 
structures are used to build an understanding on the types of relationships found 
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within the industry and the implications for the stability of IMP firms. Finally, the 
process of value attainment in each relationship type is highlighted. Profit generation 
is found to differ considerably between relationship types based on the structure of 
customer purchasing contracts, generating distinct temporal patterns of value 
creation. 
 
5.2 Deconstructing Client-Supplier Relationships  
Interdependency between transaction partners has received considerable attention in 
both the network and chain literatures. Under both approaches dependency between 
transaction partners, based on unequal resource levels or access, is a central 
element of governance. Asset specificity encourages dependency through 
investments targeted only at particular relationships and therefore the investment is 
only valuable within specific transaction context (Williamson, 1979). Increasing 
product complexity and collaboration across production tasks within the production 
systems has been suggested to generate increasing interdependency between 
transaction partners (Herrigel, 2010). 
Forms of dependency have focussed attention on the explicit power of lead-firms to 
structure the nature of relationships through their investment behaviour and their 
consequential distribution of risk and cost to suppliers (Fields, 2006; Sturgeon and 
Lee, 2001; Sturgeon, 2002). However, it has been suggested that these dominant 
forms of power may be influenced, at least temporarily, by more complex power 
asymmetries in vertical inter-firm relationships (Dorry, 2008; Rutherford and Holmes, 
2008) that are influenced by strategic decision making of firms (Gibbon and Ponte, 
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2008). IMP firms have demonstrated complex and varied relationships with their 
clients, with multifaceted power dynamics. The following empirical analysis will 
explore the structure and nature of the client-supplier relationships found in the IMP 
industry.  
5.2.1 Power in the Production Process  
The study has identified a series of areas in the production process which can 
generate specific elements of relative power between buyer and supplier, as depicted 
in Figure 5.1. The elements are based on the deconstruction of the production 
process into stages of decision making between the supplier and customer: product 
type, ownership, level of approvals needed, order structure, method of production, 
level and nature of investment required, and specific tooling requirements. These 
stages represent instances where one transaction partner can generate a position of 
relative power over the other. The approach is based on a conceptualisation of power 
in the organisation as causal power (Clegg, 1989). That is, power asymmetries 
develop based on control of resources. The following analysis builds on this by 
viewing power as a dynamic and transitory capacity (Taylor, 1996; Taylor et al., 
1995), where control of resources is influenced by strategic decision points in the 
production process. As such, it looks at the relative power fluctuations between 
supplier and purchaser, defined as ‘powerfulness’ or ‘powerlessness’ of the supplier 
(Taylor, 2006). This follows an assumption that power is based on interaction 
between two parties that determines dominance through recognition (Bathelt and 
Gluckler, 2005). Critically, power is conceptualised as a potential ability to influence 
based on the structural frameworks of the transaction. Although this 
conceptualisation is limited to the inter-firm relationship, it does identify the 
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complexity of power dynamics between transaction partners, which has yet to be fully 
incorporated into current understandings. A discussion of each stage will be provided 
in detail below following the layout in Figure 5.1.  
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Figure 5.1 Decision Points in Inter-Firm Production Relations: Implications for 
Power Inequalities between Exchange Partners 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author (2012) 
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Product type  
The type of product manufactured is a fundamental component of the relationship 
dynamic. To generate complex and customised products requires a more varied skill 
base at the supplier firm compared to more standardised components. A 
standardised component generally requires more asset specific investments by 
customers and therefore reduces the relative powerfulness of the supplier firm by 
restricting their market (Gereffi et al., 2005; Sturgeon, 2002). Complex and 
customised products tend to be of higher value than more standardised components. 
Transaction partners are more likely to invest in developing an ongoing relationship 
where spend is of considerable value. Foundry SME 10 -PLC group subsidiary, a 
large foundry, has focussed on a key set of high –value customers in an attempt to 
strengthen their relationship, as they explain:  
Instead of having lots of little customers with lots of little orders we’ve 
concentrated on a big customer who can give us a big amount of the work and 
then we can love them up …if somebody wants to buy a £5,000 casting or 
somebody wants to give you a £2 million order, who are you going to look 
after? (Interviewee 1, Foundry SME 10- PLC group subsidiary). 
 
The strengthening of the relationship builds a sense of trust and shared 
competencies between supplier and customer (Herrigel, 2010; Murphy, 2011) but 
also increases dependency and potential risk as a single customer represents a large 
proportion of turnover. The product becomes more critical to the relationship when it 
is of strategic importance to the customer. This creates increased dependency on the 
behalf of the customer as the supplier becomes vital to the continuation of the wider 
production chain. An example of this is Forge SME 10, a mid-high volume forge that 
specialises in automotive components. The product they manufacture is critical to the 
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continuation of the entire production chain for their OEM customer because it is an 
integral part of the functioning of the car. In this instance, the strategic importance of 
the particular component allows the supplier to enact on its position of relative power 
because the customer is dependent on the suppliers capability at a specific point in 
time. 
Product ownership  
Product ownership is a critical point which can determine the role of the supplier. If 
the supplier has no rights to the product, then they have little influence over sourcing 
and profit options. However, if the firm is partially involved in the design process then 
the firm can influence where the product is manufactured either through intellectual 
property rights or the existence of design intelligence specific to the firm, which may 
discourage or prevent sourcing elsewhere.  
However, the enactment of this protection is not always successful, despite clear and 
formalised legal rights. In several cases, IMP firms have lost production orders 
despite complete or partial ownership with customers. Foundry SME 1 - Fabricator, a 
SME foundry that also diversified into fabricated products, had developed intellectual 
property on a particular product for a customer. Rather than securing the customer’s 
demand, the customer transferred production to another company and the IPR was 
unable to prevent this. In this instance, the relative power gained from partial 
ownership was ineffective because of the far greater influence of the customer’s size 
and resources to pressurise the supplier into accepting their use of the supplier’s 
product. In contrast, Foundry SME 20 - Fabricator, another small fabricating 
business, utilised partial product ownership to recover unpaid debts from a customer, 
another small manufacturer. In this case, the customer was unable to sell the product 
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without Foundry SME 20 – Fabricator’s involvement. As such, Foundry SME 20 - 
Fabricator negotiated the sale of their IPR to recover part of the unpaid debt. This 
was a difficult and lengthy process, but due to the customer’s low level of resources 
and financial instability the IMP firm was able to enact their relative power through 
ownership rights to secure the recovery of funds. In both cases the enactment of 
ownership power was dependent on the IMP firm’s relative resource power to 
challenge their customer’s.  
Approvals 
Product and supplier approvals are certifications of appropriate standards of 
capabilities in supplier firms to manufacture products to the required quality and 
specification. Approvals generate increased levels of power for the supplier because 
they require investments in time and finance by customers. By undertaking this, the 
customer becomes interested in maintaining the relationship because “…production 
part approval processes … can be very expensive. For example, I am told that if a 
product has to go through the whole process of approval then it can cost around 
£10,000” (Interviewee 1, Foundry SME 26). This is particularly the case for the 
aerospace industry because of product specifications and, increasingly, to 
differentiate suppliers in the automotive industry based on quality capabilities.  
These additional costs are only undertaken if the customer trusts the supplier to 
invest so heavily in developing these approvals. In addition, particular industries, 
such as aerospace, and products, such as critical engine parts, require production 
approvals from the OEM, not necessarily their direct customer. As a result, the 
process can be very time consuming and limit the ability of a firm to transfer 
production to new suppliers. It does not prevent resourcing completely, and 
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redistribution of sourcing between existing suppliers is common, but it generates a 
time lag that the IMP firm can utilise to find other sales avenues.  
Order type and agreement  
The nature of the product order and agreement can influence the level of 
dependency from the customer. Under long term product agreements, the customer 
is likely to invest in the supplier and therefore become more committed and less able 
to shift production elsewhere. In contrast, contract order type is also associated with 
a discrete product life cycle and, as a result, the continual change of product makes 
alternative sourcing options more applicable, as new costs will still have to be laid 
down. Continual product change does not build this sort of dependency and, 
therefore, the supplier remains less powerful against the customer. However, in 
these situations the supplier has less invested in the customer and is not as 
dependent on maintaining that particular relationship. 
Production method  
The production method is associated with the product value, volume and stage of 
development. Prototype work has the potential to lock-in customers to further work: 
sunk costs have already been established at the supplier firm through tooling and 
design adjustments. Long term contract and schedule work can generate cost 
efficiencies at the supplier firm through continual improvements in production 
processes. These characteristics make it more costly, both financially and temporally, 
to source somewhere else and therefore puts the supplier firm in a relatively more 
powerful position with the customer.  
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Investments  
The specificity of investment to meet the requirement of particular customers by 
suppliers can both increase and reduce their relative powerfulness. Asset specific 
investments can strengthen a buyer-supplier relationship by illustrating commitment 
by suppliers. On the other hand, it increases the suppliers’ dependency on 
customers. Non-transaction specific investment has the benefit of strengthening 
suppliers’ capabilities without enhancing dependency on any particular customer 
(Sturgeon and Lee, 2001; Sturgeon, 2002). 
Tooling  
The tooling characteristics, such as customisation to firm machines, sunk costs, 
partial ownership and storage patterns can also provide some relative power for 
supplier firms. Customers retain the ability to source components at other 
manufacturing facilities, ultimately reducing the powerfulness of suppliers in relation 
to customers because of this open sourcing ability. In addition, customers usually 
retain ownership of designs and purchase the tooling, making it impossible for 
suppliers to utilise the tooling and ultimately its value to suppliers is minimal without 
the associated customer order.  
These sunk costs do allow IMP firms to capitalise on the customer’s dependency and 
increase their relative power in certain circumstances, such as unpaid debts. Several 
firms were able to threaten their customers into paying their debts in order to recover 
the tooling, which despite not being owned by the supplier was in their possession. 
Thus, one supplier had an unpaid debt due to their customer entering administration: 
. . . we were owed a lot of money and we had all of their dyes and tools. They 
had to trade the business because it provided forgings to people like [OEM 1]. 
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[OEM 2] was the biggest problem for them and you take those forgings away 
and all these cars are not going to be built. So the administrator was in a 
position where they had to trade the business ‘cause if they fall out with [OEM 
1] then they’re in trouble with the next one in administration, and the next one 
and the next one. So they had to trade the business. They came to trade the 
business and they’ve got no dyes and tools to make any parts. So they 
knocked on the door. They offered us double the price for every dye and tool 
we’d got here to have the dyes and tools back, which came to a small figure 
compared to the overall bill. We said no, we’re going to keep them, we’re not 
interested…It got to the point where they paid every single penny (Interviewee 
1, Forge SME 10). 
 
Due to the time delay and cost of generating new tooling the supplier was in a 
position of relative power to demand payment. However, this powerfulness is unlikely 
to continue as customers tend to multisource products where it is cost effective, for 
example on higher volume products. 
Sunk costs and dependency  
These decision points represent instances of resistance, as well as coercion (Clegg, 
1989). The production decisions stabilise the power asymmetries between the 
organisations during a period of time where the control of resources and investments 
generate value. Investment is a key determining factor in each stage, generating 
distinct and differentiated forms of sunk costs (Clark and Wrigley, 1995). Sunk costs 
imply a preference to continue a production relation while prior investments in 
equipment or knowledge retain value by maintaining the current production context. 
This analysis has illustrated the continued relevance of sunk costs as framework for 
understanding production relations but highlights the complexity of their influence. 
Multiple areas of sunk costs generate a complex system of investment structures 
between transaction partners and may entail conflicts between different sets of 
investment. These layers can generate distinct areas of relative power for transaction 
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partners and specifically instances of relative power for suppliers. Although sunk 
costs are not the only dependency element in production relations [for instance 
access to resources see Pfeffer and Salancik (1978)], they form distinct inter-firm 
asymmetries. 
It should be noted that these production decisions are rooted in the overriding 
financing framework. Trade credit is a prominent funding system for the IMP industry. 
As IMP firms are generally givers of trade credit (Chapter Four, section 4.4.4), much 
of their financial capacity is continually tied up in raw materials, work in progress and 
finished stock. In this situation, their relative position of power is reduced against the 
customer because they are highly dependent on the sale of goods to unlock cash. 
During the 2008 recession, IMP firms were in a further state of limited power as credit 
levels and insurance were reduced and their trade with customers was unsecured. 
To generate any income, they needed to continue to trade and free already tied up 
money in the production line. The importance of trade credit to the IMP industry 
enhances the dependency of firms on their customers. Financing structures 
represent the disposition and facilitative aspects of Clegg’s (1989) Frameworks of 
Power model. Clegg’s model identified interlinked circuits of power and resistance, 
generated from three key aspects of power: agency, termed causal power; rules of 
practice, termed dispositional power; and resource dependencies, termed facilitative 
power (Taylor, 1996).  The interaction of these circuits generates a dynamic system, 
where power is held in tension, based on the feedback loops of agency, working 
practices and innovations.  Critically, for this study, the feedback of the socio-
economic environment influenced the power inequalities in IMP-client relationships. 
The reliance on trade credit, a working practice, and the reduction in credit insurance, 
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a destabilising force, created a distinct, or ‘episodic’ change in the nature of the 
power inequalities (Taylor, 1996). These additional ‘circuits of power’ work in 
conjunction with the sunk costs framework identified above. The circuits influence 
power structures between IMP firms and clients, generating distinct periods of 
relative powerfulness within the inter-firm relationships. 
 
5.3 Relationship Structures in the Value Chain 
The complexity of the power dynamic between buyer and supplier has generated 
variations in inter-firm relationship. The empirical results have shown four distinct 
types of customer-supplier relationship within the IMP industry. These relationships 
illustrate the negotiation of power and dependency between transaction partners at 
key areas of the production process. These are outlined in Figure 5.2 and Table 5.1 
below. Each relationship type is detailed below to identify the characteristics and 
impacts of the relationships. The nature of interdependency found in the study will be 
discussed, followed by an examination of the role of IMP supplier firms in developing 
the relationships. 
The types of relationship are based around the negotiation points identified in the 
previous section and the strategic action of IMP firms. They are differentiated based 
on the basic orientation of the IMP firm towards shaping the relationship they have 
with the customer. The types are not mutually exclusive and firms may have engaged 
in different relationships across their customer portfolio; however, the groups include 
those firms where a dominant strategic direction could be identified. The relationship 
dynamics are in continual flux and illustrate heterogeneity within the classification 
from the different resources and historical development of individual firms. They are 
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based on the distribution of relative power between buyer and supplier during the 
production process and the resultant dependencies this creates. 
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Figure 5.2 Client-Supplier Relationship Types in the IMP Industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Spine points reflect the decision making stages as indicated in Figure 5.1 
Source: Author (2012) 
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Table 5.1 Client-Supplier Relationship Characteristics 
 Type 1: Vulnerable Type 2: Interdependency Type 3: Lock-In 
 
Type 4: Boundary 
Spanning 
Number of firms  
 
4 4 10 2 
Firm characteristics 
 
Limited investment 
potential 
Subcontract position in 
supply chain 
High investment levels  
High profile/image 
Large customers 
High volume production or 
support for high volume 
production elsewhere 
Joint product development 
Early pre-production and 
prototyping. 
 
High cash resources 
Advantages for IMP 
firm 
 
Low dependency on 
individual customers 
Increased customer 
dependency from time lag 
in re-sourcing 
Additional value added 
production tasks 
Learning/knowledge build 
up  
Strengthening of 
relationship with customer 
Increase dependency of 
customer 
Less dependency on 
current customers 
Networking outside 
industry 
Knowledge build up 
Disadvantages for 
IMP firm 
 
 
 
Limited collateral in 
relationship 
Dependent on customer 
preferences for skills 
No ownership 
Dependency on customer 
Additional risks and costs 
High investment 
requirements 
Dependency on customer  
No ownership protection 
Additional services require 
investment from IMP firm in 
skills 
High investment 
requirements 
Commercialisation capacity 
required 
     
Source: Interview data (2009-10)
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5.3.1 Relationship Types 
Vulnerable   
The first relationship typology identified is Vulnerable. In these instances the 
customer is a relatively more powerful relationship partner as there are limited 
sourcing ties to the specific supplier. In particular, there are three key areas of the 
relationship which can leave the supplier firm unprotected from loss of demand. 
Continual changes of customer product do not require additional sunk costs when 
moving and are not usually long enough for the supplier to generate cost efficiencies. 
As a result, the supplier is susceptible to loss of customers as they have no sunk 
costs or benefits to encourage them to remain with that particular supplier for future 
products. Lack of ownership of product design by the supplier ultimately leaves the 
firm unprotected from sourcing decisions by the customer. The supplier may have a 
high skill base but they are generic IMP skills and non-transaction specific, 
consequently there is little protection from customers resourcing. This group is less 
vulnerable to multiple sourcing of components because they generally engage in 
small order volumes. 
This relationship type is characterised by small jobbing IMP firms (both foundries and 
forges), relatively low investment capacity and low levels of dependency on primary 
customers (illustrated by proportion of turnover primary customer represents), with a 
modal dependency between 10-23%. The limited investment capacity could be a 
result of seven of the ten firms being relatively old and have suffered extensively from 
loss of demand to overseas competitors in the past, which has led to a low 
capitalisation from profits supported through cash reserves. Two of the three 
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relatively newer firms have suffered financial difficulties in recent years and changed 
ownership through administration.  
These firms have a varied and large customer base, with ongoing ‘relationships’ of 
up to 150 different customers (Foundry SME 16) that typically purchase small 
batches every few years. Although the firms are not reliant on any particular 
customer (as each represents such a small proportion of turnover), they are have 
limited competitive advantages or potential to generate transaction-specific sunk 
costs and therefore customers remain highly mobile. As such, they are reliant on 
price premiums from customisation and repeat orders. A large majority of these 
orders are repeat batches (up to 85% (Foundry SME 13)) and as such, tooling 
outlays can generate sunk costs that discourage production being allocated to other 
firms. Here, the IMP firm is able to generate some power in the relationship, although 
the tooling is relatively cheap and therefore does not constitute such a significant 
sunk cost. To retain this commitment from customers it is common for these IMP 
firms to retain tooling independently. Although the tooling is technically owned by the 
customer as its cost is either directly or indirectly charged to the customer, the 
customer is rarely interested in keeping it, particularly because it is relatively cheap. 
IMP firms retain it, under their own cost, as a means of attracting the customer back 
for subsequent runs. This is a weak form of lock-in because of the low level of sunk 
cost: the IMP firm remains vulnerable to resourcing for subsequent runs and the finite 
nature of the product runs.  
Instances of Interdependence  
The firms engaged in Interdependent relationships are involved in mid-high volume 
manufacture, either directly or as a capacity filler and logistics supplier. The level of 
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interdependency is dynamic, influenced by stability in the production chain (e.g. 
disruptions from natural hazards or strikes), customer sourcing practices (three firms 
in this category were sole suppliers of certain products) and level of asset specific 
investment made by both transaction partners. In this approach the relative 
powerfulness between buyer and supplier changes during the course of the trading 
relationship. However, both transaction partners rely on each other at specific points 
in time. 
IMP firms within the West Midlands often act as capacity fillers and short run 
producers to supplement high volume component manufacture undertaken in lower 
cost locations. In these instances, the supplier can gain opportunities to build 
relationships with customer when they provide capacity at crisis points with short 
notice. This notion of ‘helping them out’ has featured heavily in the study as a way of 
stabilising the customers sourcing concerns and building trust and respect in the 
supplier-customer relationship. As a result of this, the supplier often finds their 
relative powerfulness increases when they help customers at difficult times and can 
generate additional, more permanent work from these instances. Here, the notion of 
benevolence features strongly. Sako (1992) suggests that benevolence is a key 
element within buyer-supplier relationships as those individuals engaged in the 
relationship feel a strong duty to repay the debt now or in the future. Although the 
study finds many instances of repaid debts, they are all dependent on the customer 
being in a continued position of dependency and the IMP firm able to enforce this 
debt repayment through their relative powerfulness. An example of this is an event 
which occurred at a relatively large SME (Forge SME 10) that provided critical 
components for an OEM. The forge had previously provided capacity filling for their 
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OEM customer that prevented stoppages on the OEM production line (saving the 
customer considerable expense). Sometime later the forge was asked to produce 
additional components, something the OEM packaged as a ‘benefit’ to the forge in 
response to repaying their ‘debt’. The forge was aware, however, of the precarious 
position the OEM was actually in and, in accepting the additional component work, 
demanded additional benefits, such as faster payment. In this situation, although the 
OEM was seen to be benevolent, in reality the OEM was experiencing difficulty and 
trying to capitalise on the existing relationship between the firms. 
It is common for these IMP firms to be a sole supplier of a strategic component, 
generating an area of relative supplier powerfulness. IMP suppliers often 
manufacture a range of components for a particular customer within their 
specialisation. These are usually critical parts to the final product and importantly, in 
one or two cases they are the only producer. This is often not a result of ownership of 
property rights or specific capabilities but rather of the closure of other suppliers or 
the consolidation of the customers supply base. This generates customer 
dependency on the IMP supplier because the part is critical and any delays in its 
production would significantly impact on the supply chain. However, the sourcing 
practices are determined by the customer, so while this may create a dependency 
and powerfulness of the supplier in these instances, this is not necessarily a 
continued area of power. The supplier has little influence in maintaining this 
dependency, provided they do not disrupt the relationship. 
The significant cost of tooling for mid-high volume production of generally more 
complex (in terms of materials and design), although standardised, components 
reinforces the above dependency and generates a level of sunk costs for the entire 
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product portfolio of the customer with the IMP supplier. As IMP firms hold patterns 
and tooling equipment on site, they can use this to their advantage in times of a 
relationship breakdown, despite the tooling in theory being owned by the customer. 
In several cases of unpaid trade credit, suppliers have retained the tooling equipment 
until a payment or agreement has been reached on the outstanding amount. 
Customers often want to transfer manufacture quickly somewhere else and reduce 
costs; as the IMP firm retains the tools, they are unable to do this without sinking in 
further investment somewhere else until the IMP firm releases the tooling. This 
provides the supplier with a more powerful position to reclaim owed money and 
potentially retain sourcing, if the customer is financially viable to continue. In 
instances of a breakdown of the relationship for other reasons, the sunk costs in the 
tooling for firm specific machines can allow the suppliers to have a more powerful 
position and increase the resourcing time, while disputes are settled or the customer 
initiates secondary tooling. This adjustment time can prove vital to the supplier form 
sourcing new orders. High levels of investment are made by IMP firms to generate 
production efficiencies and automation to reduce the cost base and maintain, or 
improve, cost competitiveness. Customers in these relationships are 
characteristically OEMs which drive annual price improvements and threaten to 
relocate production (Bair, 2008; Rutherford and Holmes, 2007). As such, IMP firms 
need continual investment in process efficiency to reduce their cost base (Hansen, 
2010; Heidenreich, 2009). The problem here is not that the investments are 
necessarily specific to that customer but that they are product and market specific. 
These firms have survived by becoming specialist producers of certain products with 
reputations as consistent quality suppliers (often with world leading quality 
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measures). As such, their market is very much reduced and with increased 
consolidation, particularly in automotive, there are a limited number of customers. As 
a result, despite their generic capabilities in these fields, IMP firms find themselves 
increasingly reliant on certain groups of customers rather than reducing their 
dependence as suggested in the modular value chain model (Sturgeon and Lee, 
2001; Sturgeon, 2002). 
This classification is characterised by a low number of foundry IMP firms. This is to 
be expected as the forging processes lends itself more to production of standardised 
products on a larger scale, where equipment investments and higher levels of 
automation are not only more cost effective but rewarded by the market. However, it 
is interesting to note which foundries have engaged in this type of relationship. Two 
of the three firms generate interdependency from cost efficiencies in production 
process due to the relatively large volumes (mid-high). Both of these firms 
manufacture for the automotive industry and have extremely large (OEM) direct 
customers. Although Foundry Large 1 has a range of customers and markets, 
Foundry SME 4 is highly dependent on a small set of automotive customers, which 
were actively reduced from five to three during the recession. The third firm has a 
slightly different relationship in that it has a range of customers but two principal 
customers that are also large multinationals. The demands from one customer in 
particular has generated increased dependence on both transaction partners. The 
size of customers cannot solely account for the formation of this relationship type. 
However, the requirements to engage with these customers (i.e. cost efficiencies and 
capacity) have encouraged the development of dependency from the IMP firm. The 
IMP firm’s capacity, or willingness, to invest in this manner (i.e. transaction-specific) 
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has put into practice this dependency. Therefore, the scale of the customer (and its 
consequent purchasing power), together with the IMP firms strategic direction and 
financial capacity has generated this form of relationship. 
Lock-In  
The Lock-In relationship specifically attempts to generate a form of dependency from 
the customer to the IMP firm by developing strong relationships through product 
development or status as a nominated supplier. IMP firms have extended their formal 
product range and services to include prototype and pre-production manufacture, 
thereby reducing their vulnerability to the loss of higher volume and more 
standardised manufacture to lower-cost producers. The prototype and pre-production 
stages involve increased collaboration between buyer and supplier in order to 
generate a product with performance qualities that can be manufactured in the most 
economical way. Product development requires substantial investment in generating 
specific customer and product knowledge. This investment acts as a sunk cost, 
providing the basis for continued commitment between transaction partners as the 
products are for set quantities/length of time (as once demand reaches a critical 
mass production will be transferred to a supplier who can mass produce at a lower 
cost). As such, the development collaboration is in effect a project, but forms part of a 
series of projects with the same customer. Customers are likely to continue to use 
the IMP firm for additional projects because there are sunk costs in customer 
knowledge and working practices (Grabher, 2002; Grabher and Ibert, 2006). For both 
the continued relationship and the sensitive nature of the work involved (i.e. 
confidential prototype development), trust in the IMP supplier is critical. Investment in 
equipment is less significant as tooling is generally far less expensive than that for 
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mass production (due to the material used). The knowledge base and personal 
relationships established encourages future product development by the customer to 
be done at that particular IMP firm (Eccles, 1981).  
Collaborative working between buyer and supplier has always been part of the 
manufacturing process in these firms, with IMP firms providing guidance on 
production techniques and product alterations to generate the most economical 
manufacture. However, the IMP firms which are developing a lock-in relationship are 
formalising this service, thereby generating a new, and sometimes independent, 
revenue stream: 
That’s actually, you may think that’s wasted, you’re not making a component 
that goes out the door and is sold, but what you’re doing is building up a bank 
of knowledge to be able to sell that component and have an ongoing funding 
stream for future sales from it. Y’know, each new project is developing a 
funding stream for the future and then you do another one and another one 
and all these funds, hopefully they will last for several years and make money 
in the future (Interviewee 1, Foundry SME 3). 
 
Those firms, which do undertake this form of development work but are not engaged 
in lock-in relationships, do not charge for the service they provide and instead view 
their capability as a means to generate competitive advantage rather than an 
additional revenue stream (Foundry SME 1 – Fabricator, Foundry SME 14). By 
undertaking formal development work and marketing it as a service to customers, 
IMP firms are attempting to ‘lock’ customers in to undertaking the next production 
stage (pre-production) with them as they already have sunk costs with them. The 
investments in knowledge and equipment (tooling is tailored to the firms specific 
machines) allows a smooth, and quick, transition to the next manufacturing stage. In 
addition, by continuing the relationship the customer is more likely to site its next 
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prototype project with the IMP firm because of a common understanding and an 
established trust between transaction partners. As a result, a subsequent stream of 
further work is generated. 
Another form of lock-in is by increasing status with the customer through nominations 
as key suppliers, but critically for new products as the New Product Route (NPR). 
Trust again becomes significant through the application of customer approvals on 
IMP firm supplier status. By developing status the supplier firm increases the level of 
trust between the transactional partners. As a nominated supplier the customer is 
reflecting a level of trust engaged with the supplier and deepening the relationship by 
investing in audits, continuous improvement programs and providing additional 
benefits to the supplier. In return, the supplier also invests in the relationship by 
capacity and service commitments, adherence to specifications and audits. Although 
it does not protect the firm from sourcing changes, it does build increased 
commitment in the relationship and, therefore, more ties between the firms. Again, 
this forms a lock-in to the pre-production manufacturing stage. 
There are disadvantages for the IMP firm in this type of relationship. A particular 
characteristic is the lack of product ownership, with no formal patents or development 
rights for the IMP firm. In this situation the formal ownership could disrupt the trust 
building between customer-supplier as the IMP firm is viewed as being less 
dependent on their customers (Sako, 1992; Vlaar et al., 2007). In addition, the 
capacity to generate IPR can be low as many of the product or process 
developments are generic and the skills for identifying and undertaking such 
formalisation processes may not be available in the firm. To provide the development 
facilities also requires significant investment in skills by the IMP firm, often new 
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employees and training. Ultimately the IMP firm can become more dependent on 
their existing customer base as a greater proportion of revenue is generated from 
them. In some cases it has broadened to a new customer segment, as discussed 
above, but this is less common.  
The group is comprised solely of foundries, which could relate to the tendency for 
foundries to produce higher complexity products and therefore a propensity towards 
product development and design. These firms are also mainly small (only one large 
firm) and promote a strong ‘professional’ image to their customers. Image was 
particularly important with this group as a means of attracting high-value work from 
corporate customers. Although the movement into prototype design has been 
targeted at existing customers (i.e. with a prior relationship), the transition towards 
more sensitive knowledge and higher-value production required the IMP firms to 
promote themselves differently (Raj-Reichert, 2011; Tokatli and Kizilgün, 2004). The 
low number of large firms utilising this strategy is not surprising as they have the 
production capacity to generate value from economies of scale. The large firm in this 
group, however, was also keen on developing its own reputation for particular shapes 
of casting and has become a market leader in this particular area of more complex 
castings. Although other large firms are also market leaders, particularly Foundry 
Large 1, this is based on price, capacity and skill combined. In the case of Foundry 
Large 2, they are more focussed on ‘locking-in’ their customers based on their ability 
to manufacture particular shapes through market dominance. In this situation the IMP 
firm has attempted to promote its design and production capacity to the market, 
although it does not hold any formal design ownerships. 
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Boundary Spanning  
The Boundary Spanning relationship type is quite different to the other types. The 
firms are involved in the design of products but importantly, they are developing 
formal property rights to reinforce this design involvement. Firms are doing this 
through either investment in R&D consortiums, generating joint and independent IPR, 
and through joint ventures with customers. The large firms have done this through 
investment consortiums for generic and firm-specific product development (Forge 
Large 3, Foundry SME 10 - PLC group subsidiary). The purpose of this is to share 
the cost and risk of large scale production and material developments with other 
supply chain partners (one firm was engaged in a MNE investment centre, the other 
in a European consortium for advancements in material properties). This strategy 
allows them to be at the forefront of material and production technology, thereby, 
building a reputation and links with other supply chain partners involved in these 
collaborations for future work. In addition, by participating in this investment the firm 
acts as a prototype production facility. This learning process builds sunk costs in 
equipment and knowledge should the prototype be successful, which encourages the 
consortium, or any potential users of the product, to site production at the 
experienced producer. Participation in these groups requires significant investment 
(£1m was the minimum investment for a place in both schemes). As such, innovation 
of this nature is limited to firms with significant capital.  
The second aspect is to generate a series of new products, either through joint 
ventures or in-house development, that generate product ownership (IPR) (Foundry 
SME 1 – Fabricator, Forge SME 1 – Fabricator, Forge SME 8 – Fabricator, Foundry 
SME 26). This requires less investment than above, but does still require significant 
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capital and risk to the firm. In two of the cases, the IPR was a chance opportunity to 
expand an existing product or a chance encounter with a product developer. This 
highlights the significance of an entrepreneurial, or strategic, attitude in developing 
opportunities when they arise. 
Although IPR protects the firm from loss of production and increased control over 
value distribution (Hudson, 2004; 2005), the use of the product is still dependent on 
the customer. Joint ownership of either the product or split ownership of component 
parts within it mean that both parties are dependent on the other to actually sell the 
product. The formal ownership rights should protect the IMP firms from loss because 
the associated costs of ignoring the legal rights discourage such action. However, in 
some cases this has not prevented larger customer firms opportunistically ending 
relations with the IMP supplier, as one interviewee explains, they had 
…. been manufacturing these castings … for about ten years. It was a really 
good part of the business and then again they [large MNE customer] found 
somebody who could do it slightly cheaper. We designed the product and the 
bloke just said ‘well we’re a lot bigger than you are’. He said ‘we owe your site 
50 grand, I won’t pay that and we’ll be fighting for years so you might as well 
have your money, there you go’ (Interviewee 1, Foundry SME 1 – Fabricator). 
 
The IMP firms are limited in selling the product without the customer because of the 
inhibiting costs, legal restrictions from IPR and also their access to the market. The 
IMP industry is characterised by a lack of direct market access and as such, IMP 
firms have little experience in selling directly to the end user or the marketing and 
distribution skills necessary. Through joint product development and IPR the IMP firm 
is provided with routes to market and both parties technically are dependent on each 
other to take the product to market. 
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In instances where investment does not generate joint IPR (and therefore is not 
transaction-specific) the IMP firm is able to expand its customer base and become a 
relatively more powerful transaction partner because they own the product. However, 
due to the limited routes to market, the IMP firms is restricted in its ability to enforce 
this relative powerfulness as it requires the market access through its traditional 
further manufacturing customers: 
Yes we’ve done, on the lock project we’re doing for this security gating, he 
came to us with a concept he’d got that he was buying from a French 
company that wasn’t 100% satisfactory. So we took it and said look, if you 
don’t mind we’ll play with it for a couple of months, see if we can make it a lot 
simpler, more economical, and if it looks ok we’ll quote some prices and take it 
forward. And that’s what we’ve done. We’ve spent about nine months total 
now developing this lock. And it’s the only lock in the UK now for security grills 
and that sort of thing to withstand a category two criminal test now. That’s the 
only one in the UK. Which is why our customer, which we’ve gone into a joint 
venture on this now, is very keen to start this project going (Interviewee 1, 
Forge SME 8 – Fabricator). 
 
Firms in this group are characterised by high levels of investment in product 
development and a stable financial position. This is reflective of the high costs of 
independent product development, which cannot be borne by the majority of firms 
within the sample. It also illustrates a relatively high risk strategy for the firms. 
Foundry SME 2 -PLC group subsidiary is undertaking this in collaboration with other 
companies in the value chain in order to look for product/parts of products which it 
can generate IPR on for its existing customer base. Thereby, the relative risk of 
failing to achieve returns on their investment is reduced. Forge SME 8 – Fabricator 
on the other hand is generating product developments without a specific market 
strategy or customer demand. This is illustrated in the development of a plastering 
tool which they have been unable to sell through a distributor (as the distributor 
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demanded ownership) and, therefore, has left the company forced to sell directly to 
the public, a more high risk and, as of yet, less profitable option. 
The Boundary Spanning group has a relatively low number of the foundry businesses 
(two foundries, four forges) to what would be expected from the ratio of foundry:forge 
in the sample. This pattern is also seen in the diversification into fabrication 
processes in the sample overall, with significantly more forges than foundries making 
the transition towards fabrication. In fact, three of the four SMEs in this relationship 
type have also made the diversification into fabrication processes. This could be a 
result of the production process and product type made in foundries (generally more 
complex products) where value-added is more easily achieved through customisation 
and low order volumes, therefore less need to search for value added through 
diversification. In both the fabrication and boundary spanning group, access to 
market is the primary motivation. Through both routes the IMP firm deals directly with 
the end user, either for a new product or for a complete product, or with customers 
further up the supply chain, such as in the investment consortiums.  
5.3.2 Complexity in Relationships 
Relationships between buyers and suppliers are complex, varied and dynamic. They 
include multiple decision points that create variety in the inter-firm relationship, both 
between customers and over time. The previous analysis of sunk costs and forms of 
relative power identified layers of production decisions that shape relationships. 
These elements come together in a multitude of ways, creating time- and space-
specific relationship structures. A focus on non-lead firms has highlighted varied 
forms of power and influences on relationship structures. Non-lead firms undertake a 
variety of tasks in various value chains across their customer portfolio. This creates 
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different forms of relationships, influenced by the configuration of tasks in the 
particular exchange, generating complexity in particular relationship structures and 
across the customer portfolio. Prior work on inter-firm relationships has highlighted 
this variability in relationships (Cox, 1996; Gereffi et al., 2005; Herrigel, 2010), 
although with only limited awareness of the affect of a combination of relationships 
within a firm. 
The relationship types identify two aspects of relationship development which are 
underdeveloped in current conceptions of vertical inter-firm linkages; 
interdependency as a dynamic process and the active role of suppliers’ strategic 
action. These elements offer a more nuanced approach to understanding the varied 
forms of buyer-supplier relationships and will be discussed in turn below.  
Interdependency comparison  
Three of the above relationship types illustrate instances of interdependency 
between buyer and supplier: Interdependent, Lock-In and Boundary Spanning. A 
careful distinction is made here to identify instances, rather than continual levels, of 
interdependency between buyer and IMP supplier. The relationship is dynamic and 
adjusted in response to specific environmental or firm contexts that generate 
temporary interdependency in certain customer groups and over specific periods of 
time.  
The distinction between the three forms is important because they differ in approach 
to interdependency, forms of security and customer segment. The Interdependent 
approach uses investment in equipment, knowledge and, often, sole manufacturing 
capability of strategic parts to retain production. This approach is used with all major 
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customers as these IMP firms have a small set of customers which together 
represent around 85-90% of turnover. The dependency is formalised through 
continued production agreements, not necessarily formal contracts. The use of 
agreements in this approach is important because profit is generated towards the 
end of the product life-cycle; therefore, the supplier needs to retain the whole 
production life in order to generate profit. The customer is also keen to maintain the 
relationship to prevent additional tooling and set-up costs with other suppliers during 
the life of the product. Here the interdependency is generated through the contract 
life as both parties can generate cost efficiencies through maintaining the supply 
relationship. The Lock-In approach specifically attempts to create dependency 
through investment in knowledge but without any formal security to lock-in customers 
to continue production. Instead IMP firms ‘package’ the development work as a 
service that will hopefully encourage customers to keep the next stage of production 
with them. Critically, this approach attempts to generate interdependency with a 
specific group of existing customers. Here both the customer and the supplier are 
invested in the relationship for ongoing work through multiple development projects. 
Although the agreement covers only one product, the sunk costs encourage ongoing 
collaboration between the transaction partners on multiple projects (Grabher, 2002; 
Grabher and Ibert, 2006). In the Boundary Spanning approach the ownership of 
design rights act as a formalised and permanent securitisation of the supplier’s 
involvement in design and production. The customer is tied to the supplier because 
of these rights and as such the interdependency is created for a specific product. 
Here the switching costs are related to a particular product and increases in the 
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supplier’s skill set through investment to generate generic, not transactional-specific, 
knowledge bases. 
Interdependency has been identified here to be more complex than shown in current 
typologies in the literature. In all forms of interdependency, switching costs are key 
elements of dependency on respective transaction partners: learnt knowledge and 
capabilities in the Lock-In approach, equipment and efficiencies in the 
Interdependent approach, and formal IPR restrictions in the Boundary Spanning 
group. This reflects Gereffi et al.’s (2005) notion of interdependency, under the 
relational governance type, from the lead firms relative cost to move suppliers (based 
on the level of standardisation, investment and abilities in the supply base). However, 
the study illustrates how the nature of the buyer-supplier relationship, and specifically 
the areas the supplier is able to generate instances of relative power, affects how 
switching costs generate interdependency. Interdependency is generated for 
particular customers, contracts or products. The IMP firms in the Lock-In, 
Interdependent and Boundary Spanning approaches have also illustrated instances 
of strategic action to capitalise on the position of the lead, or customer, firm that are 
outside these cost efficiency based forms. Learnt practices and ways of working from 
repeated transactions, defined as relational proximity by Murphy (2011), have 
influenced both the Lock-In and Interdependent forms of interdependency. In the 
Lock-In approach trust between customer and supplier has been a significant 
determinant of the supplier’s ability to engage the customer. In the Interdependent 
approach the sense of benevolence (Sako, 1992), or repaying a favour, has been 
used repeated by suppliers to generate a form of dependency. In both these cases, 
the closeness, or specific forms of relational sunk costs, has been used by the 
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customer to their own advantage, where they can also benefit from the situation. In 
this sense, both transaction partners have been active in shaping the relationship 
dynamic and the negotiation of power at specific instances for specific groups or 
customer.  
Importantly, the costs of switching alone have not sustained a level of 
interdependence from the customer on the IMP firm. The interdependency has 
adjusted as the supplier capitalises on situations to increase their independence and 
the customer to limit it. The relational governance type identified by Gereffi et al. 
(2005) is seen to generate mutual dependency between transaction partners through 
high supplier skill base and complex products with little ability to codify the 
transactions. This level of mutual dependency was not observed in the study. 
Although instances of increased dependency from one partner were found, these 
were for specific periods, and in all instances one partner remained more powerful 
than the other. In this sense the IMP firm moves between positions of ‘dependent 
with influence’ and ‘independent with influence’ (Ruigrok and van Tulder, 1995), 
depending on the environmental and firm specific circumstances of the relationship. 
A position of interdependence is not found to be achieved as the relationship is in 
continual flux and varies between customers. Critically, the IMP firms are capitalising 
on instances of implicit power, rather than the explicit forms of power discussed in 
Gereffi et al.’s (2005) typology of governance types. 
Active supplier involvement  
The different types of interdependency have formed as a result of supplier strategic 
action in shaping relationships and utilising situations, such as emergency production 
requests, to generate temporary positions of dependency and ongoing collaboration. 
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The division of relationship types is influenced by the type of product and production 
process characteristics, as illustrated by the general distribution of IMP sub-industries 
between the groups. Foundries lend themselves to developing lock-in relationships 
due to the generally higher level of complexity in their products. On the other hand, 
forges tend to benefit from more standard products, where efficiencies can be 
generated. These factors influence how IMP firms fit in the buyer-supplier 
relationship and the areas of relative power they can generate. The vulnerable group 
has a fairly representative split of foundry and forges, illustrating a lack of strategic 
intent from IMP firms to develop areas of power. However, there are instances where 
these classifications don’t fit, particularly in the boundary spanning group. Here the 
strategic direction and financial capability of individual firms is important and 
illustrates the important role IMP firms, or suppliers more generally, play in 
determining the nature of a buyer-supplier relationship. 
The negotiation of power has differed in each relationship type. In the Interdependent 
approach the customer is the driving force behind the relationship type by 
encouraging investments by the supplier to drive cost reductions and can determine 
sourcing decisions. Although there is a level of interdependency from this, it is not 
directed by the supplier. The IMP firm only becomes active in shaping in the power 
dynamics in the relationship in instances of ‘helping out’, whereby the supplier 
generates an increased dependency for a limited period of time and after being 
asked by the customer. However, these firms do generate instances of 
interdependency from switching costs (specifically they are often sole suppliers of a 
strategic part) but also from generating a tit-for-tat relationship by ‘helping out’ their 
customers in periods of crisis. In all these situations the supplier is active in 
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capitalising on these situations and generating a form of dependency from the 
customer and a resultant period of relative powerfulness. The usefulness of the debt, 
however, is determined by the customers own sense of benevolence and the 
suppliers strategic use. As such, suppliers activeness in asserting relative 
powerfulness is guarded by the customers own strategic purpose. 
In contrast, the Lock-In and Boundary Spanning approaches illustrate the active role 
of the supplier in shaping the relationship which is not driven by customer 
governance. In the Lock-In approach, the instigation of a product development 
service was by the IMP firm looking to generate additional revenue streams and was 
met with resistance from the customer base in some instances: 
With customers I think there’s always, probably a nervousness…that it 
somewhat limits them later for going into the market place to achieve the best 
price. Where we’ve got excellent relationships with customers…they have 
started to use the facility now. Because they know that we’re not doing it to 
lock them in we’re doing it as an added service to customers. There is always 
scepticism as to why are they doing this, are we locked in at an early stage 
then they’ve got us. And y’know, you have to work on getting a history with 
people so that they understand and believe when you say yes we can do this 
and also believe that when you get to the final part you’re still going to be 
competitive and you what you haven’t done is lock them into you and taken 
advantage on price (Interviewee 1, Foundry SME 19). 
 
In this case the customers were reluctant to increase their dependence on the IMP 
firm and resulted in the IMP firm having to build relationships and persuade the 
customer to utilise the service.  
In the Boundary Spanning approach, the investment in product development was 
most often undertaken in combination with existing customers or to encourage new 
customers. The product is either jointly owned or only valuable to a specific customer 
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for their product. As such, the IMP firm is still dependent on the customer. In these 
cases it is the supplier who is active in securing property rights, as the following three 
examples illustrate: 
We were naïve for a long time and not set up proper contracts to sign up 
people. So we’ve now …said as soon as we get into negotiating with people, if 
we don’t have the intellectual property right into it, we’re going to design it, 
they’ve got to sign some form of agreement (Interviewee 1, Foundry SME 1 – 
Fabricator) 
…every couple of years we develop a new product if we can…We’ve got a 
couple of patents that are still live and umm, that’s what we try to get 
ownership of a product at some point (Interviewee 1, Forge SME 8 – 
Fabricator) 
[A strategic partnership in an industry research centre has generated]…IP 
that’s developed from the core projects [which] is shared between all the 
members or you can do your own individually funded project and basically any 
IP that’s developed belongs to you because you funded it. …We’ll be 
participating with our peers on generic projects and then we’ll have some 
other projects that we’ll fund specifically which hopefully exploit the market 
place (Interviewee 1, Forge Large 3). 
 
The ability of suppliers to do this has been influenced by their ability to invest and the 
determination of the IMP firms to adjust working practices to capture some level of 
ownership. Customer firms have also been actively involved in this relationship 
formation, often through joint ventures or encouragement to be involved in R&D 
consortia with them. In this sense both customer and supplier have been active in 
developing the relationship.  
The IMP firms have been able to instigate relationship dynamics more in the Lock-In 
and Boundary Spanning group, where they are involved in product design. Herrigel 
(2010) suggests the division of production tasks, specifically the division of design 
and production, as being critical in influencing the level of dependency between 
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partners as collaboration is always required. The division of design and production 
tasks alone does not determine levels of dependency in IMP firms. This is specifically 
illustrated through the Lock-In and Boundary Spanning firms both involving shared 
design capacity with the IMP firm. The distinction between them is not their design 
involvement per se, but their strategic intent to formalise it: the co-ownership of 
design rights in the Boundary Spanning group generates relatively low levels of 
dependency from either transaction partner, whereas the sole ownership rights of the 
customer in the Lock-In approach generates increased dependency from the 
supplier. Both these approaches are, however, differentiated by how the supplier 
chooses to capitalise on this profitable, and powerful, area of the production process. 
The Boundary Spanning firms are attempting to generate property rights, whereas 
the Lock-In firms are attempting to generate informal ties for further production.  
The active involvement of the supplier in capitalising on opportunities to increase 
their power and generate instances of interdependency has formed a critical element 
of these relationship forms. In Sturgeon & Lee’s (2001) modular value chain 
approach, the suppliers are increasingly becoming independent from specific 
customers through the generation of generic skill bases and departure from asset 
specificity. This has not been identified in the IMP firms. In fact, these firms are 
actively increasing their dependency on customers through investment in specific 
customers, products and contracts. This increased collaboration, particularly in 
design, found in this study has also been observed by Herrigel (2010). The sustained 
competitive collaboration (SCC) approach illustrates how the collaboration is central 
to buyer-supplier relationships, particularly in high-production cost locations, such as 
the West Midlands. However, Herrigel suggests that the relationship will inevitably 
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depart from this interdependency, as transaction partners learn additional skills and 
search for new work. In contrast, this study has found an increasing level of 
interdependence in the three approaches, culminating in shared property rights in 
Boundary Spanning firms. In this sense, the IMP firms are actively formalising their 
collaboration and increased dependency rather than moving away from it. Despite 
this general transition, there remains a considerable level of heterogeneity in 
relationship types and the IMP sector does not seem to be evolving into any 
particular relational type. Overall the customer remains powerful in the relationship 
but the suppliers do actively negotiate relative powerfulness from periods of 
increased customer dependency. This is achieved through the division of tasks in the 
relationship and product type but also the strategic intent and investment capacity of 
the individual supplier firm. Each relationship, however, is different and characterised 
by past interactions and industry norms, their own customer and product base 
compositions and their customers sourcing activities.  
 
5.4 Generation of Value 
The focus on high value-added manufacturing as a defence against low cost 
competition has received considerable attention (Bryson et al., 2008; GHK et al., 
2009). Competitiveness has been shown to be generated from multiple aspects of 
the manufacturing process, not just production (Chapter Four, section 4.3.1) (Bryson 
and Rusten, 2011; Bryson and Taylor, 2010; Livesey, 2006). There are key stages in 
which value is created within the supply chain (Livesey, 2006) and this shapes the 
nature of the inter-firm relationship. The nature of profit and the ability to capture 
value will be examined below. This analysis identifies the main areas of profit 
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generation from premiums that can be achieved in each relationship type but it 
should be noted that profit is not exclusive to these mechanisms. 
5.4.1 Profit Timescales 
The areas of profit generation differ between the relationship types based on 
diversification in the supply chain, customer governance and contract timescales, as 
illustrated in Figure 5.3. In Vulnerable relationships the IMP firm generates its profits 
from price premiums on low production volumes and outsourcing of finishing 
activities. Spare parts are commonly produced through jobbing manufacturers 
because of the low and infrequent nature of demand. These have a relatively high 
price premium, because they are required quickly, in low volumes (sometimes single 
orders) and, critically, the customer does not possess the tooling. The tooling is often 
retained by the original manufacturer (who undertook production prior to its transfer 
to a more cost efficient mass manufacturer) and stored, at the IMP firm’s own cost, 
for future spares work. In addition, it is common for the customer to ‘forget’ their 
responsibility to retain tooling for spare parts after the components life cycle (Foundry 
SME 13). As jobbers, these firms often provide additional finishing services to 
provide a complete product to the customer. Due to the small volumes and high 
capital expenditure required to invest in such facilities, the IMP firm outsources these 
activities. They then charge a price premium to cover the logistical expense and low 
number, again generating a significant profit stream for some firms. Overall the profit 
levels are variable, associated with fluctuating demand, and very low. The recession 
was a particularly difficult period as demand volumes dropped and there was less 
uptake of additional finishing options on the products, as customers attempted to 
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reduce production costs. As such, profit levels were disproportionately affected in 
these firms. 
Figure 5.3 Value in Contract Structures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author (2012) 
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The profitability of the Interdependent group varies over time. Due to the nature of 
the product, IMP firms usually manufacture the component for the entire product life 
(up to 7 years) because of expensive tooling equipment. During this period the level 
of profitability varies. Initially the IMP firm will make a loss due to production 
difficulties, which are funded by the supplier under fixed sales prices form the 
customer. The drive by the customer for continual cost reductions encourages 
investment by the IMP firm in process efficiency. Once these difficulties have been 
managed the IMP firm can start to generate profit from the contract (which could 
have been unprofitable prior to this). This profitability supplements the losses made 
early on in the production contract, making the IMP firm highly dependent on 
maintaining the relationship throughout the contract period to generate profit. Over 
this period the tooling and equipment become increasingly tailored to the production 
site as the IMP firm make modifications. As a result, future work can be generated at 
a relatively lower price than if a new supplier was initiated. Forge Large 1, a high-
volume automotive pressworks, was able to utilise sunk costs under an existing 
contract when their customer was introducing a new, replacement, model because 
“…if they’re using the same platform [base part on which components fit into] and 
same parts then, they’ve almost got to continue using us haven’t they…. Because so 
many of those parts are specifically designed around our presses that we’ve got 
here” (Interviewee 2, Forge Large 1). 
The Lock-In approach has attempted to extract additional revenue, and particularly 
higher profit margins, from their existing customers. This type of work carries a higher 
market value than more cost-conscious standard production. The development work 
generates the highest areas of profit, albeit for a short period of time as projects are 
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finite and, once production reaches a critical level, it will be transferred to a high 
volume supplier who can provide cost efficiencies to the customer. Due to the limited 
temporal period to capture profit, these IMP firms attempt to extract all the production 
work prior to this move. An example of this is Foundry SME 19 who have recently 
introduced a ‘rapid prototype’ facility as its production site. This has enabled the firm 
to develop an additional and separate revenue stream at a particular stage of 
production, as the interviewee explains: 
…we’ve picked up an amount of work with rapid prototyping where we will 
never be the long term supplier because the part possibly isn’t suitable for our, 
our manufacturing, it may be in a material we don’t produce but by advertising 
we’ve got this facility then you open the doors for anybody who might want to 
use it (Interviewee 1, Foundry SME 19). 
 
Although the approach was targeted at existing customers, the facility has attracted a 
new set of independent customers, some of which have subsequently continued 
production at the IMP firm despite having no prior experience of working with them. 
Consequently, it has generated an additional revenue stream of the most profitable 
areas of production they can engage in. 
The Boundary Spanning firms generate profitability from property rights for design 
involvement. Where this is through a joint venture, the IMP firm is better able to 
stabilise their profit levels and generate profit for the entire product life as production 
must be undertaken by the IMP firm. In instances where the IMP firms have their own 
products, despite entitled to all of the profits, routes to market are difficult and 
therefore this generates a relatively small revenue stream (around 5% of turnover). 
Following Herrigel’s (2010) identification of supplier strategies in collaborative 
partnerships (his SCC approach) in high cost locations, the IMP sector has illustrated 
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transitions towards specialisation and diversification, both within and across supply 
chains. All relationship approaches have diversified within the supply chain. The 
Lock-In and Boundary Spanning groups have made a transition towards design 
involvement to add value, a common strategy in high cost manufacture (Bryson and 
Rusten, 2011; Bryson and Taylor, 2010; Bryson et al., 2008). In the case of Lock-In, 
additional profit is generated from moving into an additional production stage – 
prototype and development. These firms perceive their vulnerability to losing the 
customer to lower cost manufacturers during the mass production stage. As such, 
the option to add value through finishing is lost when the firm is only utilised for pre-
production activities. The Boundary Spanning group increase their value added by 
investing in design ownership and generating a continuous and secure profit stream 
from the component. Both these approaches have similar profit margins (averages of 
1.5-1.6% - note based on limited data) and dependency levels (32-33% dependence 
on primary customer). In these groups, the IMP strategies have been to engage in 
the more profitable areas of production by diversifying down the supply chain.  
The movement into design as opposed to finishing to add value is also influenced by 
investment capacity. To engage in finishing activities requires considerably more 
capital for equipment and space than design based added value, which is generally 
already undertaken in many IMP firms, although not formalised. Investments tend to 
be limited to personnel and small scale equipment. As such, those firms which have 
engaged in machining activities are predominately in the interdependent group, 
where their competitive advantage relies on cost efficiencies from a high level of 
automation. In addition, large firms in other groups have developed machining 
facilities. These firms have made substantial investments in equipment. Smaller and 
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vulnerable firms are not undertaking machining directly and out-sourcing these 
activities to continue to provide the service and generate a price premium. To recoup 
large investments in machinery IMP firms need relatively high volumes of product, 
which is why the transition up the supply chain is restricted to large and 
interdependent firms.  
The only group to exhibit diversification across supply chains is the Boundary 
Spanning group, and, particularly, those firms that have moved into fabrication. In 
these situations, the firms have actively looked for avenues to increase their 
profitability and direct market access. The diversification across supply 
chains/products is fundamentally used to gain more direct access to markets. Without 
market access IMP firms are reliant on further manufacturers to promote and sell 
their developed product, which has proved inconsistent in the past. These firms are 
undertaking diversification through both joint ventures and own product development. 
Although it has generated additional profit, it requires substantial investment in 
product development. Three other firms have entered new market areas that 
capitalise on existing skill bases, but also provide direct access to end users. The 
development of these areas is sporadic and niche, such as customised bells and 
balconies, and represents only a very small revenue stream. In these cases, the 
diversification has not proved successful in generating anything other than a small 
revenue stream and is often quoted as an ‘interest’ rather than a strategic direction 
(Foundry SME 5). 
Specialisation has been developed in the Interdependent IMP firms who have 
significantly invested in generating product/market specific skills. This approach has 
led to a very confined customer base of particularly OEMs, most of which are based 
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in the automotive sector. The continual cost pressures have driven down margins 
and the small market limits the IMP firms’ capacity to generate additional custom or 
profit. These firms have capitalised on the cost efficiencies generated from 
collaborative relationships, without necessarily diversifying in or across supply 
chains, to generate profitability. Two of these firms have diversified within the supply 
chain to increase their profitability, and, in fact, are by far the two most profitable 
firms in the study (16.2 and 17% profit margins). Foundry Large 1 has invested in 
large scale machining operations to provide finished components to their customers. 
Foundry SME 21 has, on the other hand, moved into providing development work for 
its biggest customer who has recently begun the transition towards resourcing 
manufacturing in China. In both these instances, their diversification has supported 
the specialisms they have developed in the market by bringing more profit to the 
business. 
The variability in profitability within the temporal extent of the contract is a key aspect 
of firm adjustment to higher value added manufacture. It has been illustrated that the 
different aspects of ‘higher value added’ production carries with it discrete zones of 
profitability. This concept builds upon the industry life cycle approach to profitability in 
production cycles. Markusen’s (1985) work on the profitability of industries 
characterises profit cycles primarily on investment, output and employment at distinct 
points in the industry’s life cycle. Here, however, the profitability of the product 
lifecycle is influenced by the distribution of profit also between buyer and supplier. 
The ability of IMP firms to capture this value will be considered next. 
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5.4.2 Capturing Value  
The capture of value differs between relationship types from two primary influences. 
The first is the formalisation of IMP firms’ involvement in product design. By 
formalising production activities, the IMP firms are better able to justify the additional 
value they bring to the manufacturing process and are more likely to capture this 
value through price increases. Both the Lock-In and Boundary Spanning group have 
formalised their capacity and involvement in product development, though in different 
ways. In the Lock-In approach, the involvement does not generate any product 
design rights and, as a result, profit has to be negotiated between buyer and supplier. 
This formalisation has in some cases generated an additional revenue stream as a 
design service. However, the profit is not secured and generated only during their 
involvement with manufacturing. In these situations, relative power in negotiating the 
distribution of value is reduced as the IMP firm has no ownership rights to the product 
to secure its manufacture. In contrast, the Boundary Spanning group have enhanced 
the formalisation of design involvement by insisting on intellectual property. This has 
ensured the production of the product is not undertaken without their involvement, 
thereby securing a revenue stream from part ownership. In instances where the IMP 
firm does not hold any direct product IPR, which may be the case in investment 
consortia, the IMP firm is again unable to secure involvement in production. The firm 
is in a position similar to that of Lock-In firms, who have to negotiate profit based on 
sunk cost dependencies. 
The second factor is the IMP firms’ access to potential markets. As an intermediate 
supplier they are characterised by supplying further manufacturers and, as such, they 
have limited, if any, direct routes to market. Consequently, the demand and price for 
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their production process is resultant on the marketing and distribution practices of 
their customers, or even customers’ customers. The creation, or enhancement, of 
added value by the suppliers only generates profit if prices are supported by the 
customer: customers are required to pay an additional amount for the activities of the 
IMP firm within the price. Increases in production costs and price pressures from 
customers can slowly erode the value added achieved by the IMP firm. This is 
particularly an issue for ongoing buyer-supplier relationships where production price 
changes are not necessarily reflected in sales prices. The interdependent group are 
particularly susceptible to this because of their long term production agreements. The 
enhanced value created during the contract can be absorbed through production cost 
increases and price pressures from customers. The lack of product ownership or 
direct end-user sales leaves these IMP firms unable to avoid this erosion of value 
over time. Although profitability increases during the contract, this is a result from 
increased efficiencies by the supplier. Their ability to capture a secure level of added 
value dissipates during the production agreement. Product ownership in the 
Boundary Spanning group, however, where access to market is secured through joint 
ownership, can allow a steady profit level to be achieved as customers are tied to 
that particular manufacturer. There has been ongoing consideration of the movement 
of value through firm ownership structures (Lawrence, 1987)  but the increased 
fragmentation of the production process has made product ownership a key 
determinant in capturing value (Angel and Engstrom, 1995; Dedrick et al.). 
Despite IMP firms increasing their value added activities, the industry continues to 
sustain only a very low profit margin because additional value added is not always 
captured by the firm and profits in one area of production are often used to support 
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other less profitable, and sometimes loss-making, activities. This supports Ruigrok 
and van Tulder’s (1995) suggestion that involvement in design tasks does not 
necessarily capture value for the supplier. Although all firms are engaged with value 
added activities (both design and finishing based), only the firms with some IPR are 
actually able to capture a continued and secure level of profit on their production 
activities. In the other relationships, the distribution of value varies over the course of 
the production agreement (Figure 5.3) and the suppliers’ capacity to negotiate profit 
margins (Dedrick et al., 2010; Murphy and Schindler, 2011; Rutherford and Holmes, 
2008; Starosta, 2010). The Boundary Spanning group are characterised by their 
strategic direction towards product ownership to secure revenue streams and 
negotiation power within the buyer-supplier relationship. The Lock-In firms instead 
use complementary assets (Teece, 1986) such as specialised design and production 
skills to capture value because they are unable to generate formal ownership 
structures or enforce them. The majority of IMP firms are engaged in high value-
added activities; however, the distribution of value from this is complex and varies 
between firms and between relationships within firms according to strategic intent, 
investment capacity and inter-firm power dynamics. 
 
5.5 Summary: Sunk Costs, Value and Contracts 
The intricacy of relations has been illustrated through the many levels of sunk costs 
within the buyer-supplier relationships and production agreement. These areas of 
sunk costs have different temporalities of influence and value properties, which is 
illustrated through the different forms of relationship evident in the IMP industry. 
Asset specificity, from transaction specific sunk costs, is a key characteristic of 
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strengthening client-supplier relationships in all relationship types (even the 
Vulnerable firms rely on prior investments in tooling to recoup after-market work). 
However, an important amendment is made. Asset specificity is related to the value 
of the investment in the current market rather than the fact there has been an 
investment related to a specific customer/relationship (Cox, 1996). Following this, 
particular sunk costs will strengthen relationships only during periods where both 
parties can recover their investment in the market. This has two implications. Firstly, 
sunk costs have a temporality in which they are effective in shaping operation 
decisions. Formal contracts reflect the temporality of value in sunk costs and provide 
IMP firms with a means of capturing some of the value at discrete periods of time 
within the contracts. Secondly, ownership is a key aspect. It is assumed that as 
collaboration increases between clients and suppliers, and the associated asset 
specificity that is built between them, that forms of ownership are likely to emerge to 
increase efficiency in the transaction (Cox, 1996; Grossman and Hart, 1986). IMP 
firms have used ownership only as a partial strategy to strengthening relationships. 
The Boundary Spanning group pursued ownership of supplementary products or 
partial design rights (for which enforcement is difficult). The Lock-In group in contrast 
relied more heavily on dependency through sunk costs in early stages of production 
rather than formalised property rights. Sunk costs have more influence in this 
industry because it is more prohibitive for customers to move away from than 
ownership rights (due to limited market access and enforcement difficulties). 
Prior work in relational contracting has stressed the importance of asset specificity as 
an alternative form of governance to formal market transactions or hierarchies 
(Gereffi et al., 2005; Williamson, 1979). High levels of asset specificity encourage 
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stability in the relationship because prior investments in equipment, knowledge or the 
relationship itself increase the efficiency of the transaction and reduce the need for 
other governance structures as there is a mutual dependence (Sturgeon et al., 2008). 
Relations between buyers and suppliers in the IMP industry are complex, with 
various forms of interdependency between transaction partners. Customers continue 
to remain significant and usually dominate the overall relationship but IMP firms have 
been shown to play an active role in influencing and, in some cases, driving 
relationship dynamics. Suppliers are able to influence the relationship at specific 
decision points in the production process and have incorporated a range of methods 
to attain value based on these interactions. The complexity of relationship formation, 
through a multitude of decision points, provides opportunities for suppliers to 
influence the power asymmetries (Gibbon and Ponte, 2008). Critically, this 
incorporates dynamism into the client-supplier relationships as power asymmetries 
can be adjusted over time. Prior work on upgrading has focussed on the transition of 
suppliers into higher-value added roles in the supply chain, which has illustrated the 
long term transitionary nature of relationships in these chains (Özatağan, 2011; 
Patel-Campillo, 2011; Pavlinek and Zenka, 2011). The evidence from the IMP 
industry, however, identifies a far more dynamic relationship development over 
shorter temporal periods. Bargaining and power struggles occur within a production 
contract and are heavily associated with the value of existing investments in the 
relationship. As the value of these investments changes, the relative power 
relationships between transaction partners are adjusted. The above analysis has 
highlighted the range of relationship types evident from the mix of products, 
investments and strategic action of transaction partners. The dynamism in the value 
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of prior investments adds to the range and complexity of relationship types. 
Interdependency has a distinct temporality based on the combination of various 
forms of asset specificity, contract structures and their value. Relational governance 
conceptualisations do not incorporate this short term dynamism or complexity of 
multiple levels of sunk costs throughout the production process.  
This has an important ramification when thinking about the transition of firms in high 
cost locations towards value-added manufacture. Value upgrading is not solely about 
the type of manufacture (product or process) but is also linked to the nature of the 
exchange relationship. Agreements, and specifically contracts, form distinct 
dependencies based on sunk costs and product ownerships. These have direct 
implications of how much and for what periods of time suppliers can capture value. 
The conceptualisation of high cost locations only able to undertake high value-added 
manufacture is also questioned. As Herrigel (2010) suggests, the division between 
high- and low-cost location manufacture is indistinct. Low value manufacture 
continues to form a considerable part of the activities in the industry. These tend to 
be supplemented by other areas in the production chain, such as the packaging of 
design activities as an additional service, which have traditionally been undertaken 
informally. In addition, the ‘higher value’ activities in which IMP firms are undertaking 
can be difficult to capture the additional value and rely on investments in production 
contracts, as well as ongoing relationships.  
The following chapter will continue to explore relationship structures in the IMP 
industry but with a focus on adjustment to rising input costs, specifically energy, and 
the ability to IMP firms to manipulate their customer relationships to retain 
profitability.  
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6 ENERGY, RISK AND GOVERNANCE: 
ADJUSTMENT AS A NEGOTIATED PROCESS  
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Energy (gas and electricity) costs are an increasingly significant challenge for 
manufacturing firms. Despite reduction in production volumes, the cost of energy 
inputs has increased, as can be seen in Chapter Four. Rising prices have increased 
the relative importance of energy in production environments (Bassi et al., 2009; 
Goldsmith, 2008; Guidi, 2009; Hammond and Norman, 2010; Leonard, 2003) and 
distribution costs, where the continuing focus of climate change abatement on 
industrial activity and rising oil prices have the potential to drive the re-localisation of 
production (North, 2010). The enhanced volatility of energy input prices has 
generated specific competitive risks (Leonard, 2003). Energy has a complex price 
structure, influenced by international political and economic stability and intra-
national regulation, legislation and market structure (Jones, C., 2010; Rutledge, 
2007). This potential competitive disadvantage is compounded by the challenges 
already facing manufacturers in high cost locations like the UK, as Jones describes: 
…given the wider global context within which … developed countries must 
compete, energy-cost-related structural change may pose more threat than 
opportunity. Much of this threat may arise from changes in the competitive 
landscape as a result of increased energy costs, as facilities in Europe 
compete (often within multinational companies) with those based elsewhere 
(2010a: 3010). 
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This complex, multi-scalar, geographical structure differentiates firms located in 
different places (Maskell and Malmberg, 1999). Firms are being forced to adapt to an 
increasingly volatile cost base; labour costs are a predictable cost compared to many 
other inputs including energy. Manufacturing firms must make complex short-term 
adjustments in their cost base that are also intertwined with longer term changes 
(Gertler, 1984). As such, the ability to cope with input price volatility plays an 
increasingly important role in the viability of enterprises. 
This chapter10 explores the process of adjustment through an examination of the 
industry’s response to changing energy costs. It has two aims. Firstly, it explores the 
role of energy in the IMP industry, drivers for efficiency and the influence of energy 
costs on the competitiveness of IMP firms. Secondly, it provides an investigation of 
the industry’s adaptation to rising and volatile energy prices. Four distinct approaches 
to managing the risk from energy prices are identified. Governance influences from 
agreement structures and embedded understandings within the supply chain are 
shown to be constraining factors on the ability of IMP firms to manage this risk. In 
response IMP firms and their customers are engaging in a negotiated process of 
adjustment, through power asymmetries between transaction partners, to determine 
the distribution of risk in the supply chain.  
 
                                            
10 Parts of the arguments of this chapter have been included in a journal publication which is 
included at the end of the thesis.  
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6.2 Energy Use and Transformation 
Energy use in the IMP industry has reduced by 63.5% (casting) and 37.4% (forging) 
since 1990 as shown in Figure 6.1. This is a far greater reduction than seen in the 
manufacturing sector as a whole (13.7%). The reduction has been erratic, with 
increased use from 1999-2001, followed by a drop in use from 2002-7. This pattern is 
apparent in both casting and forging sub-sectors and closely follows the ‘boom and 
bust’ nature of demand in the industry. The overall level of energy use differs 
considerably between the IMP sub-sectors. The castings industry has seen a far 
greater reduction in energy use: at almost double that of the forging sector. In 
addition, the forging sector has seen a transition towards electricity use, indicated by 
a smaller reduction in electricity use (-9.07%) compared to natural gas (-54.06%) 
(DECC, 2010) (Chapter 4, Table 4.10).  
 
Figure 6.1 Change in Total Energy Use by Industrial Sector (UK), 1990-2008 
 
Source: ONS Industrial Energy Consumption (2010a) 
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Both industries illustrate a non-linear relationship between production and energy 
volume; a drop in production volume does not necessarily result in an equivalent 
reduction in energy use. This is illustrated in Figure 6.2. The forging industry has 
seen a rise in production volume since 2002 but a drop in energy use of 13.1% 
(CBM, 2010). Although the casting industry has illustrated a reduction in both 
production and energy volumes, energy use peaked above production volume during 
2006. The relationship is influenced by two factors: energy efficiency of the 
production process and product characteristics. 
 
Figure 6.2 Comparative Analyses of Production and Energy Use Levels in IMP 
Sub-Industries, UK
 
Source: CBM (2010), CTI (2010) 
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6.2.1 Efficiency  
Energy efficiency (measured by the volume of energy used per ton of production) 
varies between the IMP sub-industries, as illustrated in Figure 6.3. The forging 
industry has consecutively increased its efficiency since 2002 (CBM, 2010). In 
contrast, the casting industry has become effectively less energy efficient during this 
period with a higher use of energy per ton of product produced. Investment levels 
differ considerably between the industries. The forging industry has seen a relatively 
stable level of investment in machinery and equipment since 1996, with an overall 
increase of 10.2% since 1996 (Table 6.1). The casting industry, however, has seen a 
substantial decline in investment since 1996 (85.9%), which could be related to both 
the overall decline in number of enterprises but also investment capacity and product 
development in the industry. Any investment options tend to be large scale in both 
industries because many of the smaller scale, lower implementation cost initiatives 
(e.g. in-house layout efficiencies) have already been made (Bassi et al., 2009). Low 
profit margins mean that firms have to rely on accessing credit or grants for capital 
investments. At the time of study the UK was experiencing a recession (2009-10). 
The considerable reduction in credit availability during this period, particularly to 
manufacturing firms, constrained investment by IMP firms. The availability of a 
government interest free loan from the Carbon Trust11 encouraged investments in 
efficiency technology (10 firms in the sample utilised this scheme). However, firms 
                                            
11 The scheme was introduced in relation to the Climate Change Levy. Funds collected from 
the levy are recycled, through a reduction in National Insurance contributions and the 
formation of a funding scheme intended to increase efficiency in energy use in SMEs 
(Pocklington, 2001). The Carbon Trust was established to run this scheme by providing 
advice, audits and funding for research and development into energy efficiency. The scheme 
provides an interest free loan for investments from approved technology providers that meet 
government guidelines for energy efficiency. 
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were reluctant to invest in new technology because of sunk costs in existing 
production methods and investment was only made when equipment needed 
replacing. 
 
Figure 6.3 Specific Energy Consumption (SEC) by IMP Sub-Industry, UK 
 
Source: CBM (2010), CTI (2010) 
 
Table 6.1 Change in Gross Investment in Machinery and Equipment by Sub-
Industry (UK), 2007 
Industry Investment Value (£m) Percentage Change (1996:2007) 
Manufacturing 16,140.5 -22.3 
Casting (27.5) 32.2 -85.9 
Forging (28.4) 99.6 10.2 
Source: Eurostat (2012) 
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The production process in the forging industry lends itself to more standardised and 
less complex products (a result of more expensive tooling and a limited capacity for 
intricacy or materials), which drives a need to increase profitability by driving down 
production costs. As a result, more direct profit increases can be achieved from 
investment in the industry. The forging industry enhanced energy efficiency through 
wider process efficiency measures. Investment in process technology to reduce 
aggregate costs (labour and production time) has also generated efficiencies in the 
use of energy, as one interviewee explained: 
[s]o we had a whole complete look at our business and decided we were 
either going to continue or decide not to continue . . . We put a massive 
amount of automation in there … So we halved our labour costs, 50% of our 
energy costs and it also freed up the rest of the buildings so making 
management a lot easier (Interviewee 1, Forge SME 10). 
 
The investment levels in the industry were targeted at larger transitions towards more 
efficient technologies, specifically the use of electric furnaces (which accounts for the 
reduction in gas use). The Carbon Trust finance stream was utilised by three forgings 
firms, all of which had introduced wider efficiency measures. The scheme has been a 
source of funding for ongoing development rather than stimulating changes 
independently. Investments in the casting industry have been smaller and used to 
directly address energy efficiency. This could be a result of limited capitalisation and 
credit availability for these firms, making the Carbon Trust loan the only available 
funding stream. However, these investments have been made in isolation, not as part 
of wider aggregate cost reductions. Of the six castings firms which utilised the 
scheme, only one used it as part of larger automation investments. More complex 
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and differentiated products (by material or structural component) mean that efficiency 
from economies of scale is not as easily achieved in the casting industry.  
6.2.2 Product Change 
In both sub-industries, the types of metal component produced are changing. 
Products are increasingly complex, using advanced materials and bespoke shapes, 
and of smaller volumes. This limits the ability to combine customer orders within the 
production process and consequently reduces the relative efficiency of each product, 
as one interviewee of a heat treatment processing service plant identifies:  
…what’s tending to happen is that volumes are reducing . . . and the nature of 
our work is changing … we’re not actually putting as much weight into the 
furnace. And when you actually look at the cost per ton, I mean its way, way 
up (Interviewee 1, SME Subcontractor). 
 
This is particularly the case in the castings industry, where there is greater scope for 
bespoke material compositions and larger products, both of which will reduce the 
economies of scale in use of energy that the forging industry can achieve. Higher 
specification materials often require more advanced treatment processes operating 
at higher temperatures, ultimately increasing the energy use per ton of product and 
reducing the relative efficiency of production.  
The transition of the product portfolio of IMP firms, and specifically castings, suggests 
that efficiency levels are unlikely to improve dramatically, even with substantial 
investment. In the forging industry the relative gains in efficiency are related to 
volume increases and large scale investments. The remaining investment options 
could make incremental improvements, but these are likely to be offset with more 
‘energy demanding’ products. As such, the role of energy as a cost in the industry is 
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likely to become even more significant as energy use per ton of production will 
increase from the increasing mix of customers and orders (i.e. different products with 
different processing requirements). The relative cost of energy in the production 
process has increased in the casting industry; it is likely to follow suit in the forging 
industry as economies of scale become more difficult under lower volumes and 
increasingly bespoke orders. The IMP industry has always been a high energy user 
and energy has always been a significant cost, but its significance is increasing from 
relative energy demands. 
Current conceptualisations of energy as a nominal factor input addressed through 
investment in efficiency (Thollander and Dotzauer, 2010; Thollander and Ottosson, 
2010; Worrell et al., 2009) do not take into account the complexity of the way energy 
is used in manufacture. Rapid price increases and price volatility of energy in the UK 
are adding to the relative importance of energy as a production cost (Jones, C., 
2010; Leonard, 2003). This has created a new energy challenge for IMP 
manufacturers. The structural costs of production are increasing, both in terms of 
energy volume and value, and market sales prices need to reflect these changes 
(Leonard, 2003). Energy can no longer be addressed as part of wider aggregate cost 
reduction approaches; it warrants independent management. The following section 
explores the relationship between energy costs and competitiveness, both spatially 
and over time, by examining the changing nature of the UK energy market and the 
wider economic landscape as it relates to the competitiveness of the IMP industry. 
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6.3 Cost and Competitiveness  
Energy has a relatively complex cost structure, influenced by multiple markets at 
multiple spatial scales, generating a non-global price (Stern, 2002). There are three 
key structural elements of energy prices: market price, legislation and purchasing 
method, and these will be examined in turn. The combined influence on competitive 
differentiation between firms, both domestically and internationally, will then be 
examined. 
6.3.1 Price 
The retail market price for industrial energy users in the UK has changed in two 
fundamental ways since the early 2000s: prices are rising and becoming increasingly 
volatile. The price of energy has increased significantly over the last decade (1998-
2008), with the average industrial energy price paid by manufacturers increasing by 
192% for gas and 60% for electricity (DECC, 2010). The rise has been particularly 
steep since 2003 with 113% gas and 110% electricity price increase (DECC, 2010). 
These increases have resulted in the growth of the relative cost of energy to the firms 
overall production costs. In other words, energy now represents a more significant 
proportion of the cost base, on average 8.6% (range 2.5-20%12) of the production 
costs (Interview data: during study period 2009-10). Historically, energy has been 
one of the three primary input costs but it represented a much lower proportion (2.5-
3%) (interview data, 2009-10). The increase in the cost component becomes critical 
at a threshold point, identified from interview data to be when energy represents 
approximately 6% of the cost base. At this point, the influence on cash flow and 
                                            
12 The significance of energy cost is dependent on the product, production process and 
efficiency levels, all of which vary considerably between IMP firms. 
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profitability directly from energy price increases becomes critical to the survival of the 
firm and requires considerable independent management. Energy prices in the UK 
are forecast to continue to rise (DECC, 2011; HMT, 2011), particularly for large 
industrial users (DECC, 2011) and SMEs (HC, 2011). As such, the significance of 
energy as a cost component is likely to grow in IMP firms if additional efficiency 
measures are not installed. 
The volatility of industrial energy prices is also increasing. The rate of change in price 
has increased both in magnitude and tempo since the early 2000s, as illustrated in  
Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5 below. Over this period (Q4 2003-current) volatility has 
become a consistent feature (Jones, C., 2010), with 62.8% of gas and 25.6% of 
electricity price quarters during this period having a rate of change greater than +/-
5% from the previous quarter (DECC, 2010). This rate and consistency of price 
change is unheard of in modern UK energy prices (since 1970). In fact, the 1970s oil 
crisis saw a far more stable rate of price change, with only 17.9% of gas and 0% of 
electricity price quarters having the current magnitude of change between quarters 
(DECC, 2010). This volatility has caused substantial increases in energy costs in 
many IMP firms when supply contracts are renegotiated. An extreme example of this 
is Foundry SME 24, a small independent jobbing foundry, who faced a 105% 
increase when they renewed their contract. Due to the timing of the contract renewal, 
the foundry was purchasing energy at a relative high point (July/August 2008) which 
generated such a significant increase because the prior fixed price contract was 
taken out several years earlier  at a considerably lower price point. Although this is 
an extreme example, IMP firms have been on average facing a significant increase 
due to the volatility of energy prices and contract timings. Of course, firms may also 
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benefit from price volatility when energy is purchased at relative low points. This, 
however, occurred in only one case during the study period.  
 
 
Figure 6.4 UK Quarterly Industrial Energy Prices (inc CCL). Seasonally 
adjusted. Fuel price index numbers relative to the GDP deflator. 
 
Data source: DECC (2010) 
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Figure 6.5 Rate of change in price index by quarter. Fuel price index numbers 
relative to the GDP deflator. 
Data source: DECC (2010) 
 
6.3.2 Legislation 
Large industrial energy users are susceptible to additional regulations aimed at 
reducing carbon emissions from energy used. There are three policy mechanisms 
used in the UK that apply to energy consumers: EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS), the Climate Change Levy (CCL) and Carbon Reduction Commitments (CRC) 
(DECC, 2011). In addition, suppliers are required to purchase a proportion of their 
electricity from renewable sources, which are more expensive. The primary 
mechanism that affects IMP firms directly is the CCL. Only two IMP firms are eligible 
to trade on the EU ETS (due to their volume of purchase) and as the industry is 
energy intensive (EII), their usage is beyond CRC.  
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The CCL is a tax paid through energy supply bills to encourage the decarbonisation 
of industry. This is a UK based tax targeted at large energy users (EIIs), which has 
added an average additional cost of 3.5% and 3.6% to electricity and gas bills 
(correct at Q3 2010) (ONS, 2010b). Several IMP firms have cited the additional 
environmental taxation in the UK as creating a price disadvantage against 
international competitors. To offset the potential international disadvantage of a UK-
based levy, the funds generated from the tax are used to promote energy efficiency 
in EIIs through (1) a rebate of the tax (80% at present), if energy efficiency targets 
are met (Climate Change Agreements (CCA)) and (2) a funding source to aid 
investment in energy efficiency (either knowledge or equipment) (Carbon Trust). Both 
these schemes are utilised by IMP firms to make investments and have been 
effective. As a result, the competitive disadvantage from a national tax is less clear, 
particularly against rising energy prices. The CCA are based on a general sectoral 
reduction (negotiated through sector representatives), which is tailored to the firms 
historical energy usage (based on 1990 baseline levels). Due to the dramatic 
reductions in production volumes since this baseline (up to 60%), the targets are 
fairly ‘easy wins’ (Foundry Large 2) and all IMP firms are receiving their eligible 
rebate. This has reduced the actual price disadvantage from the CCL, however firms 
still need to fund input cost until the rebate is paid and therefore working capital is 
reduced. European and national taxation and subsidy policies can be applied to the 
market price, resulting in greater spatial difference between actual purchase prices 
paid by industrial users (EC, 2007; Haley and Haley, 2008; London Economics, 
2007). However, the additional policies surrounding such taxes (such as the CCA 
and Carbon Trust scheme) reduce the actual cost impact. These policies are set to 
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be reduced from 2013, which will increase the competitive disadvantage felt by UK 
EIIs (HMT, 2011). 
6.3.3 Retail Supply Market Structure: Purchasing Methods 
The purchasing methods used by IMP firms are a significant factor in determining the 
energy cost component. Denationalisation of UK energy markets has allowed 
increased competition in the market and as a result, greater variety of purchasing 
methods as illustrated in Table 6.2. The retail market has particularly responded to 
the increased volatility in prices by introducing greater variety of supply options to 
industrial users in order to capitalise on the buyers’ desire to reduce this particular 
cost component. Fundamentally, there are three key purchase methods available to 
industrial users: 
 spot buying through the retail market  - one-off payments for discrete 
quantities at the point of use; 
 forward contracts through the retail market – pre-agreed rates for a specified 
quantity over a specified period (these contracts usually have a cheaper unit 
price as they allow energy suppliers to plane for demand); and 
 wholesale purchase – very large users are able to directly purchase from the 
wholesale market, eliminating the retailers margin. 
In addition, energy brokers are increasingly utilised by buyers as a means of 
generating the most suitable and advantageous supply structure. Brokers act as 
intermediaries between energy suppliers and users, providing guidance on the most 
suitable form of purchase across the market. 
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Table 6.2 Energy Purchasing Methods 
Traditional Purchasing 
Methods 
Current Purchasing Methods (2009-10) 
Method Reasons for use Method Reasons for use 
Annual fixed 
price 
contract 
Stable low prices Multi-year fixed 
price contracts  
Increased volatility in the market abated by fixing prices for longer periods 
Premium paid to supplier to transfer risk of price changes to the supplier 
Uniform volume usage within set minimum and maximum values 
Flexible contracts Increased volatility in the market can be abated by purchasing blocks of energy, 
combining with spot price purchasing and purchasing staggered over time to hedge 
risk 
Customer manages risk of price fluctuations 
Set minimum and maximum volumes over contract period 
Spot buying (short 
dated buying e.g. 
day-ahead, 
month-ahead) 
To avoid locking into a contract at a high point 
Prices usually significantly higher than contract prices* 
Direct from 
wholesaler 
Available for large users to remove retailers overhead 
Increased financial and volume risk to customer from additional set up costs and 
volume requirements in market. 
Energy 
traders/agents 
Able to advise and manage energy purchasing and trading on customers behalf to 
generate a more complex purchasing pattern than customers could independently 
manage 
Additional cost from traders margin 
*Dependent on timing of contract and market fluctuations as spot-prices reflect point-in-time (half-hour blocks) prices rather than temporally 
independent prices in contracts 
Source: Utilities Exchange (2007), Manufacturer (2004; 2006, 2010; 2011), Interview data (2009-10) 
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The purchasing options available have altered in three fundamental ways. Firstly, the 
timing of contract purchases has changed. Traditionally, all large industrial users 
would generally purchase annual fixed price contracts at a set period during the year 
(around 1st October). With significant increase in price volatility, the timing of forward 
contract purchasing has become extremely important in determining competitive 
(dis)advantages: firms can potentially buy energy at a considerably higher or lower 
price than their domestic competitors based solely on the timing of purchase. As a 
result, forward contract purchasing now occurs throughout the year to (hopefully) 
optimise the timing of the lock-in price. The second change is related to the length of 
contracts. Again, traditionally, an annual fixed price contract would be purchased. 
However, due to volatility in prices the retail market now provides variable contract 
lengths. Extended contracts (up to five years) are increasingly available, which allows 
industrial users to forward plan their energy cost and mitigate their risk to unplanned 
price changes from market volatility. Though, the retail provider charges a price 
premium to cover any short term losses they may be susceptible to. The third 
alteration has been the transfer of the risk of price changes from the retail market 
supplier to the purchasing firm. The retail market now offers flexible contracts, which 
allow staggered purchasing of blocks of energy, spot buying, direct trading on the 
wholesale market or a combination of these, to allow purchasing firms to manage 
their own risk to commodity price changes.  
IMP firms have responded to such supply market changes in several ways. The fixed 
price contract remains the most popular purchase method. However, contract length 
is now longer (usually two years but can be up to five years) (Figure 6.6). Spot 
buying (daily rate) has been utilised between fixed price contracts to optimise the 
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timing of the contract purchase. Only four (4/27) firms currently have flexible 
contracts. Of these, three (all SME) used an energy broker to manage the purchasing 
within the contract and one (large) firm introduced an internal energy management 
role (as a supplement to a current employee’s position). This is due to the additional 
knowledge and expertise required to manage commodity price risk under this 
contract type. Only one firm engaged in direct wholesale purchase. The limited use of 
this approach could be a result of the extremely large volume required to engage in 
wholesale purchase, which would usually be above and beyond the energy 
requirements of most IMP firms.  
 
Figure 6.6 Energy Purchasing Methods in IMP Firms 
 
Source: Interview data (2009-2010). Based on known purchasing methods from 27/47 firms. 
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The new purchasing methods available have introduced additional risk to IMP firms 
by allowing firms to engage in differentiated supply methods and as such only a 
limited number of the firms have undertaken flexible contracts or direct wholesale 
trading. This approach is attractive as it has the potential to reduce energy costs 
through optimal purchase timing and without the retailer’s price premium of a fixed-
price contract. However, the risks are considerable. The large firm which engaged in 
wholesale energy suffered great financial loss under this purchasing strategy due to 
the difficulty of matching required energy and production volumes, as he explains: 
We were buying blocks of energy on the open market [wholesale]. But we 
were buying them in advance to try and have enough bought, pre-bought for 
our production. Unfortunately that also perfectly timed with the downturn so we 
ended up having bought too much. And of course we bought it at the premium 
prices … we weren’t using it and we were selling it back at a huge loss. That’s 
why it cost us 2 million quid basically (Interviewee 1, Foundry Large 1). 
 
In this case, the IMP firm was free to manage its own energy requirements in relation 
to current production volumes, albeit by making a financial loss through trading. In 
forward contracts (both fixed-price and increasingly in flexible) usage volumes are 
predefined within a range (minimum usage clause). In fixed-price contracts the unit 
price is based on this volume tolerance and in flexible contracts the usage must be 
taken during the contract period. Forecasting production volumes therefore becomes 
critical to the cost of energy – usage outside the prediction creates penalties and a 
far more expensive unit price (the daily rate) for additional energy beyond the agreed 
volume. This did create problems for some IMP firms during the recession when 
production volumes reduced dramatically and very quickly. Those firms in the early or 
mid-stages of long term contracts were not susceptible to penalties because their 
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usage could be spanned over the contract period (prior to the downturn production 
levels were very high and consequently, so was their energy usage). However, in 
some instances, such as at the end of the contract period or under more strict 
volume tolerances, the clauses restricted the flexibility of the cost base and actually, 
the relative unit cost of production increased because the relative unit cost of energy 
increased.  
Firms have attempted to hedge their risk to energy price changes through spot 
buying between contract renewals and the use of external expertise (energy 
brokers/traders). To engage in commodity markets, such as the retail energy market, 
requires expert knowledge that is rarely available in-house to IMP firms. Large firms 
have developed specific energy management roles and integrating it with existing 
metal market management to generate the most competitive purchasing strategy. 
However, smaller firms often lack the capacity to do this. Instead, energy brokers are 
increasingly employed to advise on the most suitable purchasing methods. The 
usage of energy brokers in the IMP sample is illustrated in Figure 6.7 below. A 
smaller number of firms have engaged in ownership group purchases (2 firms) and 
inter-firm consortiums (1 firm) to increase their collaborative spend and hopefully 
generate more competitive pricing. The ability of firms to negotiate the best 
contractual terms is based on purchase volume or market knowledge. 
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Figure 6.7 Use of Energy Broker in IMP Firms 
Source: Interview data (2009-10). Based on responses by 25/45 firms. 
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advantage because of their relatively cheap energy sources. Industrial energy prices 
of other competitor nations (chiefly the US, China and India) are more difficult to 
obtain, although anecdotal evidence suggests that energy prices are far lower in 
China (Haley and Haley, 2008) and the US (Goldsmith, 2008; Leonard, 2003). 
Although there is an additional UK tax (CCL) on energy use, this is a relatively small 
amount and could easily be absorbed by relatively lower energy prices and 
overshadowed by the much greater magnitude of general energy price increases. 
These geographical differences are shown here to be a relatively small influence on 
the energy cost competitiveness of IMP firms. 
Secondly, the relative price differences between firms could generate competitive 
differences as a result of purchasing methods, and specifically forward contracting. 
As fixed price contracts remain the most popular purchase strategy, the timing of a 
purchase becomes the most critical factor in generating competitive (dis)advantage 
because of the volatility of energy prices. This competitive differentiation is not 
necessarily spatial and is influenced by the negotiating ability of the firm. Inter-firm 
differences in the ability to negotiate contract prices from the volume of energy 
purchased (i.e. ability to buy direct from the wholesaler or restricted to the retail 
market), utilise external expertise (i.e. through an energy broker), or the timing of 
price fixing and discrete purchases, can lead to significant differences in the relative 
cost of energy inputs between firms. The structure of the retail supply market 
therefore becomes a critical factor in the relative competitiveness of firms. This itself 
has a spatial element, in that supply markets are organised at a national, regional or 
sub-national [US (Hess, 2011)] scale, but critically, price differences do not have to 
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be geographically determined and competitive (dis)advantages can be generated 
between firms operating under the same market structure.  
Purchasing strategies reflect the additional significance of energy as a cost 
component from both the price increase (including additional environmental taxes) 
and price volatility changes that have occurred over the recent period. The supply 
methods utilised are increasingly complex, integrating a combination of methods to 
optimise the purchase of energy inputs. Price differences are related to competitive 
differences between retail providers and the firm’s capacity to negotiate a good deal, 
therefore are not explicitly spatial. The complexity of supply structures can drive 
competitive differences between firms to a greater extent than geographical market 
or policy price differences. Energy is in effect a commodity, purchased through 
contracts that create rigidities in the production process. Contracts are formal, with 
limited influence from relationship characteristics, such as trust, between buyer and 
supplier. This highlights a distinct limitation of current conceptualisations of inter-firm 
relationships in economic geography based on fluidity and trust (Murphy, 2011; Uzzi, 
1996; 1997). The rise in input costs can have specific short- and long-term impacts 
on the profitability, and therefore viability, of IMP firms because they are difficult to 
transfer to the sales market. This risk will be examined in more detail in the following 
section.  
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6.4 The Firm as a Nested Set of Contracts: Price Volatility, Contract 
Rigidity and Risk 
The input and output structure of a firm generates specific risks. In order to generate 
an output, a product sale, the firm requires a series of inputs, each of which are 
purchased through specific agreements. The input purchases may not directly reflect 
the amount of input required for the particular product or order and are often instead 
ongoing purchases to satisfy the requirements of the total order book over time. In 
this sense, the firm is composed of a nested set of contracts, where an output order 
is composed of a series of input agreements to generate that particular product. This 
is critical for understanding the performance of firms and their related geography. 
The contracts are fixed within jurisdictions and operate over precisely defined time 
periods. 
Inputs are purchased under different forms of agreement with varying temporal 
commitments; fixed purchase period, differential purchase period or long term 
contracts as illustrated in Figure 6.8. The IMP industry cost base is characterised by 
three distinct costs (Chapter Four); labour, raw material and energy. Each of these 
costs is purchased through either one or a combination of these temporal 
commitment periods. Labour costs are most often characterised by a steady rate with 
an annual wage rate adjustment for inflation (fixed input cost for the time period). 
Although temporary workers may be used, which ultimately increases the labour cost 
within this annual period, this is often for a fixed period of time (discrete purchase) 
and pre-empted by the firm, thereby the additional cost is predictable to a degree and 
easily changed (i.e. firms can dismiss workers quickly under temporary contracts). 
Metal tends to be purchased through short term orders for specific quantities, of 
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discriminate purchase periods, to match order requirements. The timescale of the 
purchase agreement may vary but essentially the purchase order relates to a 
quantity for a specific, and known, product order. The final input purchase agreement 
is a long term contract. Energy is often purchased under such an agreement and the 
temporal commitment can stretch for up to five years. In these instances, the price of 
the factor input can be set for the entire contract period. 
An output price is determined based on the cost base at a specific point in time, most 
often when the order is made. This cost base is composed of a set of nested input 
agreements (in the case of the IMP industry; labour, metal and energy factor 
contracts) and is determined for a cost period, a set period of time under which the 
firm calculates its cost base and fixes it costs from which it quotes sales orders. The 
cost period is recalculated at set points, traditionally annually after inflationary wage 
rises. When an order is quoted it is thus based on a set of input costs covering 
different temporal periods and therefore has the potential to include multiple 
contracts for the same input (frequent short term purchases). The risk arises from the 
interaction of output orders and the nested set of input purchase agreements. 
A risk can be generated when the sales price does not reflect the true factor costs. 
Discrete output orders are able to more accurately reflect the input costs because the 
cost calculation is done for a specific point in time, when the factor agreements can 
be sequenced as to provide known costs for the entirety of the order (a short 
temporal period) (Figure 6.8: Synchronisation). The largest variable in this instance is 
raw material costs, as labour and energy costs do not usually change during such a 
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short time period13. As raw material is able to be purchased discriminately14, the IMP 
firm is able to purchase directly for the order and therefore contracted costs 
accurately reflect the factor costs. Batch orders are similar in that they are also for 
relatively short time periods, in which case, even if factor prices alter the firm will only 
risk price changes for a short period. 
The risk of mismatching input and output prices is greatest under long term orders 
(schedules) and existing long term trading relationships (where a price precedent is 
set, irrespective of the discrete nature of orders). Here factor costs are quoted based 
on the cost period, with a nested set of factor agreements, and as such, it becomes 
critical that the cost period accurately reflects the factor costs throughout the duration 
of the product order/arrangement. The composition of order and factor agreements 
changes over time and between firms. As such it has the potential to generate price 
differentials between competitors.  
                                            
13Although labour and energy costs may change during the period they are usually based on 
fixed price agreements (worker contracts and energy supply contracts). 
14 The reduced demand for metal in manufacturing in the UK has resulted in a reduction of 
metal processing mills, which traditionally would supply large volumes, and instead 
stockholders and service centres are more common, which provided very low volume as and 
when required by the manufacturer (Ahlbrandt et al., 1996; Cockerill, 2003). 
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Figure 6.8 Firm Cost and Order Structure  
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Confounding the risk from long term product agreements is volatility in input prices. 
Inputs are negotiated at a different point in time as well as for a different length of 
time. The point in time at which a factor is purchased is particularly important when 
the factor is purchased through long term contracts and the rate of change of the 
price is significant, such as with energy. There are two specific risks generated 
through such a cost composition (assuming the firms structure their sales price from 
their cost base, not solely to reflect market tendencies): 
1. Long term contract crosses multiple cost periods (Figure 6.8: Vulnerability Point 1) 
In this situation the agreed energy price is set at the beginning of the first cost period 
(cost base: Timei) but the price extends through to the second cost period (cost base: 
Timei+1). The price may not reflect the market price for energy at the point in time 
when the second cost period is calculated. This could generate either a cost 
advantage (where the firms energy cost is less than the current market price) or a 
disadvantage (where the firms price is greater) between competitor firms. As energy 
is purchased under a contract, the firm is unable to renegotiate its energy purchase 
and can potentially be at risk of a sales price that does not reflect market price. 
2. Change of factor contract within a cost period (Figure 6.8: Vulnerability Point 2) 
Here the risk is to the firm’s cash flow. A change of long term factor contract mid-
point during a cost period can again generate a competitive advantage if energy 
prices are currently low or a disadvantage if prices are high. As the firm has already 
set its cost base for the given period (reflecting the cost sequences at the start of the 
period) a change in a key input cost can result in inaccurate selling prices. These 
inaccuracies may not be able to be formally adjusted until the next cost period. As a 
result, the IMP firm needs to absorb such changes through its working capital. 
 252 
 
It would be assumed that the best way to avoid such a risk is to synchronise input 
and output contracts (Figure 6.8: synchronisation). However, the risks generated 
from input price volatility remain. By purchasing inputs, such as energy, through long 
term contracts, although the cost base is stable and cash flow is not threatened 
under the specific order, there remains the potential to be asynchronous with the 
market price for such output, as one interviewee explains:  
…we have energy escalators, so ultimately we pass the costs onto our 
customers. So we are covered for the increased cost, fine. The problem arises 
when we’re out of step with everybody else. So if we are as a country 
expensive for electricity or for raw materials and I’m competing against a 
country that is cheaper, they are selling a cheaper product. So I might lose out 
on new orders or repeat orders or whatever. That’s the risk (Interviewee 1, 
Foundry Large 1). 
 
The stabilising of input costs only removes the first risk, and does not prevent firms 
being at a competitive disadvantage from fixing input prices at rates which turn out to 
be higher than the present market price (a price at which, in theory, competitors 
could have purchased the input). Having said that, there is of course the counter of 
this proposition, where the firms fixed price is less than the current market price. In 
which case, they have a competitive advantage from an overall lower cost base 
(assuming all others costs are equal15). 
6.4.1 The Energy Risk 
The energy price risk is the loss of profitability in the IMP industry because of rises in 
structural costs (from energy demand and price increase) which are not recovered 
from market output prices. There are two related issues to this - actual and relative 
                                            
15 This is a simplified model to illustrate a theoretical competitive position. 
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price differences (Leonard, 2003, 2006). Actual price differences from increases in 
the cost base remove profitability and can potentially make profitable contracts 
unprofitable. The relative difference to competitors reduces the cost competitiveness 
of the product. Both have implications for profitability, which can immediately reduce 
working capital and cash flow in the business and long-term, reduce the investment 
capacity of the firm to improve efficiency and innovate. The risk is to the profit margin, 
not turnover, of the firm and ultimately to the short- and long-term viability of the 
business. The change in the cost base needs to be passed on to customers through 
alterations in sales prices to fully reflect price increases (Leonard, 2003). The 
temporal and spatial differences in factor markets create the risk. Products are sold in 
international markets with prices determined through supply and demand but inputs 
are purchased through more decentralised, local markets (Clark, 1985). The market 
sales price does not necessarily reflect the local, firm specific, production cost which 
ultimately creates a profitability risk that rests with the producing firm. 
The price risk is from the increase in structural cost, a combination of both energy 
price increases and volatility. Price increases make energy a critical area of cost 
competitiveness, whereas volatility creates competitive risks from the unpredictability 
of the cost component. The significance of price differentials is influenced by the 
context of the individual firm: the level of capitalisation, dependence on energy inputs 
and the firm’s strategic capacity in both purchasing and contract structuring. The 
already low profitability and capitalisation in the industry make it difficult for IMP firms 
to sustain these structural cost increases for even a short period. The interaction of 
energy price volatility and the input-output contract structure of the firm generate 
temporal, rather than spatial variability in pricing that creates the risk (Clark, 1985). 
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Time is especially important in contractual relationships. During the early years of a 
five year contract, profit margins may be acceptable, but may be eroded towards the 
end of the contract. In addition, the composition of order structure changes over time. 
The cost structure the sales price was quoted on can become unprofitable, either 
directly or within the mix of output agreements (i.e. the blend of profitable and 
unprofitable). 
The sequence of factor and product agreements increases the rigidity of the firms 
cost structure, leaving firms less able to reflect input costs accurately in output prices. 
As such, the risk from short term price changes becomes internalised into the firm 
and the reduced flexibility to adjust to them makes short term changes more 
detrimental to the firm (Clark, 1985; Gertler, 2003; Monk, 2008). Existing adjustments 
to long-term environmental changes, specifically increased international competition, 
accentuate the risk from temporal variation in input price. Fixed-price energy 
contracts continue to dominate in the IMP industry. However, the important point is 
that these contracts typically extend over a longer time period (2-5 years as opposed 
to 1 year). This is a long-term adjustment to energy price volatility. The output 
agreements in the industry have also adjusted overall towards lower volume orders in 
order to compete in the current global market place. This was exaggerated during the 
recession when schedule orders were dramatically reduced, and often stopped 
altogether, and replaced by short-term discrete orders. The increased mix of product 
order types (particularly from bespoke and prototype product orders) has given IMP 
firms wider scope to manage the synchronization of agreements. However, these are 
predominately repeat orders with existing customers where a price precedent and 
long term agreement has been established. As such, these short-term orders actually 
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behave as longer-term schedule orders in terms of costing. Importantly, it is the 
interaction of long term strategic adjustments and short term environmental changes 
which create the energy risk for firms. Energy has become a more significant and 
fixed cost, the product output structure more complex, and, ultimately, the firm’s 
flexibility to respond to changing prices is reduced by this contractual, and hence 
cost, rigidity.  
The significance of the energy risk has meant that IMP firms have been forced to 
address it specifically, and independently, from wider aggregate cost base 
adjustments. The direct transfer of the additional energy cost to the customer base 
through surcharges is not established. Surcharges are a common method of 
transferring commodity price movements, both upwards and downwards, in the 
industrial sector. However, these conventions have not been yet been established for 
energy and the IMP industry is forced to make other adaptations to the increasing 
cost. These adaptations will be explored in the following section. 
 
6.5 Firm Adaptations to the Energy Risk  
IMP firms are experiencing an energy crisis with two elements: price increase and 
price volatility. Although these components have different implications to the cost 
base -price increases raise the relative importance of energy costs in the wider cost 
structure of firms and price volatility renders firms more vulnerable to price 
differentials compared with competitors - both elements of the energy crisis have a 
significant combined impact on enterprise cash flow and profit margins. It is this 
outcome, generated from price increases and volatility, which impacts on firm survival 
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and to which firm strategies are targeted. The following section explores four broad 
strategic approaches for managing energy price risk that IMP firms have developed, 
which are outlined in Table 6.3: Ostrich, Protectionist, Re-assert Competitive 
Advantage and Opportunistic. Although differences in energy use have been 
identified between sub-industries, the strategic directions of firms are not necessarily 
reflected in these groupings and they are only highlighted where appropriate in the 
wider adjustment approaches. This classification outlines the principal approaches 
and it should be noted that the categories are not mutually exclusive. Different 
approaches have been adopted using different timescales and in conjunction with 
one another.  
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Table 6.3 Approaches to Energy Price Changes within the IMP Industries 
Firm Approach Ostrich  Protection Re-assert Competitive 
Advantage 
Opportunistic 
Strategic tools (1) Absorb additional cost 
from profit margin, cash 
reserves or short term credit 
facilities 
(1) Fix costs through 
contractual agreements 
(2) Transfer price increases 
forward in supply chain 
 
(1) Investment in efficiency 
measures to regain profit 
margin 
 (2) Restructuring to take 
advantage of cheaper tariffs 
(3) Buying consortium to 
generate economies of 
scale when purchasing 
(1) Actively manage energy 
markets through wholesale 
or flexible purchasing 
strategies to eliminate 
retailer premium and benefit 
from low price points 
(2) Actively manage pricing 
structure of segments of the 
customer base to achieve 
additional profit during 
energy price low points 
Number of firms using strategy 
independently  
3 3  (1) 0 (2) 3 8  (1) 7 (2) 3 (3) 2 0 
Firm 
characteristics 
Firm size Small Multiple sites, group 
purchasing activity 
Varied size  
Product type Some IPR ownership  Bespoke manufacturers, 
small volume 
 
 Order 
structure 
Subcontract order Prominence of schedule 
order 
Prominence of discrete 
orders 
 
 Dependency High number of markets, 
stock management for 
customers 
Stock management for 
customers, additional risk 
taken on during recession 
Market dependency  
 Investment   Government schemes  
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Table 6.4 Continued 
Firm Approach Ostrich  Protection Re-assert competitive 
advantage 
Opportunistic 
Number of firms using as 
partial strategy  
17 19  (1) 10 (2) 12 11    (1) 6 (2) 8 (3) 2 4  (1) 1 (2) 3 
Firm 
characteristics 
Product type Bespoke manufacture Bespoke manufacture  Bespoke manufacturers, 
high export level  
Bespoke manufacturers, 
value added components  
 Dependency High market dependency High market dependency, 
additional risk taken on 
during recession 
Market dependency, lower 
drop of orders in recession, 
no additional risk during 
recession  
Market dependence, 
additional risk during 
recession 
 Order 
structure 
Prominence of discrete 
orders (mix with schedule 
orders), high number of 
formal agreements with 
main customers 
Schedule order books (mix 
with discrete orders) 
 Mix of order types, use of 
formal agreements 
 Investment   Continual investment Little investment 
 Finance 
structure 
Overdraft Invoice discounting High cash reserves or credit 
available: credit (7), cash 
reserves(6), grants (5) 
Financial stability: no 
borrowings, cash reserves 
and high profit levels 
Source: Author (2012)
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6.5.1 Ostrich16 Approach  
Under this approach firms take on the responsibility of price increases internally by 
absorbing alterations in prices through reducing profit margins on a contract-by-
contract basis. Price increases can be substantial enough to eliminate the profit 
margin, in which case the product is sold at a loss and is subsidised through cash 
reserves or short term lending facilities, such as bank overdrafts. This was the initial 
response by all firms at the beginning of the current period of energy price escalation 
(around 2004). This short term solution is limited by the profit margin the firm can 
achieve, which has been continually eroded through competition with lower cost 
producers, and the availability of cash reserves or short term credit facilities. As a 
result, the Ostrich approach most commonly forms an initial and partial solution to 
energy price increases and fluctuations, with only three firms using this strategy in 
isolation.  
The three cases where this approach was used in isolation have a distinct type of 
relationship and order type with their customer base - subcontract. Although the IMP 
industry consists of subcontract manufacturers for semi-finished components, the 
firms using this approach in isolation have an order structure predominately based on 
transactions with subcontractors that do not undertake further manufacture of the 
product and have pre-agreed deadlines, costings and specifications from their end 
customers. This is unlike the more typical product agreements where orders are from 
other manufacturers without a pre-agreed fixed end price. This contractual 
agreement impacted on the cost base of firms as: 
                                            
16 The approach is termed Ostrich to reflect the common phrase of ‘bury your head in the 
sand’. The approach does not confront the energy risk and instead attempts to continue 
existing working practices without adjustment. 
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[a] lot of people we deal with have got product catalogues. Catalogue price are 
settled at the beginning of the year, you can’t change [them] … We go back to 
the catalogue price. We go back to things that we’ve made for 13, 14 years at 
that set price, that are sold at that set price (Interviewee 1, Foundry SME 20 -
Fabricator). 
 
By fixing a price further up the supply chain, quite often through catalogue pricing, 
the IMP firm is unable to negotiate a price increase after a quotation is made. As a 
result, the firm is forced to absorb the increase and at best share this absorption with 
subcontractors. These firms are also found to be small, acting in a range of markets 
without a strong relationship with a particular customer as order values are relatively 
low and infrequent (Table 6.3). This lack of interdependence between transaction 
partners reduces the relative power the IMP firm has within the supplier-customer 
relationship as asset specificalities for particular customers are not developed 
(Sturgeon and Lee, 2001).  
As energy price changes have become more consistent many firms have developed 
other strategic approaches. The price rise absorption approach remains common as 
a partial strategy for many firms (17, 38%). This approach is used as a temporary 
measure for short term and low price fluctuations and as a last resort for customers 
who will not accept price increases or as a partial response to customers when price 
negotiations occur. The strategy is used most commonly for small price fluctuations, 
below approximately 5%, which are difficult and time consuming to pass on to 
customers. Relatively small price increases are far harder to deal with and are most 
commonly absorbed by IMP firms: 
…5% price increases customers expect us to soak it up. When it’s massive 
actually the whole world just passes it on. So actually if … prices are going to 
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go up, go up by a lot once is an easier thing to manage than it is to say every 
year (Interviewee 1, Forge Large 1 -  Fabricator). 
 
Over time, the absorption of relatively small price rises can have a significant 
detrimental effect on the financial stability of firms as it erodes cash reserves and 
profitability (Markusen and Teitz, 1985). Working capital is reduced, ultimately 
reducing the capacity to invest in product and process innovations. Firms which 
engage with this approach in combination with others predominately do so to address 
the discrete order segment of their product agreement structure. A sale price is set 
for current factor prices, which is stable for the duration of the order because it only 
covers a short time period. As such, any miscalculations of factor price adjustments 
during this period will hopefully be small and IMP firms are forced to absorb these 
adjustments. As a result, the use of overdraft facilities is common in this group of 
firms as a means of coping with price changes. Restrictions on credit availability 
undermine the ability of IMP firms to cope with energy volatility; the mainstream 
banks are reluctant to lend to cover cash flow or working capital problems as such 
loans are considered to be relatively high risk transactions.  
6.5.2 Protectionist Approach  
The Protectionist approach attempts to retain profit margins on sales by ensuring 
output prices reflect input costs. There are two principal methods used to achieve 
this: by stabilizing energy price fluctuations and price increases during a given period 
through purchasing strategies and by transferring price increases to customers by 
price increase notifications or surcharge mechanisms. 
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Firms that used only this approach were involved in transferring price changes 
forward to their customers by surcharge mechanisms incorporated into schedule 
orders. In addition, IMP firms often took on additional responsibilities and risks for 
customers, particularly during the recession. This indicates a level of 
interdependence between customers and suppliers, which would generate additional 
power for the IMP firm to transfer price changes to customers because they were 
both invested in the relationship and therefore benefited from its continuation (Gereffi 
et al., 2005; Sturgeon, 2002). Firms that were able to transfer the risk of energy price 
fluctuations were relatively powerful given their size (two were part of larger groups) 
and capabilities (one firm was the industry leader in a production process). 
Firms that deployed this approach in combination with others did so through both 
transferring the risk of price fluctuation forward to customers and the strategic 
purchasing of fixed price energy contracts. Firms with a strong schedule ordering 
relationship with customers attempted to utilise formal contractual relationships by 
including regular price review points and a surcharge mechanism. An interviewee 
from a large forge noted that:   
[t]he easiest way of doing it [passing costs forward] is to have regular review 
points against perhaps universally agreed indices or some other recognizable 
benchmark. For example, aluminium prices can be controlled by the LME 
[London Metal Exchange]. So some contracts have an agreement at intervals 
to measure what the LME was at the start of the contract and what it is at the 
rate point and if it’s gone up pass an increase, if it’s gone down pass the 
reduction through (Interviewee 1, Forge Large 3).  
 
IMP firms which were able to formalise the transfer of risk associated with price 
volatility had distinct capabilities which enhanced customer’s dependency. All these 
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firms had invested in technology and capabilities such as early stage manufacture 
and prototyping. Customer-supplier relationships had moved beyond the 
manufacture of one particular product under a schedule order, towards higher value 
customised products. IMP suppliers could use this dependence on their technical 
capability to improve the pricing structure on higher volume orders. The capabilities 
of suppliers increased their relative powerfulness in customer-supplier relationships 
(Gereffi et al., 2005), although there are also other influences. Several firms (3) were 
the sole manufacturer of products, which created considerable client dependency; 
and one firm was engaged in ‘helping out’ the customer when it was experiencing a 
production crisis, which evoked a form of benevolence in the relationship (Sako, 
1992) increasing supplier powerfulness. Significantly, not all these firms were large 
(50% were SME). As such, this highlights the complexity of the power asymmetries in 
the relationship, which extend beyond the capabilities of supplier firms and asset 
specificity. 
The most common purchasing method (18 firms, 40%) was to fix energy prices over 
a given period, usually 2-3 years, in an attempt to limit potential price volatility risk by 
matching factor and product agreement timescales. An interviewee from a large 
foundry supplying aerospace components highlighted the difficulty of managing long 
term agreements with principal customers by using utility input supply contracts: 
I mean we’ve tried to do contracts, [Aerospace OEM] won’t do anything less 
than 5 years. We struggle a bit because we can’t get any more than 3 years, 
on particularly our utility costs, electric and gas. So we’ve managed to tie 
ourselves down for 3 of the 5 … So worse case, yeah if everything went up 
we’d be a bit at risk but that’s one of the problems we’ve got  (Foundry SME 2- 
PLC group subsidiary). 
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Firms taking this approach were characterised by having large proportions of 
schedule orders, which increases their vulnerability to temporal changes in factor 
prices. The use of invoice discount financing was common for such firms, which 
highlights a reliance on external credit for cash flow. Discount financing or factoring 
also reduces the firm’s margins as there is an associated financing cost (interest 
charge). This implies the need to fix input costs as there is limited working capital to 
fund fluctuations in prices.  
6.5.3 Re-asserting Competitive Advantage Approach 
The approach attempts to generate efficiencies in production processes and 
purchasing activities to retain or improve the profitability of firms under existing 
product and factor prices. Firms internalise risks and manage it through offsetting 
price increases with a reduction in production costs. This reduces the firms’ 
vulnerability to price volatility as energy accounts form a lower proportion of the firms’ 
cost base. This approach is a long term strategy aimed at retaining and improving 
price competitiveness by maintaining a cost base in line with competitors and 
generating suitable profit margins. Firms that engage in this strategy do so through 
investment in energy efficiency measures, restructuring production processes to 
utilise utility cost advantages and through sophisticated purchasing methods 
including energy brokers, consultants and buying consortiums.  
The Re-assert Competitive Advantage strategy is the most popular single approach 
(8 firms, 18%) and was predominately used by independent SMEs (7/8 firms). This 
highlights a significant power asymmetry between transaction partners based on the 
relative size of enterprises (Christopherson and Clark, 2007; Zabin, 1997). 
Independent SMEs cannot generate relative powerfulness from wider group 
 265 
 
ownership and as a result, the significant size and purchasing power of larger 
customers constrains the IMP firm’s ability to transfer energy cost risk forward in the 
supply chain. Consequently, these firms are forced to internalise the risk of energy 
price changes and make alternative adjustments, such as utilisation of funding 
scheme for energy efficiency (5 firms used the Carbon Trust scheme).  
Those firms which engaged in multiple strategies, of which Re-Assert Competitive 
Advantage was one, were characterized by significant continuous levels of 
investment throughout the production system. The ability to invest is critical to this 
approach. Firms using this strategy had a high level of available funds, either through 
cash reserves (6 firms), credit availability (7 firms) or grants (5 firms) and 
management teams interested in innovation combined with cost control. This group 
also had a high level of export based turnover. During the recession credit 
availability, primarily through invoice discounting or overdraft facilities, was 
favourable to exporting firms. As a result, the institutional context enabled exporting 
firms to make efficacy investments (Dorry, 2008). Government schemes intended to 
increase efficiency in industry were critical for SMEs in the sample. Such schemes 
were used to reduce energy use and ultimately improved profitability as firms were 
able to re-balance their cost structure (Bassi et al., 2009). Larger IMP firms were less 
active in making direct energy efficiency investments during the study period, partially 
because they had previously made significant investments that would make any 
further investment less effective. Larger firms also had high levels of asset specificity, 
in both equipment and knowledge, which generated a degree of interdependence, 
power in client relationships and consequently were more successful in transferring 
energy price risk to customers (Gereffi et al., 2005).  
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6.5.4 Opportunistic Approach  
The final approach to energy price changes is far more embryonic and of a much 
smaller scale, with only four firms engaged in it (3/4 SME). Under this approach IMP 
firms actively manipulate the pricing structure of their customer base to generate 
additional profit by exploiting energy price volatility. By doing this for specific types of 
customers, those which are small and less powerful, IMP firms can supplement 
losses made from pricing structures with the remainder of their customer base. 
Dependent or less powerful customers are used to offset the IMP firms’ inability to 
transfer price volatility to less dependent and more powerful customers. In the case 
of Foundry SME 18, a jobbing foundry, the firm was able to pass on energy price 
increases to its smaller customers but, importantly, the firm does not adjust prices 
when energy costs fall. This allows them to generate additional income from a small 
portion of its less powerful customer base. A representative from this firm noted that: 
I think we all benefited a bit from [surcharges]… [For] my small customers, I 
just put the price up. Then I put it up again, put it up again, then again. With 
the bigger boys, when the surcharges come down they benefit. The small 
ones, they’ve not benefited at all. Because we’ve looked around and said well 
it will cost them more to move and go somewhere else. It’s a bit naughty but 
umm its well, financial, commercial, you know, you’ve got to stay with it 
(Interviewee 1, Foundry SME 21). 
 
This firm is able to manipulate surcharges to its advantage but only with customers 
that have a dependent relationship with the firm. This represents a form of ‘lock-in’. 
Small jobbing foundries have relative power over some of their clients. It is extremely 
costly and time consuming to transfer small batch production to another producer as 
the tooling is located at and tailored to a particular foundry. Consequently, smaller 
customers are highly dependent on a foundry and the foundry has a much stronger 
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governing relationship (Gereffi et al., 2005). Firms which do not provide specialised 
foundry-specific capacities and manufacture mass produced components are less 
able to generate this form of ‘lock-in’ relationship and consequently are less powerful 
in exploiting price change mechanisms. Larger clients will avoid such lock-in by 
spreading the production of parts between firms and playing providers off one 
another. Due to the limited use of this strategy, it does not generate very significant 
additional profit for IMP firms. By exploiting this dependence an IMP firm could 
undermine the financial stability of these customers, but these customers only form a 
small proportion of the customer base. 
 
6.6 Adjustment through Evolving Relationships: Embedded 
Understandings, Power and Risk Transfer 
The strategies undertaken by IMP firms towards managing the energy risk illustrate 
the key role of inter-firm agreements in influencing the capacity of firms to adjust. 
There is little distinct correlation between the relationship types identified in Chapter 
Five (Section 5.3.1: 188) and the adjustment approaches identified here. This is in 
part a result of the limited number of cases identified in each approach (due to data 
variability) but also because of the multiple approaches used by most IMP firms to 
manage energy risk. There is a correlation between the Lock-In and Interdependent 
approaches to low cost competition and the Protectionist and Re-asset Competitive 
Advantage approaches to energy price management. This is because these cases 
are based on formalised long term agreements (schedules and early development 
work), which IMP firms have used to incorporate price transfers and on which energy 
 268 
 
efficiency investments are based. Firms that use the Lock-In and Interdependent 
approaches have a limited customer base that has been nurtured to develop a ‘close’ 
relationship. As such, these firms are more vulnerable to energy price changes 
because they are in longer term relationships with their customers: both formal and 
informal agreements have an implied precedent that can be difficult to change. A 
smaller customer base results in more significant impacts from the absorption of price 
escalations through profit margin and, therefore, these firms have a tendency to 
undertake long term and more sustainable adjustments be reducing the dependency 
on energy costs (through efficiency and innovative purchasing methods in the 
Protectionist and Re-asset Competitive Advantage approaches). The significance of 
agreements in the approach to energy cost management is also indicated in the 
variety of approaches: governance structures implicit in forms of agreement and the 
strategic action of IMP firms in manipulating these agreements generate a range of 
relationship dynamics. There are two elements that underpin the role of relationships 
in managing energy risk; embedded understandings and transactional governance. 
These will be examined in turn. 
6.6.1 Embeddedness in Institutional Practices and Places 
The embedded understanding of the supply chain has played a critical part in 
determining ‘industry norms’ (Storper, 1997) and the capacity for firms to transfer 
price increases through inter-firm relationships. This is particularly highlighted 
through two instances: the acceptance of metal, and not energy, as a commodity 
input, and the capacity to forward larger, rather than smaller, price changes to 
customers. Traditionally, metal alloy and ingot prices have fluctuated (UK Steel, 
2010) and, as a result, manufacturing industries have adapted to this process and 
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surcharges are common practice. Relatively recent energy price fluctuations were 
less grounded in industry experience and contractual norms. Although energy prices 
have had periods of considerable increase, particularly during the 1970s, the relative 
stability of energy prices has resulted in the industry perceiving energy costs to be 
the domain of the supplier. As one interviewee explains, their customer base  
…generally accepts that steel is totally beyond our control and therefore is 
more agreeable to accept the steel clauses [surcharges]…the steel side has 
been like that for many years … Energy, up until probably six, seven years 
ago maybe, eight years ago, not so much of a cost for consideration in that 
respect … and therefore, it has not got that embedded understanding within 
the customer base that there is going to be a price premium to pay for energy 
(Interviewee 1, Forge SME 4). 
 
The scale of price changes also illustrates the importance of the wider acceptance of 
the responsibility of input price increases. Smaller price increases are difficult to 
forward to customers and as a result they are usually absorbed by the IMP firm. For 
larger increases IMP firms are able to forward some of the price change as “…they’re 
well flagged, so everybody in our industry knows about it” (Forge SME 1 – Fabricator) 
and “…the whole world just passes it on. So, actually, if raw material prices are going 
to go up, go up by a lot once is an easier thing to manage than it is to say every year” 
(Forge Large 2 – Fabricator). Energy is perceived by IMP customers as an internally 
controllable cost, whereas metal is perceived as a globally traded commodity with the 
individual firm having limited control of its price. The process of negotiation between 
IMP firms and their customers is to determine the extent to which the IMP firm, not 
the market, is responsible for energy price changes. The difficulty is that these 
expectations are embedded in working practices but also in contracts and terms and 
conditions. The assumption is that energy is a cost managed by IMP firms and it is 
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this expectation that is being challenged in negotiations between IMP firms and their 
customers to adjust contractual terms. This challenge has led to new working 
relationships or forms of adaptation and may eventually transform energy into a risk 
that is shared between IMP firms and their customers.  
6.6.2 Power and Transactional Governance  
The adaptive approaches developed by IMP firms in response to energy price 
changes are entangled with governance influences from both transactional partners 
and the institutional setting of the IMP firm’s geographical location. As a result, firms 
have developed and implemented a range of adjustments, which are most commonly 
used simultaneously to address specific elements of the firm’s transactional 
relationships and financial stability. IMP firms are engaged with multiple value chains 
that reflect a mix of products and order types, and have multiple and varied 
customer-supplier relationships. This is highlighted by the ability of IMP firms to use 
specific approaches with different segments of their customer base. The ability to 
manipulate relationships with customers as a means of adapting to changing 
environmental conditions is influenced by power differentials in individual buyer-
supplier relationships (Fuller and Lewis, 2002; Grimshaw and Rubery, 2005; 
Sturgeon et al., 2008). In some instances IMP firms were able to transfer the risk of 
energy price increases forward in the supply chain to their customers through price 
increase notifications or more formal surcharge mechanisms.  
Those firms which were able to transfer the energy risk to some customers did so 
through two types of powerfulness. The first results from the significant size or 
capability of the IMP firms, as was the case of those firms which used the price 
transfer mechanism independently or the Opportunistic approach. This form of 
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structural power allows firms to exploit the dependence of other firms on the 
relationship (Fields, 2006; Zabin, 1997). The second, more complex, power 
negotiation is illustrated in instances where firms are able to transfer part of the 
energy risk to some of their customers. In these cases, the relative powerfulness of 
supplier firms is constructed through the types of order and agreements between 
transaction partners. Formal contractual agreements allowed supplier firms to 
negotiate a price change mechanism into the contract, however, where the power 
differential between customer and supplier firm is less clear, IMP firms often 
attempted to build upon informal relationships. An example from a large foundry 
describes how an informal relationship of trust and reputation can allow firms to 
manage energy cost increases more successfully than a purely formal contractual 
agreement: 
[we]  did put a one year delta [surcharge] against the contract based on the 
electric . . . Yeah it’s, to be honest that was a pretty big favour on the basis 
we’ve got a very good relationship with them all, so … the T&C’s [terms and 
conditions] would say no, they don’t do that (Interviewee 1, Foundry SME 2 -
PLC group subsidiary). 
 
The current recession amplified power differentials between firms by making firms 
generally more dependent on customers and therefore reduced the enforceability of 
formal contracts and power in negotiating informal agreements. With lower volumes 
and batch orders IMP firms could, in some cases, take advantage of their relative 
powerfulness as customers required smaller orders and were consequently more 
dependent on rapid, short order runs. This dynamic between power and trust as a 
governance structure is dependent on the context in which the relationship is situated 
(Grimshaw and Rubery, 2005; Rowley et al., 2000; Sturgeon et al., 2008). Time and 
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timing is important and this was the case for the IMP industry with the onset of 
recession that was also combined with enhanced energy volatility. The power 
differentials in individual customer-supplier relationships not only vary between 
customers but also through the duration of contracts. Ongoing adjustments to 
changing market dynamics and international competitiveness have changed the 
nature of contracts and agreements. This illustrates the complex and dynamic nature 
of adjustment as an ongoing negotiation of risk and cost distribution between 
transaction partners. 
6.6.3 Adjustment as a Negotiated Process: Transfer of the Energy Risk 
Energy as a risk is influenced not just by the spatial differentiation in price between 
places but also the institutional setting, particularly the market structure and industry 
norms, and the active involvement of firm as strategic entities (Christopherson and 
Clark, 2007; Clark and Wójcik, 2003). Both transactional partners in the buyer-
supplier relationship want to minimise their exposure to such risks and resist taking 
responsibility. The energy risk illustrates how this responsibility is determined through 
independent negotiations between the supplier and each customer, drawing on the 
specific relationship characteristics to determine who will accept the additional cost.  
IMP firms have developed multiple strategic approaches to manage the energy risk. 
This is a direct result of the multiple relationships, and, hence, governance 
structures, in which the firm is engaged. This variety of governance regimes means 
that a single approach does not reduce the risks associated with alterations to energy 
prices. Instead, firms are forced to develop strategies which can minimise risk related 
to energy price changes by adjusting specific governance structures. It is this mix of 
governance structures which affects the stability and vulnerability of IMP firms. 
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Governance models in the literature focus on the ability of lead firms to transfer costs 
and risks to their suppliers (Gereffi et al., 2005; Sturgeon and Lee, 2001; Sturgeon et 
al., 2008). However, here attention is given to the suppliers’ ability to transfer risks to 
their customers through specific transactional relationships; suppliers’ play different 
roles depending on the type of customer – from lead to dependent, from a position of 
power to powerlessness. This draws attention to the complex nature of power 
differentials in transaction relationships, influenced by order structures, agreement 
types and the product portfolio of supplier firms. These more complex forms of 
governance have a significant effect on the adjustment processes of IMP firms and 
need to be more fully incorporated into conceptualisations of governance structures.  
In many cases, IMP firm were unable to transfer price increases to customers: the 
risks associated with energy volatility still rests with the IMP firms. Several other 
attempts have been developed by the firms to offset this risk, such as investment in 
efficiency improvements and purchasing activity. Purchasing activity has generated 
additional risks through the mismatch of factor and product prices and also the 
increasingly complex purchasing activity undertaken to reduce risk through the 
introduction of more flexible contracts. Under this situation, the IMP industry 
continues to face a significant risk from the energy crisis. Sturgeon’s (2002) modular 
model suggests that the development of increased supplier competencies dissipates 
the risk which is transferred from customers through governance structures. In this 
case, the risks faced by IMP firms continue to be experienced due to the influence of 
transactional and institutional governance structures on the adjustment options of 
firms. This mix of governance forms affects the adjustment options available to IMP 
firms, particularly as IMP firms have no direct end user market access, and, 
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therefore, their stability and vulnerability to risks from the external environment, such 
as energy. From the history of metal price practices, it seems clear that adjustment 
processes will evolve into a more standard convention over time, however at the 
beginning of a new challenge in the supply chain environment the adjustment is far 
more complex and influenced by transactional partners as well as the IMP firm. 
 
6.7 Summary: Costs, Relationships and Adjustment 
The energy risk, from price increases and volatility, has had a significant effect on the 
profitability of IMP firms. Rising input prices have made production agreements with 
customers potentially unprofitable unless the IMP firm is able to adjust the nature of 
the agreement through its relationship with the customer. This short term 
environmental change has a substantial impact on both the short term viability of IMP 
firms, through reductions in profitability, and the long term survival, through reduced 
investment that threatens the competitiveness of the industry. The IMP industry’s 
adjustment to increasing and volatile energy prices has illustrated the complex 
relationship between costs, competitiveness and adjustment. Two key following 
points can be made: 
(1) Costs and competitiveness 
The analysis here has highlighted the temporal variation in cost structures that 
comes from the distinct combination of input contracts and their interaction with 
output orders within the individual firm. Cost structures are dynamic and require 
fluidity in relationships with customers to allow firms to adjust to such changes in 
order for the firm to remain competitive. The transfer of price changes through 
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customer relationships is only one aspect of adjusting to changing input prices as 
ultimately IMP firms will become uncompetitive if they continue to increase their sales 
prices. However, it does form a critical aspect, both in the short and long term, to 
allow the firm to manage such volatility. This interaction of input and output 
agreements generates a dynamic and firm specific relationship between cost and 
competitiveness, shaped by the strategic action of the IMP firm, its relationships with 
its customer base and their capacity to purchase inputs at the best price. 
(2) Adjustment is a negotiated process  
IMP firms have developed multiple strategic approaches to manage the energy risk. 
This is a direct result of the multiple governance structures acting on firms that are 
part of specific transactional relationships, with their associated power asymmetries, 
and the institutional constraints and enablers on firm activity. This variety of 
governance regimes means that a single approach does not reduce the risks 
associated with alterations to energy prices. Instead, firms are forced to develop 
strategies which can minimize risk related to energy price changes by adjusting 
specific governance structures. As a result, it is this mix of governance structures 
which affects the stability and vulnerability of IMP firms. 
The cost structure of the firm is both fluid and rigid. Costs fluctuate from market 
prices, particularly in commodity inputs such as energy and metal, and the efficiency 
of the production process. However, there are also distinct periods of rigidity from 
contracts. Purchases and sales are based on specified prices, fixed under 
contractual agreement between transaction partners, for specified periods of time. 
The analysis here identifies distinct periods of path dependency in the IMP firm from 
 276 
 
utility contracts: the fixed energy contract produces a time limited period in which a 
contracted utility price can impact on firm performance. The contract generates a 
conditional environment in which the firm can respond based on prior decisions 
(David, 1985; Martin and Sunley, 2006), constraining the potential range of options 
(Kirk et al., 2007; Vogel, 2005). Prior focus within economic geography has been on 
the long term ‘lock-in’ effects of path dependency in regional economies (Hudson, 
2002; Martin, 2010a). In contrast, the path dependency identified here is temporally 
defined and generated from specific contracts. The temporality of this rigidity is 
limited – i.e. it ends when the contract ends. As such, this form of path dependence 
has a distinct element of change incorporated within it. A focus on change, as 
opposed to continuity, in path dependency has been suggested by Martin (2010) as a 
more useful conceptualisation in understanding the evolution of firms and places. 
The rigidity found in the contract structure has implications for the fluidity conception 
in networked production systems (Castells, 1996; Uzzi, 1996). Contracts introduce a 
temporally defined period of rigidity: path dependency during the contract but also the 
change prompted by the cessation of the contract. The contract form of agreement, a 
distinctive part of the relationships identified between IMP firms and their customers 
and suppliers, needs to be incorporated into the conceptions of firm relationships to 
provide a more nuanced understanding of a firms capacity to adjust.  
This chapter has identified a central role of agreement structures in determining the 
ability of IMP firms to adjust to energy price risks by transferring price changes to 
their customers. The following section further examines the nature, use and impact of 
the range of inter-firm agreements used by IMP firms. The focus is on the form of 
customer agreements and the governance structures that they generate.  
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7 PRODUCTION ORGANISATION AND THE 
COMPLEXITY OF INTER-FIRM AGREEMENTS: 
CONTRACTS, TRUST AND PLACE 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Client-supplier relationships have been a key aspect of the capacity of IMP firms to 
adjust to increased international competition (Chapter Five) and changes in the cost 
base (Chapter Six). The structure of the agreement between transaction partners has 
been shown to be complex, with varied forms of sunk costs throughout the 
production process. Contracts have introduced forms of temporal rigidity in the 
adjustment practices of IMP firms from interdependency in value attainment (Chapter 
Five, Section 5.4: 210) and path dependency from energy purchases (Chapter Six, 
Section 6.4: 247). Contracts are thus a distinct form of coordination and governance 
within the supply chain of IMP firms. 
Contractual agreements of all types – written and tacit - between transaction partners 
are a fundamental component of the organisation of production. All exchanges 
involve some form of explicit or implicit arrangement that reflects the nature of 
corporate relationships. The increased fracturing of production activities between 
different entities in the production system intensifies the use, complexity and 
significance of agreements in shaping the organisation of production. The role of 
relational agreements between transaction partners has been a focus of much 
research on GPNs (Hess, 2008; Hess and Coe, 2006), clusters (Dicken and 
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Malmberg, 2001; Maskell, 2001b) and upgrading (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000) and 
draws attention to the importance of complex relationship structures based on trust 
and dependencies. However, the significance of formal contractual agreements has a 
less developed critique in economic geography, despite the prominence of market 
based transactions and legally based agreements in the management and marketing 
literatures (Beuve and Saussier, 2012; Hodgson, 2002). The role of contracts in inter-
organisational agreements is varied. The transaction cost economies approach 
traditionally views contracts as a control method to remove the threat of opportunistic 
behaviour. However, the resource based view approach sees contracts as 
performing more of a coordination role in interdependent relationships to protect 
mutual benefit (Mellewigt et al., 2007). Contracts are increasingly viewed as a 
supplement to relationally based agreements (Vlaar et al., 2007; Woolthuis et al., 
2005), with trust and contracts integrated into complex and evolving agreement 
structures. Contracts are a continuing aspect of inter-firm agreements (Rusten and 
Bryson, 2010) and are shaped by the social context in which the relationship is 
developed (Woolthuis et al., 2005). The use and nature of both explicit and implicit 
forms of agreement needs to be better conceptualised in the organisation of 
production within economic geography. 
The subsequent analysis specifically examines the use, structure and impact of 
client-supplier agreements in the IMP industry. The previous empirical chapters have 
been based on an extensive examination of the industry. In contrast, the following 
analysis will be based on a sub-set of IMP firms and their agreements with primary 
customers. The details of these relationships are outlined in Table 7.1. The sample of 
cases was determined through analysis of the most significant and visible client-
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supplier relationships evident in the IMP sample (for further details see Chapter 
Three, section 3.4.3: 100). Five cases have been used as the primary source for this 
examination. These cases include interview data from both transaction partners: the 
IMP firm and its customer. The approach is used to explore the intricate details of 
agreements in each case and to allow comparison across cases. A more 
contextualised understanding, based on views from both transaction partners and in 
most cases (4/5) from multiple supplier interviews, is therefore generated. This 
provides an insight into why both parties enter into particular types of agreements 
and the benefits/difficulties of these relationship forms, thereby helping to breakdown 
the complexity of relationships identified in earlier analyses. In addition, the 
remainder of the IMP sample will be used to provide contextual evidence and aid 
comparison between cases.  
This chapter specifically explores the complexity and use of agreement forms, their 
transformation and the influence of space and place in shaping such agreements. An 
overview of the types of explicit and implicit agreements used between clients and 
suppliers is presented. Following this, the structure of agreements is discussed and 
two additional elements of complexity are proposed; the organisational separation of 
trust within agreements and the dynamic nature of agreement structures. These 
features are used to understand how agreements influence the stability of the firm 
and their evolution over time through an examination of the mixture of agreements 
within the individual firm. A transition towards more formalised contractual structures 
is identified in firms undertaking more valuable and complex projects, where 
intellectual property requires significant protection for the competitive advantage of 
IMP customers. This evolution has generated a shift in the relationship between 
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buyers and suppliers, with suppliers actually bearing additional risks transferred from 
their customer through certain types of agreement structure. The role of place and 
space is a key element in the shaping of agreements for distribution of and protection 
from risk. The chapter concludes by providing a short discussion on the wider 
significance of these findings and the relationship between contracts and trust in 
production organisation. 
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Table 7.1 Transactional Case Studies 
Customer Firm Supplier Product/ 
Volume 
Customer 
Significance 
(proportion of 
turnover) 
Status Employment 
Size of IMP 
Supplier 
Agreement
/Position 
Agreement Type Direct 
Investment 
MNE -  
Aerospace 
Component 
Manufacturer 
Forge Large 3 Non-critical/low Non-major  None 550 Direct  
(multiple sites) 
Global LTA
17
 (large 
supplier for other 
customer plants) 
 
 Foundry SME 2 
- PLC group 
subsidiary 
Non-critical/low Non-major  None 410 Direct Local purchase order  
MNE - 
Automotive 
Component 
Manufacturer 1 
Forge SME 9 - 
SME group 
subsidiary 
Non-critical/high Major  Sole supplier 
(sole supplier 
for other parts 
to other 
customer 
plants) 
26 Agreement 
with UK site 
(production at 
Indian site) 
Global LTA with 
purchase orders 
 
 Foundry Large 1 Non-critical/high Minor  672 Direct Global LTA  
Large Pump 
Manufacturer 
Foundry SME 
21 
Prototype & pre-
production/low 
Primary  
(43%) 
Strategic use 93 Direct  
(multiple sites) 
LTA (two year 
agreement extended 
to three years) 
 
 
MNE -Power 
Generation 
Manufacturer 
Foundry SME 
13 
Jobbing 
runs/low 
Primary 
(18%) 
Preferred 
supplier 
43 Indirect  
(through 
machinist) 
Short term contract 
(per product) 
agreement 
framework 
 
 Foundry SME 
14 
Jobbing 
runs/low 
Primary 
(25%) 
Preferred 
supplier 
35 Indirect  
(through 
machinist) 
Single orders in 
agreement 
framework 
 
 
                                            
17
 Long Term Agreements (LTAs) are formal agreements between transaction partners for an extended temporal period (usually three to five years). 
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Table 7.1 Continued 
 
Customer Firm Supplier Product/ 
Volume 
Customer 
Significance 
(proportion of 
turnover) 
Status Employment 
Size of IMP 
Supplier 
Agreement/
Position 
Agreement Type Direct 
Investment 
MNE - 
Automotive 
Component 
Manufacturer 2 
Forge SME 10 Critical 
standardised & 
small amount of 
prototype/high  
Primary 
(indirect) 
None 73 Indirect   
(through 
machinist) 
‘Loose arrangements’ 
with forecast schedule 
Interest 
free 
loan 
 Forge Large 1 Bespoke & non-
critical/low & 
high 
Non-primary  Preferred 
supplier 
326 Direct  Annual negotiation 
under non-contracted 
agreement 
 
 Foundry SME 
17 
Prototype & pre-
production/low 
Primary 
(27%) 
Development 
site 
42  Direct ‘Gentleman’s 
agreement’ for project 
work 
Interest 
free 
loan 
 Foundry SME 
22 
Critical/low Primary 
(65%) (direct 
and indirect) 
Preferred 
supplier 
28 Indirect  
(through 
machinist) 
Open purchase order 
with forecast schedule 
 
 Foundry SME 3 Critical/low Non-primary  Preferred 
supplier 
75  Direct Single orders  
Source: Interview data (2009-10) 
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7.2 Agreement Structures Explored: Explicit and Implicit Inter-Firm 
Agreements 
Agreements between firms in a supply chain can be complex and intricate, related to 
product specificity, volume of supply or level of knowledge exchange between the 
companies involved. To understand the structure of such agreements, an overview of 
generic agreement types found in both management and geographical literature is 
provided in Table 7.2 below. A distinction is made between two broad forms of 
agreement; implicit (tacit) and explicit (codified). Each type has a series of forms and 
commitment structures which determine the governance mechanisms used and 
levels of security provided to support transaction(s). The transaction is defined here 
as the trade between two parties. The agreement structure is defined as the overall 
relationship between firms that supports such transaction(s), which may involve tacit 
and codified elements.  
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Table 7.2 Agreement Structures  
Agreement Basis Agreement Forms Definition Commitment Structures* 
Explicit Integration Unified administrative 
control 
Common ownership of technology/design 
Financial ties (Helper, 1993) 
Obligatory contracting Formal contract Legal rules 
Implicit Relational contracting with 
incentives from self-
interest – economic 
reciprocity 
Tacit based Dependence (Ruigrok and van Tulder, 1995; Sako, 1992) 
Reputation (Helper, 1993) 
Switching costs/asset specificity (Gereffi et al., 2005) 
Tacit knowledge/learning (common understanding) 
(Lundvall, 1993) 
Relational contracting with 
loyalty as basis from trust 
– social reciprocity 
Tacit based Trust (Nooteboom, 2002; Sako, 1992) 
Mutually implied rules/social norms (Nooteboom, 2002) 
Dialogue exchange* Progressive tacit based 
understanding 
Evolved email exchange 
Network* Tacit based associations Loose ties (Granovetter, 1973) 
Firm inter-dependency (Håkansson and Johanson, 1993) 
Source: Adapted from Nooteboom (Figure 4.2 2002:127) (* own additions to the table) 
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The implicit contract forms are based on a shared tacit understanding of 
expectations, behaviour and responsibilities between transaction partners. Trust is 
said to feature highly in these relational forms of agreement as a foundation for 
loyalty between partners and a sense of shared interest (Ettlinger, 2003; Hess, 
2008). Nooteboom (2002) suggests that there are two forms of trust in implicit 
relationships; that based on incentives for economic self-interest, i.e. economic gain, 
or a form of strong trust where loyalty is the underlying aspiration. These forms have 
different commitment structures. Self-interest trust is based on an economic benefit 
of continuing an existing relationship where asset specificity, tacit based learning and 
reputational gain generate incentives to continue the relationship and a sense of 
interdependence to reduce costs, including transfer costs associated with finding 
another supplier. Much of the GPN literature has focussed on the role of sunk costs 
as a form of governance and stability between transaction partners. Specifically, 
dependency relationships from investment in asset specific equipment, skills or 
shared understandings between partners has been illustrated to generate a strong 
commitment, replacing more formalised obligatory agreement types (Gereffi et al., 
2005; Håkansson and Johanson, 1993) . A more moral understanding of trust is used 
as pure moral guidance where transaction partners act according to mutually implied 
rules and social norms. These ‘strong’ forms of trust are less empirically observed 
and have been identified by Nooteboom (2002) and Sako (1992) to be an extreme 
form in a continuum of trust based relationships. In addition to these types, an 
evolved understanding of the relational expectations and responsibility, for example 
through an email exchange or long trading relationship, can develop implied 
agreements or codes of behaviour which generate or underlie exchanges between 
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transaction partners (Eccles, 1981). The enforcement of implicit agreements is done 
through the termination of the trading relationship and the portrayal of the firm’s 
image to the wider industry (Baker et al., 2002). These implied governance structures 
are generated by the firm itself and through their own trading patterns and 
relationships. Implicit contracts can easily become codified or transformed into 
explicit agreements through everyday practices, procedures and all forms of 
communication between both parties to the transaction. In many instances, terms of 
trade underpin a transaction and these reflect an explicit, although often un-
negotiated, legally enforceable contract.  
Explicit agreements are defined by the overt depiction of terms of trade through 
formalised, legally based agreement structures, which can include specific details of 
the transaction, responsibilities of transaction partners and repercussions of 
misconduct. Explicit agreement types include common ownership of product and 
obligatory formal contracts (Grossman and Hart, 1986). Shared ownership of product 
design or supply rights can be through vertical integration or bilateral intellectual 
property agreements, where firms may have either purchased design rights or been 
involved in joint product development. Formal contracts between independent firms 
identify specific terms and conditions of sale/purchase. Both forms are based on 
enforcement through legal mechanisms, which are external to the firm and outside 
the remit of firm control (Baker et al., 2002; Hodgson, 2002; Williamson, 1979).  
These agreement types are structured within transaction levels, outlined in Table 7.3, 
based on Sako (1992). Each level of transaction offers a different amount of 
commitment. The agreement structure may contain several of these transaction 
levels, and their associated levels of commitment, or can be based on a single type. 
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Framework agreements set the rules of the relationship where both parties agree to 
certain expectations, responsibilities and commitments. They can be industry specific 
‘norms’ or more clearly identified frameworks of understanding. A framework order, or 
more commonly referred to as a schedule, is an outline of a long term order, with an 
element of both forecast and fixed orders within a given period. It is usually here 
where prices and terms are decided for the order as a whole- although these can 
sometimes be reviewed at set periods. Framework orders are used by purchasers to 
order set volumes of goods at set periods. Their commitment is for the entire order 
over the entire period, not for specific amounts at specific points of time within the 
contract. A calling off agreement is for a specific product, at a specific price, for a 
specific volume, over a specific period through a purchase order. Under an evolved 
exchange the transaction is gradually formulated through continued dialogue 
between partners. In these situations, the details of the agreement (such as terms of 
trade and penalties) are implied through a shared understanding of each partner’s 
rights and responsibilities based on layers of previous transactions and dialogue 
(Sako, 1992). As such, the formal aspect of the agreement is weak (as few details 
are explicitly set) but the relationship it is built upon offers greater stability and 
security. Framework agreements can include aspects of both explicit and implicit 
agreements as they have often evolved through the trading relationship and 
encompass multiple elements (Eccles, 1981).  
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Table 7.3 Transaction Levels 
Source: Adapted from Sako (1992:117-8) 
 
There has been considerable investigation into the forms of agreement between 
transaction partners (for instance Grimshaw and Rubery, 2005; Mellewigt et al., 
2007; Woolthuis et al., 2005), but much of this debate has been in marketing rather 
than economic geography. Despite this rich literature there are several key elements 
not fully represented; the role of obligatory and trust based agreements in a single 
transaction, the dynamism of agreement types and the role of place in forming the 
type and extent of inter-firm contracts. It is these processes which will be explored in 
the subsequent analysis. 
 
7.3 Agreement Structures in the IMP Industry 
The study has identified a range of agreement structures in place between IMP firms 
and their customers, which are identified in Table 7.4 below. The level of formality 
associated with these agreements differs, ranging between formal legal contracts to 
informal ‘handshake’ agreements based on a shared understanding of the 
Level of 
Transaction 
Definition Specific Agreement Forms 
Framework 
agreement 
Over-arching agreement that 
maintains a relationship – limited 
specific orders, prices or timelines 
Bilateral agreement/industry 
norms/tacit 
Framework order Long term order –specific quantities 
over an extended timeline 
Schedule 
Calling off Specific order with exact quantities 
and delivery dates 
Purchase order 
Evolved exchange Development of tacit based 
agreement through layers of contact 
Email exchange 
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responsibilities of transaction partners rather than a formalised statement. Each type 
of agreement will be discussed and their commitment structures identified. 
Table 7.4 Types of Agreement in the IMP Industry 
Contract Definition Forms of Contract Number of 
Firms Using 
Contract for 
Primary 
Customers 
Formal written 
contract 
Range of 
timescales with 
additional 
responsibilities/ 
rights 
 
Long term agreement 
(LTA) (greater than 1 
yr) 
 
Short term agreement 
(less than 1 year) 
5 large 
5 SME 
 
 
1 large 
10 SME 
Formal 
transaction 
agreement 
Single order with 
only details of 
transaction/exchan
ge of terms of trade 
 
Purchase order 1 large  
10 SME 
 
(all firms use 
within customer 
base) 
Informal 
agreement 
Range of 
timescales and 
detail of what is 
included but is not 
signed 
 
Gentleman’s 
agreement 
Loose agreement 
1 large 
10 SME 
Sunk costs Existing 
investments in 
place 
 
Tooling All 
Source: Interview data (2009-10) 
 
7.3.1 Tacit: Handshake Agreements 
Informal agreements are common in the IMP industry with one third of firms (11/33 
who responded to the survey) utilising them with their main customers. The 
informality was conceptualised as not signing a contract or agreement and instead 
developing an understanding of the performance criteria and responsibilities of both 
transaction partners. Under informal agreements existing investments in equipment 
and knowledge become strong commitment structures that replace more explicit 
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commitments made in formal contracts (Baker et al., 2002). The equipment required 
to produce components for sale are customer and product specific and as such, 
generate a form of commitment or lock-in instead of a formal contract. The 
investments generated from set up costs, such as tooling requirements, have implied 
contractual criteria, such as a shared understanding of the performance, terms, and 
offer of sale. It is also the case that the agreement develops on the basis of 
experience or performance and may commence with a simple transaction governed 
by established terms of trade, as one interviewee explains:  
It’s, it’s, you use the word contract, it’s not as though ‘you will supply that for 
twelve months’, it’s, really their contract with us is, we’ve got their tooling, they 
own the tooling, they give us a month’s order, maybe they’ve got two months 
firm on order. So there’s a commitment to take some stock, you know, for the 
future if it’s a long lead time (Interviewee 1, Foundry SME 3).  
 
In this example the sunk costs act as a long term commitment between the 
transaction partners - to order from that particular supplier (by placing tooling with 
them) and to meet orders from customers (by storing equipment on site with the 
suppliers). In the majority of cases, there is inevitably multiple sourcing of these 
products by the customer. However, by retaining tooling at the supplier’s site both 
parties are actively committed to the relationship, with or without orders placed. In 
this sense, the sunk costs act as an informal agreement framework between parties 
that generates a relationship based on trust of reciprocal benefit in maintaining the 
trading relationship. The structure of the trading relationship, such as infrequent 
batch orders or the life cycle of the product, also establishes an implied commitment 
between transaction partners through sunk costs as they can generate cost 
efficiencies in maintaining the existing relationship (Chapter Five, Section 5.2).  
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The use of tacit based agreements is common in smaller IMP firms because of the 
nature of the product and trading process (infrequent but repeat orders) and the 
limited resources available to the firm to generate and enforce more formalised 
contracts. Although the same commitment structures are in place with larger firms, 
the consequential higher volume of orders means that it is more likely the product is 
dual sourced and a formal agreement is in place. This replaces the security from the 
commitment structure (tooling) with explicit forms of commitment. The capacity to 
engage in legal discussions is often restricted in smaller firms that do not have 
adequate legal knowledge within the firm or the available funds to engage external 
expertise. As such, smaller firms can be at a considerable disadvantage in 
determining the implications of such formal contracts and their relative vulnerability. 
Formal contracts often have additional restrictions imposed on suppliers, which can 
increase the supplier’s dependency on key customers because of the additional 
performance conditions established through the contract. One interviewee from a 
mid-volume foundry highlighted the additional criteria the supplier is forced to meet to 
secure a long term contract with their customer: 
There are some what are called LTAs, long term agreements… some people 
do enter into those, I don’t . . . and the reason I don’t is because they are 
always very one way. So the customer says ‘oh we’ll give you an LTA 
agreement for 3 years’, and we think ‘oh that sounds good, get guaranteed 
business for 3 years’, ‘but we want, you’ve got to reduce your prices by 5% a 
year and if you let us down we’re going to throw the agreement away, or if we 
can find a more competitive supplier’. ….And there’s other reasons for that 
[not engaging in LTAs], other than just being sort of maverick; one is that all of 
our customers have got competitors and most long term agreements have, 
they either discourage you to supply competitors or you’re outright not allowed 
to supply competitors (Interviewee 1, Foundry Large 2). 
 
By promoting the suppliers dependency on the customer through formalising a long 
term sale the customer is able to enforce additional requirements, such as price 
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reductions, and enact an implied power asymmetry through this dependency. From 
the suppliers perspective informal agreements can actually provide protection to the 
firm specifically because of their ‘looseness’, which can enhance the suppliers 
negotiating  power, as an interviewee in a mid-high volume forge illustrates: 
So you have to buy the material with an expectation you’re going to supply for 
six months. And they [the customer] simply cancelled one day. And we’re left 
with x thousand pounds worth of product they no longer need. We asked the 
question why did you not tell us?  ‘Well it’s a mistake in the business’. So what 
are you going to do about it?  ‘Nothing, we go back to our schedule’. So they 
hide behind the schedule. And I say, well ok, I will now only buy to your 
schedule. And they say, ‘well what does that mean?’  Well it means I’m not 
going to supply you. ‘Well that’s no good, we need to discuss that’. Then it 
gets all lost and loose (Interviewee 2, Forge SME 10). 
 
As the agreement criteria had not been fully disclosed and both parties were working 
towards implied understandings through the schedule order, the supplier is able to 
negotiate the stoppage of the schedule. By purchasing inputs directly related to the 
customers schedule they are not breaking any agreement, despite it being disruptive 
to the customer. The threat of disruption to the customer’s production system 
generates negotiating power for the supplier and both parties work towards a more 
amicable solution. 
The value of building a relationship with suppliers is discussed by two of the case 
study customers. MNE Automotive Component Manufacturer 2’s approach is 
interesting as they suggest that they actively collaborate with their suppliers and work 
in partnership, as the interviewee explains below: 
… we are not an aggressive purchasing organisation, we want to work in 
partnership with our suppliers, we want to collaborate with our suppliers. Of 
course you have to negotiate with your suppliers so you have to find a way 
you can get a win-win. You don’t want to have a set of suppliers who are on 
the edge of bankruptcy or you can’t invest so you’ve got to look at it in the 
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whole, you’ve got to look at it and understand the value you’re getting from 
that (MNE Automotive Component Manufacturer 2). 
 
The perception of a supplier’s value and position in the supply chain that is outlined 
above is disputed by one of their direct suppliers. Forge SME 10 views their 
relationship as based entirely on price, with little recognition of the long standing 
relationship which has developed: 
[MNE Automotive Component Manufacturer 2], its facility has been supplied 
for seven years. They will cancel their order tomorrow ...the relationship can 
be destroyed in a day…It’s all about price. … [W]e sell [a component] to 
[them]….that’s [worth] £30 on two thousand [pounds of the value of the total 
product]. If they had them free it wouldn’t save them anything. But they would 
quite happily destroy your business to get a tick in their strategy box for 
savings (Interviewee 2, Forge SME 10). 
 
In another case, MNE Aerospace Component Manufacturer highlight the importance 
of developing a relationship with their customers, particularly in the current recession 
where orders have become more difficult to generate and require shorter lead time, 
the value of loyal and trustworthy suppliers have become more critical to the 
organisation. However, whilst the interviewee is describing the value of such a 
relationship they go on to explicitly illustrate through an attempted price increase 
from a long standing supplier, who is affectionately called ‘Uncle [name]’, how the 
trust-based relationship is actually formally benchmarked to test the validity of the 
supplier’s claims about increases in their cost base. In this case the notion of building 
a relationship with their supply base is actually to generate increased customer 
power and significance to the supplier (by increasing their purchasing weight), as the 
customer actually purchases very low volume, infrequent orders and “…through 
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necessity we have to work with our suppliers” (MNE Aerospace Component 
Manufacturer). 
Both examples illustrate how relationships between buyers-suppliers are not based 
on the ‘strong’ notion of trust, to paraphrase Nooteboom (2002). In these examples 
relationships, and the implied trust between transaction partners, is utilised by firms 
for economic gain as suggested by Orderud’s (2007) examination of the Norwegian 
building sector. Cost remains a critical element in the success of a proposed 
transaction and relationships are built to support profit maximisation and generate 
additional influence in situations where more direct forms of power, such as value of 
spend or ownership rights, do not generate dependency from the supplier. Forms of 
dependency may be more important with buyers having limited options other than 
purchasing goods from their existing IMP suppliers. In many instances the suppliers 
may be less dependent than their customers on maintaining the relationship in the 
immediate term.  
Firm size does not necessarily generate power either, illustrated clearly by the 
opposing governance mechanisms of the two sister plants of the same customer 
MNE. MNE Automotive Component Manufacturer 2 used only direct forms of 
governance, specifically contract clauses, audits and cost reduction targets. 
Whereas, MNE Aerospace Component Manufacturer, with the same formal contract 
with its suppliers, utilised indirect governance mechanisms based on knowledge 
transfer, benchmarking and supplier status. Here, trust is enacted between buyer-
supplier to support profit maximisation. Trust is used as a governance mechanism to 
generate relative power over a supplier, however, only in certain situations where 
direct forms of influence from supplier dependency are not available. 
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These examples illustrate that informal agreements are influenced by a range of 
factors and not limited to dependency or trust. Dependency between transaction 
partners is a key element, as suggested by relational approaches to GPN (Dicken et 
al., 2001; Gereffi et al., 2005), but this is influenced by historical relationships and the 
scale of production. Dependency from sunk costs (both physical and relational) is 
again highlighted as central elements in shaping the nature of the IMP-client 
relationship (Chapter Five, section 5.2.1). However, the agreement is also influenced 
by past trading and the evolution of the agreement framework within which sunk 
costs form one type of commitment structure. Larger firms tend to have the same 
informal commitments but this is often (4/5 cases) supplemented with an additional 
formal element. Trust is based on generating profitable trading relationships and 
strengthening the customer’s position in the relationship, as opposed to inter-
personal loyalty (Ettlinger, 2003). The following section will examine how explicit 
forms of agreement are used in the industry and the implications for conceptions of 
inter-firm relationships. 
7.3.2 Formal Agreements: LTAs and Purchase Orders  
Formal agreements are found in two types: long term agreements (over one year, 
with or without a draw off period) and short term purchase orders (for specific 
quantities of a given product over a specific period). The LTAs are primarily found in 
large IMP firms and with primary customers (4/5 firms), where large values are spent, 
as a means of legalising investment commitments. By contrast, purchase orders, 
despite being formal documents, are used by the majority of firms and mostly for 
secondary customers. These are also common for IMP firms that undertake batch 
production (jobbers), where volumes are infrequent and products changeable.  
 296 
 
The formality of the agreement in both cases (LTA and purchase orders) differs 
somewhat on the type of product and the intricacies of the trading relationship. Basic 
formal agreements include a standard set of terms and conditions about terms of 
trading and transaction details. The negotiation of these terms is sometimes only 
implied as when “… purchase orders [are sent] out they have our [customers] terms 
and conditions on the back. Now, if a supplier confirms your order and has their 
terms and conditions on the back of their confirmation, theirs apply. Because it’s as 
simple as the last piece of paper that changes hands” (Multinational Aerospace 
Component Manufacturer). Under long term agreements, the formalisation of trading 
terms and specific contractual requirements is far more explicit and involves clear 
identification of additional responsibilities and restrictions. The depth of agreement is 
a reflection of the additional investments involved in LTAs (by both sides) in terms of 
retained capacity, price advantages and shared understanding. The obvious time and 
financial cost to generating these agreements means they are only used when it is 
justified by the level of security  required by the customer, such as continuous 
production capacity, quality levels or prevention of illegal copying. 
These agreement structures are often used separately to match the volume and 
product type being ordered- purchase order for one-off simple trades and LTAs for 
long term strategic relationships. However, they can be combined to provide an 
additional enforcement ability (through LTA and its added demands) whilst also 
reducing commitment by using purchase orders for specific components of the order. 
MNE Power Generation Manufacturer used this structure with two of the IMP firms in 
the study. A long term agreement framework was set up to formalise an 
understanding of the responsibility of the supplier and to maintain response time and 
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service (key requirements of the customer’s competitiveness). This has ensured a 
level of capacity is retained by the supplier and the supplier is aware of the trading 
terms and product requirements. From this understanding the customer was then 
able to purchase as and when required, knowing that the commitment from the 
supplier is prearranged. Here, formality in agreements was used to generate specific 
levels of commitment, and therefore the required level of security or separation for 
the customer firm.  
In fact, only one large IMP supplier had an informal agreement with either its primary 
or five main customers (based on value), whereas ten SME suppliers had such 
agreements. There is a prominence of low value customer spends associated with 
informal agreements, with eight of the SMEs the customer represented below 30% of 
their turnover (five represent <10% of turnover, three between 20-30%), and in the 
case of the large IMP firm, the customer represented only 20% of turnover (in 
comparison to 27-50% of the other large IMP firm transactions). However, the 
proportion of spend, or the dependency of the IMP firm on its customer, cannot be 
the only factor in determining the level of formality of transactions as the difference 
between proportions of turnover are relatively small in some cases (a difference of 
only 7% between those firms with LTAs and those with informal agreements). Higher 
dependencies were also found in both SME and large firms in buyer-supplier 
agreements in various other forms. This could reflect resources available to large 
firms to have procurement professionals able to manage contracts but the nature of 
agreement is most often determined by the customer and irrespective of the 
suppliers ability to ‘handle’ a contract.  
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The agreement structure also seems closely related to the type of product 
manufactured and the firm’s relative strategic importance to the customer. Those 
SMEs with LTAs all provided additional services to the customer such as logistics 
support, design involvement or new product manufacture, all of which generated a 
form of reliance on the supplier from the customer. As such, customers were keen to 
formally tie the supplier to them and secure their supply. The SMEs with informal 
agreement structures were predominately (8/10 firms) low volume and jobbing 
manufacturers not engaged in development work. However, the large IMP firm which 
has informal agreement structures with its main and primary customers was of key 
strategic importance to its customers. Here it is interesting to understand why this 
firm has not engaged in LTAs with its customer base despite this significance. 
Foundry Large 2 has developed a strong informal relationship with the end 
manufacturer, a large MNE. The IMP firm actually directly supplies a second tier 
manufacturer but, because of having this relationship with the end manufacturer, the 
end manufacturer has stipulated that the second tier purchase off the IMP firm. 
Under this situation, the informal relationship with the end user provides security and 
therefore the firm does not need to secure its relationship with the direct customer in 
a formal agreement 
The range of agreement types used in the industry highlight some interesting points 
about inter-organisational relationships. Firstly, different types of agreements are 
used for different purposes, as the purpose changes the relationship is left with a 
history of relationship structures that can influence the overall dynamic and 
organisational structure of the relationship (Vlaar et al., 2007). The varied and 
multiple forms of agreement used have different levels of commitment and 
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separation, which are used strategically by both transaction partners. Dependency is 
only one form of commitment within the relationships and its function is influenced by 
other aspects of the relationship –strategic importance and layers of agreements. 
Secondly, the interaction of trust and contractual forms of agreement is multifaceted. 
Explicit formal agreements are a fundamental element of IMP-client agreements. 
Purchase orders are a simple form of explicit contract, based on specified 
commitments and obligations, with implied terms of trade. Long term contracts are far 
more complex, with an explicit outline of obligations that are actively acknowledged 
through the ‘signing of the contract’. Implicit agreements, particularly those based on 
asset specificity and prior trading relationships, are evident across the IMP industry 
however these often interact with additional agreements structures. IMP-client 
relationships include aspects of both implicit and explicit governance.  
Frameworks of agreements and dual use of formal and implicit ties generate a more 
complex structure to inter-firm relationships that changes over time. A critical 
departure from current conceptions of inter-firm relationships in economic geography 
is the prominent role of formal agreements between buyers and suppliers. It has 
been suggested that formal agreements are superseded by dependency 
relationships, where the need to collaborate – and the investment from this – 
removes the need for legally based agreements and instead implicit agreements 
based around a tacit relationships are the primary form of governance (Gereffi et al., 
2005; Herrigel, 2010; Sturgeon and Lee, 2001). The loose ties argument, based on 
the assumption that strong connections between firms generate a form of rigidity and 
negatively impact the performance of firms (Grabher, 1993; Rowley et al., 2000), is 
not found in the IMP industry. The evolution of the relationship incorporates both 
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loose and strong forms of inter-firm relationship and the explicit framework 
agreements actually provide some flexibility within a legal structure. To further 
explore the role of formality in IMP agreements, the following section will breakdown 
the agreement structures and specifically examine the complexity and dynamism 
evident in IMP-client relationships. 
 
7.4 Mapping Inter-Firm Agreements 
Mapping of inter-firm relationships has traditionally been based on the division and 
subcontract of production activities between firms, as shown in Figure 7.1. There has 
been a tendency to equate agreement structures between firms as either a formal 
contractual or informal trust based relationship. Although these simple structures are 
present in the study firms, the agreement structures identified illustrate a far greater 
complexity of inter-firm relationships than a ‘one or the other’ classification or a static 
link (Taylor, 2006). This form of agreement structure has implications for the 
governance and division of risk and responsibility between firms within a production 
network. Therefore, it is critical to understand their form, use and stability in order to 
assess the consequences for IMP firms. 
 
Figure 7.1 Standard Subcontract Relationship 
 
 
Source: Author (2012) 
 
IMP Further 
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The types of buyer-supplier agreement structures will be illustrated through a series 
of diagrams where the components of the agreement are broken down. This is to 
demonstrate the complexity of inter-firm agreements and the specific constructions of 
the component parts: product supply, transaction and relationship. Where trust is 
specifically used as a relationship component it will be demonstrated by +T (Figure 
7.2). 
Figure 7.2 Key for All Diagrams 
 
 
 
7.4.1 Fracturing Inter-Firm Agreements: Networks of Production, Contracts 
and Relationships  
The study has identified three types of separation of the relationship and contract in 
buyer-supplier agreements: subcontract manufacture, multisite agreements and 
direct end-user relationships (Figure 7.3, Figure 7.4, Figure 7.5 respectively). The 
types of separation are based on analysis of production agreements between the 
IMP firm and the end manufacturer. Each form will be discussed and the reasons for 
its use identified. 
Type 1: Subcontract of manufacture  
Under this agreement structure the IMP firm acts as a ‘factorer’ of products, where by 
the purchase agreement is agreed with a UK based IMP who then purchases the 
product from other suppliers which are usually based in low cost production region, 
Key: 
  
Informal relationship  Production structure 
 Formal contract  Ownership structure 
+T       Trust 
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illustrated in Figure 7.3a. This arrangement is used for two fundamental reasons: (1) 
to reduce cost (thereby the UK IMP can continue to supply products at an 
internationally competitive rate) and (2) to generate additional services for the 
customer. These services include the logistical management of distance supply, the 
maintenance of a backup emergency production facility (the UK site) and the ability 
to source both low and high skill products through a single supplier. This allows the 
customer to rationalise its supply base with the use of only first tier suppliers and 
reduce its exposure to risk from changes in demand (extended lead times from low 
cost suppliers reduce the flexibility in adjusting demand). 
Figure 7.3 Subcontract relationships 
(a) Product factoring relationship 
 
 
 
(b) Case study relationship: MNE Automotive Component Manufacturer 2 and 
Forge SME 9-SME group subsidiary  
 
 
 
 
Source: Author (2012) 
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This agreement structure is used by five IMP (SME) firms, all of which have been 
proactive in identifying low cost producers themselves, either pre-empting customer 
price reduction demands or in response to them. The arrangements with the low cost 
producers range from shared ownership, partnerships or factoring through 
intermediaries in the low cost regions. A clear illustration of this type of agreement is 
Figure 7.3b which illustrates a factoring relationship between MNE Automotive 
Component Manufacturer 2 and Forge SME 9-SME group subsidiary. The 
relationship with the UK plant was long standing and the UK site has historically 
manufactured the components for them. However, the customer encouraged the IMP 
firm to source from a low cost country to reduce costs. This was actually part of the 
IMP firm’s long term plan and as such they found an Indian based manufacturer to 
purchase the UK site in order to establish a production system whereby high volume 
work would be manufactured at the Indian site and bespoke or emergency products 
manufactured at the UK site. The UK site would also manage the logistics of such a 
production system.  
Under this type of production agreement the IMP firm is able to continue supplying 
products which would be not be economically feasible to produce in a high cost 
location, i.e. low cost products, by taking a service charge for the sourcing 
responsibility. In addition, by maintaining this supply the customer is more likely to 
use the IMP firm to produce higher value products where a price premium can be 
charged (e.g. emergency runs and bespoke products). All IMP firms who engage in 
factoring have achieved additional revenue streams from it. However, this service 
also generates additional responsibilities to manage distance sourcing. This is the 
particular advantage for the customer firm, who can engage in value sourcing without 
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the risks attached to it by paying an IMP firm to provide contingency production 
capacity, to stock purchased supply and manage inventory. The costs associated 
with these services are undertaken by the IMP firm through the service charge and 
price premium on the associated products. The IMP firm is willing to undertake these 
additional services because of a prior trading relationship and the development of a 
tacit, trust based relationship. In return, the customer does not undertake sourcing 
themselves because they trust the supplier to effectively, and more efficiently, 
undertake the task themselves. This generates a distinct spatial relationship 
structure. Although production subcontracts are taken with firms located overseas, 
the tacit relationship remains with the UK site.  
Type 2: Breakup of product supply, contract and relationship in a customer company  
The second agreement structure identified in the study is that used to supply multiple 
sites of a customer organisation. In this situation the relationship is maintained with a 
single site, usually the initial contract holder based in the UK, whilst production is 
undertaken to supply several other sites for the customer, either nationally or 
internationally, as illustrated in Figure 7.4. Nine firms were found to be engaged in 
this production system, all of which maintained a tacit based relationship with the 
original UK contract site only. These firms were of strategic significance to their 
customers, either due to the volume of spend by the customer or their distinct 
capabilities. By locking suppliers into supply relationships with several sites the 
customer is able to increase its influencing ability with the supplier by increasing their 
order volume and therefore the supplier’s relative dependence on them. It also allows 
the customer to retain a smaller set of key suppliers with whom it has a level of 
dependence with. 
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Figure 7.4 Multisite Production Relationships  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author (2012) 
 
In this situation ‘global’ agreements are common. This is where a formalised contract 
is in place between the IMP supplier and the customer as a whole (i.e. the head 
office), stipulating the general terms of trade, rights and responsibilities held by both 
transaction partners. This makes the process particularly time consuming and 
expensive, which again restricts the number of instances in which it is used. 
Purchasing under these agreements is carried out at a group scale. By centralising 
the customers purchasing activity the customer increases the relative weight of its 
purchasing power. Under these agreements the customer can enact a more direct 
form of governance over price reductions, trading terms and increased displacement 
of risk onto the IMP firm. The ‘global’ agreement highlights the divergence between 
contracts and relationships in agreement structures, as the individual customer site 
does not necessarily develop a relationship (i.e. trust) with the supplier. Two 
examples of case study relationships which use global agreements will be used here 
to illustrate this point. MNE Power Generation manufacturer utilises a local 
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agreement (i.e. between the IMP firm and one customer plant) that is tailored to the 
specific circumstances of the transaction. Under a localised agreement there is less 
consistency or formalisation of agreement and relationships and transactions are 
closely related. Although MNE Power Generation manufacturer utilise their global 
presence for negotiating power, its use reflects the nature of the specific buyer-
supplier relationship which is based on a level of respect between transaction 
partners.  
In the second example MNE Aerospace Component Manufacturer also use global 
agreements to generate a more powerful position over their supplier when ordering a 
relatively low value of product. However, in this case the customer was unable to 
enact the instilled power asymmetry from a global agreement because it did not have 
an associated relationship with the supplier, unlike its sister plant: 
So there are benefits of going with those suppliers [already in a global 
agreement with the company], as in you can drop the ‘we spend £6m a year 
with you’. So it can help in one respect but then the flip side of that, if that 
supplier has got a problem because their machine’s down and I’m chasing my 
one bit and [sister site] are chasing their £6m worth of bits, my bit keeps going 
to the bottom of the pile (Multinational Aerospace Component Manufacturer). 
 
Here the supplier is protecting its dependence on the main customer plant. Although 
the global agreement is the same between the IMP firm and both customer sites, the 
IMP firm has a tacit based relationships with the main customer plant that has 
evolved through a historical trading relationship and interdependence from the 
significance of the customer spend. This informal relationship acts as a driver of 
power dynamics, not the agreement itself. On its own the global agreement was not 
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enough to induce the IMP firm to give preferential treatment to the customer site with 
a lower, and more infrequent, spend. 
Both examples illustrate the use of different forms of governance over suppliers 
based on the management preferences at individual sites and the specificities of 
order/product. However, both examples required a tacit based relationship to enact 
the power asymmetries generated through global agreements. 
Type 3: Direct end user relationship 
The third type of agreement structured identified in the study is the separation of 
contract and relationship within the supply chain. Here contracts or formal 
production-payment relationships are maintained through the supply chain between 
direct transaction partners (i.e. IMP firm to further manufacturer, further manufacturer 
to end manufacturer), as shown in Figure 7.5. However, relationships are developed 
between non-direct transaction partners (i.e. IMP and end manufacturer). This is 
different to Type 1 in that the tacit relationship is with the end user (and may in fact 
skip several levels in the supply chain) and also the tacit relationship and transaction 
are separate (in Type 1 these elements were maintained together, with production 
subcontracted from the IMP firm under a new transaction). This separation of 
contract and relationship has been identified in six of the IMP firms and two of the 
transactional case studies. Under these situations, the IMP firm already has some 
form of relationship with the end manufacturer, either through historic trading, product 
development or networking. The end manufacturer actively either installs a formal 
tiered supply chain or adjusts the existing supply chain to reduce their risk and 
liability within the production chain, whilst maintaining a tacit relationship with sub-
tiered firms. 
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Figure 7.5 Direct End-User Relationships 
 
 
 
Source: Author (2012) 
 
Relationship structures such as these are utilised to formalise where in the supply 
chain liabilities and responsibilities lie. By having a nominal contract with the direct 
customer the financial and legal responsibilities remain with the direct customer, not 
the end manufacturer. As one interviewee points out, this technique is instigated by 
the end manufacturer, utilising their influence to direct supplier purchasing patterns 
rather than engage in direct transactions with the IMP firms: 
…the design of the shape [the end manufacturer] are looking to create comes 
from the foundry. So the end customer [end manufacturer]…‘that foundry can 
make that kind of shape, …[b]ut we actually need to machine it or do this to it, 
and that company, they’re the experts at that, so what we’ll do is we’ll tell that 
company to buy that because we need the shape J and they’re going to do 
some added value’. And then what they try and do is force a tiering 
relationship, where they try and get … the machinist [to] be responsible for 
purchasing the castings. But it never works because the foundry always end 
up talking direct … to [the end manufacturer] (Interviewee 1, Foundry Large 
2). 
 
The IMP supplier firm can be vulnerable under this type of structure because the 
transactional, and theoretically legally binding trade relationship, is with the further 
manufacturer, who are predominately other SME manufacturers with less financial 
stability than the large end manufacturers. An example of this is Foundry SME 1-
fabricator who suffered an unpaid debt by its direct customer after this type of forced 
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tiering relationship had been established. The IMP firm felt that their long standing 
trading relationship would evoke a sense of responsibility from the end manufacturer, 
despite the formalised trading relationship being between the two local intermediate 
manufacturers. The tiered relationship allowed the end manufacturer to transfer 
payment liability to the further manufacturer. The existing relationship and trust 
between the IMP firm and the end manufacturer did not provide any protection to the 
IMP firm.  
What is interesting in both examples is the ability of the end manufacturer to 
establish a tiered agreement structure whilst maintaining the ability to influence 
decisions within the supply chain without a direct and formalised relationship. The 
influencing ability of the end manufacturers is enacted through the maintenance of a 
tacit based relationship with IMP firms. They have no other form of direct relationship, 
unlike in Type 1 and 2. By separating the relationship, or tacit, element of the 
agreement from the formal transaction, the end manufacturer is able to reduce its 
own liabilities whilst retaining influencing ability over suppliers. The majority of IMP 
firms (5/6) have attempted to protect themselves from this loss of security in the 
transaction by building a tacit relationship with the end manufacturer in return. 
The three examples illustrate how inter-firm relationships have multiple elements 
(trust and agreements) and that these elements are often organisationally, and 
sometimes spatially, separated. This illustrates another level of complexity evident in 
inter-firm agreements: tacit and formal agreements interact within one agreement 
structure to generate specific advantages, primarily for the customer. The separation 
of trust and formal agreements allows firms to more easily distribute risk. The location 
of trust (both organisationally and spatially) is a key element of this. The maintenance 
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of trust provides a form of governance without legal responsibilities. The next section 
will examine how these structures change over time and draw conclusions for the 
implications of both complexity and dynamism in inter-firm agreements. 
7.4.2 Dynamic Structures: Evolving Agreements and Recessionary 
Adjustment 
The agreement structures identified in the study were subject to change and adjusted 
through the evolving nature of inter-firm relationships. The nature of transactions and 
relationships has adjusted in response to changing product types, order and 
ownership structures of customer firms. As such, formalised transactions can 
become quickly outdated and unrepresentative of the nature of work undertaken or 
the specific responsibilities of trading partners. The dynamic nature of inter-firm 
relationships may explain the prominent use of terms of trade through purchase 
orders and informal agreements as fundamental commitments.  
Many of the trading relationships held by IMP firms in the study have been long term. 
In four cases the initial trade was from the subcontracting of work from a competitor 
who was unable to meet demand or when a supplier closed and the customer asks a 
nearby competitor to step into the breach. At one firm their 
…first turbo-charger housing [the product] was produced as a subcontract to 
another foundry. And at the time, there were very, very few producers of turbo-
charger housings in the country. And once [current customer MNE] … found 
out that we produced the turbo-charger housing, and they were short of 
capacity from people…suddenly a truck load of patterns appeared and we 
were starting to produce turbo-charger housings for a range of products for 
[them]. [Another current customer MNE] … found out that we were producing 
turbo-charger housings and they gave us a book of patterns (Interviewee 1, 
Foundry SME 26). 
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In these situations speed of installing new production relationships is critical to 
maintaining supply and the IMP firm needs to respond quickly to capitalise on this 
advantage. As such, the development of the specific transaction is often sidelined 
until production is up and running. The specificalities of the relationship, and 
sometimes even the price, are not determined before production begins. The IMP 
supplier is in a relatively powerful position because the customer is highly dependent 
on their manufacturing capacity. However, this position of power is short term. The 
customer can actively look for other suppliers where they can negotiate a better deal 
because they are no longer desperate to source their supply. This occurred in 
several instances when Foundry SME 19 absorbed customers from the closure of a 
local foundry. Without installing an agreement structure (whether a formal contract or 
tacit relationship) the customers were able to take advantage of the IMP firm despite 
their initial reliance on them. 
A common approach to managing this evolvement is to install levels of transactions 
(Table 7.3), specifically to develop an overarching agreement framework that 
specifies the general terms of trades and responsibilities. This has particularly been 
the case in the case study relationships which involve development work (MNE 
Power Generation Manufacturer, MNE Automotive Component Manufacturer 2). In 
these situations, the speed of product change or exact responsibilities of the 
transaction partners is difficult to define and as such a specific formalised agreement 
structure would need constant revamping. These structures then rely quite heavily on 
more tacit based relationships between transaction partners, where a common 
understanding and shared learning provide the basis for terms of trade. However, in 
the case of Large Pump Manufacturer-Foundry SME 21 the agreement structure was 
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instead highly formalised despite the development nature of the work undertaken. In 
this case the customer was in the process of launching several new products and 
therefore the security of their new product route was important. The customer failed 
to bring the Chinese high-volume manufacturers online in the correct timescales and 
therefore the IMP firm had to maintain production whilst the problems were resolved, 
in a sense acting as their volume supplier. As a result, the security of manufacture at 
a specific point in time became critical in determining the nature of the transaction. 
Prior to this there was no long term formalised agreement in place. Due to the re-
launch the customer decided to install a more formalised contract because of the 
strategic significance of the Foundry SME 21 as a prototype manufacturer. This was 
set at two years, with a staggered declining order volume incorporated to cover that 
period (to reflect the reduction in development work over the product life cycle). 
However, when the volume suppliers failed to become operational the customer 
extended the LTA to incorporate the changing order because the IMP became more 
critical to the product supply. As a result, the agreement evolved due to the changing 
circumstances of the product launch. 
The significance of the transaction structure (contract) may actually decline over time 
because of the development of other forms of commitment including during the 
period. The sunk costs involved in equipment/tooling, learning and a shared 
understanding of practices can act as a reinforcement of the tacit based relationship 
which can develop. As such, the formalised contract does not necessarily have to 
reflect the true nature of exchange, product or order for the transaction partners to 
successfully trade. But critically, the contract retains a legal protection that can be 
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enforced at any point. This underpins the tacit based relationships through both an 
overarching framework and a specific LTA.  
Temporary agreement structures 
This study has identified specific instances of adjustment in agreement structures 
related to periods of ‘crisis’, such as the financial stress in the supply chain, 
specifically with the direct customer of the IMP firms (further manufacturer), during 
the ‘credit crunch’ that commenced in 2007. In this situation several firms faced 
unpaid debts by their direct or indirect end customer and were unable to protect 
themselves with credit insurance because of the perceived financial instability in the 
industry. As such, under the ‘every day’ agreement structures production would grind 
to a halt as cash flow at individual firms was reduced (from a reduction in orders and 
credit restrictions) which restricted the movement of product and cash through the 
system (unable to fund working capital requirements) and increased the liability of 
unpaid debts (large scale removal of credit insurance). To maintain the supply chain 
the payment and production links had to be reorganised as illustrated in Figure 7.6. 
The supply of products was sent directly to the end manufacturer, who had the 
financial capacity to pay for the semi-finished components. This was then sent to the 
further manufacturer to continue the manufacture and then the final components 
returned to the end manufacturer (Figure 7.6a). This reduced the working capital 
requirements of the further manufacturer as they did not have to ‘purchase’ the semi-
finished components for the IMP firm. It also sped up payment in the system because 
firms were paid directly by the end manufacturer for their respective parts (Figure 
7.6b). As a result, the IMP firm had no transaction or relationship with the further 
manufacturer during this period (Figure 7.6c). As the interviewee below explains, this 
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adjustment increased the financial security of the IMP, and further manufacturer, 
during this period: 
In some cases during the recent recession where we supply …an intermediary 
who might do something with our product to add value to it and then sell it on. 
We’ve done it where we’ve been paid directly by the end users. We have 
certain product that’s gone directly into the [large public organisation] and we 
feel comfortable at getting our money through the [large public organisation]. 
But it went via a subcontractor who did other things to it. So we had an 
agreement that we would supply, give them copies of our invoices and got 
paid direct. That helped him with his cash flow as well because he didn’t have 
to pay (Interviewee 1, Foundry SME 19).  
 
This type of payment agreement or structure was not beneficial for all IMP firms. 
Those who utilised a certain type of credit finance system (CID) faced a subsequent 
problem. Under this system the financial stability of the firm is measured by their 
relative dependence on each customer (or concentration ratio) and the firm’s own 
financial resources. This then determines a level of pre-payment (credit available 
based on the completed order and the invoice sent to the customer) and a total credit 
limit for each customer. During the recession, automotive based supply chains were 
deemed high risk and as such those firms engaged in them faced reduced overall 
credit limits and pre-payment levels (from 85% to 60%), which dramatically reduced 
cashflow. In addition, the adjusted payment structure (Figure 7.6b) meant faster and 
direct payments from the end manufacturer. Their relative dependence 
(concentration ratio) on other customers because of the speed of payment by one 
customer lowered the level of outstanding debt; the IMP firm was deemed a higher 
risk because it was now over-reliant on the remainder of its customer base. This 
further reduced the amount of credit available and the working capital available to the 
firms. Ultimately this prevented firms taking new orders because they were unable to 
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fund the purchase of materials and as a result, the financial input structure of some of 
the IMP firms is at odds with the changes in output agreements, further constricting 
adjustment and growth. 
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Figure 7.6 Adjusted Agreement Structures 
(a) Product Route 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Transaction/Payment Route 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) Agreement Structure 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author (2012) 
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The prominence of nationally based agreements generates credit problems. A 
relative competitive advantage of IMP small firms in the UK is their ability to support 
other UK based manufacturing sites with rapid response times and low volumes. 
Advanced manufacturers in the UK use these services to maintain their production 
structures. With more preference to non-UK based transactions from credit 
institutions favouring export growth, the IMP firm’s ability to produce and the ability of 
more advanced manufacturers is threatened. Ironically, the majority of products 
made by IMP firms are ultimately exported, although their direct transaction is in the 
UK. As such, the relative position of the agreement (i.e. whether with the tier 1 or the 
end manufacturer) had far reaching implications on credit availability during the 
‘credit crunch’.  
The structure of agreements is important for the relative power of firms and their 
ability to influence their transaction partners. This section has identified how the 
nature of the transaction links between buyer-supplier firms is associated with the 
movement of risk and liabilities between transaction partners. Integral to this premise 
is the separation of agreement components and the ability of firms (either buyers or 
suppliers) to reconfigure them in response to changing environmental conditions. 
Geography plays an interesting role in the relationship between risk and liabilities and 
firms with different trading geographies may have better balance sheets or are 
perceived as having reduced risk. Grimshaw and Rubery (2005), Ettlinger (2003) and 
Sako (1992) have also clearly illustrated how agreement forms are formulated in 
response to the temporal and spatial conditions in which they are formed or 
influenced by. The evolution of the agreement structure is path dependent – highly 
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influenced from prior interactions, the build up of trust and also existing frameworks 
of agreement. 
The complexity and dynamism of relationships identified in the IMP industry is 
significant because it illustrates additional influences on corporate practices (i.e. 
more than a single governance structure) and the organisational, and sometimes 
spatial, location of these influences. Loyalties can be separated within an 
organisation, through a contract with one part of the organisation and a trust based 
relationship with another. The use of commitment structures (assets and 
dependencies, trust, reputational effects and legal implications) within the 
relationships has a more complicated relationship to the firm’s performance and 
capacity to adjust. The location of the commitment structure that influences the 
nature of the relationship may be more important than the actual existence of the 
commitment – governance from the head quarters of a customer may be more 
significant than a tacit relationship with a branch plant. Temporary structures found 
during the recession highlight a more significant aspect of relationships than purely 
adaptation practices to cope with demand problems. It illustrates the dynamic nature 
of relationships and the importance of relationships in firm performance. Alliances lie 
not necessarily where production agreements are and these connections (beyond 
production agreements) are more significant for the firm. These alliances are 
complicated. They often involve an element of trust and distrust, but more importantly 
a form of dependency that cannot be directly measured through a simple 
construction of buyer-supplier relationships. Governance is multifaceted and a single 
aspect of the relationship does not represent the different forms of governance acting 
on the individual firm. Trust itself is selective within an organisation and often 
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structured differently to other agreement structures. It is a key aspect of governance, 
shown in the earlier examination of agreement structures (section 7.3: 288), but it 
interacts with other forms of agreement (Mellewigt et al., 2007; Mudambi and Helper, 
1998). At different times certain forms of agreement are more significant in shaping 
firm performance than others.  
However, the role of corporate practices cannot be overlooked in this process. The 
evidence has shown that there are various interpretations of the agreement 
configurations to certain environments, influenced by the management practices of 
the individual firms and historic trading arrangements. The following section will 
examine the suppliers own role and capacity to influence the agreement structures in 
its own customer portfolio through an analysis of the mix of agreements in the firm. 
 
7.5 The Agreement Mix  
IMP firms predominately use single type of agreement within their customer portfolio 
(21/34 firms), as shown in Figure 7.7. The agreement type is roughly evenly divided 
between contractual or tacit based agreements (11 and 10 respectively) and is not 
related to the size of the IMP firm, with 3/5 large firms also only having a single type 
of agreement (Table 7.5). There are however, 13 (38.2%) IMP firms that have 
multiple agreement types in their customer portfolio. 
 320 
 
Figure 7.7 Blend of Agreement Types in IMP Firms 
 
 Source: Interview data (2009-10) 
 
 
Table 7.5 Division of Agreement Mix by Firm Size 
Number of Contract Types 
Used in Firm 
Firm Size Total 
Large SME 
1 3 18 21 
2 2 6 8 
3 0 4 4 
4 0 1 1 
5 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 
Source: Interview data (2009-10) 
 
10 
1 
1 
11 
7 
3 
1 
0 5 10 15 20 25 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Number of Firms 
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
A
gr
ee
m
en
t 
Ty
p
es
 
Informal Formal 
 321 
 
Firms are characterised by a bundle of relationship types, ranging from those based 
entirely on trust and those with no trust. The conception of trust based inter-firm 
relationship within network approaches (Murphy, 2011; Uzzi, 1996; 1997) is limited 
as it does not include those relationships not based on trust. Those firms with 
multiple agreements types also have a prominence of formal contracts.  
There is a distinction in the strategic direction of the firms with a blend of agreement 
types. The firms with a mix of agreement types include the Boundary Spanning group 
of IMPs identified in Chapter 5 (4/13 firms). Of the five SMEs which utilised LTAs with 
their main customer, four (the Boundary Spanning firms) did so as part of a wider 
agreement portfolio. By having a portfolio of order structures that have with them 
associated timescales of agreement length, responsibilities and transaction 
structures, the firm is able to protect itself from loss of contracts and price changes. 
Counter to this, those firms with a single agreement type include Lock-In and 
Interdependent firm types (6 and 2 firms respectively). These firms have attempted to 
generate commitments from their customers through stronger relationships and joint 
investments, providing a level of tacit based security from loss of customer through 
trust. In doing so, the IMP firms are significantly dependent on a single customer. In 
addition to this, there are firms which have a single order type based specifically on 
the nature of the product i.e. ‘jobbers’. The vast majority of SMEs (9/10 firms) with a 
single agreement type had tacit based agreements. These firms have relatively low 
value and infrequent orders, with the majority of them (6/9 firms) ‘jobbers’, where the 
rate of product change means formal contracts are uneconomical and the 
commitment structures of tacit relationships (sunk costs, speed of response) are 
sufficient for security. 
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This pattern suggests the active role of IMP firms in influencing the type of buyer-
supplier agreement, either through negotiation over agreement structure or the 
diversification of products and consequently their agreement type. The ability for the 
supplier firm to influence the type of agreement in place differs between individual 
firms and individual relationships; customers are also strategic entities. Many firms 
reported their inability to engage in negotiation with their customers over the terms of 
trade. In these cases the prominence of formal, legal, contracts is the preference of 
customers enacting direct forms of governance and clear legal responsibilities and 
rights (or lack of), rather than the suppliers own preference. The suppliers have 
limited power in shaping the nature of the agreement, which can leave them 
vulnerable to customer preferences and sudden order loss (with or without 
agreement in place).  
A small group of firms are able to influence their blend of agreements and are 
attempting to formalise their agreements through common ownership as they have 
relatively large investment capital. By owning some form of IPR in the product design 
the suppliers are attempting to retain their revenue sources by locking customers into 
joint design ownerships or developing their own design rights. One interviewee at a 
small foundry and fabrication firm recently rebranded the company to establish a 
specific design input division to help lock customers into these forms of agreement, 
as explained below: 
We were naïve for a long time and not set up proper contracts to sign up 
people. So we’ve now, literally in the last few months, said as soon as we get 
into negotiating with people, if we don’t have the intellectual property right into 
it, we’re going to design it, they’ve got to sign some form of agreement 
(Interviewee 1, Foundry SME 1 - Fabricator).  
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These firms see formalisation as providing additional protection from loss of order, 
through legal requirements for notice periods or common product ownership. The 
ability to prompt this form of formalisation is down to the type of work undertaken by 
the IMP supplier, development work that involves substantial sunk costs in one-off 
equipment and potentially property rights. However, several other IMP firms which 
could potentially promote this, as they also engage in development work, do not do 
so. The strategic direction of the IMP firm seems to be significant in determining the 
take up of formal agreements and forms of contract lock-in, where the individual 
preferences, historical trading relationships and specific dependency relationships 
may affect the utilisation of such forms. In addition, their view on the ability to enforce 
these legal contracts may be a factor. The financial expense, time delay and legal 
resources (own knowledge or access to legal experts) has prevented many IMP firms 
from enacting any of their legal requirements. The most significant factor is the loss 
of additional work once any proceedings to voice supplier upset is used, thereby 
damaging the relationship between buyer and supplier. However, this movement to 
formalisation is not evident in all firms in the study. There remains a reluctance to 
formalise agreements, particularly from those firms who already have some form of 
interdependence with their customers. In these cases, the supplier firms have other 
forms of protection from this dependency, such as sunk costs, and the formal 
agreement offers little additional benefit. 
The ability to enforce agreements, whether through formal legal channels or through 
tacit reputation- or loyalty-based relationship structures, is a key tool of IMP firms in 
protecting them from sudden changes in customer demand or poor trading practices. 
The move towards formalisation by a segment of IMP firms engaged in development 
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work is surprising. Due to the innovative and quick changing nature of development 
work it is often assumed that trust will form a more important role in inter-firm 
relationships because the specific details of the product and trading terms are 
constantly evolving (Aoyama et al., 2006; Nooteboom, 2002). As such, it is difficult 
(and costly) to specify these details in a formal contract and keep it up to date with 
developments. However, evidence here suggests that although this may be the case, 
and particularly from the perspective of the customers (such as MNE Automotive 
Component Manufacturer 2 and MNE Power Generation Manufacturer who attempt 
to develop tacit agreements), the IMP supplier in some cases sees this as an 
opportunity to install formal protection methods (long term legal contracts or co-
ownership) which tie buyer-supplier together. Mudambi and Helper (1998), however, 
suggest that formalisation of relationships does not in itself generate protection as 
enforcement is extremely difficult without a trust based relationship. The vulnerability 
of IMP firms to customer agreements will be discussed in the next section. 
7.5.1 Vulnerability: Input and Output Structures  
The composition of agreement structures in the firm has direct implications for its 
vulnerability to change and adjustment. The structure is influenced by three key 
elements of contracts: profit distribution, level of formalisation and temporal range. 
IMP firms are characterised by multiple customer relationships and input agreements. 
The convergence of these structures within the firm, the nested agreement structure 
identified in Chapter 6 (section 6.4), generates specific and complex risks for the firm. 
To minimise the firm’s vulnerability to such contractual risks the firm must offset it 
with increased protection in other relationships and generate a blended risk profile. 
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The distribution of profit can vary between products and customers, but also during 
the contract period (Chapter Five, section 5.4.1). As such, some IMP firms have 
attempted to generate a mix of profitability in their customer agreement structure. 
Profitability during the contract is difficult to maintain as output sales prices are 
difficult to adjust to changes in input costs and continual price pressure from 
customers drive down sales prices. As such, the IMP firm often suffers an erosion of 
profitability over time through the contract agreement. To balance this, the firm 
requires a continual generation of new orders, from both new and existing clients, to 
supplement margins. The interviewee below illustrates the difficulty in retaining profit 
levels on existing and reduced orders from its primary customers and its attempts to 
increase the mix of orders: 
Well I suppose the one strategy is that we want to try and find new 
opportunities, new markets because if you can bring new product in then you 
are going to bring it in based on current costs, rather than existing product 
which is largely driven by costs at the time you quoted the work. We have also 
spoken to major customers with the view to saying that you know, with your 
volumes disappearing, and we are very volume necessary, we need a volume 
to ensure we have a viable business, and your volume is disappearing, if we 
can’t have the volume then we might have to put a price increase…[and] some 
of our customers are trying to find alternative products that they can bring to 
us (Interviewee 1, Foundry SME 26). 
 
The erosion of profit can also occur during the customer relationship, not just the 
specific product contract, as ongoing relationship dynamics set price precedents 
which can be difficult to move away from. In the example above, the firm is actually 
developing additional work from its existing customers in new product development, 
which is distinctly different to the mid-volume manufacture they currently undertake. 
In this sense, the firm has a greater capacity to generate ‘fresh’ profit margin, less 
influenced by precedents from prior orders, as this is a new type of production with 
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this customer. In addition, by moving into new markets or products the firm has the 
capacity to increase its level of value-added products.  
Without this blend of customers and contracts, the firm becomes vulnerable to profit 
erosion over time, eventually threatening the financial stability of the business. The 
capacity to generate profit in each relationship or product type varies and as such, 
the firm must generate a blend of more and less profitable products. The continuation 
of less profitable, and sometimes unprofitable, contracts is vital to the firm because it 
supports the generation of future orders and the maintenance of more profitable 
orders they currently have. IMP firms are characterised by repeat business, whether 
that be through repeat batches or ongoing schedule orders, which means the 
relationship between value and volume is closely related, even in low volume 
manufacturers. Profitability is supported by the volume of production from the 
particular customer (not necessarily particular order of product) and therefore the 
maintenance of the relationship to support future orders is critical. The generation of 
new customers is fairly rare and only generally through the transition into new 
markets through own product development of strategic investments. The volume of 
orders themselves (i.e. number of actual orders) protects the IMP firm from loss of 
margin in any particular order. The resultant blend in profitability across orders 
(contracts) is a direct result of maintaining customer relations for future work: the 
maintenance of a particular production order (which can potentially be unprofitable) 
supports the generation of other orders (hopefully more profitable).  
The structure of the relationship and the level of relative supplier power in shaping 
profitability and ongoing demand security vary according to the nature of the 
agreement structure in place. The agreement structures used, a continuum between 
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formal contracts and tacit based agreements, varies across the customer base. 
These agreement types offer different levels of demand security and commitment to 
the IMP firm. The transition towards the production of increasingly complex products 
has also increased the level of formalisation and risk burden associated with these 
order types to the IMP firm. This is in stark contrast to the suggestion in the literature 
of the increase in trust based agreements in high-cost production locations because 
of the increased level and speed of development in production agreements in these 
locations, where the level of detail cannot be maintained in formal contracts that 
quickly become outdated (Casson, 1991b; Nooteboom, 2002). However, this study 
has identified the reverse of this, where more formalised agreement structures are 
used because of the sensitive nature of the product.  
In conjunction with this, there is an additional transfer of risks from the customer to 
the supplier through formal ties. A common risk which is transferred to suppliers is 
that of stock management. Customers are increasingly demanding the management 
of stock by their key suppliers in order to reduce cash tied up in stock, outsource its 
logistical management and to generate the benefits of global value sourcing without 
the risks from extended lead times. MNE Aerospace Component Manufacturer, MNE 
Automotive Component Manufacturer 1 and Large Pump Manufacturer have 
formalised long term agreements which include the management of stock by 
suppliers to provide a just-in-time production system. Here the responsibility to hold 
stock, and in the case of Large Pump Manufacturer to produce and ship to a hub 
close to the customer, are formalised in extensive agreements which stipulate strict 
financial responsibilities for stock levels. Those case study customers without such 
formalised agreements manage their stock intake through single orders within formal 
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‘agreement frameworks’. This gives them the flexibility to only house the required 
level of stock because they buy as and when required. The agreement frameworks 
provide outline schedules of forecasted need, for which the suppliers can adjust their 
production too, and also means the customer is not financially responsible for 
anything outside a specific order, unlike in a stock management agreement. Both 
these management systems add additional risk to the supplier. The supplier has 
attempted to manage such increased risk profiles by balancing their overall risk 
levels between customers. 
The risk profiles of suppliers significantly changed in the majority of cases during the 
recession period. With reductions in demand suppliers became increasingly 
dependent on their customer bases, which allowed customers to transfer an 
increasing amount of risk to their suppliers. A common case was the extended use of 
trade credit without insurance because of the reduction of banking credit and credit 
insurance services. This reduction in creditability of the customer meant suppliers 
were unable to secure insurance on the trade credit they gave to their customer and 
as such were left to either take on the risk themselves or refuse to trade. The blend 
of the firms risk profile in these cases was significantly reduced as they faced loss of 
credit insurance for the majority of their customers and as such, their vulnerability to 
unpaid debts increased dramatically for individual customers and overall. During the 
recessionary period these additional risks were usually undertaken informally rather 
than included in up to date buyer-supplier agreements. As a result, the additional 
risks the IMP firm was undertaking were not supported by any increase in 
commitment or security by the customer. 
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The blending of contract structures to reduce vulnerability to profit erosion and risk is 
in constant flux due to the changing nature and compositions in the structure of the 
firm over time and between customers. The blend is used to achieve a mix of 
increased security of demand and reduce the vulnerability associated with the 
agreements developed for this security. Securing demand through increased 
formalisation or invested relationships with customers has the potential to limit the 
search or innovation capacity of supplier firms as they are not as exposed to different 
customer and market environments (Collinson and Wilson, 2006; Miller and Chen, 
1994). As such, by maintaining the blend of agreements it allows the supplier to 
maintain a level of security from certain agreements while remaining engaged with a 
wider set of agreements (not necessarily customers or markets) to promote search 
capacity. By engaging in multiple agreements the supplier is able to generate 
changes more easily in their overall relationship with the customer base. This 
dynamism in the contractual structure has direct implications on the ability of the firm 
to undertake change. 
7.5.2 Contracts as an Integral Aspect of Agreements in IMP Firms 
The purpose of contracts found in this analysis is twofold:  contracts provide an 
additional level of agreement and they allow efficient risk transfer from customer to 
supplier. Contracts have been used to provide protection from loss of customer 
competitive advantage. This is particularly evident with the increased formalisation of 
relationships between customers and strategic suppliers/prototype developers where 
the value of the product requires additional protection (Cox, 1996; MacPherson and 
Pritchard, 2007). In the cases discussed in this analysis, firms are increasingly 
transitioning to formal agreements for additional control functions (through 
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enforcement of rights). As such, implicit agreements are being surpassed by an 
additional level to the relationship. The ability to specify clauses in the relationship, 
such as ‘subject to sourcing at a lower price elsewhere’, allows customers to remove 
themselves from the relationship without any legal damage. This use of contract 
resonates with the transaction cost approach that has traditionally viewed contracts 
as providing a control function in relationships (Williamson, 1979). For contracts to 
provide protection they need to be enforceable. Enforcement of contracts can have 
detrimental effects on the reputation and therefore future business of both firms 
involved. In addition, the supplier is often unable to enforce contracts due to their 
limited time, financial and knowledge resources to undertake such a task. Despite 
this, enforcement continues to occur in supply chains (Helper, 1993; Rutherford and 
Holmes, 2007). In both these examples, the enforcement of agreements had no 
significant long term damage to business rates despite the OEMs building a 
reputation for aggressive purchasing behaviour. This is reflected somewhat in the 
evidence from the IMP industry (Forge Large 1, Foundry SME 4, Foundry SME 21, 
Forge SME 10). IMP firms are dependent on their existing supply base, with relatively 
few new customers or markets because of the individual firm’s strategic direction and 
also the consolidation of markets. As such, suppliers are increasingly dependent on 
repeat business from existing customers and therefore continue relationships with 
firms with such a reputation. Framework agreements aid this use of contract 
enforcement for customers. A nested set of agreements allows the customer to 
maintain some form of relationship even if it disrupts a specific element (for example 
severs a contract), as an overarching relationship is maintained. 
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Contracts are also used to transfer risk between transaction partners. Contracts act 
as a form of coordination, in addition to their control function (Vlaar et al., 2007; 
Woolthuis et al., 2005). Formal agreements allow the dissemination of risks through 
the supply chain, such as stock management, as they can be specified in 
agreements. From the supplier’s perspective, contracts tend to add additional 
responsibilities to the relationship, such as activities or targets, and actually make it 
easier for customers to resource whilst limiting their reputational damage. However, 
contracts are also seen as a form of commitment in maintaining the trading 
relationship because of the investment in formulating the agreement by the customer. 
Some suppliers view contracts as a safeguard to the relationship because of this 
investment.  
Trust is a fundamental part of production relationships. Trust is a factor in all 
relationships because not everything can be specified in a contract a priori and 
therefore transaction partners need some level of trust in the function and 
commitment of their partner to meet the obligations of the trade. Contracts are also 
expensive to establish. They can require extensive legal counsel, are time 
consuming and can involve difficult negotiations on its content. For these reasons, 
explicit contracts may not feature in all relationships. However, evidence from the 
IMP industry illustrates that agreements are composed of multiple elements that 
evolve over time. Formal contracts are part of this relationship construction.  
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7.6 Space and Place in Agreement Structures 
The majority of agreements for IMP firms to supply are held with UK based 
customers, as illustrated in Figure 7.8. Only five SMEs and two large IMP firms had 
only agreements based with overseas customers. This appears to be irrespective of 
the relative dependence of the IMP firm on their customer (in terms of proportion of 
turnover they represent), as a range of agreement significances are found in the 
nationally based agreements (between 25-75% of turnover attributed to a single 
customer). However, the location of agreement does seem to be affected by the 
agreement type (Figure 7.8). For the primary customer, informal agreements are only 
based in the UK, whereas more formal agreements, and particularly those with a long 
timescale agreement, have a wider range of customer locations. This proposition will 
be examined further in section 7.6.2. 
Figure 7.8 Agreement Location by Contract Type (Primary Customer) 
 
Source: Interview data (2009-10) 
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7.6.1 National Agreements: Historical Plant-Plant Relationships  
The prominence of UK based agreements could be related to the origin of the trading 
relationship. In a number of cases (4) the initial trade was from the subcontracting of 
work from a competitor. Over the course of trading long term relationships have been 
generated with site workers and product specific tooling having been developed 
which has generated a pre-requisite to continue to purchase from existing IMP firms 
over the course of customer ownership or restructuring changes. The asset specific 
investment acts as a form of lock-in for the customer because of the relatively high 
level of investment and time resource needed to duplicate. This is particularly the 
case for lower volume work. As such, the relationship and agreement become tied to 
specific sites within the business – as the form of lock-in is product specific and site 
specific (other sites will have their own sources which may or may not overlap). 
A significant number of firms have their agreement with the UK site of a multinational 
enterprise. Their relationship and agreement is solely with the UK site which 
generates vulnerabilities if the site reduces production levels or closes. It is 
particularly interesting that the agreement is based at a specific location (tied to a 
specific plant) and not extended to the wider company. These agreements are 
structured in a large part by historical relationships with the individual site, through 
several ownership changes or product diversifications, as one interviewee explains:   
…we’ve managed to get an older customer … tied down to a long term 
agreement, which actually is very good because they were quite a small 
company, who then got bought out by, well they expanded the company quite 
well actually and expanded their product range quite well and they got bought 
out by a Scandinavian company (Interviewee 1, Foundry SME 1 - Fabricator).  
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Here the IMP firm was able to establish global trading relationships with multiple sites 
within the company from their original relationship with what is now the UK site of the 
MNE. However, expansion into additional plants of the customer has been more 
difficult in other cases. One interviewee highlights the importance of geographic 
location for accessing new agreements within existing relationships. The IMP firm 
has been attempting to enhance its relationship with its existing customers by 
expanding its production into prototype and development work. This has been 
established for its prime customer, however has proven more difficult for its 
secondary customers who have their technology centres outside the UK, as an 
interviewee explains: 
So [resin pattern moulds used for prototype and early production] has given us 
a big advantage and we are certainly the nominated new product introduction 
[NPI] route for [prime customer]. We are gaining a greater foothold in 
[secondary customer 1]. Umm, we have started to get that work with 
[secondary customer 2], umm, we are early days yet. The NPI division of 
[secondary customer 2] is offshore … which is why it is harder for us to break 
into that (Interviewee 1, Foundry SME 26). 
 
The reason for the slower progress could be a result of a weaker relationship 
between transaction partners (i.e. they have a lower value spend) but the IMP firm 
clearly identifies the difficulty arising from access to their new product divisions 
because the existing relationship is with the UK site, which is not a technology 
centre. In the case of the prime customer, Foundry SME 26 supplies the UK site, 
which is also the worldwide technology centre and, therefore, it already has a 
relationship with them.  
In both examples, the ability to expand sales into other customer sites was 
successful when agreements and relationships were already held with customer sites 
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that undertook product development (whether that is in the firms before it was 
purchased by a MNE or with the technology centre of the MNE). This is because 
these IMP firms are seeking prototype/product development work from their customer 
and therefore proximity to these customer sites is essential for further orders of this 
type. This notion will be explored further in the following section. 
7.6.2 From Sticky Products to Sticky Agreements: Governance and 
Competitiveness through Place 
This study has identified the location of the buyer-supplier contract, not necessarily 
the location of production, to be a significant factor in determining sourcing activities 
of customers. As illustrated earlier, the location of agreement and production can be 
separated in several ways. This separation is intentional due to the specific benefits, 
capabilities and relationship characteristics which can be generated from arranging a 
contract in a particular location. As such, the type of agreement plays an important 
role in generating these benefits. The study identifies three primary reasons for 
locating agreements (i.e. the formal contractual or framework agreement) in particular 
locations; additional services, proximity to supply and trust.  
Separating Agreements  
By fragmenting the components of agreements customer firms are able to generate 
additional benefits, as are suppliers. This fragmentation has a spatial pattern, where 
certain parts of the agreement structure are located in particular areas in order to 
generate these benefits. In the example of Forge SME 9-SME group subsidiary - 
MNE Automotive Component Manufacturer 1 (section 7.4.1, Figure 7.3), the contract 
and relationship was with the UK site of an Indian forge (the site the transaction has 
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historically been with). The purpose of this design was to retain the official, formal 
agreement with a supplier in the UK, as the interviewee explains: 
We still operate some types of, we say in the UK we buy the product from 
[Indian owner] and we sell it in our name, ok, if it goes to a continental country 
initially we do that until everybody is comfortable with the supply chain but 
then we transfer ownership of the contract back to [Indian owner] and we just 
manage the contracts (Interviewee 1, S Forge SME 9 -SME group). 
 
It is interesting to note however, that despite the success of the production 
relationship with the Indian plant, the agreement still remains with the UK subsidiary.  
In a slightly different example, MNE Power Generation Manufacturer has benefited 
from locating its supply contract in Japan and indirectly influencing the suppliers own 
sourcing activities to generate cost savings. By implementing an indirect ‘value 
sourcing’ approach, MNE Power Generation Manufacturer is able to benefit from cost 
reductions whilst retaining the security of the activity by maintaining a formal contract 
with a trusted and long standing trading partner in a developed economy. Here the 
customer can retain a contract for key parts with an existing supplier in a particular 
location but is still able to generate cost savings on input prices. 
In both examples the location of the formal contract proved critical to the sourcing 
behaviour of the customer firms. It allowed the customer to reap the benefits of low 
cost manufacture without the associated risks and responsibilities of ensuring ethical 
and correct corporate procedures. In this sense the firm is able to distance itself from 
particular activities where it would be more difficult to ensure the correct safety, 
human rights and corporate practices were being followed. The practice of deflecting 
responsibilities has been highlighted by Hughes (2012) in his coverage of corporate 
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ethical practices during the recent recession. However, unlike the manufacturers in 
the Hughes study, the IMP firms here are left with additional sourcing responsibilities 
and associated risks of logistical or quality errors. The deflection of responsibilities by 
the customer leaves suppliers increasingly vulnerable. In addition, the legal 
agreement is retained with a UK based firm and therefore they remain under UK law. 
If production contracts are located overseas these may be more difficult to enforce 
and therefore even the threat of enforcement is reduced (Casson, 1991a). 
Proximity  
Proximity between trading partners remains important for certain types of transaction. 
Where low volume or development work is undertaken the key drivers are proximity 
and intellectual property protection, as illustrated by one interviewee; 
… the package parts of the engine are easier. It’s like a car. If you go back to 
looking at the vehicle of the car, the package elements are quite, I wouldn’t 
say easier but they’re more straight forward to try and source globally. 
Whereas the engine components tend to have more intellectual property and 
let’s say core ownership. They are more difficult. The part that we’re in, the 
core engine, it’s more difficult for us to buy components from further afield. 
You could say I suppose intellectual property on the one hand, but also the 
development (MNE Power Generation Manufacturer). 
 
Low volume manufacture relies on close proximity as orders are often infrequent, 
require fast response and do not generate economies of scale in transportation that 
larger volumes do. As such, it is more economically rational to manufacture close to 
sale. Development work on the other hand requires expertise, trust and a co-
ordinated development program. The specific skill sets IMP firms in the West 
Midlands have, combined with their willingness to produce at extremely low volumes 
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(sometimes a single product), makes the firm an ideal source for project and 
development work.  
Here proximity is, as Scott (1998) describes, a factor of order volume, standardisation 
of order and requirement for interpersonal contact. However, if we recall the example 
in section 7.6.1 of the ability of IMP firms to expand their trading transactions with 
other sites of their customer organisation, this notion of proximity is not complete. In 
this example the proximity to particular areas of the customer organisation proved 
critical to their expansion. Although physical distance between trading partners was 
quoted as being important, in the cases in which the IMP firm had successfully 
integrated (in the Foundry SME 1 - Fabricator case and the primary customer of 
Foundry SME 26), there was an existing relationship with the key site in the larger 
organisation, i.e. the technology or development site. This would suggest that past 
experience, or relational proximity as Gertler (2004) termed it, is a factor in 
successful integration into the wider company. However, following on from Gertler’s 
notions of proximity, the physical distance highlighted in the quote was ‘offshore’ and 
therefore not necessarily geographical distance but ‘institutional proximity’ (2004: 
150). From this it could be suggested that proximity, geographical, relational and 
institutional, remain significant factors in transactions that require co-development. 
Trust 
In cases where the intellectual property in the product is high, the location of 
production is less significant but the location of the agreement remains important. 
The purchase of critical components with a high value of intellectual property in them 
is preferred to be located in ‘Western’ - such as western Europe, United States or 
Japan - based organisations because there is a high level of trust required to protect 
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the value of the product, the intellectual property rights (IPR), as one interviewee 
explains: 
The sourcing of the majors [critical components] is, I think, y’know, foundries 
are, foundries in those markets [low cost regions] are developing, that’s logical 
stuff to move. Stuff like fuel injection and injectors [critical components], I still 
think they are predominantly European or US because of the technology. … 
So you move the stuff that you’re happy to move, you don’t move the stuff that 
you believe is your IPR (MNE Automotive Component Manufacturer 2). 
 
Protection of product value is based on preventing illegal copying of IPR, securing 
confidentiality during production and ensuring procedures and legislation are followed 
in production. The most common way of protecting the customer from this is to install 
requirements in supplier agreements, where the formality of the agreement is based 
on the ‘criticality’ of the product: 
… I would say that the type of the agreement or the strength of the agreement 
all depend on the criticality of the components, so you won’t have an in-depth 
detailed supply agreement for a simple component but where the cost and 
complexity and strategic importance grows then you put more rigorous work 
behind your supply agreements (MNE Automotive Component Manufacturer 
2). 
… lots of our propeller technology is highly confidential, highly sensitive so we 
have pretty tough confidentiality rules in place at all of the foundries [that 
produce prototype work] (Large Pump Manufacturer). 
 
Both of these customers have supply agreements with UK based IMPs for their high 
IPR value products that are critical to the manufacture of their products. However, 
each has a different agreement structure in place (see Table 7.1): MNE Automotive 
Component Manufacturer 2 uses informal agreements based on a strong relationship 
with suppliers and Large Pump Manufacturer has installed a formal LTA with its 
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primary supplier (Foundry SME 21). MNE Automotive Component Manufacturer 2’s 
lack of formalisation seems surprising given the above statement; however this could 
be a result of several factors. The build up of tacit knowledge between transaction 
partners acts as an informal governance mechanism where knowledge transfer is 
limited to firms outside this relationship because of their capacity to absorb and utilise 
it (Howell 2002). The actual location of IPR in the manufacturing process could have 
an effect on the type of agreement used. In the case of Large Pump Manufacturer 
the technology is actually shared with the prototype developer (Foundry SME 21) 
because it is involved in the work undertaken by the supplier. However, MNE 
Automotive Component Manufacturer 2 actually retains the manufacturing process 
which creates the IPR in-house (its own machining process). Of course, the 
approach to confidentiality remains rooted within a wider management style of each 
firm; MNE Automotive Component Manufacturer 2 heavily emphasises the value of 
building a relationship with its suppliers and their loyalty to existing suppliers and 
Foundry SME 21 are currently acting as a high volume supplier, which could explain 
the more structured contract.  
For agreements to be an effective protection of IPR their enforceability is critical. 
Enforcement is encountered through two means: formal legal structures and informal 
norms of practice, both of which are place specific. Take firstly the role of formal 
institutions. The institutional setting in this case is comprised of the legal structures in 
a given location and the ability to enact such structures to enforce contract 
infringements (Casson, 1991a; Nooteboom, 2002). Secondly, informal conventions 
and norms of practice have a strong influence on the enforcement of agreements. 
Their relationship to place is more complex than the physical location of institutions 
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as above. Both Storper’s (1997) and Scott’s (1998) work identified the process by 
which practices establish in a given location and ways of working develop. The 
combination of physical and social relations within a place creates an asset for that 
particular location. This asset, the confidence in enforcement, can influence the 
location of agreements if it is required for a particular task, such as protection of 
product value. The task, and not necessarily the firm, is then important in the spatial 
organisation of production.  
Contract structures have been shown to be used to protect customers from losing the 
value of their intellectual property through both informal relationships based on 
cultural norms and formalised agreements based on strong legal institutions, both of 
which act as enforcers of agreements. Here the institutional setting is important and a 
key differentiator between the location of manufacturing activities. Previous work 
identifies the role of place in shaping contract types in accordance with the 
cultural/institutional setting and the design of corporate practices in response to 
difference between these institutional settings. Although trust is required in all 
transactions, certain parts of the production process require more overt forms of trust. 
Bryson and Rusten’s (2011) production tasks approach allows for a more precise 
examination of how and why the separation of agreement and production can be 
important in these circumstances. Under this approach, specific tasks, rather than 
firms or production entities, have specific production requirements. The tasks that 
involve issues of confidentiality and IPR require protection and therefore a 
confidence in the ability to enforce the agreements that are put in place to protect 
them: both actual enforcement and the threat of enforcement. Enforcement is related 
to place-based institutions and conventions as discussed above, therefore, trust in a 
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place becomes a critical factor in determining where the task is carried out. The 
actual location of the contract (to utilise these place-based assets) is a significant 
factor in the ability to enforce and protect the ownership and value of IPR. It is these 
production tasks, and the firms which undertake them, which benefit from the 
regional asset of strong legal institutions and conventions that generate a level of 
trust in a place. Here, trust is identified as a place-based association, addendum to 
transaction specific trust between buyer-supplier. 
The role of trust outside the specific transaction has also been identified by Ettlinger 
(2003) who suggests, however, that trust is built through layers of previous 
experiences in the individual, which are themselves tied to place and location, and 
therefore trust itself is not place-bound, instead tied to the individuals within that 
place. Again, Orderud (2007) also suggests that trust is not tied to a territory despite 
it being bound to tacit knowledge comprised from proximate relations and networks. 
Under these assumptions, trust is tied to proximity, not necessarily to a place, 
through inter-person relation. However, both conceptions look essentially at place-
based associations as anchored through proximity and a path dependent process in 
a certain location through the people that are involved. The evidence from this study 
instead illustrates that the foundations of trust in a place are anchored through 
institutional structures, both formal and informal.  Personal interaction in the 
development of trust is a secondary aspect of the development of personal 
relationships over time. Trust as a factor in the location of agreements is not a result 
of proximity per se, as identified in the studies above, and instead is centred on 
place-based structures: legal institutions and working practices. No personal 
interaction, or necessarily sustained engagement, is required for the development of 
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trust for property right enforcement. These structures act independently once 
established and no longer require proximity or personal interaction (Storper, 1997). 
7.6.3 Institutions and Perceptions: Brand UK?   
The place-specific benefits of generating additional services and offsetting 
responsibilities, closeness to suppliers and trust attract certain production tasks to be 
located in certain areas that posses these characteristics. Formal contracts have 
been identified above to require place-specific institutions and conventions for 
enforcement: enforcement is important as this type of contract is used to protect 
product value in IPR. These elements together generate a ‘brand’, a form of regional 
competitiveness, that sits side by side with individual firm capabilities or 
competitiveness. By placing an agreement with a firm within the brand location, these 
competitive characteristics can be utilised by firms: protection of value through 
enforcement and reputation. As such, there is a tendency for certain things to be 
purchased from certain locations. 
Although the study has identified place as being a significant determinant of how 
production agreements are fractured to generate specific qualities, it is unclear 
whether these qualities are place based or firm based. An interviewee of a large PLC 
suggested that certain products that were important for the companies brand would 
only be made in certain locations in order to protect that brand, thus 
…this ‘everything’s going to come from China/India’ I get sick of hearing, 
because it won’t. And here’s why. Firstly, commoditised products, my shirt, 
your pull over, will always go to the lowest cost economy because they are a 
commodity product. And those commodity products left the UK, the Western 
World, went years ago, many years ago. But things for branded goods, almost 
indefinitely, will have an element of Western in them (Interviewee 1, Foundry 
Large 2). 
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The interviewee goes on to differentiate between the firm’s own quality capabilities 
and the instilled capacity to develop products: 
[Interviewer] Sort of a quality reputation? [interviewee] Err, yes. Yeah, quality 
is the wrong word ‘cause defining quality is always very difficult and it’s the 
ability to be able to manufacture or engineer a product that a customer might 
want to change significantly or have on-going dialogue with its performance 
and have people he can talk to. And the quality is kind of a given (Interviewee 
1, Foundry Large 2).  
 
Here the production capabilities are not a form of competitive differentiation. Instead 
the ability to engage in dialogue and joint development is. For these capacities 
proximity and common cultural norms/ways of working are important. These are to 
some degree out of the direct control of firms. Of course, their own capacity to 
engage in dialogue and generate a successful working relationship is down to the 
specific personal attributes of those employees. However, there is a wider element of 
cultural practices (i.e. work routines, common languages, business etiquette etc) 
which is related to doing business in certain locations (Casson, 1991a; Hess and 
Coe, 2006; Storper, 1997) and specifically enforceable legal institutions (Hodgson, 
2002).  
The strength of institutional and cultural aspects in trust is illustrated through the 
experience of MNE Aerospace Component Manufacturer, who had to source 
independent approval of one of their products before it was accepted by their 
customer. Certification was sought from an approval centre based in the UK 
however, MNE Aerospace Component Manufacturer felt this would not be sufficient 
to satisfy their customer and therefore sought a second approval from a specific test 
centre in Germany. In this case the reputation of the specific test centre seemed to 
 345 
 
be more significant than the cultural or institutional background (in which both the UK 
and German based test centres operated) in forming the required trust from the 
customer. 
The perception of place-based qualities is derived from historical reputations based 
initially on firm-based capabilities and success. However, over time these firm-based 
reputations have generated specific place-based reputations from historical industrial 
centres in the Western world, such as ‘German quality’ or ‘British innovation’ (Bryson 
and Rusten, 2011). These perceptions, or reputations, influence sourcing activities of 
firms. 
Places have been shown to play pivotal roles in certain production systems because 
of historical practices, place-based associations with products or firms (Pike, 2009; 
Rusten et al., 2007; Tokatli, 2012), the accumulation of power (through the sitting of 
several key players in a particular location (Hughes, 2000) or the instillation of 
cultural practices in large firms which displace these practices to their wider 
multinational organisations (Christopherson, 2007; Christopherson and Lillie, 2005). 
Here firms play a critical role in developing reputations through their collective action, 
developing “…regional economic commons…[where]…elements of economic 
advantage that emerge out of the collective order of agglomeration, but that by their 
nature cannot be reduced to individual ownership and control” (Scott and Storper, 
2003: 587). This economic advantage could be the development of a reputation of 
firms in certain places possessing certain capabilities (for example, key skill bases, 
working practices), which can generate ‘positive externalities’ beyond the ownership 
of the individual firm (Storper, 1997). This perception of firms located in a particular 
place generates a confidence in their ability to carry out certain manufacturing tasks. 
 346 
 
In terms of the evidence generated in this study, certain capabilities have proven 
important in determining the location of production in the UK – namely trust for the 
manufacture of high intellectual property value products. By utilising the place-based 
differences in institutional structures and behavioural norms through agreements, a 
place begins to develop a brand which differentiates itself from other places due to 
both structural and behavioural factors and the evolution of firm based reputations.  
Obviously the significance of a place’s brand in sourcing activity is determined by the 
specific product characteristics and what they require to be installed in the production 
agreements. The actual capabilities of firms and cost of manufacture are 
fundamental, but the brand of a place can be a significant influence in the initial 
sourcing decision for particular products that demand additional properties in their 
agreement to protect the value of the product (perceptions of trustworthiness and the 
ability to enforce contracts). Therefore, it is proposed that the sourcing location (i.e. 
where the contract is held, not necessarily the production) is determined in two 
stages based on product characteristics: 
 
1st stage decision making:  Product type (IPR, production cost, development level) – 
location (cost structure, institutions, cultural norms) 
 
2nd stage decision making:  Firm (capabilities, relationships) 
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Cost remains a significant determinant of sourcing decisions. However, the study has 
identified two decision making levels: the location and the firm. The type of product to 
be manufactured is critical in determining where it is made. Initially, the cost 
structure, institutional structures and its brand determine the region (i.e. either high- 
or low-cost location) of manufacture. Products of relatively high value require 
additional protection of intellectual property and often involve development 
collaboration. In this situation the ability to enforce agreements and common 
behavioural practices are critical to forming trust in the relationship and for the 
protection of valued assets of the customer (i.e. enforcement of IPR). Once this has 
been determined the sourcing decision is based on individual firm characteristics, 
capabilities and competitive differences. Obviously, historical relationships 
complicate this picture as there is a tendency to continue rather than change 
sourcing behaviours. However, the location is a critical element because of its 
inherent cost structure and enforcement capabilities, or its ‘brand’. 
This brand can offer some protection from competition from low cost production 
areas as it is these areas which are perceived not to have the right resources or 
capabilities - trust, proximity and services - for the production of this particular 
product, confidential and high value, illustrating a differentiation of market type 
(Bryson and Rusten, 2011). The industry views low cost locations as not presently (or 
in the near term) having the regulatory institutions to protect IPR, despite individual 
firms having the capabilities to manufacture such products. As a result, customers 
will not directly source in these locations and retain contracts in branded regions with 
the perceived ability to protect their IPR (both cultural norms against illegal copying 
and formal institutional frameworks). However, the sustainability of this locational 
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competitive advantage is questionable as the locations will, over time, develop their 
resources and capabilities to meet this need.  
Contracts of all levels (simple purchase orders to intricate long term agreements) act 
as a distinctive and separate form of governance based on control and financial 
power for enforcement. Contracts have a different spatiality to trust and relational 
forms which are based on both geographical and relational proximity between 
transaction partners (Gertler, 1995; Murphy, 2011). Formal agreements are 
characteristically aspatial – terms of trade are passed between organisations but are 
not rooted in particular geographical locations. More extensive contracts have a more 
complex relationship to place. Global agreements are usually tied to head office 
plants and encompass generic terms of trade used across multiple suppliers and 
national borders. The local agreements are tied more specifically to the 
characteristics of the plant-to-plant relationships and specific requirements of certain 
locations. In addition, the use of contracts can also be related to place through the 
ability to enforce them (either cultural conventions or legal structures) (Casson, 
1991a). This more intricate spatiality of inter-firm agreements is not incorporated into 
current conceptions of relationship spatiality based on proximity and specifically trust 
and collaborative based relationships (Bair, 2008; Gertler, 2004; Murphy, 2011; Uzzi, 
1996). 
 
7.7 Summary: Contracts, Trust and Agreement Layers 
Trust remains a fundamental aspect of the coordination function of contracts (Fuller 
and Lewis, 2002; Mellewigt et al., 2007; Mudambi and Helper, 1998). Trust and 
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contracts are supplementary forms of coordination and “…neither trust nor 
formalization should become ends in themselves, as this could lead to naiveté or 
rigidity, respectively. Inquires into interorganizational governance should therefore be 
accompanied be performance assessments, which help to make sure that trust and 
formal coordination and control do not become final aims” (Vlaar et al., 2007: 422). 
Both trust and contracts have been used in the IMP industry as supplements to each 
other: trust is a pre-requisite for the use of extensive formal agreements that require 
considerable investment; trust enables a contract to remain flexible through the 
evolution of the relationship; and trust continues to remain important after the 
installation of such formal contracts because coordination requires trust in the ability 
to enforce or threaten to enforce contracts.  
The role of formal contractual agreements is an important element of production 
relationships and provides a more nuanced understanding of relationships in 
economic geography. Building on the development of the complexity of inter-firm 
agreements discussed in Chapter Five (section 5.5) and the flexibility of networked 
relationships in Chapter Six, the above analysis allows a revised discussion of both 
elements of inter firm relationships. The flexibility of agreements can be viewed 
differently from the customers and suppliers perspective. The multiple elements to 
agreements help maintain relationships, even when contracts are severed. 
Framework agreements provide an overarching relationship structure, usually based 
more on a tacit relationship (trust, prior trading), but also formal overriding 
agreements (framework agreements). These structures allow customers to disrupt 
particular elements of the agreement, such a particular production contract, without 
necessarily ruining the overall relationship. Of course, there are limitations to this and 
 350 
 
suppliers’ overall dependency will feature highly in the customers’ ability to do this 
but the framework provides flexibility in long term relationships. In contrast, formal 
agreements introduce rigidity into the supplier firm because of the additional 
responsibilities and risks transferred from the customer through the agreement. 
However, they also support the relationship because long term contracts are only 
entered into after a trust relationship has developed. The contract adds an additional 
level of protection and coordination for firms involved in particularly valuable products 
to continue the relationship, acting as a sign of commitment.  
The generation of a long term contract is often associated with an increased 
dependency from the customer to the supplier (for instance for strategic parts or 
prototyping). In relational conceptions of inter-firm agreements dependency is the 
reason for limited use of formal agreements because trust, investments and common 
understandings provide protection and commitment in the relationship (Gereffi et al., 
2005). The evidence from IMP firms suggests that in some cases the increased 
dependency prompts some firms to formalise the relationship. Customers want to 
commit the supplier under the contract to increase the supplier’s dependency, 
increase their flexibility to exit the relationship and therefore rebalance the mutual 
dependency in favour of the customer through contractual clauses and additional 
risks to the supplier. Other conceptualisations of mutual dependency in the supply 
chain suggest that dependency removes the need for formal contracts (Herrigel, 
2010; Sturgeon et al., 2008; Sturgeon, 2002). Herrigel (2010) also states that mutual 
dependency is unsustainable long term because of the need for firms to learn, 
expand and avoid lock-in in particular relationships. However, he suggests that firms 
will separate in search for other opportunities. The evidence here suggests that 
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formalisation of the relationship may be another route from mutual dependency in 
certain production relationships. The notion of flexibility based on weak ties (Brusoni 
et al., 2001; Castells, 1996; Grabher, 1993; Granovetter, 1973; Uzzi, 1996, 1997), is 
not fully evidenced in the IMP industry. Customers generate some form of flexibility 
through formalisation of relationships, in addition to trust aspects. The proposition 
that shorter product life cycles require trust based relationships to allow for 
knowledge transfer for innovation (Aoyama et al., 2006; Casson, 1991a) does not 
include the evolution of the relationship. As the relationship progresses dependency 
becomes an increasingly prominent issue and customer attempt to reduce this 
through the formalisation of relationship and the use of get out clauses. 
The significance of formal contracts in the IMP industry has been evidenced through 
this analysis. The following chapter provides some overall conclusions to the 
research study and in particular will explicitly examine the role of trust and contracts 
throughout the empirical evidence. 
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8 CONTRACTING TRUST: FOUNDRIES, FORGES 
AND FLEXIBILITY 
 
Economies throughout the world have become globally interdependent, 
introducing a new form of relationship between economy, state, and society, in 
a system of variable geometry… Capitalism itself has undergone a process of 
profound restructuring, characterized by greater flexibility in management; 
decentralization and networking of firms both internally and in their relationship 
to other firms (Castell, 1996:1). 
 
8.1 Understanding Adjustment in West Midlands IMP Firms 
This research  commenced by focusing on exploring  firm adjustment strategies in a 
mature manufacturing industry, with a focus on foundry and forging businesses in the 
West Midlands region of the UK. The increasingly complex integration of production 
tasks between suppliers and core manufacturers, and the resultant connectivity 
between firms, was a key focus of analysis. The initial research questions were 
designed to examine the process of adjustment, specifically how firms are 
connected, how adjustment varies across different timescales, the involvement of 
actors in shaping adjustment and the resultant vulnerability from change. The study 
explored these issues through an intensive study of 45 IMP firms and 10 transaction-
partner firms in the supply chain.  Qualitative interviews with decision makers were 
the primary research method and combined with secondary data sources, including 
financial records (FAME dataset) and industry statistics. 
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The research was focussed on processes of adjustment because of the ongoing 
transition of manufacturing firms in the UK to increased international competition from 
firms based in lower labour cost regions. Forge SME 2 was a prime example of this. 
The firm traditionally manufactured high volume automotive components. It has 
increased its product portfolio and made a transition towards lower volumes and 
higher value components (prototypes, tool design). It has also invested in technology 
and site upgrades, and integrated into regional manufacturing networks to 
successfully compete against both domestic and international firms. It has 
strengthened relationships with its key customers: opened a low cost distribution 
centre to source components for customers oversees, taken on additional 
responsibilities and capabilities (particularly, increased its service provision of stock 
management) and become intricately woven into its customers production process, 
so that both were mutually dependent on the management of the relationship to 
maintain production. Despite these adjustments, the firm entered administration in 
2009. Adjustments to strengthen relationships, build interdependency and add value 
have not been enough to ensure the survival of IMP firms. Profitability remains a key 
element of survival and the industry has suffered a prolonged decline in the profit 
margin it can achieve, as the forge explains: 
…[T]he margin of this business, it’s never been a hugely profitable business 
but you know, it was a comfortable seven or eight percent return on sales... 
But ultimately we were down to two or three percent. And that’s very close to 
not making enough money to put resources in. So yeah I think this squeeze 
has been on the metal industry for the last ten to fifteen years. And which is 
why lots of businesses closed because there just wasn’t the margin there… 
the margins were getting tighter and tighter (Interviewee 1, Forge SME 2). 
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This squeeze of profit margin has not been rectified through a transition to higher 
value-added products or integration of production activities between customers and 
suppliers. Customer-supplier relationships, and the distribution of value within them, 
are a key aspect of manufacturing firms because connectivity in the supply chain, 
and therefore relationships, are a central element of an individual firm’s 
competitiveness. The IMP industry provides an insight into how relationships 
influence adjustment capacity, as they are characterised by a series of input and 
output relationships with other manufacturers.  
The empirical chapters reflect particular challenges facing the IMP industry that were 
identified during fieldwork. It became clear during analysis that the practices of 
adjustment were varied, dynamic and complex. Isolating specific elements of 
adjustment would reduce this variety – an important feature of adaptation in itself. It 
became clear that significant issues (low cost competition and energy price changes) 
were occurring across the industry and, therefore, these challenges provided a 
unifying focus to the empirical discussion, rather than directly addressing the 
research questions. In addition, the initial research questions did not fully capture the 
intricacy of current issues in the industry. By structuring the thesis around key 
challenges and relationship structures it provided a clearer illustration of this 
complexity. The following section will outline the significant findings from the 
empirical investigation. The wider contribution to theoretical understandings in 
economic geography will be explored and areas of further research identified. Finally, 
the key contributions of the research study will be explicitly outlined to conclude the 
thesis. 
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8.2 Relationships: Hierarchies and Bundles 
The conceptual framework (Chapter Two, section 2.4) identified knowledge gaps in 
the conceptualisation of production relationships, specifically the hierarchy of 
relationship types and the bundling of these within the individual firm. Formal aspects 
of relationships, and particularly contracts, were identified as a current gap in 
understanding. These gaps were explored through the context of adjustment. The 
focus of the research was to understand adjustment in the framework of connectivity 
and relationships in the supply chain. The industry analysis (Chapter Four) identified 
two key areas of adjustment in the industry -transitions to higher value-added 
products and services (Chapter Five) and energy input cost changes (Chapter Six) – 
which were subsequently examined as specific examples of industry adjustment. 
This analysis highlighted the role of relationships in shaping the nature, capability 
and extent of adjustment practices undertaken by IMP firms. An in-depth analysis of 
relationships and agreements between IMP firms and a sub-set of their customer 
base was then undertaken to explore this further (Chapter Seven). 
The findings are related to the overall aim of adjustment within the context of 
connectivity. The research questions were used as a framework to understand and 
construct the relationships and their impact on adjustment. The overall findings are 
built across the empirical chapters and will be discussed individually below.  
Dynamism in relationship structures 
Client-supplier relationships in IMP firms in the West Midlands illustrate elements of 
short-term dynamism based on the variability in value during the relationship. This 
takes two forms. First, relationships are structured through multiple stages of sunk 
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costs in the production relationship that can generate distinct combinations of relative 
power for or against the supplier. The value of the sunk costs varies during the 
course of the relationship (according to production demand) and therefore … sunk 
costs have a temporality in which they are effective in shaping operation decisions. 
Formal contracts reflect the temporality of value in sunk costs and provide IMP firms 
with a means of capturing some of the value at discrete periods of time within the 
contracts (Chapter Five, section 5.5: 221). Secondly, profit structures are related to 
contract length, which generates distinct temporal interdependencies between buyer 
and supplier to recover and attain value. Value is not achieved based solely on asset 
levels and product complexity but varies over time in relation to the structure of the 
product and when profit can be extracted through the production contract. In addition, 
contracts are important for retaining value throughout the production contract through 
the transfer of price increases. The focus on capturing value has centred on product 
upgrading (Pavlínek and Ženka, 2011) but contract structures are a vital element in 
determining and retaining the associated profit margins in such upgrades.  
Interdependency in the value chain partners has a distinct temporality. Bargaining 
and power struggles occur within a production contract and are heavily associated 
with the value of existing investments in the relationship. As the value of these 
investments changes, the relative power relationships between transaction partners 
are adjusted (Chapter Five, section 5.5: 222). The combination of various forms of 
asset specificity, contract structure and value generate short term dynamism in IMP 
firms’ relationships with their customers.  
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Adjustment as a negotiated process between transaction partners 
IMP firms have responded to environmental changes through innovative methods of 
adjustment. This has included the intricate manipulation of relationships with 
customers, as evidence in the construction of Lock-in and Boundary Spanning 
relationship forms by a select group of firms (Chapter Five, section 5.3.1: 188) and 
the management of escalating energy costs through the attempted transfer of price 
increases to customers (Chapter Six, section 6.5: 255). The capacity of IMP firms to 
adjust to these changes has been reduced through prior adjustments and the 
structure of customer agreements. 
Contracts introduce rigidity in to the network. Time and timing become critical 
elements of the contractual relationship (Chapter Six, section 6.4.1 252). The 
procurement contracts for energy inputs illustrate the formal, fixed and rigid nature of 
some input structures. The sequence of factor and product agreements increases the 
rigidity of the firms cost structure, leaving firms less able to reflect input costs 
accurately in output prices. As such, the risk from short term price changes becomes 
internalised into the firm and the reduced flexibility to adjust to them makes short 
term changes more detrimental to the firm (Chapter 6, section 6.4.1: 254). Existing 
conceptualisations of network relationships highlight fluidity as the central element of 
modern global economies (Castells, 1996; Urray, 2000). In this conceptualisation, 
structures (people, locales, activities) reduce their significance because flows 
between them generate power (Castell, 1996) and ‘an open architecture’ (Uzzi 1996; 
678) that allows cooperation between transaction partners, promoting flexibility. 
Interactions between IMP firms and their customers and suppliers illustrate a far 
more fixed form of association through contracts. These forms of fixity have a 
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temporality, generated through the combination of contract lengths within the nested 
set of contracts of the firm (Chapter Six, section 6.4: 247). The fixity generated from 
contracts interacts with trust based relationships, often underpinning the relationship. 
Trust allows some negotiation and flexibility in the relationship but the capacity to 
utilise trust varies. Larger firms are able to choose to enforce or ignore contractual 
agreements, whereas smaller firms are more susceptible to the rigidity of contracts 
because of increased dependency. This dependency varies between firms, 
influenced by product and service portfolios and alternative supply arrangements, 
generating an intricate agreement structure with varying forms and periods of fluidity 
and fixity.  
Relationship hierarchies 
Examination of IMP firms and their relationships with customers has identified a 
hierarchy of relationships that range from those based entirely on trust to those 
based on formal contractual frameworks. The nature of the agreement is influenced 
by the type of product manufactured, the firms location and prior trading relations. 
There is an increased utilisation of formal agreement structures, largely based 
around contracts of varying timescales, due to the transition in the industry towards 
the manufacture of new and complex products, with high levels of intellectual 
property (Chapter Seven). Customer strategy has directed the protection of IPR 
through the use of formal contracts rather than informal trust based agreements and 
also strategically sourced production contracts in geographical regions where 
contract enforcement is more certain. Despite this transition for particular production 
agreements, there remains a large variant in the types of client-supplier relationship 
because of the historical evolution of the relationship. The adjustment of relationships 
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is illustrated through the discussion of the energy risk in Chapter Six. Here 
responsibilities are determined through independent negotiations between each 
supplier and customer, drawing on the specific relationship characteristics to 
determine who will accept the additional cost. Both the evolution of the product and 
the relationship influence the unique composition of the agreement structure in the 
individual firm. 
The variability in relationships, over time and between customers, affects the stability 
of IMP firms. The composition of contract structure across the firm affects the level of 
security and vulnerability from profit changes (Chapter Five) and risk distribution 
(Chapter Six). Firms attempt to manage this by blending contract types, timescales 
and profit distributions. This allows them to balance vulnerabilities and manage 
change in the overall composition of agreements and relationships between firms 
(Chapter Seven, section 7.5.1: 324).  
Relationships identified in the analysis of IMP firm adjustment practices distinguish a 
complex structure drawn from multiple elements of the relationship. Relationships are 
based on a mix of influences, both soft and technical, generating a dynamic, 
negotiated and intricate composition that illustrates the complex nature of client-
supplier interactions. Formal contracts are an integral element of these relationships, 
influencing value attainment, introducing rigidity and affecting the stability of the firm. 
Time and timing are key aspects of contractual agreements, generating distinct 
periods of interdependency, commitment and influence through sunk costs and path 
dependency in contract structures. The complexity of agreement structures found in 
IMP firms suggests a need to reconfigure the way the firm is conceptualised in 
economic geography. The firm should be conceptualised as a bundle of different 
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types of contracts that range in form – from those based entirely on trust to those 
which have limited use of trust as a coordination mechanism. The firm is an active 
constructor of relationships for strategic value or competitive advantage. As such, 
firms should be reintegrated as a central element in the structuring and operation of 
relationships and networks. Castells’ notion that “…the power of flow takes precedent 
over the flows of power” (1996: 469) does not take into account the significant role of 
firms in shaping the power asymmetries in relationships through sunk costs and path 
dependencies of contracts.  The flows of power matter but the flows themselves are 
shaped, manipulated and coordinated to achieve strategic objectives. Varied forms of 
relationships exist because of the strategic intent of actors in shaping particular 
product relationships (Herrigel, 2010). It is this variety and complexity that needs to 
be integrated into conceptualisations of firms and their relationships. The mix and 
intricacies of relationships within the firm are significant to firm competitiveness and 
long term survival and require careful and specific management to reduce rigidity and 
increase the stability of firms in the IMP industry. 
 
8.3 The Wider Significance of Contributions: Building Formal Contracts 
into Relational Understandings of Firm Competitiveness and 
Survival 
Relational approaches to inter-firm agreements have been a central focus in recent 
years (Bathelt, 2006; Yeung, 2005). This approach has emphasised non-rational 
forms of economic engagement, based largely on social aspects of economic action 
where the social-economic context of interaction is a key influence on the nature of 
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inter-firm engagement. Based on this approach a stream of work that focuses on 
collaborative inter-firm relations has developed (Cooke, 2004; Porter, 2000a; 2000b) 
that emphasises proximity – both spatial and relational (Amin and Roberts, 2008; 
Gertler, 1995; Murphy, 2011) and trust between firms (Hess and Coe, 2006; Uzzi, 
1996).  The conceptualisation of production systems as an integrated network of 
relationships based on knowledge exchange views interaction as the primary source 
of organisation (Castells, 1996), structured through informal bonds of trust that 
generating flexibility (Uzzi, 1997). Trust has been a central aspect of the network and 
relational approach to the economy and is seen as an alternative, and fundamental, 
aspect of commitment structure. Thus; 
…a significant outcome of trust is that it facilitates the extension of benefits to 
transacting partners and invites the receiving partner to reciprocate when a 
new situation arises. The particular quality of these transactions is that they 
are not easily priced at a “cash value” or bound by contracts; no exact 
repayment or penalty is devised a priori. This situation creates an open 
architecture of exchange which promotes the exchange of services that are 
critical for survival but are difficult to price or specify contractually beforehand 
(Uzzi, 1996: 678). 
 
Trust is seen as a resource in networks (Bathelt and Glücker, 2005), built from 
embedded and specific experiences in the relationships that shaped obligations and 
coordination.  
Formal contracts are an integral part of agreement structures found in IMP firms. 
Their incorporation introduces a far greater complexity to inter-firm relationships that 
generates periods of path dependency, rigidity and interdependence that are 
unrelated to the relational aspects of the agreement. Time is a fundamental element 
of these rigidities. Contracts lock firms into relationships for periods of time, which 
 362 
 
allows trust to develop and supplement contractual arrangements. The temporal 
extent of the relationship is outlined, whether for a very short period of time or 
indefinitely, which introduces a discrete temporality to relationships. This temporality 
is evident both in terms of rigidities from path dependencies and sunk costs but also 
in the cessation of the contract. The end of the contract will have different effects for 
each firm and may signal a new procurement process. The economic transaction is 
the fundamental aspect of inter-firm relationships. How firms buy and the process of 
the transaction should not be lost from understandings of inter-firm relationships. 
Procurement needs to be a fundamental aspect of value chain analysis, incorporating 
both formal and informal aspects of agreement structures, to provide a more 
nuanced understanding of firm relationships. Procurement involves negotiation 
(Ruigrok and van Tulder, 1995), which is shaped by social relations and trust but also 
formal contracts. When social relations breakdown or value attainment from 
intellectual property is too great, formal contracts are an essential element of the 
relationship. Protection through contracts relies on enforcement – whether actual or 
threatened – to protect the firm from financial losses. Procurement processes can 
destroy trust (Helper, 1993; Mudambi and Helper, 1998; Rutherford and Holmes, 
2007) and ultimately disputes can be settled legally if the benefits for one firm out 
way the reputational damage that may result. 
 
8.4 Further Work 
The study generated a very interesting account of adjustment in metal component 
manufacturing businesses which identified a series of avenues for further research. 
Procurement is a prominent issue. The focus of this study has been on both the 
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purchasing of inputs, particularly energy, by IMP firms and the procurement 
behaviour of customers to IMP firms. The location of procurement contracts used by 
customers has been illustrated to be a significant factor for certain types of products, 
namely strategic components, and in certain places (Chapter Seven, section 7.6: 
332). These are only preliminary findings on a small sample of procurement activities 
but it does draw attention to the potential significance of contract location, not 
necessarily production, in shaping purchasing decisions. Further work on a wider 
sample of firms and their agreement structures and location needs to be undertaken. 
The procurement of energy by IMP firms also warrants further exploration in two 
areas. Firstly, the use of brokers as intermediaries to purchase energy is a 
significant, and growing, method which has resulted from the complexity of the 
energy market, and commodities in general, that requires external (and specialised) 
knowledge to optimise purchases (Chapter Six, section 6.3.3: 238). This illustrates a 
more complex production chain, where purchasing itself is outsourced, than is 
currently conceptualised. Secondly, the increased cost of oil and transport costs has 
been suggested to potentially drive a re-localisation of production to reduce 
distribution costs (North, 2010). However, increased costs and the focus on reducing 
carbon emissions through the climate change agenda may instead drive a more 
complex distribution of production activities, where the most energy intensive 
activities are located in the least cost, or least regulated, locations [for a review of the 
pollution havens debate see Brunnermeier and Levinson (2004)]. Procurement 
contracts would then become far more significant in the distribution of energy 
between locations and for the configuration of embedded energy in particular 
contracts [for quantitative analysis on embedded energy see Lenzen (1998) and 
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Limmeechokchai and Suksuntornsiri (2007)]. Procurement contracts can illustrate the 
distribution of costs, and associated legal responsibilities, between firms and places. 
Purchases may be made in areas such as the UK (where additional benefits such as 
firm capabilities, legal structures or proximity are provided) but production outsourced 
elsewhere. The embedded energy within these contracts could provide a more 
accurate illustration of effects of industrial activity on carbon emissions. 
 
8.5 Summary and Conclusions 
The IMP sector has received relatively little academic attention, particularly recently, 
despite providing interesting and significant insights into industrial adjustment. 
Economic geography has neglected to explore key industrial sectors in recent 
decades in favour of ‘newer’ industries and ‘high tech’ firms. However, the study 
illustrates how one such industry is evolving and undertaking complex and varied 
forms of adaptation to compete with low cost producers, which has involved 
transitions into customised, higher value added products and services but also a 
more intricate manipulation of customer relationships (Chapter Four, section 4.6; 
Chapter Five, section 5.3). The transition into sophisticated product manufacture has 
involved an innovative form of integration with advanced end-manufacturers through 
the formalisation of product design services. These forms of adaptation are bound up 
in historical relationships with customers, a developed skill base and also innovative 
methods of capturing value in the manufacturing process. The analysis of IMP firms 
illustrates that mature industries are able to generate new forms of adaptation that 
utilise their historical development in innovative ways, rather than constraining them 
to prior activities. Firms are able to shift towards value-added manufacture through 
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the absorption of core tasks but also through the adjustment of inter-firm 
relationships. The ability of firms to modify relationships with customers to benefit 
from the redistribution of tasks has been central to their viability and has been 
achieved in complex and innovative ways. Mature industries offer an alternative and 
novel understanding of adjustment which has the capacity to utilise and move 
beyond a particular path. These issues are important areas of research in industrial 
activity and regional growth. 
Supply chain relationships are a critical element of successful adjustment and the 
attainment of value in higher value-added manufacture. In particular, the intricate 
structure of individual client-supplier relationships and the composition of these 
relationships across the firm generate distinct temporality and vulnerability that 
requires careful management within the firm. Formal contracts are a key element of 
these relationships and influence; 
 the attainment of value through product ownership agreements and risk and 
cost transfer between transaction partners, 
 introduce rigidity in the adjustment practices of firms through procurement 
practices and the bundling of input and output agreement structures within the 
firm, and 
 add complexity to the nature of relationships, which vary across the portfolio of 
agreements within the firm – from those which are based solely on trust to 
those which trust acts as a minimal governance structure. 
Contracts need to be incorporated more fully into conceptualisations of networked 
production systems to more accurately reflect the complexity, rigidity and formality of 
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flexible networks of production. This is an exciting research agenda that would make 
an important contribution to the on-going development of economic geography. In 
many respects, this is to call for the development of a new emphasis within economic 
geography on legal and contractual matters.  
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9 APPENDICES 
9.1  Input-Output Analysis Methodology 
Data sources and Method 
Based on the 1995 Analytic Tables of United Kingdom Input-Output Analyses, 
Published May 2002.  
Input-output tables 
The input-output tables provide a representation of the national economy based on 
the transactions between different segments of the economy (sectors, industries etc) 
(Jensen and West, 1986). A transaction shows both a sale (by industry A) and a 
purchase (by industry B) within the economy and therefore illustrates the overall 
structural composition of the economy at a point in time. The tables differentiate 
intermediate demand from final demand, thereby identifying and mapping the 
significance of inter-relationships (Jensen and West, 1986; Wood, 1988). 
The tables allow for two principal forms of investigation; significance and impact 
analyses (Jensen and West, 1986). Significance studies ‘measure’ the importance of 
a particular entity (sector, industry, product of firm) to the overall economic structure. 
Impact investigations however, are used as a modelling tool to explore how changes 
in final demand, the transaction table (through technology or import changes) or 
outcome considerations (such as employment change or environmental issues) 
affect the operation and nature of the economy (Jensen and West, 1986; Ruiz, 
2002).  
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Impact assessments are achieved using multiplier analysis techniques. The 
technique is based upon adjusted analytical tables to remove the ‘price’ associated 
with the transaction in order to generate the fundamental structural relationship. This 
avoids the influence of growth and inflation over the time period of analysis (Ruiz, 
2002). The process has two parts: 
1. Coefficient (A matrix): represents the proportional relationship between products 
i.e. the amount of product A needed to produce a unit output of Product B. 
2. Leontief Inverse: is the multiplier effect of a unit increase in final demand for the 
intermediate products sector. The change in the requirements for each product 
generates a cascade effect through the economy, reflecting inter-relationships 
between product groups. 
Essentially, these tables provide a framework structure of the economy to assess the 
impact of changes in final demand, such as employment changes (Valadkhani, 2003; 
Wood, 1988) and environmental impacts (Lenzen, 2003). 
Multiplier analysis: environmental and economic linkages  
Several studies have been undertaken to investigate the relationship between the 
economy and its environmental impacts as a way of identifying sectors to target for 
environmental action (Dahlstrom and Ekins, 2006; Shadbegian and Gray, 2006). The 
input-out model allows examination of environmental effects from economic activity, 
specifically to identify and trace environmental impacts through the inter-relationships 
structure of the economy (Leontief, 1970; Valadkhani, 2003). The procedure is again 
based on the proportional relationship between industries defined by coefficients. 
‘Externalities’ are incorporated into the economic structure by replacing price 
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(monetary values) with physical values (Duchin and Steenge, 1999; Lenzen, 2001; 
Leontief, 1970). Multipliers then reflect physical flows rather than monetary. 
Identifying ‘key sectors’ that are responsible for particular impacts is a technique 
developed by Rasmuen (1956) (cited in Alcántara and Padilla, 2006: 3). The technique 
can identify industries against a specific criteria, such as employment generation 
(Valadkhani, 2003), carbon dioxide emissions (Alcántara and Padilla, 2006) or 
resource use (Lenzen, 2001), by tracing the impact through the economic structure. 
This study has used a key sector approach as outlined by Lenzen (2003) to identify 
industries that have above average forward and backward impact links. This allows 
for the identification of industries that are significant intermediate producers, both 
economically and environmentally. The following procedure was followed: 
Step 1: calculate forward and backward linkages 
Using,  
Sectoral production factor = Total output for sector x environmental Indicator for 
sector 
Generate a multiplier: 
Factor multiplier = (sectoral production factor per unit of total output) x (Leontief 
Inverse) 
The significance is calculated by the relative significance of an industry by the factor 
multiplier (e.g. emissions, water use etc) to the global average significance. This 
generates a ratio, whereby any value over 1.0 represents above average links to 
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other industries. This procedure is undertaken for each industry for both input (X, 
generating Uj) and output (X, generating Ui). 
Step 2: Identification of key sectors: 
The forward and backward linkage values were mapped graphically to highlight those 
sectors with both input and output significances above 1.0.  
The key sector multiplier illustrates a unit change in final demand (i.e. is not 
weighted) and therefore assumes a no variability in the influence of changes in final 
demand between sectors (Lenzen, 2003). It illustrates the structural characteristics of 
the economy rather variability. 
Limitations 
There are several limitations to input-output analysis. Firstly, the tables are a static 
representation of the economy. The use of multiplier analysis does allow for 
consideration of change in the economy because it is based on a coefficient value for 
each product which relates to the products structural position in the economy (Wood, 
1988). However, this is a very gradual change over time (Ruiz, 2002). Secondly, the 
analytic tables are limited to include only domestic production because imports 
cannot be represented in the table configuration (Ruiz, 2002). As a result, imports 
have to be considered separately to the analytic tables. A third limitation is the 
classification of industries (Wood, 1988). The method only identifies 
interdependencies between the broad product/industry groups, which are assumed to 
be homogeneous (Ruiz, 2002), and does not identify other relationships within the 
industry. Finally, the data is relatively old. The most recent accounts are the 1995 
tables. The multiplier technique also has significant limitations. The Leontief Inverse 
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does not allow for economies of scale related to changes in final demand, which may 
adjust the nature of input sourcing and output sales patterns (Ruiz, 2002). The values 
are linear and do not reflect changes in production techniques, efficiencies, 
expansion of industries (Jensen and West, 1986) or availability of resources 
(Valadkhani, 2003). In addition, the multiplier is assumed to have an equal increasing 
or decreasing effect (Valadkhani, 2003). However, for the purpose of this study, to 
identify broad structural relationships within the economy, the method is suitable and 
generates useful results. 
Results 
The key sector analysis was undertaken for economic and environmental linkages. 
Environmental linkages were based on availability of suitable data and included; 
emissions, water use, acid rain and fuel use. The results indentified a series of key 
sectors for each indicator (see Figure 9.1 and 9.2 a-c). Economic and environmental 
indicators did identify different industries as the most significant (see Figure 9.3 for 
comparison example). This indicated that the significance of certain industries varies 
between economic and environmental considerations. Sectors were far more 
dispersed in environmental indicators, illustrating a more variable significance of 
particular sectors for particular impacts. However, the results were dominated by 
large industries (such as banking and finance) and processing industries (such as 
electricity generation and iron and steel) (Table 9.1). 
The method was limited in its ability to identify a sector for further analysis in the 
study because the output was dominated by basic processing, rather productive 
industries. A key sector that was identified was metal forgings. It was the only goods 
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manufacturing sector to be identified in the economic analysis. Although it was not 
shown to be environmentally significant, it was a key pathway industry to several of 
the other industries that were identified as key environmental impact sectors; 
electricity production, transport industries and iron and steel. This was highlighted 
through structural path analysis (Lenzen, 2002; Wood and Lenzen, 2003). This 
approach is used to identify pathways in the economy for a more detailed analysis of 
the location of impacts, rather than their cumulative effects. The statistical procedure 
for this application was undertaken by Richard Wood at the Norwegian University of 
Science and technology on behalf of the project in July 2009.  
 
Figure 9.1 Key Sectors by Economic Linkage 
 
Data source: Mahajan (2002) 
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Figure 9.2 Key Sectors by Environmental Linkage 
(a) Emissions 
 
Data source: Wiedmann et al. (2008) 
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(b) Acid Rain 
 
Data source: ONS (1995a) 
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(c) Fuel Use 
 
Data source: ONS (1995b) 
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Figure 9.3 Key Sectors by Economic and Emission Linkage  
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Table 9.1 Key Sectors by Individual Indicator 
Economic CO
2
 Emissions Fuel Use Acid Rain 
Sector Ui Uj Sector Ui Uj Sector Ui Uj Sector Ui Uj 
Banking & 
Finance 
3.96 1.16 Electricity Prod. 
& Dist. 
29.24 29.07 Other Business 
Services 
15.28 17.75 Electric Electricity 
Prod. & Dist. 
55.01 66.54 
Wholesale 3.91 1.15 Other Land 
Transport 
6.63 3.07 Electricity Prod. 
& Dist. 
12.49 11.92 Agriculture 14.92 26.34 
Agriculture 2.75 1.05 Cement 6.41 19.44 Iron & Steel 4.01 7.37 Water Transport 2.26 6.66 
Electricity Prod. 
& Dist. 
2.60 1.04 Iron & Steel 4.15 7.70 Other & 
Transport 
6.30 4.74 Other Land 
Transport 
5.39 5.82 
Construction 1.66 1.14 Oil & Gas 3.77 2.27 Water Transport 1.34 3.83 Coke & 
Associated Fuels 
1.97 2.85 
Iron & Steel 1.38 1.04 Agriculture 3.11 1.35 Meat Production 1.29 3.46 Iron & Steel 1.26 2.26 
Metal Forging 1.26 1.05 Coke & 
Associated 
Fuels 
2.61 4.14 Animal Feed 1.18 3.27 Wholesale 5.60 1.87 
Nonferrous 
Metals 
1.17 1.12 Air Transport 2.07 4.11 Agriculture 10.82 2.94 Construction 1.80 1.58 
Gas Distribution 1.12 1.06 Water Transport 1.99 5.67 Coke & 
Associated 
Fuels 
1.71 2.92 Oil & Gas 2.43 1.10 
   Fertiliser 1.58 5.04 Oil & Gas 3.11 2.57    
   Inorganic 
Chemicals 
1.43 3.74 Construction 2.69 2.50    
      Wholesale 9.45 1.73    
      Motor Vehicle 1.29 1.41    
      Printing 1.53 1.13    
Source: Author (2012). Dominance of basic processing industries highlighted in grey. 
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9.2 NVivo Output 
Figure 9.4 Example of Visualisation Map (Chapter Five) 
 
Source: Created using NVivo relationship tool to link related themes and hierarchical structure of codes 
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9.3 Statistical Indices 
Table 9.2 Magnitude Analysis Indicators 
Factor Indicators Data source Measurement 
Structure 
Ownership Structure of 
company 
Company report – 
FAME Database 
Legal classification: 
limited liability, PLC 
Age Number of years 
since established 
Company report – 
FAME Database 
Base year = 2010 
Size Total employment Company report – 
FAME Database 
Number 
Turnover Company report – 
FAME Database 
£th from financial results 
2010 
Sites in company Company report – 
FAME Database 
Number 
Subsidiaries Company report – 
FAME Database 
Number 
Transnationality Sites under control 
in other countries 
Interview Yes/no 
Agents Interview Yes/no 
Agreements with 
foreign firms 
Interview and 
company report – 
FAME Database 
Yes/no 
Overseas turnover Company report – 
FAME Database 
% of total turnover 
generated in overseas 
site 
Integration 
(product type 
divisions) 
Product type 
divisions   
Interview If manufacture includes: 
own product, bespoke, 
product factoring, design 
involvement 
Customer divisions Interview and desk-
based research 
If sell to: end customer, 
direct to public 
Differentiation Product portfolio Interview and desk-
based research 
Scale of the mix of 
product types 
Order structure Interview Scale of the mix of order 
agreements 
Stability 
Financial Profitability Company report – 
FAME Database 
% from financial results 
2010 
 Borrowings Company report – 
FAME Database 
Use of credit facilities as 
a proportion of turnover 
Performance Turnover per 
employee 
Company report – 
FAME Database 
£th per employee 
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Table 9.2 Cont. 
Factor Indicators Data source Measurement 
Ability to bear 
losses 
Liquidity ratio Company report – 
FAME Database 
% from financial results 
2010 
Working capital Company report – 
FAME Database 
£th from financial results 
2010 
Ratio of trade 
creditors to debtors 
Company report – 
FAME Database 
>1 or <1 from financial 
results 2010 
Credit streams Overdraft Company report – 
FAME Database 
If used, from financial 
results 2010 
Invoice discounting Company report – 
FAME Database 
If used, from financial 
results 2010 
Bank deposits  Company report – 
FAME Database 
£th from financial results 
2010 
Market Markets Interview Number 
Main market 
dependency 
Interview % of turnover 
Export Company report – 
FAME Database 
% of turnover 
Risk 
Risk factors N/A Interview Identification of key risk 
areas 
Scale of risk N/A Interview Geographical scale of 
source of risk 
Control of risk N/A Interview Scale of level of control 
firm has  
Power 
Ownership Ownership of 
manufactured 
products 
Interview Product/design rights  
Position in 
supply chain 
Status as a 
preferred supplier 
Interview Main customer & top 5 
customers: Yes/no 
Single supplier Interview Main customer & top 5 
customers: Yes/no 
Direct supplier to 
end customer 
Interview Main customer & top 5 
customers: Yes/no 
Inter-firm power Size of counterpart Interview  Main customer & top 5 
customers: Bigger or 
smaller than study firm 
Proportion of 
turnover they 
represent 
Interview Main customer & top 5 
customers: % of turnover  
Contract structure 
with transaction 
partner and location 
Interview Main customer & top 5 
customers:  Scale & 
contract types by length 
and formality 
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Mulhall, R. A. & Bryson, J. (forthcoming) The Energy Hot Potato and 
Governance of Value Chains: Power, Risk and Organizational 
Adjustment in Intermediate Manufacturing Firms, Economic 
Geography. 
 
Abstract 
Cost competitiveness remains a significant element of firm advantage in developed 
economies. Input costs, and particularly non-labor costs, are important factors 
underlying the competitive position of firms competing both domestically and 
internationally. Energy costs are becoming an increasing threat to the long term 
survival of firms due to their more volatile nature. The distinct geographical structure 
of energy prices combines both inter-national markets and intra-national policies and 
supply structures. It is vital to understand how the risk generated from such a 
complex input is managed by firms. The article explores the adjustment process of 
intermediate metal processing firms (IMP) in the West Midlands (UK) and their wider 
supply chain to the energy price risk and its interaction with existing, long term 
adjustments to globalization pressures. Formal and informal relational agreements 
between customers and suppliers are identified as critical factors in determining the 
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capacity of supplier firms to transfer energy price risks to their customers and to 
adapt to energy related pressures.  
1. Introduction  
The nature of firm competitiveness in developed economies has been widely debated 
with a recent focus on non-cost based forms of competitiveness (Bryson et al. 2008; 
Bryson and Taylor 2010; Bryson and Rusten 2011; Tokatli 2012). Cost control is still 
critical (Giarratani et al. 2006; Kalafsky 2007) as each factor input (raw materials, 
energy, labor) poses different challenges, constraints and opportunities. Rising 
energy prices and price volatility has transformed energy into a more significant cost 
component (Leonard 2003; Goldsmith 2008; Cook and Van Horn 2011; Forfas 2011; 
Rudge 2011) forcing firms to adjust to changes in their cost structure once a cost 
threshold has been surpassed. At this point, energy costs become a critical element 
of the cost competitiveness of firms (Leonard 2003; Goldsmith 2008; Bassi et al. 
2009; Guidi 2009; Hammond and Norman 2010). The price of energy is determined 
by inter-national political and market drivers and intra-national governance 
mechanisms including taxation, government policy and market structure. This 
complex, multi-scalar structure differentiates firms located in different places (Maskell 
and Malmberg 1999) and with different purchasing requirements. Firms are being 
forced to adapt to an increasingly volatile cost base; labor costs are a predictable 
cost compared to many other inputs including energy. For manufacturing the ability to 
cope with input price volatility plays an increasingly important role in the viability of 
enterprises. 
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This article explores the survival and competitiveness of manufacturing firms in an 
age of increasing energy price volatility. This is the first in-depth analysis of the ways 
in which manufacturing firms located in the West Midlands, the UK’s industrial 
heartland, are adapting to energy volatility. The focus is on analyzing adjustment 
strategies to short term variability and the ways in which organizational resources 
and the configuration of input-output contracts influences adaptation. These issues 
are explored by examining adjustments to energy price volatility risk in the 
intermediate metal processing (IMP) industry. This is an energy intensive industry, 
particularly vulnerable to energy price volatility or the ‘energy hot potato’, which 
produces components for further manufacture (Hammond and Norman 2010; DECC 
2011; HMT 2011). The IMP industry provides design, development and production  
processes to other manufacturers (Wood 1976; Mahajan 2006) and is a significant 
indirect exporter (HMT, 2011:136). The industry has and continues to face cost 
based competitive pressures from international restructuring of production activities 
to lower cost regions.  
The energy hot potato18 refers to the risks generated from energy price volatility 
outside the direct control of individual firms. The ‘hot potato’ metaphor refers to 
something that is unwanted and difficult to manage (OED 2011). In the energy 
context, firms attempt to avoid the risks associated with energy volatility by 
transferring price increases to transaction partners, who try to resist the additional 
costs. The negotiation process between actors in the supply chain, specifically 
energy providers, component manufacturers and lead firms, is a means of adapting 
                                            
18 The term ‘hot potato’  developed from a children’s game in which an object is passed 
between players, often to music, and whomever is holding the object when the music stops is 
eliminated from the game (Maguire 1990). 
 409 
 
to the threat and highlights the significance of the transitional period of adjustment to 
the competitive position of firms and their associated vulnerabilities. Industry 
conventions have played an important part in managing other input price fluctuations, 
namely metal, by establishing standard supply chain practices (Storper 1997; Scott 
and Storper 2003). Conventions have yet to be established that cover energy price 
volatility and its implications. Energy volatility threatens profit margins rather than 
turnover; reduced margins make it difficult for firms to invest in energy efficient 
equipment and to innovate. The key concern is the (in)ability of firms to transfer the 
cost of energy to customers. New lessons can be learnt about adaptation and 
survival from exploring the challenges firms face in an industry already undergoing 
long-term transition.  
The article is structured into six sections. The methodology is detailed in section two. 
The theoretical framework is developed in section three by exploring the significance 
of costs in firm competitiveness and the influence of governance structures on firm 
adaptation. Section four provides an overview of the IMP industry and section five 
examines energy costs and adaptation. The article concludes by exploring the wider 
significance of this research. 
2. Methodology  
The analysis is based on qualitative fieldwork on the IMP industry in the West 
Midlands, which has the highest concentration of metal processing industries in the 
UK (Eurostat 2011a). The Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) identifies two 
subgroups within the IMP sector, casting (SIC 27.5) and forging (SIC 28.4), and was 
selected for two reasons. First, it is a critical intermediate supply industry for many 
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advanced manufacturers. The survival of the industry and its ability to adjust to 
energy volatility has repercussions for the long-term vitality of British manufacturing. 
Secondly, IMP firms are energy intensive and research into their experience of 
managing energy costs will inform other industries which are beginning to face 
energy cost pressures.  The threshold identified is applicable across industries as it 
represents the point at which energy becomes significant enough to be managed as 
an individual cost component.   
An intensive research strategy was followed based on 54 interviews in 45 firms 
(Table 1). The FAME database was used to construct a working sample with firms 
selected randomly. The average response rate was 61.1%, although this varied by 
access method: 39.0% (cold call letters) to 83.3% (snowballing from initially randomly 
selected firms). All firms are UK registered companies, reflect the size distribution of 
the industry (a prominence of SMEs) and together represent 3.81% of the British IMP 
industry (BIS, 2010). Large firms are over represented due to the small number of 
large IMP firms. The division between foundry and forging firms is reflected in the 
sample (Table 1), although forging enterprises are slightly under represented due to 
access difficulties. Several additional methods, such as web searches, discussions 
with industry experts and snowballing were used to create a wider sample of these 
firms. Several forging businesses were identified that had diversified into fabrication 
activities, a sister industry to forging (SIC 28.4). These firms were included in the 
forging group but sub-categorized during analysis as they now undertake quite 
different activities to core forging businesses.  
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Table 1 Structure of IMP Industries at National, Regional and Respondent 
Group Level 
 Foundry  
(casting of metals SIC 
275) 
Forge  
(forging, pressing, 
stamping and roll forming 
of metal, powder 
metallurgy SIC 284) 
IMP 
Total 
SME Large Total SME Large Total 
UK Population a 470  5  
 
475 
 
695  10  
 
705 
 
1180 
West Midlands Population b 365 10  
 
375 
 
4395  25  
 
4420 
 
4790 
Respondent 
Group   
 
Number of 
firms 
26  
 
2  
 
28 
 
14 
 
3  
 
17 
 
45 
Number of 
interviews* 
30 3 33 16 5 21 54 
Note: SME (1-249 employees), large (250 or more employees)  
Source: a= BIS (2010), b= Wetherill (2009) [note: figures only available at the 2-digit SIC (Manufacture 
of basic metals (SIC 27), Manufacture of fabricated metal products; except machinery and equipment 
(SIC 28) and therefore only illustrative of the size distribution of firms],  
*Multiple interviews conducted in some firms 
 
Intensive semi-structured interviews were conducted over eleven months (September 
2009-July 2010) with decision making representatives (managing director, finance 
director, operations manager). The interviews explored three main topics; how the 
firm relates to the wider industry (specifically relationships and transactions with 
customers and suppliers, including inputs), challenges the firm has faced over recent 
years (including the impact of the 2008 recession) and risks the firm faces. Multiple 
interviews were undertaken in seven of the larger firms. Four of the interviews 
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involved multiple participants (between 2-3 from each firm). Follow up emails were 
used for clarification (Giarratani et al. 2006) and secondary data (financial data and 
trade reports) were consulted to validate the interviews (Markusen 1999).  
3. Costs, competitiveness and governance in production chains 
3.1 Costs, price and competitiveness  
Economic geography has a long history of research on ‘cost surfaces’. Smith (1970) 
built upon Alonso’s (1967) approach by incorporating other factors of production 
beyond simply transportation cost, where costs vary according to distance such that; 
Conceptually there is thus a cost surface for each input … and the sum of the 
individual input-cost surfaces gives the surface of total costs … [T]he cost 
surfaces reflect all spatially-variable expenditures on the inputs in question, 
and not simply transportation charges (1970:15, emphasis original). 
 
Webber (1972) suggested that a cost surface is a factor of uncertainty, where 
distance from market creates greater uncertainty which is reflected in the pricing of 
key inputs and investment decisions of individual enterprises. Differential pricing of 
factors of production influences the structure of production over space (Scott 1983) 
and has direct implications for firms competing between different geographical 
locations (Krugman 1990; Jonkeren et al. 2011).  
Competitiveness is not based solely on input costs, particularly in advanced industrial 
and service industries where non-price based forms of competitiveness are critical 
(Tokatli and K1z1lgün 2004; Tokatli 2012). The revenue generated from products 
also varies between places, influenced by differing market prices for such goods and 
differences in the significance of a firm’s cost base between locations. Costs have a 
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complex relationship to competitiveness; they are an important influence on strategic 
decision making (Clark and Wrigley 1997; Coe et al. 2004), linking trends and actions 
across multiple scales (Zabin 1997). To Maskell and Malmberg (1999) the 
competitiveness of firms can be related to particular production inputs and resources, 
purchased outside the organization, which have a locally specific cost structure. 
Thus, firms: 
…need resources acquired on factor markets at a local, regional and national 
or sometimes even global level. But as long as not all factors are acquired on 
global markets, the competitiveness of otherwise identical firms diverges as a 
result of the way in which difference in location shows up in their strategy 
(1999:10). 
 
The purchase of inputs creates price differentials between competitors based in 
different locations. The localization of some factor inputs highlights the difference that 
location makes to firm competitiveness. Globalization converges capabilities across 
space through a process of ‘ubiquitification’, leading to an evenness of some input 
prices. Nevertheless, globalization amplifies the differentiation of localized costs, 
namely labor, but also energy. Even those inputs traded on global markets, which 
theoretically are less spatially sticky and therefore should generate a relatively even 
price for any buyer, can create price differentials between locations based on 
availability, buyer behavior and the purchasing structure of the location (Giarratani et 
al. 2006). As a result, the market context of production inputs/resources, the political 
economy of individual firm’s dependence on such inputs and their interaction with 
wider strategic decisions determines the significance of these price differentials 
(Clark 1985; Clark and Wrigley 1997; Dicken and Malmberg 2001; Coe et al. 2004). 
Local institutional structures around purchasing markets and the organization of 
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production activities generate a more complex structuring of costs over space, 
particularly for strongly localized cost inputs. Prices for output and input costs are not 
only determined by these spatial factors; in some cases market controlling firms 
directly influence the price and availability of goods.    
Adaptation to cost differentials, notably to labor costs, has been examined through 
studies of transnational enterprises and the organization of production chains 
(Christopherson and Clark 2007) and internal enterprise restructuring (Clark and 
Wrigley 1997). Despite the significance of cost related restructuring and adjustment, 
there has been relatively limited examination of the impact energy costs have on firm 
competitiveness. Energy costs and regulations have been identified as a threat to 
firm survival through a wider examination of cost pressures (Markusen and Teitz 
1985; Giarratani et al. 2006; Kalafsky 2007). Studies have been undertaken on the 
impact of energy price rises on reducing total manufacturing output (Hutchison 1994; 
Guidi 2009) and the influence of price volatility on industry structure (Bruno and 
Sachs 1982; Hammond and Norman 2010). The relationship between energy and 
industry has been shown to be complex and influenced by credit availability and 
capitalization (Bruno and Sachs 1982; Hutchison 1994; Guidi 2009; Hammond and 
Norman 2010).   
The impact of energy prices on firms and its wider role in production networks has 
not been addressed to any great extent. Birch (2008) draws attention to the wider 
implication of factor costs on production chains by weighing cost advantages against 
cost disadvantages to construct the most competitive production chain. As such, the 
competitiveness of individual firms is determined by their ability to develop strategies 
to enhance the certainty of their cost base. 
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3.2 Cost as risk: the role of governance  
A firm can be conceptualized as a set of factor and product contractual agreements, 
which vary between location, time and stakeholder (Cheung 1983; Clark 1985; Taylor 
and Bryson 2006). Agreements are a cost to a firm which must be managed. In this 
context a firm: 
… deals with two different sets of measurements, absorbing any gain or loss 
by directing and monitoring the performance of input owners and providing to 
consumers total commodities with specified characteristics (Cheung 1983:7). 
 
The relationship between spatially and temporally different costs represents a risk to 
firms (Gertler 1984). Clark (1985) highlights the significance of temporal variability in 
factor prices, which can generate short-term spatial variations in costs between 
competing firms. Geographically differentiated input costs not only place a firm in a 
position of competitive disadvantage or advantage,  they potentially strip the firm of 
investment capital that could be used to enhance the firm’s ability to adapt to 
changing circumstances; uncertainty and the cost structure can become a source of 
risk for enterprise survival.  
Governance defines the ability of a firm to transfer risk and cost out of one firm, the 
more dominant, and into another firm, the less dominant (Sturgeon 2002; Gereffi et 
al. 2005). Individual firms are influenced by strategic decisions made by stakeholders 
positioned within the wider production network and which are negotiated through a 
series of transactional relationships with other firms at various levels within the 
production process (Birch 2008). Power inequalities, such as firm size, resources and 
political weight, between firms in the value chain act to displace and transfer costs 
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and their associated risks between enterprises (Zabin 1997; Fields 2006; 
Christopherson and Clark 2007).  
There has been a considerable debate over the generation of power inequalities 
between transaction partners. A prior focus on structural forms of power, generated 
from positionality and formalities in the production network (Rutherford and Holmes 
2007), has focused attention on lead firms in production chains (Christopherson and 
Clark 2007). A more contextualized understanding of power has developed, where 
inter-firm alliances at multiple scales (Birch 2008), informal institutions (Dorry 2008) 
and interdependencies (Fields 2006) contribute to the formation of power 
asymmetries, and specifically enhancing the powerfulness of non-lead firms. 
Smaller firms, and particularly SMEs, in inter-firm relationships have different 
resources and capabilities (Dorry 2008). The composition of resources and 
capabilities ultimately impacts the stability of smaller firms and their dependence and 
vulnerability to the governance structures of larger firms. The conceptualization of 
transactional governance structures has begun to explore the characteristics of 
supplier firms within inter-firm relationships, particularly in respect of supplier 
capabilities and asset specificity, in the development of network forms of governance 
(Sturgeon and Lee 2001; Sturgeon 2002; Gereffi et al. 2005). The ‘modular’ value 
chain model considers how larger, or lead, firms dissipate risk to suppliers (Sturgeon 
and Lee 2001; Sturgeon 2002). Research has explored contract manufacturers in the 
electronics industry and specifically the changing division of production between 
firms in value chains, which has enabled lead firms to transfer costs and demand 
risks to suppliers because they have developed generic capabilities to absorb risk 
(Sturgeon and Lee 2001). This notion of risk in the supply base is reliant on supplier 
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firms having significant resources available and the independent development of 
generic capabilities.  
The modular value chain approach does not take account of the multiplicity of 
governance structures in firms. Institutional governance has been identified as critical 
to the adaptation processes of individual firms (Sturgeon and Lee 2001; Bair and 
Gereffi 2002; Tokatli and K1z1lgün 2004; Pavlinek and Zenka 2011). The complexity 
of governance structures increases in firms that have many order agreements with 
many customers and therefore are engaged in multiple value chains. These 
agreements have differing spatial and temporal structures that affect the distribution 
of costs and risks between transaction partners because of asymmetric power 
between buyers and suppliers. The configuration of such agreements within non-lead 
firms has not been fully explored. Energy provides an interesting case study of these 
relations given increasing volatility and the localization of price structures. 
4. The IMP sector  
4.1 Industry structure and organization of production 
Between 1996 and 2007, the British IMP industry experienced a sustained period of 
decline in employment (32.9% forging, 60.2% casting) and number of enterprises 
(9.0% forging, 23.8% casting) (Wetherill 2009; Eurostat 2011b). This decline has 
been consistent with the pattern observed in British manufacturing more generally. 
Both industries increased value added per employee through automation and a move 
towards higher value products (Bryson et al. 2008; Hansen 2010). Profitability has 
been eroded as firms compete with companies based in lower labor cost areas; 
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average profitability in the industries was 2.3% (interviewee answers ranged between 
-11.2% to 17%). 
The greatest decline has been in larger firms, those with over 250 employees, who 
traditionally manufactured high volume, standardized components and competed on 
price based on economies of scale. This section of the industry experienced a 
reduction in firm numbers by 77.8% (casting) and 33.3% (forging), compared to an 
industry average decline of 18.8% (casting) and 11.7% (forging) between 2002-2007 
in the West Midlands (Eurostat 2011b). In response to this, IMP firms continue to 
adjust to globalization through a series of non-price based competitive advantages, 
such as customization of products, products bundled with service provision and the 
development of skills and processes which are difficult to replicate (Bryson et al. 
2008; Bryson and Taylor 2010). Firms have moved to more complex manufacturing 
based on a close dialogue with customers and combined development work between 
supplier and customer. Competitiveness is increasingly based on trust, service, 
image, capability and quality, but price and cost control remain important for IMP 
firms, with 12 firms (26.7%) citing it as a significant element of their competitiveness.  
The orientation towards customized and complex products has developed specific 
relationship structures in the industry. The IMP industry traditionally consisted of firms 
specializing in either discrete orders of small volume or high volume orders. With the 
decline of high volume demand firms have developed a greater mix of order types, 
which has resulted in a more varied order structure. There are three primary types of 
product order; 
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 Discrete – independent orders for a fixed quantity at a set price in a single 
transaction over short time periods, 
 Batch – independent orders for a specific quantity over an extended, yet still 
short, time period and, 
 Schedule – long term agreements, which can be over a designated time 
period, such as 3-5 years, or open-ended, with stable monthly volumes 
(initially, quantities and timescales are generally not fixed, although prices 
are).  
The order structure is a reflection of market and product types. Schedule orders 
remain for complex components of products still mass produced elsewhere and 
discrete and batch orders reflect the more bespoke and development elements of 
component manufacture. Those firms with a specific market dependency, such as 
the automotive industry, may have a greater proportion of a specific order type, such 
as schedule.  
The recession has played a significant part in the restructuring of the current order 
structures of IMP firms. IMP markets suffered dramatic decline (average 38.4%) over 
very short time periods and IMP firms became more reliant on existing customers. 
The order type has changed affecting the relative dependency between customer-
supplier. Schedule orders declined, and often stopped altogether, as volumes 
reduced. Instead, customers who traditionally depended on schedule orders began to 
order smaller batches or discrete low volumes to match reduced and infrequent 
customer demand. In turn, this increased their reliance on British IMP firms as 
components were required quickly and intermittently, thereby reducing the 
customer’s ability to purchase from high volume suppliers in low cost locations.  
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4.2 Relationship of price to cost in the firm unit 
IMP firms have three distinct factor costs: labor, metal and energy. These inputs are 
characterized by specific geographical influences on the formation of price, rates of 
change, availability and purchasing patterns. The first cost, labor, is a distinctly local 
component of cost, influenced by the availability of skills and employment 
opportunities in the local area (Clark 1985). Despite the historical reduction in 
employment in the IMP industries, there remains a shortage of certain skills, 
particularly moulders and tool makers. A prominence of internal career progression 
into management and a decline in the number of training providers has created a 
relatively older workforce. Firms typically use permanent employment contracts which 
have generated a long standing and stable labor force.  
The second production input, metal, accounts on average for 45.5% of the selling 
price. Metal prices have two distinct pricing structures. The first is for the purchase of 
alloys, and increasingly steel, through global market structures (Cockerill 2003). 
These pricing structures not only reflect supply and demand for manufacture but also 
spot trading which can distort price structures. As a result, alloy prices are 
characterized by significant fluctuations (UK Steel 2010). In contrast, significant 
transportation costs means that the price of scrap metal is determined by localized 
supply and demand. The price is highly volatile as there is a captive supply and 
demand market. The demand for scrap metal by larger producers, such as Corus19, 
has a monopolistic effect on the price structure, further increasing short term price 
volatility. The decline in demand volume from IMP customers has resulted in smaller 
                                            
19
 Corus, owned by Tata Steel Europe, is a transnational producer of steel for direct sale to 
manufacturing firms. Most of its steel making facilities are located in the UK.  
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volumes being purchased at more frequent intervals and with more specific grades of 
material (essential for higher value products). Key metal producers have responded 
to this by restructuring their distribution systems. Instead of locating mills in consumer 
markets, large metal suppliers have established service centers in local markets, 
served by mills located elsewhere (Cockerill 2003). Metal is usually purchased 
through these service centers or local stockholders, both local subsidiaries of 
multinational producers and independent enterprises (Ahlbrandt et al. 1996). This 
localized restructuring of metal suppliers in the UK, and in the US, generates a price 
premium for stock management and purchase of specific material in addition to the 
international market price. 
The third major cost is energy, which represents 8.6% of the average cost base 
(ranging between 2.5-20%). Energy has a more complex price structure that is 
influenced by geographical location and firm purchasing practices. Energy prices are 
structured through multiple spatial scales of influence, which results in more localized 
prices with no standard global price (Stern, 2002: 148). International political and 
economic stability is influential in the security of energy supplies (Rutledge 2007; 
Jones 2010). National market structures and legislation differ, influencing the 
regulation of retail prices (EC 2007), additional tax elements (specifically the carbon 
cost) (London Economics 2007) and price subsidies (Haley and Haley 2008). The 
average industrial price can vary significantly between countries (for example, 
German gas was 72% and electricity 31% more expensive than the UK during 
S12010) (Eurostat 2011c). The spatial differences in unit prices between countries 
are only an indication of price differences as tariffs for individual buyers (firms) vary 
considerably according to purchasing power and contract type. Sub-national 
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differences in energy prices can be found in some countries, such as the U.S., where 
state level markets operate (Hess 2011). However, retail energy markets are largely 
nationally based in both regulated and deregulated markets, such as the UK, where 
price differences are related to competitive differences between retail providers, not 
explicitly spatially based. 
The UK has benefited from some of the lowest gas prices and an EU average 
electricity rate in Europe over recent years (EC 2011; HC 2011). Prices are rising and 
forecast to continue to do so, particularly for large industrial consumers (DECC 2011) 
and small enterprises will be negatively affected by price increases because of the 
present contract purchasing methods in the UK market (HC 2011). Industrial high 
energy consumers have been targeted for additional energy taxes (specifically the 
Climate Change Levy20). Although the Climate Change Levy (CCL) adds only 3.5% 
and 3.6% on electricity and gas respectively to industrial energy bills (according to 
Q2 2010 prices) (DECC 2010), it remains an additional cost to UK based firms 
through energy purchasing contracts (London Economics 2007; Bassi et al. 2009; 
HC 2011).  
UK energy prices have always been volatile due to the influence of local and global 
political and economic changes on the availability and price of energy resources, 
particularly global oil price (Rutledge 2007; Jones 2010), but they are becoming 
increasingly more volatile (Figure 1). They UK energy is managed through a network 
of interconnections with other countries, where demand and supply between 
                                            
20 The Climate Change Levy is a tax imposed on energy use at the time of supply for specific 
groups of industrial and commercial users operating in the UK, based on quantity of fuel 
supplied. It was introduced in 2001 as part of the UK’s strategy to meet Kyoto’s agreements 
carbon emission reduction targets (Pocklington 2001).  
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countries is managed through price signals (DECC 2011). The UK’s reliance on non-
domestic sources of supply is threatening the security of supply and consequently 
increasing the UK’s exposure to global price vulnerability. The mid-1970s oil price 
hikes (1973-1982) created a period of high UK energy prices (Figure 1). Although 
prices are of a similar level currently (2004-2009), they are considerably more 
volatile. The volatility has been measured by the rate of change in price between 
consecutive pricing periods, which in the UK are four times per year (every three 
month period, know as a ‘quarter’).   It is considered that a rate of change greater 
than +/-5% between consecutive quarters is high and if this continues to occur it 
illustrates volatility in prices. Over the current period (2004-2009) 84% (21/25) of 
price periods (quarter-to-quarter) had a high magnitude of change in retail energy 
price. In comparison, during the oil price hikes (1973-1982) only 20% (8/40) had such 
a magnitude of change (DECC, 2010). This illustrates that large price fluctuations are 
more common during the current period. This level of price volatility has the potential 
to destroy IMP firms working with relatively low profit margins, potentially converting 
profitable contracts into unprofitable transactions.  
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Figure 1 UK Quarterly Industrial Energy Prices (inc Climate Change Levy). Seasonally adjusted. Fuel price index 
numbers relative to the GDP deflator (2005=100) 
 
  
Source: DECC (2010) 
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The purchasing activity of firms can play a significant role in generating competitive 
vulnerability. The denationalization of the UK energy market from 1990  generated 
more complex purchasing patterns that allowed differential prices, contracts and 
timing of purchasing, thereby introducing competitive (dis)advantage into energy 
input purchases (The Manufacturer 2010; The Manufacturer 2011). Inter-firm 
differences in the ability to engage in certain markets (wholesale as opposed to retail) 
and negotiate cheaper contracts based on energy spend or ability to access or use 
external expertise produces competitive differences between firms. Increased 
volatility in prices over the last decade has generated more complicated energy 
purchasing strategies. Flexible contracts, which allow staggered purchasing of 
energy blocks, direct trading on the wholesale market or a combination of methods, 
have developed and increased in popularity as they provide a means of managing 
price volatility. Spot buying has increased as an in-between-contract method allowing 
firms to optimize low price points by timing contract purchasing. The increasingly 
complex energy market requires significantly more management time and 
knowledge. As a result, the use of third party brokers to try to optimize cost savings is 
growing.  
Under these new methods firms actively take on additional risks, which were 
previously managed by the energy supplier through a price premium in fixed price 
contracts, to reduce costs through staggered and complicated purchasing strategies 
(The Manufacturer 2010). IMP firms have made a transition towards more flexible 
purchasing methods; flexible contracts were used by five firms, spot trading between 
contracts by three firms and one firm engaged with direct purchase from wholesale 
markets. Fixed price contracts remain the most widespread contract form (18 firms, 
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40%). The use of brokers, for both types of contracts, is fairly common in the study 
with 10 firms (22%) using external knowledge sources to optimize purchasing 
activities. This pattern indicates the transition towards more complex purchasing and 
the increased risks taken by IMP firms to obtain the best market prices for energy 
inputs. 
4.3 The firm as a set of contracts 
The different times in which factors are purchased and product agreements 
determined generates an inherent risk for IMP firms (Figure 2). The range of input 
agreements (labor, raw materials, energy) spans various timescales, but a firm has to 
calculate a production cost or sales price at a specific point in time for a given 
temporal period (for example, Cost Period 1 in Figure 2). The selling price has within 
it a collection of different input costs and the cost of each input can be negotiated at a 
different time and for a different length of time. The selling price reflects many 
different costs controlled or regulated by different terms and conditions and 
contractual agreements. Shorter product agreements, such as discrete and batch 
orders, allow a firm to reflect the present cost base more accurately, or only risk 
incorrect costing for a short time period. In the synchronization in Figure 2 the 
discrete output agreement is costed on fixed energy, raw material and labor costs 
(the contracts of the inputs required for this order span the length of the order and 
therefore do not pose a cost risk). The interaction of longer factor and product 
agreements can generate a series of competitive advantages or disadvantages from 
the interplay of temporal and relationship characteristics. The change of a cost base 
(Vulnerability Point 1 in Figure 2), say for an annual review of labor rates, can 
generate a competitive advantage for schedule orders if existing long term factor 
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agreements, such as energy, remain inline or better than the current market price. 
Conversely, if the contract price is higher than the present market price then the new 
cost base, from which product prices are quoted, will be out of line with competitors 
(assuming their contract structure allows them to access the market price). In 
addition, a change of long term factor agreements during a cost base (Vulnerability 
Point 2 in Figure 2) can generate the same competitive vulnerability or potential 
advantage. The renewal of the energy contract can be above or below the price on 
which ongoing orders have been costed. Therefore, a potential shortfall in profit from 
the sale may result. 
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Figure 2 Firm Contract and Cost Structure 
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The composition of order structure and purchases changes over time and between 
firms, thereby potentially generating price competitive differentials between firms. The 
synchronization of these agreements in the firm is important as it allows transactional 
partners to transfer risk between them. By synchronizing factor price increases with 
output orders the relative increase can be incorporated into the product price and 
transferred to customers (assuming the product price stays in line with market 
competition). This allows firms to maintain profitability and long term viability. 
Conventions have been established to transfer metal price volatility to customers 
through a surcharge21 or annual price review mechanism. The relative stability of 
energy prices over the past few decades has resulted in the industry perceiving 
energy costs to be the domain of the supplier. As one firm explained:  
Our customer base generally accepts that steel is totally beyond our control 
and therefore is more agreeable to accept the steel clauses [surcharges] … 
the steel side has been like that for many years … Energy, up until probably 
six, seven years ago maybe, eight years ago, not so much of a cost for 
consideration in that respect … and therefore, it has not got that embedded 
understanding within the customer base that there is going to be a price 
premium to pay for energy (Interviewee 1, Forge SME 4). 
 
Metal prices have been extremely variable (UK Steel 2010) and industry practices 
have developed to manage the additional risks to supplier firms by transferring price 
changes to customers through product agreements, partially matching input-output 
agreements. The IMP industry has yet to establish any such conventions for energy 
price volatility and as a result, the decentralized nature of energy agreements draws 
risk to supplier firms without any means to transfer it to customers. 
                                            
21
A surcharge is an additional payment to the base price and can be used for positive or 
negative movements. 
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The adjustment processes already underway within IMP firms towards more complex 
manufacturing and lower volumes has significant implications in terms of the 
contractual, or input-output, structure of firms. The increased mix of product order 
types has given IMP firms wider scope to manage the synchronization of 
agreements. Firms have actively tried to increase this mix to reduce their vulnerability 
to risks associated with price volatility. Energy, as a long term purchase and an 
increasingly significant cost to firms, represents a potential risk because of the rate of 
change in prices. The management of this risk, and the attempt of IMP firms to 
transfer the risk outside of the firm, will be discussed in detail in the following section. 
5. Energy, adaptation, relationships and the IMP industry 
Energy costs have always been a cost consideration in the IMP industry as 
production processes are energy intensive. IMP firms have attempted to reduce 
energy costs through ongoing process improvements and cost reduction strategies to 
reduce the overall production cost. The study has identified a threshold point at which 
individual cost components, in this case energy costs, become significant enough to 
require additional and specific management of their own, as the interviewee below 
explains;    
I mean the energy bill on this site was a million pounds five years ago. It’s now 
more like four million pound. But, it’s still less than 10% of our operating costs 
so we have to make our own judgments and do our own hedge on energy 
markets. … it’s a four million pound bill so it deserves a bit more process 
around it  (Interviewee 1, Forge Large 3). 
The threshold point is dependent on the overall composition of costs and the 
resources available to the firm to manage it. As a result, the threshold may vary 
between individual firms but as a guide the study has illustrated this point to be when 
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energy represents greater than 6% of product costs (interview data). The average 
energy component cost during the study period was 8.6% (range 2.5-20%). 
The principal forms of energy used in the IMP industry are gas and electricity, which 
represent 74.3% of basic metal production and 93.8% of fabricated metal production 
energy use (ONS 2010). Since 1990, IMP energy use has reduced significantly 
driven by reductions in production volumes and technological advances, particularly 
the transition to electric power induction heating, which has resulted in a far greater 
reduction in gas use than electricity (ONS 2010). This fuel switching is dependent on 
significant investment by firms as many of the low cost adaptations have already 
been made (Bassi et al. 2009). Low profit margins means that firms have to rely on 
accessing credit for capital investments. At the time of study the UK was in recession 
(2009-10). The considerable reduction in credit availability during this period, 
particularly to manufacturing firms, constrained investment by IMP firms. The 
availability of government interest free loans from the Carbon Trust22 encouraged 
investment in efficiency technology (10 firms in the sample utilized this scheme); 
however firms were reluctant to invest in new technology because of sunk costs in 
existing production methods and investment was only made when equipment needed 
replacing.  
Despite the overall reduction in energy use since 1990, the foundry subgroup of the 
IMP industry has actually increased the energy intensity of its production (energy use 
                                            
22 The scheme was part of the Climate Change Levy (2001). The levy was recycled, through 
a reduction in National Insurance Contributions and by a funding scheme intended to 
increase energy efficiency in SMEs (Pocklington 2001). The Carbon Trust was established to 
run this scheme by providing advice, audits and funding for research and development into 
energy efficiency. The scheme provides an interest free loan for investments from approved 
technology providers that meet government guidelines for energy efficiency. 
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per ton of casting) between 2002-10 (CTI 2010). This has been driven by a shift 
towards the production of more intricate cast components with high grade properties 
(e.g. strength), particularly for lightweight materials required for the aerospace 
industry, which require higher temperatures and additional treatments to produce the 
desired properties. In addition to this, production volumes have reduced and 
therefore the energy efficiency of the process has reduced. The forging industry 
however, has seen a significant reduction in energy intensity (CBM 2010).  
Investment in new technology for energy efficiency specifically, measured by use of 
the Carbon Trust scheme, was considerably higher in the castings industry (60% of 
firms in sample who used scheme) compared to the forging industry (30%). The 
forging industry enhanced energy efficiency by introducing wider process efficiency 
measures. Investment in process technology to reduce labor and production time 
created energy efficiencies. One firm:  
. . . had a complete look at our business and decided we were either going to 
continue or decide not to continue . . . We put a massive amount of 
automation in … So we halved our labor costs, 50% of our energy costs and it 
also freed up the rest of the buildings so making management easier 
(Interviewee 1, Forge SME 10). 
 
The three forging firms which used the Carbon Trust scheme combined the scheme 
with an investment program to increase automation, but only one casting firm 
introduced automation. The following section examines in more detail the impact of 
the changing UK energy market and economic landscape on the IMP industry and 
the specific ways firms are adapting to it.  
5.1 Adaptation to the energy challenge 
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IMP firms are experiencing an energy crisis with two elements; price increase and 
price volatility and firms have responded by developing adaptation strategies. In this 
section we explore four broad strategic approaches for managing energy price risk 
that IMP firms have developed: ostrich, protectionist, reassert competitive advantage 
and exploitative (Table 2). Different approaches have been adopted using different 
timescales and in conjunction with one another.   
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Table 2 Approaches to Energy Price Changes within the IMP Industries 
Firm Approach  Ostrich  Protection Re-assert Competitive 
Advantage 
Exploitative 
Strategic tools (1) Absorb additional cost 
from profit margin, cash 
reserves or short term credit 
facilities 
(1) Fix costs through 
contractual agreements 
(2) Transfer price increases 
forward in supply chain 
 
(1) Investment in efficiency 
measures to regain profit 
margin 
(2) Restructuring to take 
advantage of cheaper tariffs 
(3) Buying consortium to 
generate economies of scale 
when purchasing 
(1) Actively manage energy 
markets through wholesale or 
flexible purchasing strategies 
to eliminate retailer premium 
and benefit from low price 
points 
(2) Actively manage pricing 
structure of segments of the 
customer base to achieve 
additional profit during energy 
price low points 
Number of firms using strategy  3 3 (1) 0 (2) 3 8 (1) 7 (2) 3 (3) 2 0 
Firm 
characteristics 
Firm size Small Multiple sites, group 
purchasing activity 
Varied size  
Product type Some IPR ownership  Bespoke manufacturers, small 
volume 
 
 Order 
structure 
Subcontract order Prominence of schedule order Prominence of discrete orders  
 Dependency High number of markets, stock 
management for customers 
Stock management for 
customers, additional risk 
taken on during recession 
Market dependency  
 Investment   Government finance schemes  
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Table 2 Continued 
Firm Approach Ostrich  Protection Re-assert competitive 
advantage 
Exploitative 
Number of firms using as partial 
strategy  
17 19 (1) 10 (2) 12 11 (1) 6 (2) 8 (3) 2 4 (1) 1 (2) 3 
Firm 
characteristics 
Product type Bespoke manufacture Bespoke manufacture  Bespoke manufacturers, high 
export level  
Bespoke manufacturers, value 
added components  
 Dependency High market dependency High market dependency, 
additional risk taken on during 
recession 
Market dependency, lower 
drop of orders in recession, no 
additional risk during 
recession  
Market dependence, 
additional risk during 
recession 
 Order 
structure 
Prominence of discrete orders 
(mix with schedule orders), 
high number of formal 
agreements with main 
customers 
Schedule order books (mix 
with discrete orders) 
 Mix of order types, use of 
formal agreements 
 Investment   Continual investment Little investment 
 Finance 
structure 
Overdraft Invoice discounting High cash reserves or credit 
available: credit (7), cash 
reserves(6), grants (5) 
Financial stability: no 
borrowings, cash reserves 
and high profit levels 
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5.1.1 Ostrich approach  
Under the ostrich approach firms take on the responsibility for price increases 
internally by absorbing alterations in prices by reducing profit margins on a contract-
by-contract basis. Price increases can be substantial enough to eliminate profit 
margins; products are sold at a loss and are subsidized from cash reserves or by 
short term borrowing. This was the initial response to energy price escalation by all 
firms. This short term solution is limited by the profit margin a firm can achieve, which 
has been continually eroded through competition with lower cost producers, and the 
availability of cash reserves or short term credit facilities.  
The ostrich approach most commonly forms a partial solution to energy price 
increases and fluctuations (17, 38%), with only three firms using this strategy in 
isolation. The IMP industry consists of subcontract manufacturers for semi-finished 
components. The three firms using the ostrich approach in isolation had an order 
structure dominated by transactions with subcontractors that do not undertake further 
manufacture of the product and have pre-agreed deadlines, costings and 
specifications from their end customers. This type of contractual agreement impacted 
on the cost base of firms as: 
A lot of people we deal with have catalogues. Catalogue prices are settled at 
the beginning of the year, you can’t change … We’re getting people pricing 
steel at the moment and they’ll hold their quotes for 2 days. . . We go back to 
the catalogue price. We go back to things that we’ve made for 13, 14 years at 
that set price, that are sold at that set price (Interviewee 1, Foundry SME 19 - 
Fabricator). 
 
By fixing a price further up the supply chain, often through catalogue pricing, the IMP 
firm is unable to negotiate price increases after a quotation is made. As a result, the 
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firm is forced to absorb increases in inputs and at best share this absorption with 
subcontractors. These firms were small, acting in a range of markets without strong 
relationships with particular customers and order values were relatively low and 
infrequent (Table 2). This lack of interdependence between transaction partners 
reduces the relative power the IMP firm has within the supplier-customer relationship 
as assets specific to meet the requirement of particular customers have not been 
created (Sturgeon and Lee 2001).  
As energy price changes have become more consistent many firms have developed 
other strategic approaches. The approach is most commonly used as a temporary 
measure for short term and low price fluctuations and as a last resort for customers 
who will not accept price increases or as a partial response to customers when price 
negotiations occur. Price fluctuations of low magnitude (below 5%) are difficult and 
time consuming to pass on to customers. Small price increases are far harder to deal 
with and are usually absorbed by IMP firms. Thus, for: 
5% price increases customers expect us to soak it up. When it’s massive the 
whole world just passes it on. So if … prices are going to go up, going up by a 
lot once is an easier thing to manage than say smaller increases (Interviewee 
1, Forge Large 2 - Fabricator). 
 
The lack of transparency of energy prices and their use in IMP firms creates 
difficulties in transferring additional costs to customers. The general perception of the 
customer base is that the risk from price changes lies with IMP firms and this 
embedded understanding generates institutional practices, or conventions (Storper 
1997), which limits adjustment practices (Dorry 2008).   
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Over time, the absorption of relatively small price rises can have a significant 
detrimental effect on the financial stability of firms as it erodes cash reserves and 
profitability (Markusen and Teitz 1985). Working capital is declining, reducing the 
ability to invest in product and process innovations. Firms adopting this approach 
predominately do so to deal with the discrete order segment of their customer base. 
A sale price is set for current factor prices, which is stable for the duration of the 
order because it only covers a short time period. As such, any miscalculations of 
factor price adjustments during this period will hopefully be small and IMP firms are 
forced to absorb these adjustments. Consequently, the use of overdraft facilities is 
common amongst these firms as a mechanism to cope with price changes. 
Restrictions on credit availability undermine this strategy; the mainstream banks are 
reluctant to lend to cover cash flow or working capital problems as these loans are 
considered to be relatively high risk.  
5.1.2 Protection approach 
The protectionist approach attempts to retain profit margins on sales by ensuring 
output prices reflect input costs. Two principal methods are used: stabilizing energy 
price fluctuations and price increases during a given period through purchasing 
strategies and by transferring price increases to customers by price increase 
notifications or surcharge mechanisms. 
Firms which used only this approach were involved in transferring price changes 
forward to their customers by surcharge mechanisms incorporated into schedule 
orders. In addition, IMP firms often took on additional responsibilities and risks for 
customers, particularly during the recession. This indicates a level of 
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interdependence between customers and suppliers which enhances the ability of the 
IMP firm to transfer input price increases to customers; both firms invested in the 
relationship and therefore benefited from its continuation (Sturgeon 2002; Gereffi et 
al. 2005). Firms which were able to transfer the risk of energy price fluctuations were 
relatively powerful given their size (two were part of larger groups) and capabilities 
(one firm was the industry leader in a production process). 
Firms deploying this approach in combination with other approaches did so by 
transferring the risk of price fluctuation to customers and by the strategic purchasing 
of fixed price energy contracts. Firms with a strong schedule ordering relationship 
with customers included regular price review points in contracts and a surcharge 
mechanism. A large forge noted that:   
The easiest way of doing it [passing costs forward] is to have regular review 
points against perhaps universally agreed indices or some other recognizable 
benchmark. For example, aluminum prices can be controlled by the LME 
[London Metal Exchange]. Some contracts have an agreement at intervals to 
measure what the LME was at the start of the contract and what it is at the 
rate point and if it’s gone up pass an increase, if it’s gone down pass the 
reduction through (Interviewee 1, Forge Large 3).  
 
IMP firms which were able to formalize the transfer of risk associated with price 
volatility had distinct capabilities which enhanced customer’s dependency. All these 
firms had invested in technology and capabilities such as early stage manufacture 
and prototyping. Customer-supplier relationships had moved beyond the 
manufacture of one particular product under a schedule order, towards higher value 
customized products. IMP suppliers used the dependence on their technical 
capability to improve the pricing structure on higher volume orders. The capabilities 
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of suppliers increased their relative powerfulness in customer-supplier relationships 
(Gereffi et al. 2005), although there are also other influences. Several firms (3) were 
the sole manufacturer of products, which created considerable client dependency, 
and one firm was engaged in ‘helping out’ the customer when it was experiencing a 
production crisis, which evoked a form of benevolence in the relationship (Sako 
1992) increasing supplier power. Not all these firms were large (50% SME) and this 
highlights the complexity of the power asymmetries in the relationship, which extend 
beyond the capabilities of supplier firms and asset specificity. 
The most common purchasing method (18 firms, 40%) was to fix energy prices over 
a given period, usually 2-3 years, in an attempt to limit potential price volatility risk by 
matching factor and product agreement timescales. An interviewee from a large 
foundry supplying aerospace components highlighted the difficulty of managing long 
term agreements with principal customers by using utility input supply contracts: 
I mean we’ve tried contracts, [but the Aerospace customer] won’t do anything 
less than 5 years. We struggle a bit because we can’t get any more than 3 
years, on particularly our utility costs, electric and gas. So we’ve managed to 
tie ourselves down for 3 of the 5 … So worse case, if everything went up we’d 
be at risk but that’s one of the problems we’ve got  (Interviewee 1, Foundry 
SME 2 (PLC group subsidiary)) 
 
Firms taking this approach were characterized by having large proportions of 
schedule orders, which increases their vulnerability to temporal changes in factor 
prices. The use of invoice discount financing23 was common for such firms, 
                                            
23
 Invoice discounting is a financial facility used to improve cash flow. Bank creditors loan a 
percentage of outstanding invoices to the firm (usually 60-80%), providing them with working 
capital. When the outstanding payment is made to the firm, the firm is able to access the 
remaining funds attached to the invoice. 
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highlighting a reliance on external credit for cash flow. Discount financing or factoring 
also reduces the firm’s margins as there is an associated financing cost (interest 
charge). This implies the need to fix input costs as there is limited working capital to 
fund price fluctuations.  
5.1.3 Re-assert competitive advantage approach 
This approach attempts to generate efficiencies in production processes and 
purchasing activities to retain or improve the profitability of firms under existing 
product and factor prices. Firms internalize risks and manage it through offsetting 
price increases with a reduction in production costs. This reduces the firm’s 
vulnerability to price volatility as energy accounts for a lower proportion of the firm’s 
cost base. This approach is a long term strategy aimed at retaining and improving 
price competitiveness by maintaining a cost base in line with competitors and 
generating suitable profit margins. Firms using this strategy invest in energy 
efficiency measures, restructuring production processes to utilize utility cost 
advantages and through sophisticated purchasing methods including energy brokers, 
consultants and buying consortiums.  
The protectionist strategy is the most popular single approach (8 firms, 18%) and 
was predominately used by independent SMEs (7/8 firms). This highlights a 
significant power asymmetry between transaction partners based on the relative size 
of enterprises (Zabin 1997; Christopherson and Clark 2007). Independent SMEs 
cannot generate relative powerfulness from wider group ownership and as a result, 
the significant size and purchasing power of larger customers constrains the IMP 
firm’s ability to transfer energy cost risk forward in the supply chain. Consequently, 
 442 
 
firms are forced to internalize the risk of energy price changes and make alternative 
adjustments, such as utilization of funding scheme for energy efficiency (5 firms used 
the Carbon Trust scheme).  
Firms using multiple strategies, of which re-asserting competitive advantage was 
one, were characterized by significant continuous levels of investment throughout the 
production system. The ability to invest is critical to this approach. Firms using this 
strategy had a high level of available funds, either through cash reserves (6 firms), 
credit availability (7 firms) or grants (5 firms) and management teams interested in 
innovation combined with cost control. This group also had a high level of export 
based turnover. During the recession credit availability, primarily through invoice 
discounting or overdraft facilities, was favorable to exporting firms. The institutional 
context enabled exporting firms to make efficacy investments (Dorry 2008).  
Government schemes intended to increase efficiency in industry were critical for 
SMEs in the sample. Such schemes were used to reduce energy use and ultimately 
improved profitability as firms were able to re-balance their cost structure (Bassi et al. 
2009).  Larger IMP firms were less active in making direct energy efficiency 
investments, partly because they had previously made significant investments that 
would make any further investment less effective. Larger firms had higher levels of 
asset specificity, in both equipment and knowledge, which generated a degree of 
interdependence, power in client relationship and consequently were more 
successful in transferring energy price risk to customers (Gereffi et al. 2005).  
5.1.4 Exploitative approach  
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The final approach to energy price changes is far more embryonic and of a much 
smaller scale (used by four firms). Under this approach IMP firms actively manipulate 
the pricing structure of their customer base to generate additional profit by exploiting 
price volatility. Dependent or less powerful customers are used to offset IMP firm’s 
inability to transfer price volatility to less dependent and more powerful customers, 
where they may incur losses. Time is especially important in contractual 
relationships. During the early years of a five year contract, profit margins may be 
acceptable, but may be eroded towards the end of the contract. Firms try to transfer 
costs to clients, or make up any shortfall from reserves or from other contracts. 
Further research is urgently required to explore the relationship between time, 
contract and relationships between firms. In the case of Foundry SME 18, a jobbing24 
foundry, the firm was able to pass on energy price increases to smaller customers 
but, importantly, this firm does not adjust prices when energy costs fall. This allows 
the firm to generate additional income from a small proportion of its less powerful 
customers. This firm argued that they: 
. . .benefited from [surcharges from] my smaller customers, I just put prices up. 
Then I put it up again, put it up again, then again. With the bigger boys, when 
the surcharges come down they benefit. The small ones, they’ve not benefited 
at all. Because we’ve looked around and said well it will cost them more to 
move and go somewhere else. It’s a bit naughty but its well, financial, 
commercial, you know, you’ve got to stay with it. (Interviewee 1, Foundry SME 
21) 
 
This firm manipulates surcharges to its advantage but only with customers that are 
dependent on the firm. This is a form of ‘lock-in’. Small jobbing foundries have 
                                            
24 Jobbing refers to the structure of product orders. These firms are characterized by discrete, 
one-off orders from a wide range of customers with non-transaction specific investments.  
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relative power over some of their clients; it is costly and time consuming to transfer 
small batch production to another producer as the tooling is located at and tailored to 
a particular foundry. Consequently, smaller customers are highly dependent on a 
foundry and the foundry has a much stronger governing relationship (Gereffi et al. 
2005). Firms which do not provide specialized foundry-specific capacities and 
manufacture mass produced components are less able to develop and exploit ‘lock-
in’ relationships. Larger clients avoid lock-in situations by spreading the production of 
parts between firms and playing providers off one another.  
5.2 Energy adaptation and governance structures of IMP firms 
The adaptive approaches developed by IMP firms in response to the ‘energy hot 
potato’ are entangled with governance influences from both transactional partners 
and the institutional setting of the IMP firm’s geographical location. As a result, firms 
have developed and implemented a range of adjustments, which are most commonly 
used simultaneously to address specific elements of the firm’s transactional 
relationships and financial stability. IMP firms are engaged with multiple value chains 
that reflect a mix of products and order types, and have multiple and varied 
customer-supplier relationships. This is highlighted by the ability of IMP firms to use 
specific approaches with different segments of their customer base. The ability to 
manipulate customer relationships to adapt to changing environmental conditions is 
influenced by power differentials (Fuller and Lewis 2002; Grimshaw and Rubery 
2005; Sturgeon et al. 2008). In some instances, IMP firms transferred energy price 
increases forward in the supply chain through price increase notifications or formal 
surcharge mechanisms.  
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Firms able to transfer the energy risk, the hot potato, to some customers did so 
through two types of power. The first results from the significant size or capability of 
the IMP firms. This form of structural power allowed firms to exploit the dependence 
of other firms on the relationship (Zabin 1997; Fields 2006). The second, more 
complex, power negotiation is illustrated in instances where firms are able to transfer 
part of the energy risk to some of their customers. In these cases, the relative power 
of supplier firms is constructed through the types of order and agreements between 
transaction partners. Formal contractual agreements allowed supplier firms to 
negotiate a price change mechanism into the contract, however, where the power 
differential between customer and supplier firm is less clear, IMP firms often 
attempted to build upon informal relationships. An example from a large foundry 
illustrates how an informal relationship of trust and reputation can allow firms to 
manage energy cost increases more successfully than via purely formal contractual 
agreement: 
[we]  did put a one year delta [surcharge] against the contract based on the 
electric . . . to be honest that was a pretty big favor on the basis we’ve got a 
very good relationship with them all, so the T&C’s [terms and conditions] 
would say no, they don’t do that (Interviewee 1, Foundry SME 2 (PLC group 
subsidiary)). 
 
The recession amplified power differentials between firms by making firms generally 
more dependent on customers and therefore reduced the enforceability of formal 
contracts and power in negotiating informal agreements. With lower volumes and 
batch orders IMP firms could, in some cases, take advantage of their relative power 
as customers required smaller orders and were more dependent on rapid, short order 
runs. Smaller orders meant that some customers had to transfer orders from China 
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back to the UK. The increased dependence on a supplier firm influenced the 
governance of the relationship in the favor of suppliers (Gereffi et al. 2005). Power is 
a means of governing inter-firm linkages as organizations have differential status in 
relationships (Grimshaw and Rubery 2005). This heterogeneity of status allows one 
firm to influence the workings of another, where power is seen as an alternative to 
trust as a governance mechanism. This dynamic between power and trust as a 
governance structure is dependent on the context in which the relationship is situated 
(Rowley et al. 2000; Grimshaw and Rubery 2005; Sturgeon et al. 2008). Time and 
timing is important; this was the case for the IMP industry with the onset of recession 
that was also combined with enhanced energy volatility.  
6. Conclusions  
IMP firms have developed significant adjustment processes for managing the risks 
associated with energy price volatility. The ability of IMP firms to transfer energy price 
risk, the energy hot potato, has been shaped by power asymmetries in customer-
supplier agreements, which have been influenced by both transactional and 
institutional forms of governance. The inability, in many cases, to shift the risk to 
customers has forced IMP firms to engage in multiple strategic approaches to reduce 
their vulnerability to energy costs, including technological investments and 
purchasing strategies. The energy crisis has provided an insight into the 
development of governance regimes as IMP firms learn to adapt to volatile energy 
costs.  
The current energy crisis has a complex multi-scalar cost structure, influenced by 
international markets, national market structure and policies, particularly carbon 
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reduction legislation, and the individual firms ability to negotiate contracts or engage 
in cheaper parts of the supply market (i.e. wholesale). Energy intensive industries, 
like the IMP, have been amongst the first to experience the energy crisis.  
IMP firms have developed multiple strategic approaches to manage energy risk. This 
is a direct result of the multiple governance structures acting on firms that are part of 
specific transactional relationships, with their associated power asymmetries, and the 
institutional constraints and enablers on firm activity. This variety of governance 
regimes means that a single approach does not reduce the risks associated with 
alterations in energy prices. Instead, firms are forced to develop strategies which can 
minimize risk related to energy price changes by adjusting specific governance 
structures. It is this mix of governance structures which affects the stability and 
vulnerability of IMP firms. Governance models in the literature focus on the ability of 
lead firms to transfer costs and risks to their suppliers (Sturgeon and Lee 2001; 
Gereffi et al. 2005; Sturgeon et al. 2008), however, our research stresses the 
importance of the supplier’s ability to transfer risks to their customers through specific 
transactional relationships; suppliers play different roles depending on the type of 
customer – from lead to dependent, from a position of power to powerlessness. This 
draws attention to the complex nature of power differentials in transaction 
relationships, influenced by order structures, agreement types and the product 
portfolio of supplier firms. These more complex forms of governance have a 
significant effect on the adjustment processes of IMP firms and need to be more fully 
incorporated into conceptualizations of governance structures.  
Energy costs are an increasingly important challenge for energy intensive firms 
(Forfas 2011). With increasing prices energy cost components are set to grow in 
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significance for firms and pose specific challenges for survival. The rate of change for 
energy prices creates immediate and short-term problems with cash flow and a 
longer term erosion of profitability and financial stability. As such, a cycle of 
continued competitive disadvantage founded on a lack of investment and innovation 
renders firms increasingly vulnerable to competitive pressures, cyclical events and 
shocks. The best firms focus on the production of innovative products combined with 
cost control. By itself, cost control eventually undermines the ability of a firm to 
manage the relationships with customers. Cost advantages can always be matched 
by some competing firms; price or cost control provides limited advantage in 
managing a long term customer relationship. IMP firms that compete on technology, 
process, speed and cost are able to acquire power in the relationship with some of 
their clients. The same firm will have different degrees of power or powerlessness in 
their relationship with different clients and that power also varies over the course of a 
contractual relationship. The interaction of short- and long-term processes of change 
generates a series of complex adjustment processes which need to be more fully 
integrated into existing conceptualizations of firm adaptation. With the increasing 
significance of climate change and the targeting of industrial activities for abatement 
of green house gasses, adaptation to energy price changes and volatility will play an 
increasingly significant role in firm strategies, both in factor input and distribution 
costs. The role of distribution costs is beyond the scope of this analysis but raises 
important questions regarding the location of production, particularly in conjunction 
with the transition of the IMP industry towards low volume production of complex 
products and the shift of some production back to the UK, which was previously sited 
in low production cost areas, during the recession. These factors rely heavily on 
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closeness to market and relationship structures with key customers. The influence of 
energy prices on the form of distribution costs is an area which requires further 
examination to understand how energy prices may promote this transition. 
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